Rename mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new to mbedtls_ct_uint_if
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 9d67ef7..44ff3d2 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
- plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
- ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
+ ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad,
(unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)),
mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
- plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(output_too_large,
+ plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) plaintext_size);