Make ECDSA restartable sign and verify functions public
Make public the versions of ECSDA sign and verify which return raw signatures
rather than returning ASN.1 encoded signatures, in order to use them for the
internal implemention of psa_sign/verify_hash_interruptible.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 3ddb82b..eb3c303 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -239,13 +239,13 @@
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
-static int ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
- mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
- int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng_blind,
- mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
@@ -394,8 +394,8 @@
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
{
/* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
- return ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
@@ -406,13 +406,13 @@
* note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL.
*
*/
-static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
- mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
- void *p_rng_blind,
- mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
@@ -462,9 +462,9 @@
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng);
#else
- ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
- f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx);
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@@ -487,8 +487,8 @@
size_t),
void *p_rng_blind)
{
- return ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
- f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL);
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
@@ -497,11 +497,12 @@
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
*/
-static int ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
- const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
- mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
@@ -610,7 +611,7 @@
const mbedtls_mpi *r,
const mbedtls_mpi *s)
{
- return ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL);
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL);
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
@@ -665,9 +666,9 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
- p_rng, rs_ctx));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx));
#else
(void) md_alg;
@@ -678,9 +679,9 @@
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng));
#else
/* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
- p_rng, rs_ctx));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx));
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
@@ -760,8 +761,8 @@
goto cleanup;
}
#else
- if ((ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
- &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
+ &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */