Use safer names for macros
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index 4195bf1..43ab8f2 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -90,17 +90,17 @@
int hmac_drbg_reseed( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
{
- unsigned char seed[HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
+ unsigned char seed[POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
size_t seedlen;
/* III. Check input length */
- if( len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
- ctx->entropy_len + len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
+ if( len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
+ ctx->entropy_len + len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
}
- memset( seed, 0, HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
+ memset( seed, 0, POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
/* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 )
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@
ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
- ctx->reseed_interval = HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+ ctx->reseed_interval = POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
/*
* See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
@@ -217,16 +217,16 @@
unsigned char *out = output;
/* II. Check request length */
- if( out_len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST )
+ if( out_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG );
/* III. Check input length */
- if( add_len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
+ if( add_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
/* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */
- if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL &&
- ( ctx->prediction_resistance == HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ||
+ if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */
+ ( ctx->prediction_resistance == POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ||
ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) )
{
if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )