diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index eec2bb4..9fbd3ac 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -1459,8 +1459,6 @@
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                            size_t early_data_len)
 {
-    uint32_t uint32_early_data_len = (uint32_t) early_data_len;
-
     /*
      * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress
      * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a
@@ -1475,13 +1473,13 @@
      * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
      * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
      */
-    if (uint32_early_data_len >
+    if (early_data_len >
         (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size -
          ssl->total_early_data_size)) {
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
-            2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u > %u",
-                ssl->total_early_data_size + uint32_early_data_len,
+            2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u",
+                ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len,
                 ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size));
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
@@ -1490,7 +1488,13 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
     }
 
-    ssl->total_early_data_size += uint32_early_data_len;
+    /*
+     * The check just above implies that early_data_len is lower than
+     * UINT32_MAX thus its cast to an uint32_t below is safe. We need it
+     * to appease some compilers.
+     */
+
+    ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len;
 
     return 0;
 }