Remove psa_key_derivation() and associated static functions
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index 6dfaa13..93ff6fb 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -224,65 +224,6 @@
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_size);
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-/** Set up a key derivation operation.
- *
- * FIMXE This function is no longer part of the official API. Its prototype
- * is only kept around for the sake of tests that haven't been updated yet.
- *
- * A key derivation algorithm takes three inputs: a secret input \p handle and
- * two non-secret inputs \p label and p salt.
- * The result of this function is a byte generator which can
- * be used to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
- *
- * The role of \p label and \p salt is as follows:
- * - For HKDF (#PSA_ALG_HKDF), \p salt is the salt used in the "extract" step
- * and \p label is the info string used in the "expand" step.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation object to set up. It must
- * have been initialized as per the documentation
- * for #psa_key_derivation_operation_t and not
- * yet be in use.
- * \param handle Handle to the secret key.
- * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute
- * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] salt Salt to use.
- * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] label Label to use.
- * \param label_length Size of the \p label buffer in bytes.
- * \param capacity The maximum number of bytes that the
- * operation will be able to provide.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- * Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- * \c key is not compatible with \c alg,
- * or \p capacity is too large for the specified algorithm and key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- * results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
- psa_key_handle_t handle,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *salt,
- size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label,
- size_t label_length,
- size_t capacity);
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-
/** \addtogroup crypto_types
* @{
*/
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index bd80144..787b5a7 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -4804,284 +4804,6 @@
/* Key derivation */
/****************************************************************/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-/* Set up an HKDF-based operation. This is exactly the extract phase
- * of the HKDF algorithm.
- *
- * Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
- * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
- */
-static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_setup( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
- const uint8_t *secret,
- size_t secret_length,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const uint8_t *salt,
- size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label,
- size_t label_length )
-{
- psa_status_t status;
- status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- salt, salt_length,
- hash_alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx, secret, secret_length );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
- hkdf->prk,
- sizeof( hkdf->prk ) );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
- hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
- hkdf->block_number = 0;
- hkdf->info_length = label_length;
- if( label_length != 0 )
- {
- hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, label_length );
- if( hkdf->info == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- memcpy( hkdf->info, label, label_length );
- }
- hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
- hkdf->info_set = 1;
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-}
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-/* Set up a TLS-1.2-prf-based operation (see RFC 5246, Section 5).
- *
- * Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
- * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
- */
-static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup(
- psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
- const uint8_t *key,
- size_t key_len,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const uint8_t *salt,
- size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label,
- size_t label_length )
-{
- uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
- size_t Ai_with_seed_len = hash_length + salt_length + label_length;
- int overflow;
-
- tls12_prf->key = mbedtls_calloc( 1, key_len );
- if( tls12_prf->key == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- tls12_prf->key_len = key_len;
- memcpy( tls12_prf->key, key, key_len );
-
- overflow = ( salt_length + label_length < salt_length ) ||
- ( salt_length + label_length + hash_length < hash_length );
- if( overflow )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-
- tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed = mbedtls_calloc( 1, Ai_with_seed_len );
- if( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed == NULL )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
- tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed_len = Ai_with_seed_len;
-
- /* Write `label + seed' at the end of the `A(i) + seed` buffer,
- * leaving the initial `hash_length` bytes unspecified for now. */
- if( label_length != 0 )
- {
- memcpy( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed + hash_length,
- label, label_length );
- }
-
- if( salt_length != 0 )
- {
- memcpy( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed + hash_length + label_length,
- salt, salt_length );
- }
-
- /* The first block gets generated when
- * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() is called. */
- tls12_prf->block_number = 0;
- tls12_prf->offset_in_block = hash_length;
-
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-}
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-/* Set up a TLS-1.2-PSK-to-MS-based operation. */
-static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
- psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
- const uint8_t *psk,
- size_t psk_len,
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
- const uint8_t *salt,
- size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label,
- size_t label_length )
-{
- psa_status_t status;
- uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
-
- if( psk_len > PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-
- /* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2:
- *
- * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets
- * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second
- * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself.
- */
-
- pms[0] = ( psk_len >> 8 ) & 0xff;
- pms[1] = ( psk_len >> 0 ) & 0xff;
- memset( pms + 2, 0, psk_len );
- pms[2 + psk_len + 0] = pms[0];
- pms[2 + psk_len + 1] = pms[1];
- memcpy( pms + 4 + psk_len, psk, psk_len );
-
- status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup( tls12_prf,
- pms, 4 + 2 * psk_len,
- hash_alg,
- salt, salt_length,
- label, label_length );
-
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) );
- return( status );
-}
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
-
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
- * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
- */
-static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_internal(
- psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
- const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_length,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label, size_t label_length,
- size_t capacity )
-{
- psa_status_t status;
- size_t max_capacity;
-
- /* Set operation->alg even on failure so that abort knows what to do. */
- operation->alg = alg;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) )
- {
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg );
- size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
- if( hash_size == 0 )
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- max_capacity = 255 * hash_size;
- status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_setup( &operation->ctx.hkdf,
- secret, secret_length,
- hash_alg,
- salt, salt_length,
- label, label_length );
- }
- /* TLS-1.2 PRF and TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS are very similar, so share code. */
- else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) ||
- PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) )
- {
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg );
- size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
-
- /* TLS-1.2 PRF supports only SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
- if( hash_alg != PSA_ALG_SHA_256 &&
- hash_alg != PSA_ALG_SHA_384 )
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
-
- max_capacity = 255 * hash_size;
-
- if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) )
- {
- status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
- secret, secret_length,
- hash_alg, salt, salt_length,
- label, label_length );
- }
- else
- {
- status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
- &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
- secret, secret_length,
- hash_alg, salt, salt_length,
- label, label_length );
- }
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
- }
-
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- if( capacity <= max_capacity )
- operation->capacity = capacity;
- else if( capacity == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY )
- operation->capacity = max_capacity;
- else
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-
- return( PSA_SUCCESS );
-}
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-
-#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
- psa_key_handle_t handle,
- psa_algorithm_t alg,
- const uint8_t *salt,
- size_t salt_length,
- const uint8_t *label,
- size_t label_length,
- size_t capacity )
-{
- psa_key_slot_t *slot;
- psa_status_t status;
-
- if( operation->alg != 0 )
- return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
- /* Make sure that alg is a key derivation algorithm. This prevents
- * key selection algorithms, which psa_key_derivation_internal
- * accepts for the sake of key agreement. */
- if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-
- status = psa_get_transparent_key( handle, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- return( status );
-
- if( slot->attr.type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE )
- return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-
- status = psa_key_derivation_internal( operation,
- slot->data.raw.data,
- slot->data.raw.bytes,
- alg,
- salt, salt_length,
- label, label_length,
- capacity );
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- psa_key_derivation_abort( operation );
- return( status );
-}
-#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
-
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg )