diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f9153ac..6d11898 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,16 +1,59 @@
 mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
-= mbed TLS 2.1.10 branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+= mbed TLS 2.1.11 branch released xxxx-xx-xx
+
+Bugfix
+   * Fix assembly sequences in bn_mul.h and aesni.c to avoid segmentation
+     faults and errors when building for the 64-bit ILP32 ABI. Found and fixed
+     by James Cowgill.
+   * Fix test_suite_pk to work on 64-bit ILP32 systems. #849
+
+= mbed TLS 2.1.10 branch released 2018-02-03
 
 Security
-   * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write. When the (by
+   * Fix a heap corruption issue in the implementation of the truncated HMAC
+     extension. When the truncated HMAC extension is enabled and CBC is used,
+     sending a malicious application packet could be used to selectively corrupt
+     6 bytes on the peer's heap, which could potentially lead to crash or remote
+     code execution. The issue could be triggered remotely from either side in
+     both TLS and DTLS. CVE-2018-0488
+   * Fix a buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash was too large
+     for the key size, which could potentially lead to crash or remote code
+     execution. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product Security Initiative,
+     Qualcomm Technologies Inc. CVE-2018-0487
+   * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked data is all
+     zeros.
+   * Fix an unsafe bounds check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() when adding
+     64 KiB to the address of the SSL buffer and causing a wrap around.
+   * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write(). When the (by
      default enabled) maximum fragment length extension is disabled in the
      config and the application data buffer passed to mbedtls_ssl_write
      is larger than the internal message buffer (16384 bytes by default), the
      latter overflows. The exploitability of this issue depends on whether the
      application layer can be forced into sending such large packets. The issue
      was independently reported by Tim Nordell via e-mail and by Florin Petriuc
-     and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022. Fixes #707.
+     and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022.
+     Fixes #707.
+   * Add a provision to prevent compiler optimizations breaking the time
+     constancy of mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp().
+   * Ensure that buffers are cleared after use if they contain sensitive data.
+     Changes were introduced in multiple places in the library.
+   * Set PEM buffer to zero before freeing it, to avoid decoded private keys
+     being leaked to memory after release.
+   * Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially
+     leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil.
+   * Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() constant-time with respect to the input
+     data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected and omitted for the
+     sake of saving memory, but potentially leading to slight timing
+     differences. Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group.
+   * Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent
+     after keypair generation.
+   * Fix a potential heap buffer over-read in ALPN extension parsing
+     (server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN
+     name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server.
+   * Change default choice of DHE parameters from untrustworthy RFC 5114
+     to RFC 3526 containing parameters generated in a nothing-up-my-sleeve
+     manner.
 
 Features
    * Allow comments in test data files.
@@ -20,6 +63,8 @@
      heavily-loaded machine.
 
 Bugfix
+   * Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were
+     accepted. Generating these signatures required the private key.
    * Fix ssl_parse_record_header() to silently discard invalid DTLS records
      as recommended in RFC 6347 Section 4.1.2.7.
    * Fix memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() when called multiple times.
@@ -48,32 +93,33 @@
    * Don't print X.509 version tag for v1 CRT's, and omit extensions for
      non-v3 CRT's.
    * Fix bugs in RSA test suite under MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY. #1023 #1024
-   * Fix net_would_block to avoid modification by errno through fcntl call.
+   * Fix net_would_block() to avoid modification by errno through fcntl() call.
      Found by nkolban. Fixes #845.
-   * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read in case
+   * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read() in case
      MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is disabled. Found by erja-gp.
-   * Add a check for invalid private parameters in ecdsa_sign.
+   * Add a check for invalid private parameters in ecdsa_sign().
      Reported by Yolan Romailler.
    * Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64.
+   * Add size-checks for record and handshake message content, securing
+     fragile yet non-exploitable code-paths.
    * Fix crash when calling mbedtls_ssl_cache_free() twice. Found by
      MilenkoMitrovic, #1104
    * Fix mbedtls_timing_alarm(0) on Unix and MinGw.
-   * Fix use of uninitialized memory in mbedtls_timing_get_timer when reset=1.
+   * Fix use of uninitialized memory in mbedtls_timing_get_timer() when reset=1.
    * Fix issue in RSA key generation program programs/x509/rsa_genkey
      where the failure of CTR DRBG initialization lead to freeing an
      RSA context without proper initialization beforehand.
-   * Fix bug in cipher decryption with MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS that
-     sometimes accepted invalid padding. (Not used in TLS.) Found and fixed
-     by Micha Kraus.
-   * Fix assembly sequences in bn_mul.h and aesni.c to avoid segmentation
-     faults and errors when building for the 64-bit ILP32 ABI. Found and fixed
-     by James Cowgill.
-   * Fix test_suite_pk to work on 64-bit ILP32 systems. #849
+   * Fix an issue in the cipher decryption with the mode
+     MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS that sometimes accepted invalid padding.
+     Note, this padding mode is not used by the TLS protocol. Found and fixed by
+     Micha Kraus.
 
 Changes
    * Extend cert_write example program by options to set the CRT version
      and the message digest. Further, allow enabling/disabling of authority
      identifier, subject identifier and basic constraints extensions.
+   * Add explicit warnings for the use of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES and ARC4
+     throughout the library.
 
 = mbed TLS 2.1.9 branch released 2017-08-10
 
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 4dbd667..7e5c141 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.1.9 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.1.10 source code documentation
  *
  * This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS.  It was
  * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 075e0c2..c05cb8b 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 # identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
 # to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
 
-PROJECT_NAME           = "mbed TLS v2.1.9"
+PROJECT_NAME           = "mbed TLS v2.1.10"
 
 # The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
 # This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/include/mbedtls/arc4.h
index 5fc5395..08ffd20 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/arc4.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/arc4.h
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H
 #define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H
@@ -40,7 +44,11 @@
 #endif
 
 /**
- * \brief          ARC4 context structure
+ * \brief     ARC4 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning   ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
+ *
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -54,6 +62,11 @@
  * \brief          Initialize ARC4 context
  *
  * \param ctx      ARC4 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx );
 
@@ -61,6 +74,11 @@
  * \brief          Clear ARC4 context
  *
  * \param ctx      ARC4 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx );
 
@@ -70,6 +88,11 @@
  * \param ctx      ARC4 context to be setup
  * \param key      the secret key
  * \param keylen   length of the key, in bytes
+ *
+ * \warning        ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                  unsigned int keylen );
@@ -83,6 +106,11 @@
  * \param output   buffer for the output data
  *
  * \return         0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning        ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input,
                 unsigned char *output );
@@ -103,6 +131,11 @@
  * \brief          Checkup routine
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning        ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose );
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 1a5b4b6..030982d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -648,6 +648,10 @@
  *
  * \return         0 if successful,
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
+ *
+ * \note           The bytes obtained from the PRNG are interpreted
+ *                 as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
+ *                 be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
  */
 int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index 70000f5..464c4ad 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * \brief     Enumeration of supported ciphers
+ *
+ * \warning   ARC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ *            constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
+ *            ciphers instead.
+ */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0,
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL,
@@ -76,6 +83,13 @@
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4,
 } mbedtls_cipher_id_t;
 
+/**
+ * \brief     Enumeration of supported (cipher,mode) pairs
+ *
+ * \warning   ARC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ *            constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
+ *            ciphers instead.
+ */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE = 0,
     MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 0c51fea..00589dd 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -224,6 +224,12 @@
  *
  * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
  * module.
+ *
+ * \warning   MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their
+ *            use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend
+ *            avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message
+ *            digests and ciphers instead.
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
 //#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT
@@ -261,6 +267,12 @@
  *
  * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
  * function.
+ *
+ * \warning   MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
+ *            constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
+ *            dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
+ *            and ciphers instead.
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
@@ -390,6 +402,9 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
  *
  * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites
+ *
+ * \warning   DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES
 
@@ -1416,6 +1431,11 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
+ *
+ * \warning   ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. If possible, we recommend avoidng dependencies on
+ *            it, and considering stronger ciphers instead.
+ *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
 
@@ -1628,6 +1648,9 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *
  * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys.
+ *
+ * \warning   DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_DES_C
 
@@ -1787,6 +1810,11 @@
  * Caller:
  *
  * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs.
+ *
+ * \warning   MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
+ *            it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C
 
@@ -1799,6 +1827,11 @@
  * Caller:
  *
  * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs.
+ *
+ * \warning   MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
+ *            it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C
 
@@ -1812,8 +1845,15 @@
  *          library/pem.c
  *          library/ssl_tls.c
  *
- * This module is required for SSL/TLS and X.509.
- * PEM_PARSE uses MD5 for decrypting encrypted keys.
+ * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and it can be used in
+ * TLS 1.2 through the choice on handshake parameters. Further, it is used for
+ * checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded
+ * encrypted keys.
+ *
+ * \warning   MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
+ *            it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_MD5_C
 
@@ -2067,6 +2107,11 @@
  *
  * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2
  * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates.
+ *
+ * \warning   SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ *            a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
+ *            on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
 
@@ -2431,8 +2476,13 @@
  * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate signing.
  * Without this build-time option, SHA-1 support must be activated explicitly
  * through mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile. Turning on this option is not
- * recommended because of it is possible to generte SHA-1 collisions, however
+ * recommended because of it is possible to generate SHA-1 collisions, however
  * this may be safe for legacy infrastructure where additional controls apply.
+ *
+ * \warning   SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ *            a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
+ *            on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 // #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES
 
@@ -2443,7 +2493,13 @@
  * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by
  * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use
  * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default
- * for compatibility with existing peers.
+ * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general
+ * warning applies nonetheless:
+ *
+ * \warning   SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ *            a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
+ *            on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/des.h b/include/mbedtls/des.h
index 5ca2ecf..37032d3 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/des.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/des.h
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *            instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H
 #define MBEDTLS_DES_H
@@ -49,6 +54,10 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief          DES context structure
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -69,6 +78,10 @@
  * \brief          Initialize DES context
  *
  * \param ctx      DES context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx );
 
@@ -76,6 +89,10 @@
  * \brief          Clear DES context
  *
  * \param ctx      DES context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx );
 
@@ -100,6 +117,10 @@
  *                 a parity bit to allow verification.
  *
  * \param key      8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
@@ -112,6 +133,10 @@
  * \param key      8-byte secret key
  *
  * \return         0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct.
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
@@ -121,6 +146,10 @@
  * \param key      8-byte secret key
  *
  * \return         0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified.
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
@@ -131,6 +160,10 @@
  * \param key      8-byte secret key
  *
  * \return         0
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
@@ -141,6 +174,10 @@
  * \param key      8-byte secret key
  *
  * \return         0
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
 
@@ -196,6 +233,10 @@
  * \param output   64-bit output block
  *
  * \return         0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
                     const unsigned char input[8],
@@ -219,6 +260,10 @@
  * \param iv       initialization vector (updated after use)
  * \param input    buffer holding the input data
  * \param output   buffer holding the output data
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
                     int mode,
@@ -277,6 +322,10 @@
  *
  * \param SK       Round keys
  * \param key      Base key
+ *
+ * \warning        DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ *                 security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ *                 instead.
  */
 void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32],
                          const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
index cd056d1..433d612 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@
  *  RFC 3526 4.    3072-bit MODP Group
  *  RFC 3526 5.    4096-bit MODP Group
  *  RFC 5114 2.2.  2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup
+ *
+ * \warning The primes from RFC 5114 do not come together with information
+ *          on how they were generated and are therefore not considered
+ *          trustworthy. It is recommended to avoid them and to use the
+ *          nothing-up-my-sleeve primes from RFC 3526 instead.
+ *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P               \
     "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/md.h b/include/mbedtls/md.h
index 00b1e3a..b48877a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/md.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/md.h
@@ -42,6 +42,14 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * \brief     Enumeration of supported message digests
+ *
+ * \warning   MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and
+ *            their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *            stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0,
     MBEDTLS_MD_MD2,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/include/mbedtls/md2.h
index 0f93fbf..d516042 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/md2.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/md2.h
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ *            digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H
 #define MBEDTLS_MD2_H
@@ -41,6 +46,11 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief          MD2 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -55,6 +65,11 @@
  * \brief          Initialize MD2 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD2 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx );
 
@@ -62,6 +77,11 @@
  * \brief          Clear MD2 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD2 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx );
 
@@ -70,6 +90,11 @@
  *
  * \param dst      The destination context
  * \param src      The context to be cloned
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst,
                         const mbedtls_md2_context *src );
@@ -78,6 +103,11 @@
  * \brief          MD2 context setup
  *
  * \param ctx      context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx );
 
@@ -87,6 +117,11 @@
  * \param ctx      MD2 context
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen );
 
@@ -95,6 +130,11 @@
  *
  * \param ctx      MD2 context
  * \param output   MD2 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -116,6 +156,11 @@
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
  * \param output   MD2 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -123,6 +168,11 @@
  * \brief          Checkup routine
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning        MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose );
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/include/mbedtls/md4.h
index 45214d4..b02d4b6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/md4.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/md4.h
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ *            digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H
 #define MBEDTLS_MD4_H
@@ -42,6 +47,11 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief          MD4 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -55,6 +65,11 @@
  * \brief          Initialize MD4 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD4 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx );
 
@@ -62,6 +77,11 @@
  * \brief          Clear MD4 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD4 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx );
 
@@ -70,6 +90,11 @@
  *
  * \param dst      The destination context
  * \param src      The context to be cloned
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst,
                         const mbedtls_md4_context *src );
@@ -78,6 +103,10 @@
  * \brief          MD4 context setup
  *
  * \param ctx      context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx );
 
@@ -87,6 +116,11 @@
  * \param ctx      MD4 context
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen );
 
@@ -95,6 +129,11 @@
  *
  * \param ctx      MD4 context
  * \param output   MD4 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -116,6 +155,11 @@
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
  * \param output   MD4 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -123,6 +167,11 @@
  * \brief          Checkup routine
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning        MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose );
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/include/mbedtls/md5.h
index 5a64061..1e67343 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/md5.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/md5.h
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ *            security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ *            digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H
 #define MBEDTLS_MD5_H
@@ -42,6 +47,11 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief          MD5 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -55,6 +65,11 @@
  * \brief          Initialize MD5 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD5 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx );
 
@@ -62,6 +77,11 @@
  * \brief          Clear MD5 context
  *
  * \param ctx      MD5 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx );
 
@@ -70,6 +90,11 @@
  *
  * \param dst      The destination context
  * \param src      The context to be cloned
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst,
                         const mbedtls_md5_context *src );
@@ -78,6 +103,11 @@
  * \brief          MD5 context setup
  *
  * \param ctx      context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx );
 
@@ -87,6 +117,11 @@
  * \param ctx      MD5 context
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen );
 
@@ -95,6 +130,11 @@
  *
  * \param ctx      MD5 context
  * \param output   MD5 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -119,6 +159,11 @@
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
  * \param output   MD5 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[16] );
 
@@ -126,6 +171,11 @@
  * \brief          Checkup routine
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning        MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose );
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/include/mbedtls/sha1.h
index 7a67c6c..05c5d24 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/sha1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/sha1.h
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
  *  limitations under the License.
  *
  *  This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
+ *
+ * \warning   SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ *            a security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ *            digests instead.
+ *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H
 #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H
@@ -42,6 +47,11 @@
 
 /**
  * \brief          SHA-1 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -55,6 +65,11 @@
  * \brief          Initialize SHA-1 context
  *
  * \param ctx      SHA-1 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx );
 
@@ -62,6 +77,11 @@
  * \brief          Clear SHA-1 context
  *
  * \param ctx      SHA-1 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx );
 
@@ -70,6 +90,11 @@
  *
  * \param dst      The destination context
  * \param src      The context to be cloned
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst,
                          const mbedtls_sha1_context *src );
@@ -78,6 +103,11 @@
  * \brief          SHA-1 context setup
  *
  * \param ctx      context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx );
 
@@ -87,6 +117,11 @@
  * \param ctx      SHA-1 context
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen );
 
@@ -95,6 +130,11 @@
  *
  * \param ctx      SHA-1 context
  * \param output   SHA-1 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, unsigned char output[20] );
 
@@ -119,6 +159,11 @@
  * \param input    buffer holding the  data
  * \param ilen     length of the input data
  * \param output   SHA-1 checksum result
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char output[20] );
 
@@ -126,6 +171,11 @@
  * \brief          Checkup routine
  *
  * \return         0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning        SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ *                 constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ *                 stronger message digests instead.
+ *
  */
 int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose );
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
index 0c93a74..060e43d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
 
 #include "ssl.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
 #include "md5.h"
@@ -134,14 +135,34 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD              0
 #endif
 
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN  ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN               \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD               \
-                        + 29 /* counter + header + IV */    \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD                       \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD                   \
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN    \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD            \
+                        + MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH                  \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD                    \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD                \
                         )
 
 /*
+ * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
+ */
+
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
+#error Bad configuration - record content too large.
+#endif
+
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN > 16384 + 2048
+#error Bad configuration - protected record payload too large.
+#endif
+
+/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
+   long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
+   implicit sequence number. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN  \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
+
+/*
  * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
  * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
  * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
@@ -584,9 +605,9 @@
 static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
 {
     size_t i;
-    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
-    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
-    unsigned char diff = 0;
+    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
 
     for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
         diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index 118130a..1e04c93 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -39,16 +39,16 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  2
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  1
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  9
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  10
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x02010900
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.1.9"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "mbed TLS 2.1.9"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x02010A00
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "2.1.10"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "mbed TLS 2.1.10"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
 
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 1a7b48f..1353df6 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -138,15 +138,15 @@
 
 if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
-    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.9 SOVERSION 0)
+    set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.10 SOVERSION 0)
     target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
 
     add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
-    set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.9 SOVERSION 0)
+    set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.10 SOVERSION 0)
     target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
 
     add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
-    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.9 SOVERSION 10)
+    set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.1.10 SOVERSION 10)
     target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
 
     install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 52edd3d..25fe8be 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -672,16 +672,20 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
 {
     int ret;
-    size_t i, j, n;
+    size_t i, j;
+    size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
 
-    for( n = 0; n < buflen; n++ )
-        if( buf[n] != 0 )
-            break;
+    /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
+    if( X->n != limbs )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
+        mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
+    }
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen - n ) ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
 
-    for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > n; i--, j++ )
+    for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ )
         X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3);
 
 cleanup:
@@ -1877,6 +1881,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, buf, size ) );
 
 cleanup:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c
index 646196e..e8fdd9b 100644
--- a/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -430,20 +430,20 @@
         goto exit;
 
     if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
-    {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    ret = 0;
+    else
+        ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     fclose( f );
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
@@ -462,14 +462,16 @@
     }
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/dhm.c b/library/dhm.c
index dc72c53..ced2a34 100644
--- a/library/dhm.c
+++ b/library/dhm.c
@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
  *
  * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2
  *
+ * This means that we need to return an error if
+ *              public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2
+ *
  * For more information on the attack, see:
  *  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf
  *  http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643
@@ -97,17 +100,17 @@
 static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P )
 {
     mbedtls_mpi L, U;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    int ret = 0;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &L, 2 ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) );
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) >= 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) <= 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) < 0 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 )
     {
-        ret = 0;
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
 cleanup:
@@ -539,7 +542,10 @@
     if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n )
     {
         fclose( f );
+
+        mbedtls_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 );
         mbedtls_free( *buf );
+
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR );
     }
 
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 1d4f5cb..5787b9b 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -1830,7 +1830,6 @@
     {
         /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
         int count = 0;
-        unsigned char rnd[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
 
         /*
          * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
@@ -1841,8 +1840,7 @@
          */
         do
         {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, rnd, n_size ) );
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( d, rnd, n_size ) );
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
 
             /*
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index b45384d..5cef78c 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@
     mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len );
 #endif
 
+    mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+
     return( 0 );
 }
 
@@ -225,7 +227,7 @@
         if( ( ret = ctx->source[i].f_source( ctx->source[i].p_source,
                         buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen ) ) != 0 )
         {
-            return( ret );
+            goto cleanup;
         }
 
         /*
@@ -239,9 +241,12 @@
     }
 
     if( have_one_strong == 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE );
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE;
 
-    return( 0 );
+cleanup:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    return( ret );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -341,6 +346,8 @@
     ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
@@ -371,12 +378,15 @@
     ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     fclose( f );
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ];
@@ -392,14 +402,16 @@
         n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE;
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index bf5f9b5..24c609e 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -364,11 +364,14 @@
 
 exit:
     fclose( f );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
@@ -387,14 +390,16 @@
     }
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/md.c b/library/md.c
index eda98f6..75b9717 100644
--- a/library/md.c
+++ b/library/md.c
@@ -312,12 +312,11 @@
         md_info->update_func( ctx.md_ctx, buf, n );
 
     if( ferror( f ) != 0 )
-    {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
+    else
+        md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output );
 
-    md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
 
 cleanup:
     fclose( f );
diff --git a/library/pem.c b/library/pem.c
index 87401ba..756572d 100644
--- a/library/pem.c
+++ b/library/pem.c
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ) ) != 0 )
     {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
         mbedtls_free( buf );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret );
     }
@@ -356,6 +357,7 @@
     ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) )
         if( pwd == NULL )
         {
+            mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
             mbedtls_free( buf );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED );
         }
@@ -392,10 +394,12 @@
          */
         if( len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83 )
         {
+            mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
             mbedtls_free( buf );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH );
         }
 #else
+        mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
         mbedtls_free( buf );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
@@ -410,6 +414,8 @@
 
 void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx )
 {
+    if( ctx->buf != NULL )
+        mbedtls_zeroize( ctx->buf, ctx->buflen );
     mbedtls_free( ctx->buf );
     mbedtls_free( ctx->info );
 
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 9cad2cd..eb92da4 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@
     if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n )
     {
         fclose( f );
+
+        mbedtls_zeroize( *buf, *n );
         mbedtls_free( *buf );
+
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR );
     }
 
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 40ea642..d2bddf6 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1326,10 +1326,11 @@
     size_t siglen;
     unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *hash_start;
     unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char zeros[8];
     unsigned int hlen;
-    size_t slen, msb;
+    size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
 
@@ -1369,7 +1370,6 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
-    slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */
 
     memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
 
@@ -1377,15 +1377,19 @@
     //
     msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
 
-    // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
-    //
+    if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
     if( msb % 8 == 0 )
     {
         p++;
         siglen -= 1;
     }
-    if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
+
+    if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
@@ -1394,25 +1398,23 @@
         return( ret );
     }
 
-    mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
+    mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx );
 
     buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
 
-    while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 )
+    while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 )
         p++;
 
-    if( p == buf + siglen ||
-        *p++ != 0x01 )
+    if( *p++ != 0x01 )
     {
         mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
     }
 
-    /* Actual salt len */
-    slen -= p - buf;
+    observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
 
     if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
-        slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
+        observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
     {
         mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
@@ -1423,12 +1425,12 @@
     mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx );
     mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
     mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
-    mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
+    mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len );
     mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
 
     mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
 
-    if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
+    if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) == 0 )
         return( 0 );
     else
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 9d1904c..af3722c 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -539,25 +539,33 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
 
     /*
-     * Use our order of preference
+     * Validate peer's list (lengths)
      */
     start = buf + 2;
     end = buf + len;
+    for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
+    {
+        cur_len = *theirs++;
+
+        /* Current identifier must fit in list */
+        if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+
+        /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
+        if( cur_len == 0 )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Use our order of preference
+     */
     for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
     {
         ours_len = strlen( *ours );
         for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
         {
-            /* If the list is well formed, we should get equality first */
-            if( theirs > end )
-                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
-
             cur_len = *theirs++;
 
-            /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
-            if( cur_len == 0 )
-                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
-
             if( cur_len == ours_len &&
                 memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
             {
@@ -3249,7 +3257,7 @@
     /*
      * Receive client pre-shared key identity name
      */
-    if( *p + 2 > end )
+    if( end - *p < 2 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
@@ -3258,7 +3266,7 @@
     n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
     *p += 2;
 
-    if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end )
+    if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 860ae29..7193809 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1194,9 +1194,12 @@
 /*
  * SSLv3.0 MAC functions
  */
-static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, unsigned char *secret,
-                     unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
-                     unsigned char *ctr, int type )
+#define SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES   20  /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */
+static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
+                     const unsigned char *secret,
+                     const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                     const unsigned char *ctr, int type,
+                     unsigned char out[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES] )
 {
     unsigned char header[11];
     unsigned char padding[48];
@@ -1221,14 +1224,14 @@
     mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen  );
     mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header,  11      );
     mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf,     len     );
-    mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, buf +    len     );
+    mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out              );
 
     memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen );
     mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
     mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret,    md_size );
     mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding,   padlen  );
-    mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf + len, md_size );
-    mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, buf + len          );
+    mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out,       md_size );
+    mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out                );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
 
@@ -1259,6 +1262,14 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
                       ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
 
+    if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %u too large, maximum %d",
+                                    (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen,
+                                    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    }
+
     /*
      * Add MAC before if needed
      */
@@ -1273,10 +1284,15 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
         if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
         {
+            unsigned char mac[SSL_MAC_MAX_BYTES];
+
             ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
                       ssl->transform_out->mac_enc,
                       ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen,
-                      ssl->out_ctr, ssl->out_msgtype );
+                      ssl->out_ctr, ssl->out_msgtype,
+                      mac );
+
+            memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
         }
         else
 #endif
@@ -1284,14 +1300,17 @@
         defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
         if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
         {
+            unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
                              ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
-                             ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc );
+
+            memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
         }
         else
 #endif
@@ -1553,8 +1572,6 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-#define SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE   48
-
 static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     size_t i;
@@ -1722,7 +1739,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
         if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
         {
-            unsigned char computed_mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+            unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
             unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
 
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
@@ -1740,16 +1757,16 @@
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
                              ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, computed_mac );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
 
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen,
                                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", computed_mac,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
                                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
 
-            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, computed_mac,
-                              ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+                                          ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
             {
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
 
@@ -1909,22 +1926,21 @@
 #if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
     if( auth_done == 0 )
     {
-        unsigned char tmp[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+        unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
 
         ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
 
         ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
         ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen      );
 
-        memcpy( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
         if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
         {
             ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
                       ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
                       ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
-                      ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype );
+                      ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype,
+                      mac_expect );
         }
         else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
@@ -1956,8 +1972,7 @@
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
                              ssl->in_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
-                             ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
             /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks */
             for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
                 mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
@@ -1972,12 +1987,12 @@
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
         }
 
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", tmp, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
-                       ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
+                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
 
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
-                         ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+                                      ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
         {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@@ -2724,6 +2739,15 @@
         if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
         {
             /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */
+            if( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
+            {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
+                              "size %u, maximum %u",
+                               (unsigned) ( ssl->in_hslen - 4 ),
+                               (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+            }
+
             memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, len - 4 );
             ssl->out_msglen += 8;
             len += 8;
@@ -5870,12 +5894,19 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
     }
 
-    if( conf->psk != NULL || conf->psk_identity != NULL )
+    if( conf->psk != NULL )
     {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len );
+
         mbedtls_free( conf->psk );
-        mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
         conf->psk = NULL;
+        conf->psk_len = 0;
+    }
+    if( conf->psk_identity != NULL )
+    {
+        mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
         conf->psk_identity = NULL;
+        conf->psk_identity_len = 0;
     }
 
     if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ||
@@ -5907,7 +5938,11 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
+    {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len );
         mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
+        ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
+    }
 
     if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
@@ -7290,8 +7325,8 @@
             if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
             {
                 if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( conf,
-                                MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P,
-                                MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G ) ) != 0 )
+                                MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P,
+                                MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G ) ) != 0 )
                 {
                     return( ret );
                 }
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa512.key b/tests/data_files/rsa512.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fd7987
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa512.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBOwIBAAJBALB20jJQgW+aqwIwfkUrl/DK51mDabQWJOivx5caWaE4kvZLB+qm
+7JKMFgstbsj50N1bY8izrAdntPZciS9WwQ8CAwEAAQJAKYfNcIoB7II6PQmsrhrU
+Z5dZW3fSKNANX7X/A1DwR0DlF8uZnpWsWbYcRoXX7QjvepZqc54wryhW55Wlm6yI
+AQIhAOJIaLjSpbHjzzcJQ7mylxn2WGIlbJPPzJ9OaFZCZQvxAiEAx6OEAvl6JKa6
+6a+N2Wvhtcgb4qqR6UHQGJQYGJz5nP8CIAvgoR6ScAAWZRoOcm+c4DGMrLb6H+ji
+T2tNQkzEz2kBAiEAmw34GStU36STpa6RGJ4+tyZN6jWakDVqf7x+HpfFE1cCIQDc
+KzXIxec2taye4OeIa1v4W/MigMmYE9w93Uw/Qi3azA==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa521.key b/tests/data_files/rsa521.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b940aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa521.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPQIBAAJCATG2mGDzy5v4XqNY/fK9KZDxt3qA1qT9+BekPdiWvffdJq+KwCN/
+Um4NM7EFyXH9vU/6ns6Z/EafMez0Kej1YsHDAgMBAAECQCdoYjwdMSHp4kksL5Aa
+0kDc58ni0chy9IgXo+FHjTVmR9DkaZANrwfVvYMJxqYCZo0im1Dw7ZJBUDJQNXnl
+ZokCIRiSk66I24AWa7XGUFvatVwXWi2ACE4QEKqzWQe1mQ24/wIhDHD1TCKpqucA
+XDI+1N7EHs+fN4CfTSWe8FPGiK6q3VM9AiESrKKLi/q011U4KeS8SfR2blDcL2cg
+XFkuQWqxzzLoGOUCIQmgl5E0+Ypwe0zc7NYZFDarf4+ZjqxKQnXCvk0irMHcGQIh
+EVPli6RQb3Gcx7vXJHltzSTno7NElzBDRMBVUlBmVxAJ
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa522.key b/tests/data_files/rsa522.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18fbe70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa522.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPgIBAAJCAtMCdT492ij0L02fkshkdCDqb7yXwQ+EmLlmqVPzV2mNZYEGDf4y
+yKuY20vFzirN8MHm5ASnWhMoJVDBqjfTzci/AgMBAAECQU05ffxf7uVg74yC9tKg
+qCa746NpMh3OM+HZrUxiOXv0sJMRXNEPD5HNLtgcNY6MI5NYbUvkOXktnFZpxWYP
+TH7BAiEeFJGs5Z6gRd2v/IbYLMFDHgjqho04INGTOvnyI7lGVKUCIRgJM7moFuoM
+UrKTmJK1uOzauWEykCKgc6BGH6TGZoEWkwIhBzQn2v82qO1ydOYGKRk2w2sa+Yd1
+pH5/kkHqf+m8QjKdAiEQ9eVW+4J30wxD0JyX4b1E/S5UpN5KYNhWX0US+6D3NBsC
+IRxePzdQlutZWg0Cnku3QE1tOLBCFlP7QVVl5FbKcY5H5w==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa528.key b/tests/data_files/rsa528.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd463b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa528.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBRQIBAAJDAOMcJG1GSFmEJh/RdMqz1DVzRGAuzXk8R9vlQlLTe7NQvGNDWbGV
+FVQggORySktnIpG+V8dkj1Finq7yNOhH2ZzGXwIDAQABAkMAsWYyLglQSlwnS4NZ
+L1z4zieTqW3lomWr2+BgxkHbxl2w0Rx4L+Ezp+YK6mhtIQWNkoytPvWJJMS7Jrkg
+agMAHQJBAiIA+F1y5GO0Bv+igsNLXwwtbCqs8hAkavU9W8egt/oDbhzbAiIA6hds
+PZp/s1X7n7dwfmebSs+3vLZFuQfifN8XZLw0CXHNAiEuEzgDQrPdMIN3er96zImI
+rYoUBgabiQ9u/WPFfa4xOU0CIgDDYC089Tfjy72pPgcr2PkpZVhqro5esg/8PI5f
+yxx7TXkCIgCYoE8Y5IxomtL1ub1AQzPe9UyyUGzQB1yWeiloJh6LjxA=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 0c4639c..c87975c 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -710,40 +710,40 @@
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client disabled, server default" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=0" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server default" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server disabled" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=0" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server enabled" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 # Tests for Encrypt-then-MAC extension
 
@@ -2843,7 +2843,7 @@
                     debug_level=3" \
             0 \
             -c "value of 'DHM: P ' (2048 bits)" \
-            -c "value of 'DHM: G ' (2048 bits)"
+            -c "value of 'DHM: G ' (2 bits)"
 
 run_test    "DHM parameters: other parameters" \
             "$P_SRV dhm_file=data_files/dhparams.pem" \
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
index f2cdeff..e351ebd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5":0
 
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
 
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #3
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #1
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #2
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Diffie-Hellman small modulus
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED
+
+Diffie-Hellman zero modulus
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hallman load parameters from file
 dhm_file:"data_files/dhparams.pem":"9e35f430443a09904f3a39a979797d070df53378e79c2438bef4e761f3c714553328589b041c809be1d6c6b5f1fc9f47d3a25443188253a992a56818b37ba9de5a40d362e56eff0be5417474c125c199272c8fe41dea733df6f662c92ae76556e755d10c64e6a50968f67fc6ea73d0dca8569be2ba204e23580d8bca2f4975b3":"02":128
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
index 002c20b..b41c798 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
-                 int radix_G, char *input_G )
+                 int radix_G, char *input_G, int result )
 {
     mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_srv;
     mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_cli;
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@
     /*
      * First key exchange
      */
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == result );
+    if ( result != 0 )
+        goto exit;
+
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx_cli, &p, ske + ske_len ) == 0 );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
index ac16beb..6258c62 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
@@ -787,3 +787,47 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
 
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, bad signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf247":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 522-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:522:16:"02d302753e3dda28f42f4d9f92c8647420ea6fbc97c10f8498b966a953f357698d6581060dfe32c8ab98db4bc5ce2acdf0c1e6e404a75a13282550c1aa37d3cdc8bf":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"016752ae0b5dfbade6bbd3dd37868d48c8d741f92dca41c360aeda553204c2212a117b1a3d77e0d3f48723503c46e16c8a64de00f1dee3e37e478417452630859486":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, SHA-512 (hash too large)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, bad signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"00471794655837da498cbf27242807b40593a353c707eb22fd2cc5a3259e728ac4f1df676043eeec8e16c1175b3d9ac8cae72ec1d5772dd69de71c5677f19031568e":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"009c4941157fa36288e467310b198ab0c615c40963d611ffeef03000549ded809235955ecc57adba44782e9497c004f480ba2b3d58db8335fe0b391075c02c843a6d":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, flipped-highest-bit signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"00e11a2403df681c44a1f73f014b6c9ad17847d0b673f7c2a801cee208d10ab5792c10cd0cd495a4b331aaa521409fca7cb1b0d978b3a84cd67e28078b98753e9466":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, all-zero padding, automatic salt length
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"":"63a35294577c7e593170378175b7df27c293dae583ec2a971426eb2d66f2af483e897bfae5dc20300a9d61a3644e08c3aee61a463690a3498901563c46041056":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index 345601b..7928b86 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Check compiletime library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.1.9"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.1.10"
 
 Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.1.9"
+check_runtime_version:"2.1.10"
 
 Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
 check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0
diff --git a/yotta/data/module.json b/yotta/data/module.json
index 076148f..3a0c537 100644
--- a/yotta/data/module.json
+++ b/yotta/data/module.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
     "name": "mbedtls",
-    "version": "2.1.9",
+    "version": "2.1.10",
     "description": "The mbed TLS crypto/SSL/TLS library",
     "licenses": [
         {