cmac: improve argument order and naming
- always use the pattern "buffer, length"
- avoid using unqualified "length" as a name when there are more than one
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
index 282d549..3b5c13e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
@@ -77,24 +77,24 @@
* \brief CMAC generate
*
* \param ctx CMAC context
- * \param length length of the input data in bytes
* \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param in_len length of the input data in bytes
* \param tag buffer for holding the generated tag
* \param tag_len length of the tag to generate in bytes
* must be between 4, 6, 8, 10, 14 or 16
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
-int mbedtls_cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+int mbedtls_cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
/**
* \brief CMAC verify
*
* \param ctx CMAC context
- * \param length length of the input data in bytes
* \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param in_len length of the input data in bytes
* \param tag buffer holding the tag to verify
* \param tag_len length of the tag to verify in bytes
* must be 4, 6, 8, 10, 14 or 16
@@ -102,25 +102,25 @@
* \return 0 if successful and authenticated,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_VERIFY_FAILED if tag does not match
*/
-int mbedtls_cmac_verify( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+int mbedtls_cmac_verify( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
/**
* \brief AES-CMAC-128-PRF
*
* \param ctx CMAC context
- * \param length length of the input data in bytes
* \param key PRF key
* \param key_len PRF key length
* \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param in_len length of the input data in bytes
* \param tag buffer holding the tag to verify (16 bytes)
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
-int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
+int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *input,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *tag );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
diff --git a/library/cmac.c b/library/cmac.c
index 2ba58b6..0d93c97 100644
--- a/library/cmac.c
+++ b/library/cmac.c
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@
/*
* Generate tag on complete message
*/
-static int cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+static int cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
unsigned char Mn[16];
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
size_t olen;
/*
- * Check length requirements: SP800-38B A
+ * Check in_len requirements: SP800-38B A
* 4 is a worst case bottom limit
*/
if( tag_len < 4 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
/* TODO: Use cipher padding function? */
// mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( ctx->cipher, MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS );
- n = ( length + 15 ) / 16; /* n is number of rounds */
+ n = ( in_len + 15 ) / 16; /* n is number of rounds */
if( n == 0 )
{
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
}
else
{
- flag = ( ( length % 16 ) == 0);
+ flag = ( ( in_len % 16 ) == 0);
}
/* Calculate last block */
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
else
{
/* TODO: Use cipher padding function? */
- padding( &input[16 * (n - 1)], padded, length % 16 );
+ padding( &input[16 * (n - 1)], padded, in_len % 16 );
XOR_128( padded, ctx->K2, M_last );
}
@@ -259,18 +259,18 @@
return( 0 );
}
-int mbedtls_cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+int mbedtls_cmac_generate( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
- return( cmac_generate( ctx, length, input, tag, tag_len ) );
+ return( cmac_generate( ctx, input, in_len, tag, tag_len ) );
}
/*
* Authenticated decryption
*/
-int mbedtls_cmac_verify( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+int mbedtls_cmac_verify( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
int ret;
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
unsigned char i;
int diff;
- if( ( ret = cmac_generate( ctx, length, input, check_tag, tag_len) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = cmac_generate( ctx, input, in_len, check_tag, tag_len) ) != 0 )
{
return ret;
}
@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@
return( 0 );
}
-int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx, size_t length,
+int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( mbedtls_cmac_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length,
- const unsigned char *input,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *tag )
{
int ret;
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@
{
return( ret );
}
- ret = mbedtls_cmac_generate( &zero_ctx, key_length, key, int_key, 16 );
+ ret = mbedtls_cmac_generate( &zero_ctx, key, key_length, int_key, 16 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@
{
return( ret );
}
- return( mbedtls_cmac_generate( ctx, length, input, tag, 16 ) );
+ return( mbedtls_cmac_generate( ctx, input, in_len, tag, 16 ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@
{
mbedtls_printf( " AES-128-CMAC #%u: ", i );
- ret = mbedtls_cmac_generate( &ctx, Mlen[i], M, tag, 16 );
+ ret = mbedtls_cmac_generate( &ctx, M, Mlen[i], tag, 16 );
if( ret != 0 ||
memcmp( tag, T[i], 16 ) != 0 )
{
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
return( 1 );
}
- ret = mbedtls_cmac_verify( &ctx, Mlen[i], M, T[i], 16 );
+ ret = mbedtls_cmac_verify( &ctx, M, Mlen[i], T[i], 16 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@
{
mbedtls_printf( " AES-CMAC-128-PRF #%u: ", i );
- mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( &ctx, 20, PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, tag);
+ mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( &ctx, PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, tag);
if( ret != 0 ||
memcmp( tag, PRFT[i], 16 ) != 0 )