diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index 1472413..f38eb04 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
-        if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
 
         return( 0 );
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
-        if( mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
 
         return( 0 );
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index 822285a..59e2c87 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -31,10 +31,9 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                              const void *b,
-                              size_t n )
+int mbedtls_cf_memcmp( const void *a,
+                       const void *b,
+                       size_t n )
 {
     size_t i;
     volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
@@ -50,67 +49,9 @@
         diff |= x ^ y;
     }
 
-    return( diff );
-}
-
-/* Compare the contents of two buffers in constant time.
- * Returns 0 if the contents are bitwise identical, otherwise returns
- * a non-zero value.
- * This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
- */
-int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1,
-                                  const void *v2,
-                                  size_t len )
-{
-    const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1;
-    const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2;
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned char diff;
-
-    for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < len; i++ )
-        diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i];
-
     return( (int)diff );
 }
 
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-unsigned char mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                                            const void *b,
-                                            size_t n )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
-    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
-    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-    {
-        /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
-         * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
-         * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
-        unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
-        diff |= x ^ y;
-    }
-
-    return( diff );
-}
-
-/* constant-time buffer comparison */
-int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                          const void *b,
-                          size_t n )
-{
-    size_t i;
-    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
-    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
-    unsigned char diff = 0;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
-        diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
-
-    return( diff );
-}
-
 /** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
  *
  * \param value     The value to analyze.
diff --git a/library/constant_time.h b/library/constant_time.h
index e6deb45..ae43081 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.h
+++ b/library/constant_time.h
@@ -29,22 +29,10 @@
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 
-int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                              const void *b,
-                              size_t n );
 
-int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1,
-                                  const void *v2,
-                                  size_t len );
-
-unsigned char mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                                            const void *b,
-                                            size_t n );
-
-int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a,
-                          const void *b,
-                          size_t n );
-
+int mbedtls_cf_memcmp( const void *a,
+                       const void *b,
+                       size_t n );
 
 unsigned mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( unsigned value );
 
diff --git a/library/nist_kw.c b/library/nist_kw.c
index 6262a7b..98c237b 100644
--- a/library/nist_kw.c
+++ b/library/nist_kw.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
             goto cleanup;
 
         /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
-        diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
+        diff = mbedtls_cf_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
 
         if( diff != 0 )
         {
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@
         }
 
         /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
-        diff = mbedtls_nist_kw_safer_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
+        diff = mbedtls_cf_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 );
 
         if( diff != 0 )
         {
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 3f076f0..a387d09 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
 
-    if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
@@ -2231,8 +2231,8 @@
      * Compare
      */
 
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
-                                      sig_len ) ) != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_cf_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
+                                              sig_len ) ) != 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 912b5d0..0bc39fa 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -1459,9 +1459,9 @@
         /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
         if( len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
             buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1,
+            mbedtls_cf_memcmp( buf + 1,
                           ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
+            mbedtls_cf_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
                           ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c
index 84fbab1..d19a13a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cookie.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
         return( -1 );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 0b940ec..57a56f4 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@
              *
              * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
              * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
-             * mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below.
+             * mbedtls_cf_memcmp() below.
              *
              * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
             rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
@@ -1304,8 +1304,8 @@
                                    transform->maclen );
 
             /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
-            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
-                                          transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+            if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
+                                              transform->maclen ) != 0 )
             {
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
                 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
@@ -1582,8 +1582,8 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
 #endif
 
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
-                                      transform->maclen ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
+                                          transform->maclen ) != 0 )
         {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index b9e4bc0..9c1bea2 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
         /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
         if( len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
             buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
+            mbedtls_cf_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
                           ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@@ -4064,7 +4064,7 @@
         /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
          * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
         if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
-            mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
+            mbedtls_cf_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
         {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
         }
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 607981a..3fafb7d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED );
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
+    if( mbedtls_cf_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
                       buf, hash_len ) != 0 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );