Fix handling of HS msgs in mbedtls_ssl_read if renegotiation unused
Previously, if `MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION` was disabled, incoming handshake
messages in `mbedtls_ssl_read` (expecting application data) lead to the
connection being closed. This commit fixes this, restricting the
`MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION`-guard to the code-paths responsible for accepting
renegotiation requests and aborting renegotiation attempts after too many
unexpected records have been received.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 2443a86..89eba05 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -6878,7 +6878,6 @@
}
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
@@ -6920,6 +6919,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
@@ -6947,6 +6947,7 @@
}
}
else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
/*
* Refuse renegotiation
@@ -6987,6 +6988,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
{
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 )