diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c
index e6e38fe..6709c68 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ticket.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c
@@ -39,4 +39,302 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
+/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
+static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
+    volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Serialize a session in the following format:
+ *  0   .   n-1     session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
+ *  n   .   n+2     peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate)
+ *  n+3 .   n+2+m   peer cert ASN.1
+ *
+ *  Assumes ticket is NULL (always true on server side).
+ */
+static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+                             unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+                             size_t *olen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t left = buf_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+    size_t cert_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+    if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) )
+        return( -1 );
+
+    memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
+    p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
+    left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+    if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
+        cert_len = 0;
+    else
+        cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
+
+    if( left < 3 + cert_len )
+        return( -1 );
+
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 16 & 0xFF );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >>  8 & 0xFF );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len       & 0xFF );
+
+    if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
+        memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len );
+
+    p += cert_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unserialise session, see ssl_save_session()
+ */
+static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+                             const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+    size_t cert_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+    if( p + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > end )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
+    p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+    if( p + 3 > end )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
+    p += 3;
+
+    if( cert_len == 0 )
+    {
+        session->peer_cert = NULL;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        int ret;
+
+        if( p + cert_len > end )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+        session->peer_cert = mbedtls_malloc( sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
+
+        if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
+
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert );
+
+        if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert,
+                                        p, cert_len ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
+            mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );
+            session->peer_cert = NULL;
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        p += cert_len;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+    if( p != end )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create session ticket, secured as recommended in RFC 5077 section 4:
+ *
+ *    struct {
+ *        opaque key_name[16];
+ *        opaque iv[16];
+ *        opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>;
+ *        opaque mac[32];
+ *    } ticket;
+ *
+ * (the internal state structure differs, however).
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *tlen )
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char * const start = ssl->out_msg + 10;
+    unsigned char *p = start;
+    unsigned char *state;
+    unsigned char iv[16];
+    size_t clear_len, enc_len, pad_len, i;
+
+    *tlen = 0;
+
+    if( ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    /* Write key name */
+    memcpy( p, ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name, 16 );
+    p += 16;
+
+    /* Generate and write IV (with a copy for aes_crypt) */
+    if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 16 ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+    memcpy( iv, p, 16 );
+    p += 16;
+
+    /*
+     * Dump session state
+     *
+     * After the session state itself, we still need room for 16 bytes of
+     * padding and 32 bytes of MAC, so there's only so much room left
+     */
+    state = p + 2;
+    if( ssl_save_session( ssl->session_negotiate, state,
+                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ( state - ssl->out_msg ) - 48,
+                          &clear_len ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE );
+    }
+
+    /* Apply PKCS padding */
+    pad_len = 16 - clear_len % 16;
+    enc_len = clear_len + pad_len;
+    for( i = clear_len; i < enc_len; i++ )
+        state[i] = (unsigned char) pad_len;
+
+    /* Encrypt */
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+                               enc_len, iv, state, state ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    /* Write length */
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( enc_len      ) & 0xFF );
+    p = state + enc_len;
+
+    /* Compute and write MAC( key_name + iv + enc_state_len + enc_state ) */
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
+                         ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
+                         start, p - start, p ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    p += 32;
+
+    *tlen = p - start;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                             unsigned char *buf,
+                             size_t len )
+{
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session session;
+    unsigned char *key_name = buf;
+    unsigned char *iv = buf + 16;
+    unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 16;
+    unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2;
+    unsigned char *mac;
+    unsigned char computed_mac[32];
+    size_t enc_len, clear_len, i;
+    unsigned char pad_len, diff;
+
+    if( len < 34 || ssl->conf->ticket_keys == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1];
+    mac = ticket + enc_len;
+
+    if( len != enc_len + 66 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    /* Check name, in constant time though it's not a big secret */
+    diff = 0;
+    for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
+        diff |= key_name[i] ^ ssl->conf->ticket_keys->key_name[i];
+    /* don't return yet, check the MAC anyway */
+
+    /* Check mac, with constant-time buffer comparison */
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ),
+                         ssl->conf->ticket_keys->mac_key, 16,
+                         buf, len - 32, computed_mac ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ )
+        diff |= mac[i] ^ computed_mac[i];
+
+    /* Now return if ticket is not authentic, since we want to avoid
+     * decrypting arbitrary attacker-chosen data */
+    if( diff != 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
+
+    /* Decrypt */
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ssl->conf->ticket_keys->dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
+                               enc_len, iv, ticket, ticket ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    /* Check PKCS padding */
+    pad_len = ticket[enc_len - 1];
+
+    ret = 0;
+    for( i = 2; i < pad_len; i++ )
+        if( ticket[enc_len - i] != pad_len )
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    clear_len = enc_len - pad_len;
+
+    /* Actually load session */
+    if( ( ret = ssl_load_session( &session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    /* Check if still valid */
+    if( (int) ( time( NULL) - session.start ) > ssl->conf->ticket_lifetime )
+    {
+        mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED );
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
+     * inform him we're accepting the ticket  (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
+     */
+    session.length = ssl->session_negotiate->length;
+    memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.length );
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate );
+    memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
+
+    /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
+    mbedtls_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */