diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index e8d9163..30a30dd 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
 
     mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
 
-    X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
+    X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
 
     mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
 
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n));
 
     s = X->s;
-    X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
-    Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(do_swap, s, Y->s);
+    X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
+    Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, s, Y->s);
 
     mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap);
 
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index c86316b..e11d88e 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
         for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) {
             unsigned char current = buf[n];
             unsigned char next    = buf[n+1];
-            buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(no_op, current, next);
+            buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next);
         }
         buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(no_op, buf[total-1]);
     }
diff --git a/library/constant_time_impl.h b/library/constant_time_impl.h
index 149cf75..b73f92e 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_impl.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_impl.h
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
     return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
                                           unsigned if1,
                                           unsigned if0)
 {
diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h
index 362b822..09de92f 100644
--- a/library/constant_time_internal.h
+++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
  *
  * \return  \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
  */
-static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
                                           unsigned if1,
                                           unsigned if0);
 
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 9d67ef7..44ff3d2 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
      * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
      * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
      * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
         bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
         (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
 
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
      * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
      *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
      * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
+    ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
         bad,
         (unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)),
         mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
      * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
      * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
      * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(output_too_large,
+    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
                                         (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
                                         (unsigned) plaintext_size);