diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index 093ae28..16d7a1f 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -334,8 +334,8 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
 
 void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(void *start,
-                                        size_t total,
-                                        size_t offset)
+                                 size_t total,
+                                 size_t offset)
 {
     volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
     size_t i, n;
@@ -590,134 +590,3 @@
 }
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
-
-int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
-                                         size_t ilen,
-                                         unsigned char *output,
-                                         size_t output_max_len,
-                                         size_t *olen)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
-
-    /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
-     * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
-     * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
-     * this would open the execution of the function to
-     * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
-     * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
-     * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
-     * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
-     * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
-     * branch predictor). */
-    size_t pad_count = 0;
-    unsigned bad = 0;
-    unsigned char pad_done = 0;
-    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
-    unsigned output_too_large;
-
-    plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11
-                                                        : output_max_len;
-
-    /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
-     * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
-    bad |= input[0];
-
-
-    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
-     * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
-    bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
-
-    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-     * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
-    for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
-        pad_done  |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char) -input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
-        pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
-    }
-
-
-    /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
-    bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1);
-
-    /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
-    bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt(8, pad_count);
-
-    /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
-     * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
-     * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
-     * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
-     * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
-     * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
-     * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
-        bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-        (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
-
-    /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
-     * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
-    output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(plaintext_size,
-                                          plaintext_max_size);
-
-    /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
-     * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
-     * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
-     *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
-     * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
-        bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
-        mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
-                           -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
-                           0));
-
-    /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
-     * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
-     * We need to copy the same amount of data
-     * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
-     * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
-     * through memory or cache access patterns. */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(bad | output_too_large);
-    for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++) {
-        input[i] &= ~bad;
-    }
-
-    /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
-     * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
-     * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
-     * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
-                                        (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                                        (unsigned) plaintext_size);
-
-    /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
-     * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
-     * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
-     * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
-     * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
-     * information. */
-    mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
-                                plaintext_max_size,
-                                plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
-
-    /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
-     * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
-     * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
-     * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
-     * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
-     * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
-     * secrets. */
-    if (output_max_len != 0) {
-        memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
-    }
-
-    /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
-     * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
-     * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
-     * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
-    *olen = plaintext_size;
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h
index 84ca962..bfeb8c5 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_internal.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -238,42 +238,6 @@
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
-
-/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
- *  operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
- *
- * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
- *       (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
- *       in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
- *       is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
- *       one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
- *
- * \param input          The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
- *                       encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
- *                       by the terminology.
- * \param ilen           The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
- * \param output         The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
- *                       PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
- *                       length \p output_max_len bytes.
- * \param olen           The address at which to store the length of
- *                       the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
- * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
- *
- * \return      \c 0 on success.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
- *              The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
- *              The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
- */
-int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
-                                         size_t ilen,
-                                         unsigned char *output,
-                                         size_t output_max_len,
-                                         size_t *olen);
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
 
 /** Constant-flow char selection
@@ -333,8 +297,8 @@
  * \param offset    Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
  */
 void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(void *start,
-                                        size_t total,
-                                        size_t offset);
+                                 size_t total,
+                                 size_t offset);
 
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */
 
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 87b3311..e4a45b3 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -56,6 +56,164 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
+ *  operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
+ *
+ * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
+ *       (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
+ *       in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ *       is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
+ *       one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
+ *
+ * \param input          The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
+ *                       encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
+ *                       by the terminology.
+ * \param ilen           The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
+ * \param output         The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
+ *                       PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
+ *                       length \p output_max_len bytes.
+ * \param olen           The address at which to store the length of
+ *                       the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return      \c 0 on success.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
+ *              The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+ *              The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
+                                                size_t ilen,
+                                                unsigned char *output,
+                                                size_t output_max_len,
+                                                size_t *olen)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
+
+    /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
+     * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
+     * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
+     * this would open the execution of the function to
+     * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
+     * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
+     * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
+     * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
+     * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
+     * branch predictor). */
+    size_t pad_count = 0;
+    unsigned bad = 0;
+    unsigned char pad_done = 0;
+    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
+    unsigned output_too_large;
+
+    plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11
+                                                        : output_max_len;
+
+    /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
+     * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
+    bad |= input[0];
+
+
+    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
+     * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+    bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
+
+    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
+     * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+    for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
+        pad_done  |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char) -input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+        pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
+    }
+
+
+    /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
+    bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1);
+
+    /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
+    bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt(8, pad_count);
+
+    /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
+     * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
+     * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
+     * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
+     * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
+     * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
+     * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+        bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+        (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
+
+    /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
+     * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
+    output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(plaintext_size,
+                                          plaintext_max_size);
+
+    /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
+     * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
+     * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
+     *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
+     * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
+    ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
+        bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+        mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
+                           -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
+                           0));
+
+    /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
+     * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
+     * We need to copy the same amount of data
+     * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
+     * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
+     * through memory or cache access patterns. */
+    bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(bad | output_too_large);
+    for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++) {
+        input[i] &= ~bad;
+    }
+
+    /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
+     * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
+     * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
+     * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
+                                        (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
+                                        (unsigned) plaintext_size);
+
+    /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
+     * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
+     * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
+     * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
+     * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
+     * information. */
+    mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+                                plaintext_max_size,
+                                plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
+
+    /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
+     * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
+     * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
+     * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
+     * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
+     * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
+     * secrets. */
+    if (output_max_len != 0) {
+        memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
+    }
+
+    /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
+     * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
+     * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
+     * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
+    *olen = plaintext_size;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
 
 int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,