Remove deprecated functions and constants.
Signed-off-by: TRodziewicz <tomasz.rodziewicz@mobica.com>
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 3f61642..165b9e7 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -921,15 +921,6 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] )
-{
- mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* AES-ECB block decryption
*/
@@ -994,15 +985,6 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char input[16],
- unsigned char output[16] )
-{
- mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* AES-ECB block encryption/decryption
*/
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 9cc5d66..aa9f0b1 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -2691,26 +2691,6 @@
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/*
- * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80
- */
-int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng )
-{
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
- MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
-
- /*
- * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most
- * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty
- * here as well.
- */
- return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* Prime number generation
*
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index 457f8f6..eab48b8 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -1288,8 +1288,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@@ -1368,8 +1368,8 @@
}
/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@@ -1468,54 +1468,6 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-/*
- * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
-{
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
- return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
- input, ilen, output, olen,
- tag, tag_len ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
- */
-int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
- const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
- unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
- const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
-{
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
- CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
- return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
- input, ilen, output, olen,
- tag, tag_len ) );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c
index 3815dc7..f7998db 100644
--- a/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2)
- * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
@@ -340,19 +340,6 @@
return( ret );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
- * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
- if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
- add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
- (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len)
* implements
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 22fb5e3..dfdd0b4 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -416,6 +416,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
+ *
+ * \note The f_rng_blind parameter must not be \c NULL.
+ *
*/
static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
@@ -469,69 +472,9 @@
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
- if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
- f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
- else
- {
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- /*
- * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
- * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
- * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
- * risk that they leak this way.
- */
- const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
-
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
- p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
- data, 2 * grp_len );
- ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
- (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
- strlen( blind_label ) );
- if( ret != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
- goto cleanup;
- }
-#else
- /*
- * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
- * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
- * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
- * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
- * restartable feature.
- *
- * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
- * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
- * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
- * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
- * a valid ECDSA signature.
- */
- p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
- /*
- * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
- * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
- * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
- * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
- * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
- */
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
- rs_ctx );
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
-#endif
- }
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@@ -544,26 +487,8 @@
}
/*
- * Deterministic signature wrappers
+ * Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
- mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
-
- return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
- NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
@@ -750,10 +675,11 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
+ ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
@@ -803,22 +729,6 @@
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
-{
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
- ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
- return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
- NULL, NULL ) );
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* Read and check signature
*/
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index 25a0225..bd14b3c 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -108,15 +108,6 @@
return( ret );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional,
- size_t add_len )
-{
- (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
/*
* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
*/
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index b7c4591..111fd59 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -3809,7 +3809,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
/* `ecp` cannot be const because `ecp->grp` needs to be non-const
- * for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det()
+ * for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
* (even though these functions don't modify it). */
static psa_status_t psa_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 72f09bb..4a694f1 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@
&rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
- * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 336cbea..ecdbe8e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -4532,24 +4532,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G )
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G );
- return( ret );
- }
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
-
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len )
@@ -5084,13 +5066,6 @@
return( max_len );
}
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
-size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
-}
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)