Fix additional misspellings found by codespell
Remaining hits seem to be hex data, certificates,
and other miscellaneous exceptions.
List generated by running codespell -w -L
keypair,Keypair,KeyPair,keyPair,ciph,nd
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
index 6e6834f..5117fc7 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
* \return 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element
* would end beyond \p end.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparseable.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index b64aa00..be5c548 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequesites"
+#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 84c7df8..6acd9b1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@
* unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the
* environment in which your server operates.
*
- * \warning Disabling this can ba a security risk! (see above)
+ * \warning Disabling this can be a security risk! (see above)
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 2213729..6b3ba48 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@
* ones going through the authentication-decryption phase.
*
* \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's
- * often relatively easy for an active attacker ot inject UDP
+ * often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP
* datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it
* easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a
* connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit