Protect the buffer in psa_export_key
Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett <ryan.everett@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index cc7dc09..7830f40 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1599,13 +1599,14 @@
}
psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
- uint8_t *data,
+ uint8_t *data_external,
size_t data_size,
size_t *data_length)
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+ LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data);
/* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a
* valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid
@@ -1630,15 +1631,18 @@
return status;
}
+ LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data);
+
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key(&attributes,
slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
data, data_size, data_length);
-
+exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
+ LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}