diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index d64f11e..9c2cb9c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 = mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
 
 Security
+   * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash is too
+     large for the key size. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product
+     Security Initiative, Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
+   * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked
+     data is all zeros.
+   * Fix unsafe bounds check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() when adding
+     64kB to the address of the SSL buffer wraps around.
    * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write. When the (by
      default enabled) maximum fragment length extension is disabled in the
      config and the application data buffer passed to mbedtls_ssl_write
@@ -11,6 +18,26 @@
      application layer can be forced into sending such large packets. The issue
      was independently reported by Tim Nordell via e-mail and by Florin Petriuc
      and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022. Fixes #707.
+   * Tighten should-be-constant-time memcmp against compiler optimizations.
+   * Ensure that buffers are cleared after use if they contain sensitive data.
+     Changes were introduced in multiple places in the library.
+   * Set PEM buffer to zero before freeing it, to avoid decoded private keys
+     being leaked to memory after release.
+   * Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially
+     leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil.
+   * Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary constant-time with respect to
+     the input data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected
+     and omitted for the sake of saving memory, but potentially
+     leading to slight timing differences.
+     Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group.
+   * Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent
+     after keypair generation.
+   * Fix heap corruption in implementation of truncated HMAC extension.
+     When the truncated HMAC extension is enabled and CBC is used,
+     sending a malicious application packet can be used to selectively
+     corrupt 6 bytes on the peer's heap, potentially leading to crash or
+     remote code execution. This can be triggered remotely from either
+     side in both TLS and DTLS.
 
 Features
    * Allow comments in test data files.
@@ -27,6 +54,8 @@
    * Fix leap year calculation in x509_date_is_valid() to ensure that invalid
      dates on leap years with 100 and 400 intervals are handled correctly. Found
      by Nicholas Wilson. #694
+   * Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were
+     accepted. Generating these signatures required the private key.
    * Fix out-of-memory problem when parsing 4096-bit PKCS8-encrypted RSA keys.
      Found independently by Florian in the mbed TLS forum and by Mishamax.
      #878, #1019.
@@ -54,6 +83,8 @@
      Reported by Yolan Romailler.
    * Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64.
    * Fix incorrect unit in benchmark output. #850
+   * Add size-checks for record and handshake message content, securing
+     fragile yet non-exploitable code-paths.
    * Fix crash when calling mbedtls_ssl_cache_free() twice. Found by
      MilenkoMitrovic, #1104
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 456a804..214e83c 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -683,6 +683,10 @@
  *
  * \return         0 if successful,
  *                 MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
+ *
+ * \note           The bytes obtained from the PRNG are interpreted
+ *                 as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
+ *                 be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
  */
 int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
index 756360b..f87397f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
 
 #include "ssl.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
 #include "md5.h"
@@ -138,14 +139,34 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD              0
 #endif
 
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN  ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN               \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD               \
-                        + 29 /* counter + header + IV */    \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD                       \
-                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD                   \
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN    \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD            \
+                        + MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH                  \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD                    \
+                        + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD                \
                         )
 
 /*
+ * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
+ */
+
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
+#error Bad configuration - record content too large.
+#endif
+
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN > 16384 + 2048
+#error Bad configuration - protected record payload too large.
+#endif
+
+/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
+   long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
+   implicit sequence number. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN  \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
+
+/*
  * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
  * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
  * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
@@ -600,9 +621,9 @@
 static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
 {
     size_t i;
-    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
-    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
-    unsigned char diff = 0;
+    volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+    volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+    volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
 
     for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
         diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index d3a150c..d27c130 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@
     volatile mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
 }
 
+/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
+static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
+    volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
+}
+
 #define ciL    (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))         /* chars in limb  */
 #define biL    (ciL << 3)               /* bits  in limb  */
 #define biH    (ciL << 2)               /* half limb size */
@@ -672,16 +677,20 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
 {
     int ret;
-    size_t i, j, n;
+    size_t i, j;
+    size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
 
-    for( n = 0; n < buflen; n++ )
-        if( buf[n] != 0 )
-            break;
+    /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
+    if( X->n != limbs )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
+        mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
+    }
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen - n ) ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
 
-    for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > n; i--, j++ )
+    for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ )
         X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3);
 
 cleanup:
@@ -1882,6 +1891,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, buf, size ) );
 
 cleanup:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c
index 55612c7..a31f7b8 100644
--- a/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -430,20 +430,20 @@
         goto exit;
 
     if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
-    {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    ret = 0;
+    else
+        ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     fclose( f );
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
@@ -462,14 +462,16 @@
     }
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/dhm.c b/library/dhm.c
index bec52a1..668d5f7 100644
--- a/library/dhm.c
+++ b/library/dhm.c
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@
  *
  * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2
  *
+ * This means that we need to return an error if
+ *              public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2
+ *
  * For more information on the attack, see:
  *  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf
  *  http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643
@@ -100,17 +103,17 @@
 static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P )
 {
     mbedtls_mpi L, U;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    int ret = 0;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &L, 2 ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) );
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) >= 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) <= 0 )
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) < 0 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 )
     {
-        ret = 0;
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
 cleanup:
@@ -542,7 +545,10 @@
     if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n )
     {
         fclose( f );
+
+        mbedtls_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 );
         mbedtls_free( *buf );
+
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR );
     }
 
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 5ad6863..b41baef 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -1953,7 +1953,6 @@
     {
         /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
         int count = 0;
-        unsigned char rnd[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
 
         /*
          * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
@@ -1964,8 +1963,7 @@
          */
         do
         {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, rnd, n_size ) );
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( d, rnd, n_size ) );
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
 
             /*
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index bf943aa..52b98cd 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@
     mbedtls_sha256_update( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len );
 #endif
 
+    mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
+
     return( 0 );
 }
 
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@
         if( ( ret = ctx->source[i].f_source( ctx->source[i].p_source,
                         buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen ) ) != 0 )
         {
-            return( ret );
+            goto cleanup;
         }
 
         /*
@@ -259,9 +261,12 @@
     }
 
     if( have_one_strong == 0 )
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE );
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE;
 
-    return( 0 );
+cleanup:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    return( ret );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -373,6 +378,8 @@
     ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
@@ -385,7 +392,7 @@
 int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-    unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ];
+    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
     /* Read new seed  and write it to NV */
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 )
@@ -396,9 +403,9 @@
 
     /* Manually update the remaining stream with a separator value to diverge */
     memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE );
-    mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE );
+    ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE );
 
-    return( 0 );
+    return( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
 
@@ -424,12 +431,15 @@
     ret = 0;
 
 exit:
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     fclose( f );
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ];
@@ -445,14 +455,16 @@
         n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE;
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index bf5f9b5..24c609e 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -364,11 +364,14 @@
 
 exit:
     fclose( f );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
     return( ret );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
 {
+    int ret = 0;
     FILE *f;
     size_t n;
     unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
@@ -387,14 +390,16 @@
     }
 
     if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
-    {
-        fclose( f );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
-    }
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    else
+        mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
 
     fclose( f );
 
-    mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
 
     return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
 }
diff --git a/library/md.c b/library/md.c
index eda98f6..75b9717 100644
--- a/library/md.c
+++ b/library/md.c
@@ -312,12 +312,11 @@
         md_info->update_func( ctx.md_ctx, buf, n );
 
     if( ferror( f ) != 0 )
-    {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
+    else
+        md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output );
 
-    md_info->finish_func( ctx.md_ctx, output );
+    mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
 
 cleanup:
     fclose( f );
diff --git a/library/pem.c b/library/pem.c
index 87401ba..756572d 100644
--- a/library/pem.c
+++ b/library/pem.c
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ) ) != 0 )
     {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
         mbedtls_free( buf );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA + ret );
     }
@@ -356,6 +357,7 @@
     ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) )
         if( pwd == NULL )
         {
+            mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
             mbedtls_free( buf );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED );
         }
@@ -392,10 +394,12 @@
          */
         if( len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83 )
         {
+            mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
             mbedtls_free( buf );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH );
         }
 #else
+        mbedtls_zeroize( buf, len );
         mbedtls_free( buf );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
@@ -410,6 +414,8 @@
 
 void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx )
 {
+    if( ctx->buf != NULL )
+        mbedtls_zeroize( ctx->buf, ctx->buflen );
     mbedtls_free( ctx->buf );
     mbedtls_free( ctx->info );
 
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 387111f..99de1c2 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@
     if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n )
     {
         fclose( f );
+
+        mbedtls_zeroize( *buf, *n );
         mbedtls_free( *buf );
+
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR );
     }
 
diff --git a/library/platform.c b/library/platform.c
index af3b2f1..b882b65 100644
--- a/library/platform.c
+++ b/library/platform.c
@@ -228,12 +228,13 @@
     size_t n;
 
     if( ( file = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "rb" ) ) == NULL )
-        return -1;
+        return( -1 );
 
     if( ( n = fread( buf, 1, buf_len, file ) ) != buf_len )
     {
         fclose( file );
-        return -1;
+        mbedtls_zeroize( buf, buf_len );
+        return( -1 );
     }
 
     fclose( file );
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index bdd2538..148f6b3 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1319,10 +1319,11 @@
     int ret;
     size_t siglen;
     unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *hash_start;
     unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char zeros[8];
     unsigned int hlen;
-    size_t slen, msb;
+    size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -1362,7 +1363,6 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
-    slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */
 
     memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
 
@@ -1371,14 +1371,19 @@
      */
     msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
 
+    if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
     /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
     if( msb % 8 == 0 )
     {
         p++;
         siglen -= 1;
     }
-    if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
+
+    if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
@@ -1387,25 +1392,23 @@
         return( ret );
     }
 
-    mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
+    mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx );
 
     buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
 
-    while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 )
+    while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 )
         p++;
 
-    if( p == buf + siglen ||
-        *p++ != 0x01 )
+    if( *p++ != 0x01 )
     {
         mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
     }
 
-    /* Actual salt len */
-    slen -= p - buf;
+    observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
 
     if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
-        slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
+        observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
     {
         mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
@@ -1417,12 +1420,12 @@
     mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx );
     mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
     mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
-    mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
+    mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len );
     mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
 
     mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
 
-    if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
+    if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) == 0 )
         return( 0 );
     else
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 37f415d..de3ea80 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -3433,7 +3433,7 @@
     /*
      * Receive client pre-shared key identity name
      */
-    if( *p + 2 > end )
+    if( end - *p < 2 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
@@ -3442,7 +3442,7 @@
     n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
     *p += 2;
 
-    if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end )
+    if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 2690e46..090b2f3 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1268,6 +1268,14 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
                       ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
 
+    if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %u too large, maximum %d",
+                                    (unsigned) ssl->out_msglen,
+                                    MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    }
+
     /*
      * Add MAC before if needed
      */
@@ -1293,14 +1301,17 @@
         defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
         if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
         {
+            unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
                              ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
-                             ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc );
+
+            memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
         }
         else
 #endif
@@ -1562,8 +1573,6 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-#define SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE   48
-
 static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     size_t i;
@@ -1731,7 +1740,7 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
         if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
         {
-            unsigned char computed_mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+            unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
             unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
 
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
@@ -1749,16 +1758,16 @@
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
                              ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, computed_mac );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
 
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen,
                                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", computed_mac,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
                                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
 
-            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, computed_mac,
-                              ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+            if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+                                          ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
             {
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
 
@@ -1918,15 +1927,13 @@
 #if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
     if( auth_done == 0 )
     {
-        unsigned char tmp[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+        unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
 
         ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
 
         ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
         ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen      );
 
-        memcpy( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
         if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
         {
@@ -1965,8 +1972,7 @@
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
             mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
                              ssl->in_msglen );
-            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
-                             ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
+            mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
             /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks */
             for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
                 mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
@@ -1981,12 +1987,12 @@
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
         }
 
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", tmp, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
-                       ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message  mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
+                               ssl->transform_in->maclen );
 
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
-                         ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+        if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+                                      ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
         {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@@ -2735,6 +2741,15 @@
         if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
         {
             /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */
+            if( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
+            {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
+                              "size %u, maximum %u",
+                               (unsigned) ( ssl->in_hslen - 4 ),
+                               (unsigned) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+            }
+
             memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, len - 4 );
             ssl->out_msglen += 8;
             len += 8;
@@ -6056,12 +6071,19 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
     }
 
-    if( conf->psk != NULL || conf->psk_identity != NULL )
+    if( conf->psk != NULL )
     {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len );
+
         mbedtls_free( conf->psk );
-        mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
         conf->psk = NULL;
+        conf->psk_len = 0;
+    }
+    if( conf->psk_identity != NULL )
+    {
+        mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
         conf->psk_identity = NULL;
+        conf->psk_identity_len = 0;
     }
 
     if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ||
@@ -6093,7 +6115,11 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
+    {
+        mbedtls_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len );
         mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
+        ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
+    }
 
     if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa512.key b/tests/data_files/rsa512.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1fd7987
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa512.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBOwIBAAJBALB20jJQgW+aqwIwfkUrl/DK51mDabQWJOivx5caWaE4kvZLB+qm
+7JKMFgstbsj50N1bY8izrAdntPZciS9WwQ8CAwEAAQJAKYfNcIoB7II6PQmsrhrU
+Z5dZW3fSKNANX7X/A1DwR0DlF8uZnpWsWbYcRoXX7QjvepZqc54wryhW55Wlm6yI
+AQIhAOJIaLjSpbHjzzcJQ7mylxn2WGIlbJPPzJ9OaFZCZQvxAiEAx6OEAvl6JKa6
+6a+N2Wvhtcgb4qqR6UHQGJQYGJz5nP8CIAvgoR6ScAAWZRoOcm+c4DGMrLb6H+ji
+T2tNQkzEz2kBAiEAmw34GStU36STpa6RGJ4+tyZN6jWakDVqf7x+HpfFE1cCIQDc
+KzXIxec2taye4OeIa1v4W/MigMmYE9w93Uw/Qi3azA==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa521.key b/tests/data_files/rsa521.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b940aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa521.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPQIBAAJCATG2mGDzy5v4XqNY/fK9KZDxt3qA1qT9+BekPdiWvffdJq+KwCN/
+Um4NM7EFyXH9vU/6ns6Z/EafMez0Kej1YsHDAgMBAAECQCdoYjwdMSHp4kksL5Aa
+0kDc58ni0chy9IgXo+FHjTVmR9DkaZANrwfVvYMJxqYCZo0im1Dw7ZJBUDJQNXnl
+ZokCIRiSk66I24AWa7XGUFvatVwXWi2ACE4QEKqzWQe1mQ24/wIhDHD1TCKpqucA
+XDI+1N7EHs+fN4CfTSWe8FPGiK6q3VM9AiESrKKLi/q011U4KeS8SfR2blDcL2cg
+XFkuQWqxzzLoGOUCIQmgl5E0+Ypwe0zc7NYZFDarf4+ZjqxKQnXCvk0irMHcGQIh
+EVPli6RQb3Gcx7vXJHltzSTno7NElzBDRMBVUlBmVxAJ
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa522.key b/tests/data_files/rsa522.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18fbe70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa522.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBPgIBAAJCAtMCdT492ij0L02fkshkdCDqb7yXwQ+EmLlmqVPzV2mNZYEGDf4y
+yKuY20vFzirN8MHm5ASnWhMoJVDBqjfTzci/AgMBAAECQU05ffxf7uVg74yC9tKg
+qCa746NpMh3OM+HZrUxiOXv0sJMRXNEPD5HNLtgcNY6MI5NYbUvkOXktnFZpxWYP
+TH7BAiEeFJGs5Z6gRd2v/IbYLMFDHgjqho04INGTOvnyI7lGVKUCIRgJM7moFuoM
+UrKTmJK1uOzauWEykCKgc6BGH6TGZoEWkwIhBzQn2v82qO1ydOYGKRk2w2sa+Yd1
+pH5/kkHqf+m8QjKdAiEQ9eVW+4J30wxD0JyX4b1E/S5UpN5KYNhWX0US+6D3NBsC
+IRxePzdQlutZWg0Cnku3QE1tOLBCFlP7QVVl5FbKcY5H5w==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa528.key b/tests/data_files/rsa528.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd463b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/rsa528.key
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBRQIBAAJDAOMcJG1GSFmEJh/RdMqz1DVzRGAuzXk8R9vlQlLTe7NQvGNDWbGV
+FVQggORySktnIpG+V8dkj1Finq7yNOhH2ZzGXwIDAQABAkMAsWYyLglQSlwnS4NZ
+L1z4zieTqW3lomWr2+BgxkHbxl2w0Rx4L+Ezp+YK6mhtIQWNkoytPvWJJMS7Jrkg
+agMAHQJBAiIA+F1y5GO0Bv+igsNLXwwtbCqs8hAkavU9W8egt/oDbhzbAiIA6hds
+PZp/s1X7n7dwfmebSs+3vLZFuQfifN8XZLw0CXHNAiEuEzgDQrPdMIN3er96zImI
+rYoUBgabiQ9u/WPFfa4xOU0CIgDDYC089Tfjy72pPgcr2PkpZVhqro5esg/8PI5f
+yxx7TXkCIgCYoE8Y5IxomtL1ub1AQzPe9UyyUGzQB1yWeiloJh6LjxA=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index 326dcad..5768e03 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -829,40 +829,40 @@
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client disabled, server default" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=0" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server default" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server disabled" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=0" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 run_test    "Truncated HMAC: client enabled, server enabled" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=4 trunc_hmac=1" \
             "$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
              trunc_hmac=1" \
             0 \
-            -S "dumping 'computed mac' (20 bytes)" \
-            -s "dumping 'computed mac' (10 bytes)"
+            -S "dumping 'expected mac' (20 bytes)" \
+            -s "dumping 'expected mac' (10 bytes)"
 
 # Tests for Encrypt-then-MAC extension
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
index f2cdeff..e351ebd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5":0
 
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
 
 Diffie-Hellman full exchange #3
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271"
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #1
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #2
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Diffie-Hellman small modulus
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED
+
+Diffie-Hellman zero modulus
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hallman load parameters from file
 dhm_file:"data_files/dhparams.pem":"9e35f430443a09904f3a39a979797d070df53378e79c2438bef4e761f3c714553328589b041c809be1d6c6b5f1fc9f47d3a25443188253a992a56818b37ba9de5a40d362e56eff0be5417474c125c199272c8fe41dea733df6f662c92ae76556e755d10c64e6a50968f67fc6ea73d0dca8569be2ba204e23580d8bca2f4975b3":"02":128
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
index b9b8e19..4fd8fff 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
-                 int radix_G, char *input_G )
+                 int radix_G, char *input_G, int result )
 {
     mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_srv;
     mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_cli;
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@
     /*
      * First key exchange
      */
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == result );
+    if ( result != 0 )
+        goto exit;
+
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx_cli, &p, ske + ske_len ) == 0 );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
index ac16beb..6258c62 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data
@@ -787,3 +787,47 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:1024:16:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":"7fc506d26ca3b22922a1ce39faaedd273161b82d9443c56f1a034f131ae4a18cae1474271cb4b66a17d9707ca58b0bdbd3c406b7e65bbcc9bbbce94dc45de807b4989b23b3e4db74ca29298137837eb90cc83d3219249bc7d480fceaf075203a86e54c4ecfa4e312e39f8f69d76534089a36ed9049ca9cfd5ab1db1fa75fe5c8":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
 
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, empty salt, bad signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf247":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 522-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:522:16:"02d302753e3dda28f42f4d9f92c8647420ea6fbc97c10f8498b966a953f357698d6581060dfe32c8ab98db4bc5ce2acdf0c1e6e404a75a13282550c1aa37d3cdc8bf":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"016752ae0b5dfbade6bbd3dd37868d48c8d741f92dca41c360aeda553204c2212a117b1a3d77e0d3f48723503c46e16c8a64de00f1dee3e37e478417452630859486":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 528-bit key, SHA-512, saltlen=64, good signature with saltlen=0
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:528:16:"00e31c246d46485984261fd174cab3d4357344602ecd793c47dbe54252d37bb350bc634359b19515542080e4724a4b672291be57c7648f51629eaef234e847d99cc65f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:64:"":"a9ad7994ba3a1071124153486924448cc67a5af3a5d34e9261d53770782cc85f58e2edde5f7004652a645e3e9606530eb57de41df7298ae2be9dec69cc0d613ab629":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 512-bit key, SHA-512 (hash too large)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"ace8b03347da1b9a7a5e94a0d76359bb39c819bb170bef38ea84995ed653446c0ae87ede434cdf9d0cb2d7bf164cf427892363e6855a1d24d0ce5dd72acaf246":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, bad signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:"":"00471794655837da498cbf27242807b40593a353c707eb22fd2cc5a3259e728ac4f1df676043eeec8e16c1175b3d9ac8cae72ec1d5772dd69de71c5677f19031568e":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, good signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"009c4941157fa36288e467310b198ab0c615c40963d611ffeef03000549ded809235955ecc57adba44782e9497c004f480ba2b3d58db8335fe0b391075c02c843a6d":0:0
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-256, empty salt, flipped-highest-bit signature
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:"41":"00e11a2403df681c44a1f73f014b6c9ad17847d0b673f7c2a801cee208d10ab5792c10cd0cd495a4b331aaa521409fca7cb1b0d978b3a84cd67e28078b98753e9466":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+RSASSA-PSS verify ext, all-zero padding, automatic salt length
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"":"63a35294577c7e593170378175b7df27c293dae583ec2a971426eb2d66f2af483e897bfae5dc20300a9d61a3644e08c3aee61a463690a3498901563c46041056":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
+