Merge pull request #8891 from Ryan-Everett-arm/document-SE_C-not-threadsafe
Officially document non thread-safety of MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 5585c78..179c3f6 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -34,9 +34,15 @@
cmake_policy(SET CMP0012 NEW)
if(TEST_CPP)
- project("Mbed TLS" LANGUAGES C CXX)
+ project("Mbed TLS"
+ LANGUAGES C CXX
+ VERSION 3.5.2
+ )
else()
- project("Mbed TLS" LANGUAGES C)
+ project("Mbed TLS"
+ LANGUAGES C
+ VERSION 3.5.2
+ )
endif()
include(GNUInstallDirs)
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8709.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8709.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0bea44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/8709.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Features
+ * The new functions mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa() and
+ mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa() provide ways to set up a PK context
+ with the same content as a PSA key.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8824.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8824.txt
index abc305f..6d6bcb7 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/8824.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/8824.txt
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
Bugfix
* Fix mbedtls_pk_sign(), mbedtls_pk_verify(), mbedtls_pk_decrypt() and
mbedtls_pk_encrypt() on non-opaque RSA keys to honor the padding mode in
- the RSA context. Before, if MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO was enabled, they always
- used PKCS#1 v1.5 even when the RSA context was configured for PKCS#1 v2.1
- (PSS/OAEP). Fixes #8824.
+ the RSA context. Before, if MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO was enabled and the
+ RSA context was configured for PKCS#1 v2.1 (PSS/OAEP), the sign/verify
+ functions performed a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature instead and the
+ encrypt/decrypt functions returned an error. Fixes #8824.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8825.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8825.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..914bd08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/8825.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Features
+ * mbedtls_psa_get_random() is always available as soon as
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled at build time and psa_crypto_init() is
+ called at runtime. This together with MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE can be
+ used as random number generator function (f_rng) and context (p_rng) in
+ legacy functions.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add_get_ecp_group_id.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add_get_ecp_group_id.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3328062
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add_get_ecp_group_id.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+ * Add new accessor to expose the private group id member of
+ `mbedtls_ecdh_context` structure.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/use_exp_mod_core.txt b/ChangeLog.d/use_exp_mod_core.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f7193a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/use_exp_mod_core.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Changes
+ * mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod and code that uses it, notably RSA and DHM operations,
+ have changed their speed/memory compromise as part of a proactive security
+ improvement. The new default value of MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE roughly
+ preserves the current speed, at the expense of increasing memory
+ consumption.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/x509-add-ca_istrue.txt b/ChangeLog.d/x509-add-ca_istrue.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c950dbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/x509-add-ca_istrue.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Features
+ * Add new accessor to expose the `MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue)` member of
+ `mbedtls_x509_crt` structure. This requires setting
+ the MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS bit in the certificate's
+ ext_types field.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 931e06d..71d7b97 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -51,15 +51,15 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE)
/*
- * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 2
+ * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 3
* Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6.
*
* Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used
- * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default)
+ * for the sliding window calculation. (So 8 by default)
*
* Reduction in size, reduces speed.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 2 /**< Maximum window size used. */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 3 /**< Maximum window size used. */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
index 792db79..a0909d6 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
@@ -142,6 +142,19 @@
mbedtls_ecdh_context;
/**
+ * \brief Return the ECP group for provided context.
+ *
+ * \note To access group specific fields, users should use
+ * `mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id` or
+ * `mbedtls_ecp_group_load` on the extracted `group_id`.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to parse. This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id of the context.
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx);
+
+/**
* \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH.
*
* \param gid The ECP group ID to check.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index ff80290..d2e8674 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -390,6 +390,77 @@
const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Create a PK context starting from a key stored in PSA.
+ * This key:
+ * - must be exportable and
+ * - must be an RSA or EC key pair or public key (FFDH is not supported in PK).
+ *
+ * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys.
+ *
+ * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely
+ * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated
+ * from.
+ * Calling mbedtls_pk_sign(), mbedtls_pk_verify(),
+ * mbedtls_pk_encrypt(), mbedtls_pk_decrypt() on the resulting
+ * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that
+ * PK context type.
+ * * For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will
+ * be based on the compile-time setting #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC.
+ * * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both
+ * encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original
+ * key's policy.
+ * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding
+ * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS,
+ * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set.
+ *
+ * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA.
+ * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized,
+ * but not set up.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input
+ * parameters are not correct.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Create a PK context for the public key of a PSA key.
+ *
+ * The key must be an RSA or ECC key. It can be either a
+ * public key or a key pair, and only the public key is copied.
+ * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys.
+ *
+ * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely
+ * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated
+ * from.
+ * Calling mbedtls_pk_verify() or
+ * mbedtls_pk_encrypt() on the resulting
+ * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that
+ * PK context type.
+ *
+ * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both
+ * encrypt and verify regardless of the original key's policy.
+ * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding
+ * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS,
+ * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set.
+ *
+ * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA.
+ * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized,
+ * but not set up.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input
+ * parameters are not correct.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/**
* \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context
@@ -484,20 +555,20 @@
* \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to
* import a key into PSA.
*
- * The attributes determined by this function are suitable
- * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create
- * a PSA key with the same key material.
+ * The attributes determined by this function are suitable
+ * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create
+ * a PSA key with the same key material.
*
- * The typical flow of operations involving this function is
- * ```
- * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes);
- * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
- * // Tweak attributes if desired
- * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
- * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id);
- * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
- * ```
+ * The typical flow of operations involving this function is
+ * ```
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes);
+ * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
+ * // Tweak attributes if desired
+ * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
+ * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id);
+ * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
+ * ```
*
* \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts
* (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()).
@@ -596,24 +667,23 @@
/**
* \brief Import a key into the PSA key store.
*
- * This function is equivalent to calling psa_import_key()
- * with the key material from \p pk.
+ * This function is equivalent to calling psa_import_key()
+ * with the key material from \p pk.
*
- * The typical way to use this function is:
- * -# Call mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() to obtain
- * attributes for the given key.
- * -# If desired, modify the attributes, for example:
- * - To create a persistent key, call
- * psa_set_key_identifier() and optionally
- * psa_set_key_lifetime().
- * - To import only the public part of a key pair:
- * ```
- * psa_set_key_type(&attributes,
- * PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(
- * psa_get_key_type(&attributes)));
- * ```
- * - Restrict the key usage if desired.
- * -# Call mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa().
+ * The typical way to use this function is:
+ * -# Call mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() to obtain
+ * attributes for the given key.
+ * -# If desired, modify the attributes, for example:
+ * - To create a persistent key, call
+ * psa_set_key_identifier() and optionally
+ * psa_set_key_lifetime().
+ * - To import only the public part of a key pair:
+ *
+ * psa_set_key_type(&attributes,
+ * PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(
+ * psa_get_key_type(&attributes)));
+ * - Restrict the key usage if desired.
+ * -# Call mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa().
*
* \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts
* (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()).
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
index 984f031..c78cc23 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
@@ -21,44 +21,24 @@
* otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/
#include <mbedtls/asn1write.h>
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
-
-/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the
- * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be
- * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h.
- * See that file for implementation documentation. */
-
-
-/* The type of a `f_rng` random generator function that many library functions
- * take.
- *
- * This type name is not part of the Mbed TLS stable API. It may be renamed
- * or moved without warning.
- */
-typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem.
*
* This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function
- * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. Use #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE
- * to obtain the \p p_rng parameter.
+ * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions.
*
* The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the
* library.
*
- * \note Depending on the configuration, this may be a function or
- * a pointer to a function.
- *
* \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active.
* This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to
* this function, and you must not call this function after calling
* mbedtls_psa_crypto_free().
*
- * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be
- * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. No other state is
- * supported.
+ * \param p_rng This parameter is only kept for backward compatibility
+ * reasons with legacy `f_rng` functions and it's ignored.
+ * Set to #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE or NULL.
* \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for
* \c output_size bytes.
* \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output.
@@ -80,32 +60,11 @@
/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem.
*
- * This macro expands to an expression which is suitable as the `p_rng`
- * random generator state parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions.
- * It must be used in combination with the random generator function
- * mbedtls_psa_get_random().
- *
- * The implementation of this macro depends on the configuration of the
- * library. Do not make any assumption on its nature.
+ * This macro always expands to NULL because the `p_rng` parameter is unused
+ * in mbedtls_psa_get_random(), but it's kept for interface's backward
+ * compatibility.
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL
-
-#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t;
-static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random;
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t;
-static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random;
-#endif
-extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state;
-
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state
-
-#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL
/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions
* @{
@@ -180,7 +139,7 @@
{
return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 78395d2..9a66663 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1859,7 +1859,8 @@
* within a single datagram. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
* One of:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
@@ -1868,6 +1869,8 @@
*/
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
#endif
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/*
* Record layer (outgoing data)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index 3f1a1e7..1ce0d23 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -916,6 +916,18 @@
return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types) & ext_type;
}
+/**
+ * \brief Access the ca_istrue field
+ *
+ * \param[in] crt Certificate to be queried, must not be \c NULL
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if this a CA certificate \c 0 otherwise.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS if the certificate does not contain
+ * the Optional Basic Constraint extension.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+
/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 47ecf17..835604f 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
padlock.c
pem.c
pk.c
+ pk_ecc.c
pk_wrap.c
pkcs12.c
pkcs5.c
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index d11a98d..bef4335 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
padlock.o \
pem.o \
pk.o \
+ pk_ecc.o \
pk_wrap.o \
pkcs12.o \
pkcs5.o \
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index d3d72ab..c45fd5b 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -37,6 +37,19 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally select an MPI sign in constant time.
+ * (MPI sign is the field s in mbedtls_mpi. It is unsigned short and only 1 and -1 are valid
+ * values.)
+ */
+static inline signed short mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond,
+ signed short sign1, signed short sign2)
+{
+ return (signed short) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(cond, sign1 + 1, sign2 + 1) - 1;
+}
+
/*
* Compare signed values in constant time
*/
@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@
{
mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
- X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
@@ -149,8 +162,8 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n));
s = X->s;
- X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
- Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_swap, s, Y->s);
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
+ Y->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, s, Y->s);
mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap);
@@ -288,8 +301,7 @@
* This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed.
*
* Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API,
- * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example
- * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod().
+ * but some code in the bignum module might still rely on this property.
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
{
@@ -1598,98 +1610,11 @@
return 0;
}
-static void mpi_montg_init(mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N)
-{
- *mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
-}
-
-/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36)
- *
- * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply.
- * It must have at least as many limbs as N
- * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored.
- * On successful completion, A contains the result of
- * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where
- * R = (2^ciL)^n.
- * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply.
- * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N
- * (B->n <= N->n).
- * \param[in] N The modulus. \p N must be odd.
- * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`.
- * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL.
- * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage.
- * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 1
- * (T->n >= 2 * N->n + 1).
- * Its initial content is unused and
- * its final content is indeterminate.
- * It does not get reallocated.
- */
-static void mpi_montmul(mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B,
- const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
- mbedtls_mpi *T)
-{
- mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(A->p, A->p, B->p, B->n, N->p, N->n, mm, T->p);
-}
-
-/*
- * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N
- *
- * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters.
- */
-static void mpi_montred(mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
- mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, mbedtls_mpi *T)
-{
- mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1;
- mbedtls_mpi U;
- U.n = 1;
- U.s = 1;
- U.p = &z;
-
- mpi_montmul(A, &U, N, mm, T);
-}
-
-/**
- * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index.
- *
- * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it
- * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an
- * attacker able to observe memory access patterns.
- *
- * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI.
- * \param[in] T The table to read from.
- * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table.
- * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select;
- * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code.
- */
-static int mpi_select(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
- for (size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(R, &T[i],
- (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(i, idx)));
- }
-cleanup:
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85)
- */
int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t window_bitsize;
- size_t i, j, nblimbs;
- size_t bufsize, nbits;
- size_t exponent_bits_in_window = 0;
- mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state;
- mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[(size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE], WW, Apos;
- int neg;
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -1705,261 +1630,88 @@
}
/*
- * Init temps and window size
+ * Ensure that the exponent that we are passing to the core is not NULL.
*/
- mpi_montg_init(&mm, N);
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&Apos);
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&WW);
- memset(W, 0, sizeof(W));
-
- i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E);
-
- window_bitsize = (i > 671) ? 6 : (i > 239) ? 5 :
- (i > 79) ? 4 : (i > 23) ? 3 : 1;
-
-#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6)
- if (window_bitsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) {
- window_bitsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE;
+ if (E->n == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
-
- const size_t w_table_used_size = (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize;
/*
- * This function is not constant-trace: its memory accesses depend on the
- * exponent value. To defend against timing attacks, callers (such as RSA
- * and DHM) should use exponent blinding. However this is not enough if the
- * adversary can find the exponent in a single trace, so this function
- * takes extra precautions against adversaries who can observe memory
- * access patterns.
- *
- * This function performs a series of multiplications by table elements and
- * squarings, and we want the prevent the adversary from finding out which
- * table element was used, and from distinguishing between multiplications
- * and squarings. Firstly, when multiplying by an element of the window
- * W[i], we do a constant-trace table lookup to obfuscate i. This leaves
- * squarings as having a different memory access patterns from other
- * multiplications. So secondly, we put the accumulator in the table as
- * well, and also do a constant-trace table lookup to multiply by the
- * accumulator which is W[x_index].
- *
- * This way, all multiplications take the form of a lookup-and-multiply.
- * The number of lookup-and-multiply operations inside each iteration of
- * the main loop still depends on the bits of the exponent, but since the
- * other operations in the loop don't have an easily recognizable memory
- * trace, an adversary is unlikely to be able to observe the exact
- * patterns.
- *
- * An adversary may still be able to recover the exponent if they can
- * observe both memory accesses and branches. However, branch prediction
- * exploitation typically requires many traces of execution over the same
- * data, which is defeated by randomized blinding.
+ * Allocate working memory for mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()
*/
- const size_t x_index = 0;
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&W[x_index]);
-
- j = N->n + 1;
- /* All W[i] including the accumulator must have at least N->n limbs for
- * the mpi_montmul() and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that
- * W[1] and the accumulator W[x_index] are large enough. later we'll grow
- * other W[i] to the same length. They must not be shrunk midway through
- * this function!
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[x_index], j));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], j));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&T, j * 2));
-
- /*
- * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end)
- */
- neg = (A->s == -1);
- if (neg) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Apos, A));
- Apos.s = 1;
- A = &Apos;
+ size_t T_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(N->n, E->n);
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(T_limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ if (T == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
+ mbedtls_mpi RR;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
+
/*
* If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N
*/
if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&RR, 1));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&RR, N->n * 2 * biL));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&RR, &RR, N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N));
if (prec_RR != NULL) {
- memcpy(prec_RR, &RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+ *prec_RR = RR;
}
} else {
- memcpy(&RR, prec_RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(prec_RR, N->n));
+ RR = *prec_RR;
}
/*
- * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N
+ * To preserve constness we need to make a copy of A. Using X for this to
+ * save memory.
*/
- if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(A, N) >= 0) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&W[1], A, N));
- /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before
- * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow
- * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], N->n + 1));
- } else {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[1], A));
- }
-
- /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs
- * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */
- mpi_montmul(&W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A));
/*
- * W[x_index] = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N
+ * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end).
*/
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[x_index], &RR));
- mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T);
+ X->s = 1;
-
- if (window_bitsize > 1) {
- /*
- * W[i] = W[1] ^ i
- *
- * The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore we
- * only need to store the second half of the table.
- *
- * (There are two special elements in the table: W[0] for the
- * accumulator/result and W[1] for A in Montgomery form. Both of these
- * are already set at this point.)
- */
- j = w_table_used_size / 2;
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[j], N->n + 1));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[j], &W[1]));
-
- for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize - 1; i++) {
- mpi_montmul(&W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T);
- }
-
- /*
- * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1]
- */
- for (i = j + 1; i < w_table_used_size; i++) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[i], N->n + 1));
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[i], &W[i - 1]));
-
- mpi_montmul(&W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T);
- }
+ /*
+ * Make sure that X is in a form that is safe for consumption by
+ * the core functions.
+ *
+ * - The core functions will not touch the limbs of X above N->n. The
+ * result will be correct if those limbs are 0, which the mod call
+ * ensures.
+ * - Also, X must have at least as many limbs as N for the calls to the
+ * core functions.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, N) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N));
}
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, N->n));
- nblimbs = E->n;
- bufsize = 0;
- nbits = 0;
- state = 0;
-
- while (1) {
- if (bufsize == 0) {
- if (nblimbs == 0) {
- break;
- }
-
- nblimbs--;
-
- bufsize = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) << 3;
- }
-
- bufsize--;
-
- ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1;
-
- /*
- * skip leading 0s
- */
- if (ei == 0 && state == 0) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (ei == 0 && state == 1) {
- /*
- * out of window, square W[x_index]
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index));
- mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T);
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * add ei to current window
- */
- state = 2;
-
- nbits++;
- exponent_bits_in_window |= (ei << (window_bitsize - nbits));
-
- if (nbits == window_bitsize) {
- /*
- * W[x_index] = W[x_index]^window_bitsize R^-1 mod N
- */
- for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize; i++) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size,
- x_index));
- mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T);
- }
-
- /*
- * W[x_index] = W[x_index] * W[exponent_bits_in_window] R^-1 mod N
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size,
- exponent_bits_in_window));
- mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T);
-
- state--;
- nbits = 0;
- exponent_bits_in_window = 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * Convert to and from Montgomery around mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod().
+ */
+ {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T);
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T);
}
/*
- * process the remaining bits
+ * Correct for negative A.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index));
- mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T);
+ if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_x_non_zero = mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(X->p, X->n);
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(is_x_non_zero, -1, 1);
- exponent_bits_in_window <<= 1;
-
- if ((exponent_bits_in_window & ((size_t) 1 << window_bitsize)) != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, 1));
- mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T);
- }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X));
}
- /*
- * W[x_index] = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N
- */
- mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T);
-
- if (neg && E->n != 0 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) {
- W[x_index].s = -1;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&W[x_index], N, &W[x_index]));
- }
-
- /*
- * Load the result in the output variable.
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, &W[x_index]));
-
cleanup:
- /* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore the first
- * half of the table was unused. */
- for (i = w_table_used_size/2; i < w_table_used_size; i++) {
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[i]);
- }
-
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[x_index]);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[1]);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&Apos);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&WW);
+ mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(T, T_limbs);
if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) {
mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR);
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.c b/library/bignum_core.c
index dfed60d..1a3e0b9 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.c
+++ b/library/bignum_core.c
@@ -856,16 +856,17 @@
return c;
}
-mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
- size_t limbs)
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs)
{
+ volatile const mbedtls_mpi_uint *force_read_A = A;
mbedtls_mpi_uint bits = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
- bits |= A[i];
+ bits |= force_read_A[i];
}
- return bits;
+ return mbedtls_ct_bool(bits);
}
void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.h b/library/bignum_core.h
index b56be0a..92c8d47 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.h
+++ b/library/bignum_core.h
@@ -662,11 +662,11 @@
* \param[in] A The MPI to test.
* \param limbs Number of limbs in \p A.
*
- * \return 0 if `A == 0`
- * non-0 (may be any value) if `A != 0`.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if `A == 0`
+ * MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if `A != 0`.
*/
-mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
- size_t limbs);
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs);
/**
* \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
diff --git a/library/cmac.c b/library/cmac.c
index f40cae2..cd3bd3a 100644
--- a/library/cmac.c
+++ b/library/cmac.c
@@ -56,22 +56,29 @@
size_t blocksize)
{
const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87;
- const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B;
unsigned char R_n, mask;
- unsigned char overflow = 0x00;
+ uint32_t overflow = 0x00;
int i;
if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
R_n = R_128;
- } else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B;
R_n = R_64;
- } else {
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- for (i = (int) blocksize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- output[i] = input[i] << 1 | overflow;
- overflow = input[i] >> 7;
+ for (i = (int) blocksize - 4; i >= 0; i -= 4) {
+ uint32_t i32 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(&input[i], 0);
+ uint32_t new_overflow = i32 >> 31;
+ i32 = (i32 << 1) | overflow;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(i32, &output[i], 0);
+ overflow = new_overflow;
}
/* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00
diff --git a/library/ecdh.c b/library/ecdh.c
index 52b1617..b276c6a 100644
--- a/library/ecdh.c
+++ b/library/ecdh.c
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@
#endif
}
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id;
+#else
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Initialize context
*/
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index 003ef4a..1d85c92 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE > PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) ? \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE : PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
+
/*
* Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context
*/
@@ -1017,7 +1021,7 @@
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg);
p = buf + sizeof(buf);
- key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, ctx);
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), buf, &p);
if (key_len < 0) {
return key_len;
@@ -1374,4 +1378,136 @@
return ctx->pk_info->type;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+static int copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ int public_only)
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg_type;
+ size_t key_bits;
+ /* Use a buffer size large enough to contain either a key pair or public key. */
+ unsigned char exp_key[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t exp_key_len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (public_only) {
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len);
+ } else {
+ status = psa_export_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ key_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attr);
+ if (public_only) {
+ key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type);
+ }
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr);
+ alg_type = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ if ((key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ||
+ (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ if (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg_type) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) {
+ md_type = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(alg_type);
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg_type) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg_type)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type);
+ } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg_type) ||
+ alg_type == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, md_type);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ||
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type), key_bits);
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 1);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
diff --git a/library/pk_ecc.c b/library/pk_ecc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86218ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/pk_ecc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*
+ * ECC setters for PK.
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ size_t ec_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits);
+
+ /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
+ if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) ||
+ (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /* set group */
+ pk->ec_family = ec_family;
+ pk->ec_bits = ec_bits;
+
+ return 0;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+
+ /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
+ if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE &&
+ mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /* set group */
+ return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_usage_t flags;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family));
+ if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) {
+ /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and
+ * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for
+ * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags
+ * and algorithm. */
+ flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
+ } else {
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
+ flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id);
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+ int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ (void) prv;
+ (void) prv_len;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw),
+ &pk->pub_raw_len);
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+
+ /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT);
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ }
+
+ /* Export public key from PSA */
+ unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t pub_len;
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len);
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status);
+ }
+
+ /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */
+ return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len);
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ (void) prv;
+ (void) prv_len;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+/*
+ * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case.
+ *
+ * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA
+ * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not
+ * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested,
+ * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason
+ * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint,
+ * in any format supported by ECP.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 on success;
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
+ * but not supported;
+ * - another error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *pub,
+ size_t pub_len)
+{
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED)
+ (void) pk;
+ (void) pub;
+ (void) pub_len;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
+ int ret;
+
+ ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key);
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
+ pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw,
+ sizeof(pk->pub_raw));
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key);
+ return ret;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+
+ /* Load the key */
+ if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) {
+ /* Format directly supported by PSA:
+ * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format;
+ * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */
+ if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len);
+ pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len;
+ } else {
+ /* Other format, try the fallback */
+ int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the key by trying to import it */
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family));
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits);
+
+ if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len,
+ &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) ||
+ (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h
index f5924ad..e86a3a0 100644
--- a/library/pk_internal.h
+++ b/library/pk_internal.h
@@ -127,6 +127,62 @@
return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id);
}
+
+/*
+ * Set the group used by this key.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type
+ * out: will have group (curve) information set
+ * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE)
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
+
+/*
+ * Set the private key material
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the private key set.
+ * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping).
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set the public key.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 on success;
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
+ * but not supported;
+ * - another error code otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len);
+
+/*
+ * Derive a public key from its private counterpart.
+ * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below).
+ * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context.
+ *
+ * Note: the private key information is always available from pk,
+ * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed,
+ * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs
+ * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context).
+ *
+ * There are three implementations of this function:
+ * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
+ * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
+ * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index 846175e..256863a 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, psa_encrypt_alg;
psa_status_t status;
int key_len;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
@@ -389,10 +389,11 @@
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa));
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg));
+ psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg);
} else {
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT);
+ psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT;
}
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_encrypt_alg);
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY);
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
@@ -403,7 +404,7 @@
goto cleanup;
}
- status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT,
+ status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, psa_encrypt_alg,
input, ilen,
NULL, 0,
output, osize, olen);
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 5a3d3b2..4f6ee13 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -46,302 +46,6 @@
/***********************************************************************
*
- * ECC setters
- *
- * 1. This is an abstraction layer around MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA:
- * this macro will not appear outside this section.
- * 2. All inputs are raw: no metadata, no ASN.1 until the next section.
- *
- **********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * Set the group used by this key.
- *
- * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type
- * out: will have group (curve) information set
- * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE)
- */
-static int pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
- size_t ec_bits;
- psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits);
-
- /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
- if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) ||
- (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
- }
-
- /* set group */
- pk->ec_family = ec_family;
- pk->ec_bits = ec_bits;
-
- return 0;
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
-
- /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
- if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE &&
- mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
- }
-
- /* set group */
- return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-}
-
-/*
- * Set the private key material
- *
- * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see pk_ecc_set_group().
- * out: will have the private key set.
- * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping).
- */
-static int pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- psa_key_usage_t flags;
- psa_status_t status;
-
- psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family));
- if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) {
- /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and
- * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for
- * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags
- * and algorithm. */
- flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
- } else {
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes,
- MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
- flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
- }
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags);
-
- status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id);
- return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
- int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
- }
- return 0;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-}
-
-/*
- * Derive a public key from its private counterpart.
- * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available.
- *
- * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see pk_ecc_set_key().
- * out: will have the public key set.
- * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below).
- * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context.
- *
- * Note: the private key information is always available from pk,
- * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed,
- * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs
- * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context).
- *
- * There are three implementations of this function:
- * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
- * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
- * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO.
- */
-static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
-
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
- (void) prv;
- (void) prv_len;
- psa_status_t status;
-
- status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw),
- &pk->pub_raw_len);
- return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
-
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
- psa_status_t status;
-
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
- size_t curve_bits;
- psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits);
-
- /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT);
- status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
- }
-
- /* Export public key from PSA */
- unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
- size_t pub_len;
- status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len);
- psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
- } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status);
- }
-
- /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */
- return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len);
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-
- (void) prv;
- (void) prv_len;
-
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
- return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng);
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
-/*
- * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case.
- *
- * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA
- * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not
- * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested,
- * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason
- * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT.
- *
- * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see pk_ecc_set_group().
- * out: will have the public key set.
- * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint,
- * in any format supported by ECP.
- *
- * Return:
- * - 0 on success;
- * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
- * but not supported;
- * - another error code otherwise.
- */
-static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- const unsigned char *pub,
- size_t pub_len)
-{
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED)
- (void) pk;
- (void) pub;
- (void) pub_len;
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key;
- mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
- int ret;
-
- ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
-
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key);
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id);
- if (ret != 0) {
- goto exit;
- }
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
- pub, pub_len);
- if (ret != 0) {
- goto exit;
- }
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
- MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
- &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw,
- sizeof(pk->pub_raw));
-
-exit:
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key);
- return ret;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-
-/*
- * Set the public key.
- *
- * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see pk_ecc_set_group().
- * out: will have the public key set.
- * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint).
- *
- * Return:
- * - 0 on success;
- * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
- * but not supported;
- * - another error code otherwise.
- */
-static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
-
- /* Load the key */
- if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) {
- /* Format directly supported by PSA:
- * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format;
- * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */
- if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- }
- memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len);
- pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len;
- } else {
- /* Other format, try the fallback */
- int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- /* Validate the key by trying to import it */
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0);
- psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family));
- psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits);
-
- if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len,
- &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) ||
- (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-
- int ret;
- mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q);
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
-}
-
-/***********************************************************************
- *
* Low-level ECC parsing: optional support for SpecifiedECDomain
*
* There are two functions here that are used by the rest of the code:
@@ -698,7 +402,7 @@
}
}
- return pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+ return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES)
@@ -714,7 +418,7 @@
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
- return pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+ return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
}
/*
@@ -740,7 +444,7 @@
/*
* Load the private key
*/
- ret = pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len);
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -748,7 +452,7 @@
/* pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der() only supports version 1 PKCS8 keys,
* which never contain a public key. As such, derive the public key
* unconditionally. */
- if ((ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -874,7 +578,7 @@
ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, pk);
}
if (ret == 0) {
- ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p));
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p));
*p += end - *p;
}
} else
@@ -966,7 +670,7 @@
/*
* Load the private key
*/
- ret = pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len);
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -990,11 +694,11 @@
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
- if ((ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) {
pubkey_done = 1;
} else {
/*
- * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above
+ * The only acceptable failure mode of mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above
* is if the point format is not recognized.
*/
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
@@ -1007,7 +711,7 @@
}
if (!pubkey_done) {
- if ((ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 3c2b6a0..ec9d115 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -101,11 +101,6 @@
static psa_global_data_t global_data;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
-mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state =
- &global_data.rng.drbg;
-#endif
-
#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \
if (global_data.initialized == 0) \
return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
@@ -1106,6 +1101,17 @@
* fully destroyed. */
PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(
&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex));
+
+ if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) {
+ /* Another thread has destroyed the key between us locking the slot
+ * and us gaining the mutex. Unregister from the slot,
+ * and report that the key does not exist. */
+ status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
+
+ PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock(
+ &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex));
+ return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE : status;
+ }
#endif
/* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to
* PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering
@@ -1115,10 +1121,10 @@
* If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key
* from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to
* deal with the deletion. */
- status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL,
- PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION);
+ overall_status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL,
+ PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ if (overall_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
@@ -6940,7 +6946,7 @@
size_t peer_key_length)
{
psa_status_t status;
- uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE];
+ uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
size_t shared_secret_length = 0;
psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(operation->alg);
@@ -7103,7 +7109,7 @@
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG);
#endif
- mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
+ mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(&rng->drbg);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
}
@@ -7114,7 +7120,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng));
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
- mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
+ mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(&rng->drbg);
rng->entropy_free(&rng->entropy);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
}
@@ -7129,7 +7135,7 @@
return PSA_SUCCESS;
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA";
- int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->entropy,
+ int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->drbg, &rng->entropy,
drbg_seed, sizeof(drbg_seed) - 1);
return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
@@ -7159,12 +7165,16 @@
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
while (output_size > 0) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
size_t request_size =
(output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ?
MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST :
output_size);
- int ret = mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- output, request_size);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size);
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
if (ret != 0) {
return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
}
@@ -7175,39 +7185,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
}
-/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG.
- *
- * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls
- * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the
- * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state.
- *
- * In the non-external case, psa_generate_random() calls an
- * `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random` function which has exactly the same signature
- * and semantics as mbedtls_psa_get_random(). As an optimization,
- * instead of doing this back-and-forth between the PSA API and the
- * classic API, psa_crypto_random_impl.h defines `mbedtls_psa_get_random`
- * as a constant function pointer to `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random`.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
-int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng,
- unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_size)
-{
- /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what
- * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages
- * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state.
- * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass
- * NULL. */
- (void) p_rng;
- psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size);
- if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
- return 0;
- } else {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
- }
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY)
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_size)
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
index 64b8949..533fb2e 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h
@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h
*
* \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction.
- *
- * The definitions here need to be consistent with the declarations
- * in include/psa_util_internal.h. This file contains some redundant
- * declarations to increase the chance that a compiler will detect
- * inconsistencies if one file is changed without updating the other,
- * but not all potential inconsistencies can be enforced, so make sure
- * to check the public declarations and contracts in
- * include/psa_util_internal.h if you modify this file.
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
@@ -22,22 +14,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
-#include <string.h>
-#include <mbedtls/entropy.h> // only for error codes
-#include <psa/crypto.h>
-
typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t;
-/* Trivial wrapper around psa_generate_random(). */
-int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng,
- unsigned char *output,
- size_t output_size);
-
-/* The PSA RNG API doesn't need any externally maintained state. */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL
-
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+
/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)
@@ -67,11 +49,37 @@
#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG."
#endif
-#else
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
+
#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module."
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
+
+/* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST
#endif
-#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
+
+typedef struct {
+ void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+ void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+ mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
+ mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg;
+} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t;
/** Initialize the PSA DRBG.
*
@@ -99,63 +107,6 @@
#endif
}
-/** The type of the PSA random generator context.
- *
- * The random generator context is composed of an entropy context and
- * a DRBG context.
- */
-typedef struct {
- void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
- void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
- mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
- mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg;
-} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t;
-
-/* Defined in include/psa_util_internal.h so that it's visible to
- * application code. The declaration here is redundant, but included
- * as a safety net to make it more likely that a future change that
- * accidentally causes the implementation to diverge from the interface
- * will be noticed. */
-/* Do not include the declaration under MSVC because it doesn't accept it
- * ("error C2370: 'mbedtls_psa_get_random' : redefinition; different storage class").
- * Observed with Visual Studio 2013. A known bug apparently:
- * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8146541/duplicate-external-static-declarations-not-allowed-in-visual-studio
- */
-#if !defined(_MSC_VER)
-static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random;
-#endif
-
-/** The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to
- * return.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST
-#endif
-
-/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state.
- *
- * This variable is only intended to be used through the macro
- * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE.
- */
-/* psa_crypto.c sets this variable to a pointer to the DRBG state in the
- * global PSA crypto state. */
-/* The type `mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t` is defined in
- * include/psa_util_internal.h so that `mbedtls_psa_random_state` can be
- * declared there and be visible to application code. */
-extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state;
-
-/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state.
- *
- * This macro expands to an expression that is suitable as the \c p_rng
- * parameter to pass to mbedtls_psa_get_random().
- *
- * This macro exists in all configurations where the psa_crypto module is
- * enabled. Its expansion depends on the configuration.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state
-
/** Seed the PSA DRBG.
*
* \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from.
@@ -167,23 +118,15 @@
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure.
*/
-static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(
- mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy,
- const unsigned char *custom, size_t len)
+static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *drbg_ctx,
+ mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom, size_t len)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
- return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- mbedtls_entropy_func,
- entropy,
- custom, len);
+ return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len);
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info =
- mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE);
- return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE,
- md_info,
- mbedtls_entropy_func,
- entropy,
- custom, len);
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE);
+ return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, md_info, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len);
#endif
}
diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c
index 125b173..4ccc5b0 100644
--- a/library/psa_util.c
+++ b/library/psa_util.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
#include <psa/crypto.h>
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include <mbedtls/cipher.h>
#endif
+#include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since
* it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */
@@ -338,7 +339,31 @@
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG.
+ *
+ * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls
+ * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the
+ * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state.
+ */
+int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_size)
+{
+ /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what
+ * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages
+ * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state.
+ * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass
+ * NULL. */
+ (void) p_rng;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size);
+ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
diff --git a/library/psa_util_internal.h b/library/psa_util_internal.h
index 3e62d5f..70a08a0 100644
--- a/library/psa_util_internal.h
+++ b/library/psa_util_internal.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
/*************************************************************************
* FFDH
@@ -96,5 +96,5 @@
sizeof(error_list)/sizeof(error_list[0]), \
fallback_f)
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 5debc69..7eb4a25 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -2231,7 +2231,7 @@
if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- if (ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ if ((ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) && (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen,
diff --git a/library/sha3.c b/library/sha3.c
index 27d495f..5738559 100644
--- a/library/sha3.c
+++ b/library/sha3.c
@@ -14,6 +14,33 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+/*
+ * These macros select manually unrolled implementations of parts of the main permutation function.
+ *
+ * Unrolling has a major impact on both performance and code size. gcc performance benefits a lot
+ * from manually unrolling at higher optimisation levels.
+ *
+ * Depending on your size/perf priorities, compiler and target, it may be beneficial to adjust
+ * these; the defaults here should give sensible trade-offs for gcc and clang on aarch64 and
+ * x86-64.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL)
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL)
+ #if defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__)
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names
+ #else
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names
+ #endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL)
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL)
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names
+#endif
+
#include "mbedtls/sha3.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@@ -56,18 +83,15 @@
};
#undef H
-static const uint8_t rho[24] = {
- 1, 62, 28, 27, 36, 44, 6, 55, 20,
- 3, 10, 43, 25, 39, 41, 45, 15,
- 21, 8, 18, 2, 61, 56, 14
+static const uint32_t rho[6] = {
+ 0x3f022425, 0x1c143a09, 0x2c3d3615, 0x27191713, 0x312b382e, 0x3e030832
};
-static const uint8_t pi[24] = {
- 10, 7, 11, 17, 18, 3, 5, 16, 8, 21, 24, 4,
- 15, 23, 19, 13, 12, 2, 20, 14, 22, 9, 6, 1,
+static const uint32_t pi[6] = {
+ 0x110b070a, 0x10050312, 0x04181508, 0x0d13170f, 0x0e14020c, 0x01060916
};
-#define ROT64(x, y) (((x) << (y)) | ((x) >> (64U - (y))))
+#define ROTR64(x, y) (((x) << (64U - (y))) | ((x) >> (y))) // 64-bit rotate right
#define ABSORB(ctx, idx, v) do { ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] ^= ((uint64_t) (v)) << (((idx) & 0x7) << 3); \
} while (0)
#define SQUEEZE(ctx, idx) ((uint8_t) (ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] >> (((idx) & 0x7) << 3)))
@@ -84,39 +108,97 @@
uint64_t t;
/* Theta */
+#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+ lane[i] = s[i] ^ s[i + 5] ^ s[i + 10] ^ s[i + 15] ^ s[i + 20];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+ t = lane[(i + 4) % 5] ^ ROTR64(lane[(i + 1) % 5], 63);
+ s[i] ^= t; s[i + 5] ^= t; s[i + 10] ^= t; s[i + 15] ^= t; s[i + 20] ^= t;
+ }
+#else
lane[0] = s[0] ^ s[5] ^ s[10] ^ s[15] ^ s[20];
lane[1] = s[1] ^ s[6] ^ s[11] ^ s[16] ^ s[21];
lane[2] = s[2] ^ s[7] ^ s[12] ^ s[17] ^ s[22];
lane[3] = s[3] ^ s[8] ^ s[13] ^ s[18] ^ s[23];
lane[4] = s[4] ^ s[9] ^ s[14] ^ s[19] ^ s[24];
- t = lane[4] ^ ROT64(lane[1], 1);
+ t = lane[4] ^ ROTR64(lane[1], 63);
s[0] ^= t; s[5] ^= t; s[10] ^= t; s[15] ^= t; s[20] ^= t;
- t = lane[0] ^ ROT64(lane[2], 1);
+ t = lane[0] ^ ROTR64(lane[2], 63);
s[1] ^= t; s[6] ^= t; s[11] ^= t; s[16] ^= t; s[21] ^= t;
- t = lane[1] ^ ROT64(lane[3], 1);
+ t = lane[1] ^ ROTR64(lane[3], 63);
s[2] ^= t; s[7] ^= t; s[12] ^= t; s[17] ^= t; s[22] ^= t;
- t = lane[2] ^ ROT64(lane[4], 1);
+ t = lane[2] ^ ROTR64(lane[4], 63);
s[3] ^= t; s[8] ^= t; s[13] ^= t; s[18] ^= t; s[23] ^= t;
- t = lane[3] ^ ROT64(lane[0], 1);
+ t = lane[3] ^ ROTR64(lane[0], 63);
s[4] ^= t; s[9] ^= t; s[14] ^= t; s[19] ^= t; s[24] ^= t;
+#endif
/* Rho */
- for (i = 1; i < 25; i++) {
- s[i] = ROT64(s[i], rho[i-1]);
+ for (i = 1; i < 25; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t r = rho[(i - 1) >> 2];
+#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL == 0
+ for (int j = i; j < i + 4; j++) {
+ uint8_t r8 = (uint8_t) (r >> 24);
+ r <<= 8;
+ s[j] = ROTR64(s[j], r8);
+ }
+#else
+ s[i + 0] = ROTR64(s[i + 0], MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(r));
+ s[i + 1] = ROTR64(s[i + 1], MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(r));
+ s[i + 2] = ROTR64(s[i + 2], MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(r));
+ s[i + 3] = ROTR64(s[i + 3], MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(r));
+#endif
}
/* Pi */
t = s[1];
- for (i = 0; i < 24; i++) {
- SWAP(s[pi[i]], t);
+#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL == 0
+ for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t p = pi[i >> 2];
+ for (unsigned j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ SWAP(s[p & 0xff], t);
+ p >>= 8;
+ }
}
+#else
+ uint32_t p = pi[0];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+ p = pi[1];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+ p = pi[2];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+ p = pi[3];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+ p = pi[4];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+ p = pi[5];
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t);
+ SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t);
+#endif
/* Chi */
+#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names
+ for (i = 0; i <= 20; i += 5) {
+ lane[0] = s[i]; lane[1] = s[i + 1]; lane[2] = s[i + 2];
+ lane[3] = s[i + 3]; lane[4] = s[i + 4];
+ s[i + 0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2];
+ s[i + 1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3];
+ s[i + 2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4];
+ s[i + 3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0];
+ s[i + 4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1];
+ }
+#else
lane[0] = s[0]; lane[1] = s[1]; lane[2] = s[2]; lane[3] = s[3]; lane[4] = s[4];
s[0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2];
s[1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3];
@@ -151,6 +233,7 @@
s[22] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4];
s[23] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0];
s[24] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1];
+#endif
/* Iota */
/* Decompress the round masks (see definition of rc) */
diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c
index 6d988a8..8892acf 100644
--- a/library/ssl_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_client.c
@@ -765,11 +765,6 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS &&
MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
- if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
- }
-
/* Bet on the highest configured version if we are not in a TLS 1.2
* renegotiation or session resumption.
*/
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index d8844fc..883b988 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -2150,6 +2150,9 @@
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t early_data_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index 2a6d434..4949306 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -4005,7 +4005,11 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."));
- /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
@@ -4129,9 +4133,15 @@
*/
if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) {
if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"));
- /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */
+
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
} else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD;
@@ -6064,7 +6074,7 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf;
- int written_data_len = 0;
+ uint32_t remaining;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write early_data"));
@@ -6114,18 +6124,27 @@
return ret;
}
}
+ remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size;
} else {
/*
- * If we are past the point where we can send early data, return
- * immediatly. Otherwise, progress the handshake as much as possible to
- * not delay it too much. If we reach a point where we can still send
- * early data, then we will send some.
+ * If we are past the point where we can send early data or we have
+ * already reached the maximum early data size, return immediatly.
+ * Otherwise, progress the handshake as much as possible to not delay
+ * it too much. If we reach a point where we can still send early data,
+ * then we will send some.
*/
if ((ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE) &&
(ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA;
}
+ remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size -
+ ssl->total_early_data_size;
+
+ if (remaining == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA;
+ }
+
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl);
if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ)) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret);
@@ -6133,16 +6152,24 @@
}
}
- if ((ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE) &&
- (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED)) {
+ if (((ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE) &&
+ (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED))
+ || (remaining == 0)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA;
}
- written_data_len = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len);
+ if (len > remaining) {
+ len = remaining;
+ }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write early_data, len=%d", written_data_len));
+ ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ ssl->total_early_data_size += ret;
+ }
- return written_data_len;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write early_data, ret=%d", ret));
+
+ return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index b09db1e..1bfd180 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1101,6 +1101,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD;
#endif
+ ssl->total_early_data_size = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/* Initialize structures */
@@ -1361,6 +1362,11 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+ if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
+ }
+
/* Space for further checks */
return 0;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 5bee188..b49a8ae 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -2178,11 +2178,6 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
- if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
- }
-
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index bc73704..d448a05 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -1454,6 +1454,54 @@
return 0;
}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t early_data_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress
+ * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a
+ * misuse.
+ */
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1
+ *
+ * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
+ * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
+ * Note that if it is still possible to send early_data_len bytes of early
+ * data, it means that early_data_len is smaller than max_early_data_size
+ * (type uint32_t) and can fit in an uint32_t. We use this further
+ * down.
+ */
+ if (early_data_len >
+ (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size -
+ ssl->total_early_data_size)) {
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u",
+ ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * early_data_len has been checked to be less than max_early_data_size
+ * that is uint32_t. Its cast to an uint32_t below is thus safe. We need
+ * the cast to appease some compilers.
+ */
+ ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 3a968aa..887c5c6 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -39,6 +39,63 @@
return ciphersuite_info;
}
+static void ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *cipher_suites,
+ const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end,
+ int psk_ciphersuite_id,
+ psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info)
+{
+ *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * In a compliant ClientHello the byte-length of the list of ciphersuites
+ * is even and this function relies on this fact. This should have been
+ * checked in the main ClientHello parsing function. Double check here.
+ */
+ if ((cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites) & 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites;
+ p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) {
+ /*
+ * "cipher_suites_end - p is even" is an invariant of the loop. As
+ * cipher_suites_end - p > 0, we have cipher_suites_end - p >= 2 and it
+ * is thus safe to read two bytes.
+ */
+ uint16_t id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info =
+ ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl, id);
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If a valid PSK ciphersuite identifier has been passed in, we want
+ * an exact match.
+ */
+ if (psk_ciphersuite_id != 0) {
+ if (id != psk_ciphersuite_id) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else if (psk_hash_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE) {
+ if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac) !=
+ psk_hash_alg) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *selected_ciphersuite_info = info;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No matched ciphersuite, psk_ciphersuite_id=%x, psk_hash_alg=%x",
+ (unsigned) psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg));
+}
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/* From RFC 8446:
*
@@ -90,8 +147,30 @@
return 0;
}
-#define SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_NOT_MATCH 1
-#define SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH 0
+/*
+ * Non-error return values of
+ * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket() and
+ * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match(). They are positive to
+ * not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero
+ * (SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated
+ * up by the callers of this function as a generic success condition.
+ *
+ * The return value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE means
+ * that the pre-shared-key identity matches that of a ticket or an externally-
+ * provisioned pre-shared-key. We have thus been able to retrieve the
+ * attributes of the pre-shared-key but at least one of them does not meet
+ * some criteria and the pre-shared-key cannot be used. For example, a ticket
+ * is expired or its version is not TLS 1.3. Note eventually that the return
+ * value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE does not have
+ * anything to do with binder check. A binder check is done only when a
+ * suitable pre-shared-key has been selected and only for that selected
+ * pre-shared-key: if the binder check fails, we fail the handshake and we do
+ * not try to find another pre-shared-key for which the binder check would
+ * succeed as recommended by the specification.
+ */
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH 2
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE 1
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH 0
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
@@ -109,7 +188,6 @@
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *ticket_buffer;
- unsigned int key_exchanges;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_ms_time_t now;
mbedtls_ms_time_t server_age;
@@ -123,7 +201,7 @@
/* Ticket parser is not configured, Skip */
if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || identity_len == 0) {
- return 0;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
}
/* We create a copy of the encrypted ticket since the ticket parsing
@@ -133,63 +211,51 @@
*/
ticket_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, identity_len);
if (ticket_buffer == NULL) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
memcpy(ticket_buffer, identity, identity_len);
- if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket,
- session,
- ticket_buffer, identity_len)) != 0) {
- if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic"));
- } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) {
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket,
+ session,
+ ticket_buffer, identity_len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH;
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired"));
- } else {
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE;
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic"));
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
+ break;
+
+ default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ticket_parse", ret);
- }
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
}
/* We delete the temporary buffer */
mbedtls_free(ticket_buffer);
- if (ret == 0 && session->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket TLS version is not 1.3."));
- /* TODO: Define new return value for this case. */
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- }
-
- if (ret != 0) {
+ if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) {
goto exit;
}
- /* RFC 8446 section 4.2.9
- *
- * Servers SHOULD NOT send NewSessionTicket with tickets that are not
- * compatible with the advertised modes; however, if a server does so,
- * the impact will just be that the client's attempts at resumption fail.
- *
- * We regard the ticket with incompatible key exchange modes as not match.
+ /*
+ * The identity matches that of a ticket. Now check that it has suitable
+ * attributes and bet it will not be the case.
*/
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags);
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE;
- key_exchanges = 0;
- if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk_ephemeral(session) &&
- ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
- key_exchanges |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
- }
- if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk(session) &&
- ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) {
- key_exchanges |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
- }
-
- if (key_exchanges == 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No suitable key exchange mode"));
+ if (session->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket TLS version is not 1.3."));
goto exit;
}
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
now = mbedtls_ms_time();
@@ -242,13 +308,15 @@
age_diff));
goto exit;
}
-
- ret = 0;
-
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+ /*
+ * All good, we have found a suitable ticket.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH;
+
exit:
- if (ret != 0) {
+ if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) {
mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session);
}
@@ -273,13 +341,11 @@
*psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "identity", identity, identity_len);
- ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
- if (ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket(
- ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age,
- session) == SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH) {
- ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
+ ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket(
+ ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, session);
+ if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) {
*psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl,
session->resumption_key,
@@ -294,7 +360,9 @@
session->resumption_key_len);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("ticket: obfuscated_ticket_age: %u",
(unsigned) obfuscated_ticket_age));
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH;
+ } else if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE) {
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
@@ -302,9 +370,9 @@
if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) {
if (ssl->conf->f_psk(
ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, identity, identity_len) == 0) {
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH;
}
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_NOT_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(5, "identity", identity, identity_len);
@@ -318,12 +386,20 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
return ret;
}
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH;
}
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_NOT_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
}
+/*
+ * Non-error return values of ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match().
+ * They are positive to not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero
+ * (SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated up
+ * by the callers of this function as a generic success condition.
+ */
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH 1
+#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH 0
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -368,100 +444,16 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( received ): ", binder, binder_len);
if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(server_computed_binder, binder, binder_len) == 0) {
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(server_computed_binder,
sizeof(server_computed_binder));
- return SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_NOT_MATCH;
-}
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite_for_psk(
- mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *cipher_suites,
- const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end,
- uint16_t *selected_ciphersuite,
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info)
-{
- psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
-
- *selected_ciphersuite = 0;
- *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL;
-
- /* RFC 8446, page 55.
- *
- * For externally established PSKs, the Hash algorithm MUST be set when the
- * PSK is established or default to SHA-256 if no such algorithm is defined.
- *
- */
-
- /*
- * Search for a matching ciphersuite
- */
- for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites;
- p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) {
- uint16_t cipher_suite;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
-
- cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
- ciphersuite_info = ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl,
- cipher_suite);
- if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
- continue;
- }
-
- /* MAC of selected ciphersuite MUST be same with PSK binder if exist.
- * Otherwise, client should reject.
- */
- if (psk_hash_alg ==
- mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac)) {
- *selected_ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
- *selected_ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No matched ciphersuite"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite_for_resumption(
- mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *cipher_suites,
- const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end,
- mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
- uint16_t *selected_ciphersuite,
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info)
-{
-
- *selected_ciphersuite = 0;
- *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL;
- for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites; p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) {
- uint16_t cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
-
- if (cipher_suite != session->ciphersuite) {
- continue;
- }
-
- ciphersuite_info = ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl,
- cipher_suite);
- if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
- continue;
- }
-
- *selected_ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
- *selected_ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-}
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *src)
{
@@ -481,6 +473,13 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+struct psk_attributes {
+ int type;
+ int key_exchange_mode;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+};
+#define PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, 0, NULL }
+
/* Parser for pre_shared_key extension in client hello
* struct {
* opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
@@ -507,7 +506,8 @@
const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext,
const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end,
const unsigned char *ciphersuites,
- const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end)
+ const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end,
+ struct psk_attributes *psk)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext;
@@ -558,9 +558,10 @@
uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age;
const unsigned char *binder;
size_t binder_len;
- int psk_type;
- uint16_t cipher_suite;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+ int psk_ciphersuite_id;
+ psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg;
+ int allowed_key_exchange_modes;
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_session session;
mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session);
@@ -586,47 +587,74 @@
ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match(
ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age,
- &psk_type, &session);
- if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH) {
+ &psk->type, &session);
+ if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) {
continue;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("found matched identity"));
- switch (psk_type) {
+
+ switch (psk->type) {
case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL:
- ret = ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite_for_psk(
- ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end,
- &cipher_suite, &ciphersuite_info);
+ psk_ciphersuite_id = 0;
+ psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+ allowed_key_exchange_modes =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
break;
- case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
- ret = ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite_for_resumption(
- ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end, &session,
- &cipher_suite, &ciphersuite_info);
- if (ret != 0) {
- mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);
- }
-#else
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION:
+ psk_ciphersuite_id = session.ciphersuite;
+ psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_flags = session.ticket_flags;
+ allowed_key_exchange_modes =
+ session.ticket_flags &
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
break;
+#endif
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- if (ret != 0) {
- /* See below, no cipher_suite available, abort handshake */
+
+ psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE;
+
+ if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes &
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) &&
+ ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
+ psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+ } else if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes &
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) &&
+ ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) {
+ psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+ }
+
+ if (psk->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No suitable PSK key exchange mode"));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end,
+ psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg,
+ &psk->ciphersuite_info);
+
+ if (psk->ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * We consider finding a ciphersuite suitable for the PSK as part
+ * of the validation of its binder. Thus if we do not find one, we
+ * abort the handshake with a decrypt_error alert.
+ */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
- 2, "ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite", ret);
- return ret;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(
- ssl, binder, binder_len, psk_type,
- mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac));
- if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH) {
+ ssl, binder, binder_len, psk->type,
+ mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) psk->ciphersuite_info->mac));
+ if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) {
/* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we
* fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2
* and appendix E.6. */
@@ -644,13 +672,8 @@
matched_identity = identity_id;
- /* Update handshake parameters */
- ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("overwrite ciphersuite: %04x - %s",
- cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name));
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
- if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) {
+ if (psk->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) {
ret = ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(ssl->session_negotiate,
&session);
mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);
@@ -676,7 +699,7 @@
return ret;
}
if (matched_identity == -1) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No matched PSK or ticket."));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No usable PSK or ticket."));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}
@@ -1003,21 +1026,29 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_ticket_is_kex_mode_permitted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- unsigned int kex_mode)
+static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
- if (ssl->handshake->resume) {
- if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags(
- ssl->session_negotiate, kex_mode)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(ssl) &&
+ ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange(ssl);
#else
((void) ssl);
- ((void) kex_mode);
+ return 0;
#endif
- return 1;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+ return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(ssl) &&
+ ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl);
+#else
+ ((void) ssl);
+ return 0;
+#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
@@ -1033,83 +1064,6 @@
#endif
}
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED)
- return ssl_tls13_ticket_is_kex_mode_permitted(
- ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(ssl) &&
- ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange(ssl);
-#else
- ((void) ssl);
- return 0;
-#endif
-}
-
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
- return ssl_tls13_ticket_is_kex_mode_permitted(
- ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) &&
- mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(ssl) &&
- ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl);
-#else
- ((void) ssl);
- return 0;
-#endif
-}
-
-static int ssl_tls13_determine_key_exchange_mode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
-{
- /*
- * Determine the key exchange algorithm to use.
- * There are three types of key exchanges supported in TLS 1.3:
- * - (EC)DH with ECDSA,
- * - (EC)DH with PSK,
- * - plain PSK.
- *
- * The PSK-based key exchanges may additionally be used with 0-RTT.
- *
- * Our built-in order of preference is
- * 1 ) (EC)DHE-PSK Mode ( psk_ephemeral )
- * 2 ) Certificate Mode ( ephemeral )
- * 3 ) Plain PSK Mode ( psk )
- */
-
- ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE;
-
- if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
- ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"));
- } else
- if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
- ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: ephemeral"));
- } else
- if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) {
- ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk"));
- } else {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
- 1,
- ("ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."));
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-}
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
@@ -1301,6 +1255,8 @@
int no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ int got_psk = 0;
+ struct psk_attributes psk = PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext = NULL;
const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end = NULL;
#endif
@@ -1464,37 +1420,20 @@
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, list of cipher suites",
cipher_suites, cipher_suites_len);
- for (const unsigned char *cipher_suites_p = cipher_suites;
- cipher_suites_p < cipher_suites_end; cipher_suites_p += 2) {
- uint16_t cipher_suite;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
- /*
- * "cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites_p is even" is an invariant of the
- * loop. As cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites_p > 0, we have
- * cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites_p >= 2 and it is thus safe to read
- * two bytes.
- */
- cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(cipher_suites_p, 0);
- ciphersuite_info = ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(
- ssl, cipher_suite);
- if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
- continue;
- }
-
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
- handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %04x - %s",
- cipher_suite,
- ciphersuite_info->name));
- break;
- }
+ ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, cipher_suites, cipher_suites_end,
+ 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, &handshake->ciphersuite_info);
if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %04x - %s",
+ ((unsigned) handshake->ciphersuite_info->id),
+ handshake->ciphersuite_info->name));
/* ...
* opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
@@ -1734,10 +1673,11 @@
/* Update checksum with either
* - The entire content of the CH message, if no PSK extension is present
* - The content up to but excluding the PSK extension, if present.
+ * Always parse the pre-shared-key extension when present in the
+ * ClientHello even if some pre-requisites for PSK key exchange modes are
+ * not met. That way we always validate the syntax of the extension.
*/
- /* If we've settled on a PSK-based exchange, parse PSK identity ext */
- if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl) ||
- ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
+ if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) {
ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf,
pre_shared_key_ext - buf);
if (0 != ret) {
@@ -1748,10 +1688,11 @@
pre_shared_key_ext,
pre_shared_key_ext_end,
cipher_suites,
- cipher_suites_end);
- if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) {
- handshake->received_extensions &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY);
- } else if (ret != 0) {
+ cipher_suites_end,
+ &psk);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ got_psk = 1;
+ } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
1, "ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext", ret);
return ret;
@@ -1766,12 +1707,68 @@
}
}
- ret = ssl_tls13_determine_key_exchange_mode(ssl);
- if (ret < 0) {
- return ret;
+ /*
+ * Determine the key exchange algorithm to use.
+ * There are three types of key exchanges supported in TLS 1.3:
+ * - (EC)DH with ECDSA,
+ * - (EC)DH with PSK,
+ * - plain PSK.
+ *
+ * The PSK-based key exchanges may additionally be used with 0-RTT.
+ *
+ * Our built-in order of preference is
+ * 1 ) (EC)DHE-PSK Mode ( psk_ephemeral )
+ * 2 ) Certificate Mode ( ephemeral )
+ * 3 ) Plain PSK Mode ( psk )
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL)) {
+ handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"));
+
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(ssl)) {
+ handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: ephemeral"));
+
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ else if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK)) {
+ handshake->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk"));
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1,
+ ("ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
- if (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode !=
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (handshake->key_exchange_mode &
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL) {
+ handshake->ciphersuite_info = psk.ciphersuite_info;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = psk.ciphersuite_info->id;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Select PSK ciphersuite: %04x - %s",
+ ((unsigned) psk.ciphersuite_info->id),
+ psk.ciphersuite_info->name));
+
+ if (psk.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) {
+ handshake->resume = 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (handshake->key_exchange_mode !=
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) {
hrr_required = (no_usable_share_for_key_agreement != 0);
}
@@ -1973,10 +1970,6 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *server_randbytes =
ssl->handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN;
- if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
- }
if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, server_randbytes,
MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN)) != 0) {
@@ -2913,17 +2906,14 @@
}
if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data"));
- /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1
- *
- * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
- * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
- *
- * TODO: Add received data size check here.
- */
if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data"));
/* Set the reading pointer */
ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, ssl->in_msglen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
}
return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA;
}
@@ -3141,6 +3131,7 @@
ssl->conf->max_early_data_size > 0) {
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags(
session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA);
+ session->max_early_data_size = ssl->conf->max_early_data_size;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index 7f0160a..2fd56fb 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -3290,4 +3290,12 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+ if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) != 0) {
+ return crt->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue);
+ }
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
+}
+
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h
index 4eb27f0..ec8bcb6 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/config_test_driver.h
@@ -40,5 +40,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
//#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
//#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
index 5b071f7..335386b 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
void (*cli_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
int resize_buffers;
int early_data;
+ int max_early_data_size;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache;
#endif
@@ -196,6 +197,13 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/*
+ * Random number generator aimed for TLS unitary tests. Its main purpose is to
+ * simplify the set-up of a random number generator for TLS
+ * unitary tests: no need to set up a good entropy source for example.
+ */
+int mbedtls_test_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len);
+
+/*
* This function can be passed to mbedtls to receive output logs from it. In
* this case, it will count the instances of a mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern
* in the received logged messages.
diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-kex-modes.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-kex-modes.sh
index 4581bc5..49f06e0 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-kex-modes.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-kex-modes.sh
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -550,8 +550,9 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-S "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -572,7 +573,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -592,7 +593,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -633,7 +634,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -653,7 +654,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -694,7 +695,7 @@
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -733,8 +734,9 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-S "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -754,7 +756,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -793,7 +795,7 @@
-S "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -921,7 +923,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -938,7 +940,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -973,7 +975,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -990,7 +992,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1025,7 +1027,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1042,7 +1044,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1078,7 +1080,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1096,7 +1098,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1133,7 +1135,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1151,7 +1153,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1188,7 +1190,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1206,7 +1208,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1243,7 +1245,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1261,7 +1263,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1299,7 +1301,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1318,7 +1320,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1357,7 +1359,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1376,7 +1378,7 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1413,8 +1415,9 @@
-s "found pre_shared_key extension" \
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-S "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-S "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1433,7 +1436,7 @@
-s "Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE" \
-s "Found PSK KEX MODE" \
-s "Pre shared key found" \
- -S "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -S "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
@@ -1580,7 +1583,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -1665,7 +1668,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1711,7 +1714,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1769,7 +1772,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1827,7 +1830,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -1870,7 +1873,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -1916,7 +1919,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -2047,7 +2050,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -2106,7 +2109,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2152,7 +2155,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2199,7 +2202,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2288,7 +2291,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2348,7 +2351,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -2392,7 +2395,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2438,7 +2441,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
@@ -2485,7 +2488,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2532,7 +2535,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2595,7 +2598,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-c "Selected key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"
@@ -2643,7 +2646,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions."
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
@@ -2690,7 +2693,7 @@
-c "client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, omitting PSK binder list" \
-c "client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension" \
-c "client hello, adding PSK binder list" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket" \
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
index ad062dc..066fa3f 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
@@ -353,8 +353,8 @@
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
- -s "No suitable key exchange mode" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C \
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
- -s "No suitable key exchange mode" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C \
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
@@ -409,8 +409,8 @@
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
- -s "No suitable key exchange mode" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C \
@@ -425,8 +425,8 @@
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
- -s "No suitable key exchange mode" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C \
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral_all reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"
@@ -468,8 +468,8 @@
-s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
-S "key exchange mode: psk$" \
- -s "No suitable key exchange mode" \
- -s "No matched PSK or ticket"
+ -s "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
+ -s "No usable PSK or ticket"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C \
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity"
requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 tls13_kex_modes=all reconnect=1" \
0 \
-c "Pre-configured PSK number = 1" \
- -S "No suitable key exchange mode" \
+ -S "No suitable PSK key exchange mode" \
-s "found matched identity" \
-s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral"
@@ -535,3 +535,18 @@
-s "$( tail -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" \
-s "200 early data bytes read" \
-s "106 early data bytes read"
+
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C \
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: Ephemeral over PSK kex with early data enabled" \
+ "$P_SRV force_version=tls13 debug_level=4 max_early_data_size=1024" \
+ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 early_data=1 tls13_kex_modes=psk_or_ephemeral reco_mode=1 reconnect=1" \
+ 0 \
+ -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
+ -S "key exchange mode: psk" \
+ -s "found matched identity" \
+ -s "EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption" \
+ -C "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists."
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 007f8e6..2f18858 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -212,10 +212,21 @@
# defined in this script whose name starts with "component_".
ALL_COMPONENTS=$(compgen -A function component_ | sed 's/component_//')
- # Delay determinig SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS until the command line options have a chance to override
+ # Delay determining SUPPORTED_COMPONENTS until the command line options have a chance to override
# the commands set by the environment
}
+setup_quiet_wrappers()
+{
+ # Pick up "quiet" wrappers for make and cmake, which don't output very much
+ # unless there is an error. This reduces logging overhead in the CI.
+ #
+ # Note that the cmake wrapper breaks unless we use an absolute path here.
+ if [[ -e ${PWD}/tests/scripts/quiet ]]; then
+ export PATH=${PWD}/tests/scripts/quiet:$PATH
+ fi
+}
+
# Test whether the component $1 is included in the command line patterns.
is_component_included()
{
@@ -889,6 +900,16 @@
# Dynamic secure element support is a deprecated feature and needs to be disabled here.
# This is done to have the same form of psa_key_attributes_s for libdriver and library.
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
+
+ # If threading is enabled on the normal build, then we need to enable it in the drivers as well,
+ # otherwise we will end up running multithreaded tests without mutexes to protect them.
+ if scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_THREADING_C; then
+ scripts/config.py -f "$CONFIG_TEST_DRIVER_H" set MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+ fi
+
+ if scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD; then
+ scripts/config.py -f "$CONFIG_TEST_DRIVER_H" set MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+ fi
}
# When called with no parameter this function disables all builtin curves.
@@ -1089,6 +1110,8 @@
echo "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE" >> $expected
# No PSA equivalent - needed by some init tests
echo "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED" >> $expected
+ # No PSA equivalent - required to run threaded tests.
+ echo "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD" >> $expected
# Compare reality with expectation.
# We want an exact match, to ensure the above list remains up-to-date.
@@ -1531,6 +1554,23 @@
make test
}
+component_full_no_pkparse_pkwrite() {
+ msg "build: full without pkparse and pkwrite"
+
+ scripts/config.py crypto_full
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
+
+ make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+ # Ensure that PK_[PARSE|WRITE]_C were not re-enabled accidentally (additive config).
+ not grep mbedtls_pk_parse_key library/pkparse.o
+ not grep mbedtls_pk_write_key_der library/pkwrite.o
+
+ msg "test: full without pkparse and pkwrite"
+ make test
+}
+
component_test_crypto_full_md_light_only () {
msg "build: crypto_full with only the light subset of MD"
scripts/config.py crypto_full
@@ -2177,6 +2217,8 @@
scripts/config.py full
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+ # Self-tests do not currently use multiple threads.
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
# The deprecated MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C interface is not thread safe.
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
@@ -4759,6 +4801,26 @@
not grep -q "AES note: built-in implementation." ./programs/test/selftest
}
+component_test_sha3_variations() {
+ msg "sha3 loop unroll variations"
+
+ # define minimal config sufficient to test SHA3
+ cat > include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h << END
+ #define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
+ #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+END
+
+ msg "all loops unrolled"
+ make clean
+ make -C tests test_suite_shax CFLAGS="-DMBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL=1 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL=1 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL=1 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL=1"
+ ./tests/test_suite_shax
+
+ msg "all loops rolled up"
+ make clean
+ make -C tests test_suite_shax CFLAGS="-DMBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL=0 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL=0 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL=0 -DMBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL=0"
+ ./tests/test_suite_shax
+}
+
support_test_aesni_m32() {
support_test_m32_no_asm && (lscpu | grep -qw aes)
}
@@ -6356,6 +6418,7 @@
pre_initialize_variables
pre_parse_command_line "$@"
+setup_quiet_wrappers
pre_check_git
pre_restore_files
pre_back_up
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_files.py b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
index 65fbc9f..4483f55 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_files.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@
b'sh': 'sh',
}
+ path_exemptions = re.compile(r'tests/scripts/quiet/.*')
+
def is_valid_shebang(self, first_line, filepath):
m = re.match(self._shebang_re, first_line)
if not m:
diff --git a/tests/scripts/quiet/cmake b/tests/scripts/quiet/cmake
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a34365b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/quiet/cmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# This swallows the output of the wrapped tool, unless there is an error.
+# This helps reduce excess logging in the CI.
+
+# If you are debugging a build / CI issue, you can get complete unsilenced logs
+# by un-commenting the following line (or setting VERBOSE_LOGS in your environment):
+
+# export VERBOSE_LOGS=1
+
+# don't silence invocations containing these arguments
+NO_SILENCE=" --version "
+
+TOOL="cmake"
+
+. "$(dirname "$0")/quiet.sh"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/quiet/make b/tests/scripts/quiet/make
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..920e5b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/quiet/make
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# This swallows the output of the wrapped tool, unless there is an error.
+# This helps reduce excess logging in the CI.
+
+# If you are debugging a build / CI issue, you can get complete unsilenced logs
+# by un-commenting the following line (or setting VERBOSE_LOGS in your environment):
+
+# export VERBOSE_LOGS=1
+
+# don't silence invocations containing these arguments
+NO_SILENCE=" --version | test "
+
+TOOL="make"
+
+. "$(dirname "$0")/quiet.sh"
diff --git a/tests/scripts/quiet/quiet.sh b/tests/scripts/quiet/quiet.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f26184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/scripts/quiet/quiet.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# -*-mode: sh; sh-shell: bash -*-
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+# This swallows the output of the wrapped tool, unless there is an error.
+# This helps reduce excess logging in the CI.
+
+# If you are debugging a build / CI issue, you can get complete unsilenced logs
+# by un-commenting the following line (or setting VERBOSE_LOGS in your environment):
+#
+# VERBOSE_LOGS=1
+#
+# This script provides most of the functionality for the adjacent make and cmake
+# wrappers.
+#
+# It requires two variables to be set:
+#
+# TOOL - the name of the tool that is being wrapped (with no path), e.g. "make"
+#
+# NO_SILENCE - a regex that describes the commandline arguments for which output will not
+# be silenced, e.g. " --version | test ". In this example, "make lib test" will
+# not be silent, but "make lib" will be.
+
+# Identify path to original tool. There is an edge-case here where the quiet wrapper is on the path via
+# a symlink or relative path, but "type -ap" yields the wrapper with it's normalised path. We use
+# the -ef operator to compare paths, to avoid picking the wrapper in this case (to avoid infinitely
+# recursing).
+while IFS= read -r ORIGINAL_TOOL; do
+ if ! [[ $ORIGINAL_TOOL -ef "$0" ]]; then break; fi
+done < <(type -ap -- "$TOOL")
+
+print_quoted_args() {
+ # similar to printf '%q' "$@"
+ # but produce more human-readable results for common/simple cases like "a b"
+ for a in "$@"; do
+ # Get bash to quote the string
+ printf -v q '%q' "$a"
+ simple_pattern="^([-[:alnum:]_+./:@]+=)?([^']*)$"
+ if [[ "$a" != "$q" && $a =~ $simple_pattern ]]; then
+ # a requires some quoting (a != q), but has no single quotes, so we can
+ # simplify the quoted form - e.g.:
+ # a b -> 'a b'
+ # CFLAGS=a b -> CFLAGS='a b'
+ q="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}'${BASH_REMATCH[2]}'"
+ fi
+ printf " %s" "$q"
+ done
+}
+
+if [[ ! " $* " =~ " --version " ]]; then
+ # Display the command being invoked - if it succeeds, this is all that will
+ # be displayed. Don't do this for invocations with --version, because
+ # this output is often parsed by scripts, so we don't want to modify it.
+ printf %s "${TOOL}" 1>&2
+ print_quoted_args "$@" 1>&2
+ echo 1>&2
+fi
+
+if [[ " $@ " =~ $NO_SILENCE || -n "${VERBOSE_LOGS}" ]]; then
+ # Run original command with no output supression
+ exec "${ORIGINAL_TOOL}" "$@"
+else
+ # Run original command and capture output & exit status
+ TMPFILE=$(mktemp "quiet-${TOOL}.XXXXXX")
+ "${ORIGINAL_TOOL}" "$@" > "${TMPFILE}" 2>&1
+ EXIT_STATUS=$?
+
+ if [[ $EXIT_STATUS -ne 0 ]]; then
+ # On error, display the full output
+ cat "${TMPFILE}"
+ fi
+
+ # Remove tmpfile
+ rm "${TMPFILE}"
+
+ # Propagate the exit status
+ exit $EXIT_STATUS
+fi
diff --git a/tests/src/psa_crypto_stubs.c b/tests/src/psa_crypto_stubs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3ca850
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/src/psa_crypto_stubs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/** \file psa_crypto_stubs.c
+ *
+ * \brief Stub functions when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled but
+ * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+
+psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size)
+{
+ (void) output;
+ (void) output_size;
+
+ return PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT && !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index 5d4cb1c..56e03f1 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -12,9 +12,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-static int rng_seed = 0xBEEF;
-static int rng_get(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len)
+int mbedtls_test_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len)
{
(void) p_rng;
for (size_t i = 0; i < output_len; i++) {
@@ -23,7 +21,6 @@
return 0;
}
-#endif
void mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer(void *ctx, int level,
const char *file, int line,
@@ -46,6 +43,8 @@
mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *opts)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ static int rng_seed = 0xBEEF;
+
srand(rng_seed);
rng_seed += 0xD0;
#endif
@@ -68,6 +67,7 @@
opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
opts->resize_buffers = 1;
opts->early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED;
+ opts->max_early_data_size = -1;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
TEST_CALLOC(opts->cache, 1);
mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(opts->cache);
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_init(&(ep->ssl));
mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&(ep->conf));
- mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&(ep->conf), rng_get, NULL);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&(ep->conf), mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(&ep->conf) == NULL);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(&ep->conf), 0);
@@ -826,6 +826,13 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&(ep->conf), options->early_data);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ if (endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
+ (options->max_early_data_size >= 0)) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(&(ep->conf),
+ options->max_early_data_size);
+ }
+#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
index 50be2d2..f3a64e1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
@@ -966,6 +966,45 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_exp_mod_min_RR(char *input_A, char *input_E,
+ char *input_N, char *input_X,
+ int exp_result)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, RR, Z, X;
+ int res;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Z); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&A, input_A), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&N, input_N), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&X, input_X), 0);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&RR, 0), 0);
+ /* The objective of this test is to check that exp_mod defends
+ * against a smaller RR. */
+ TEST_LE_U(RR.n, N.n - 1);
+
+ res = mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&Z, &A, &E, &N, &RR);
+ /* We know that exp_mod internally needs RR to be as large as N.
+ * Validate that it is the case now, otherwise there was probably
+ * a buffer overread. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(RR.n, N.n);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(res, exp_result);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(sign_is_valid(&Z), 1);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Z, &X), 0);
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Z); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mpi_exp_mod(char *input_A, char *input_E,
char *input_N, char *input_X,
int exp_result)
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
index c53e42a..eb55dbe 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
@@ -1362,6 +1362,9 @@
Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: 10 ^ 0 (1 limb) mod 9
mpi_exp_mod:"0a":"00":"09":"1":0
+Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: -3 ^ 3 mod 27
+mpi_exp_mod:"-3":"3":"1b":"1b":0
+
Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod: MAX_SIZE exponent
mpi_exp_mod_size:2:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"":0
@@ -1391,6 +1394,14 @@
depends_on:MPI_MAX_BITS_LARGER_THAN_792
mpi_exp_mod:"-9f13012cd92aa72fb86ac8879d2fde4f7fd661aaae43a00971f081cc60ca277059d5c37e89652e2af2585d281d66ef6a9d38a117e9608e9e7574cd142dc55278838a2161dd56db9470d4c1da2d5df15a908ee2eb886aaa890f23be16de59386663a12f1afbb325431a3e835e3fd89b98b96a6f77382f458ef9a37e1f84a03045c8676ab55291a94c2228ea15448ee96b626b998":"40a54d1b9e86789f06d9607fb158672d64867665c73ee9abb545fc7a785634b354c7bae5b962ce8040cf45f2c1f3d3659b2ee5ede17534c8fc2ec85c815e8df1fe7048d12c90ee31b88a68a081f17f0d8ce5f4030521e9400083bcea73a429031d4ca7949c2000d597088e0c39a6014d8bf962b73bb2e8083bd0390a4e00b9b3":"eeaf0ab9adb38dd69c33f80afa8fc5e86072618775ff3c0b9ea2314c9c256576d674df7496ea81d3383b4813d692c6e0e0d5d8e250b98be48e495c1d6089dad15dc7d7b46154d6b6ce8ef4ad69b15d4982559b297bcf1885c529f566660e57ec68edbc3c05726cc02fd4cbf4976eaa9afd5138fe8376435b9fc61d2fc0eb06e3":"21acc7199e1b90f9b4844ffe12c19f00ec548c5d32b21c647d48b6015d8eb9ec9db05b4f3d44db4227a2b5659c1a7cceb9d5fa8fa60376047953ce7397d90aaeb7465e14e820734f84aa52ad0fc66701bcbb991d57715806a11531268e1e83dd48288c72b424a6287e9ce4e5cc4db0dd67614aecc23b0124a5776d36e5c89483":0
+Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (N.n=3, RR.n=1 on 32 bit)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32
+mpi_exp_mod_min_RR:"10":"2":"10000000100000001":"100":0
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod (N.n=3, RR.n=1 on 64 bit)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+mpi_exp_mod_min_RR:"10":"2":"100000000000000010000000000000001":"100":0
+
Base test GCD #1
mpi_gcd:"2b5":"261":"15"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function
index eeefc95..70e7bad 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include "debug_internal.h"
#include "string.h"
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include <test/ssl_helpers.h>
struct buffer_data {
char buf[2000];
@@ -65,11 +66,12 @@
memset(buffer.buf, 0, 2000);
buffer.ptr = buffer.buf;
- mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
-
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
+ 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf, string_debug, &buffer);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
@@ -103,11 +105,12 @@
memset(buffer.buf, 0, 2000);
buffer.ptr = buffer.buf;
- mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
-
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
+ 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf, string_debug, &buffer);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
@@ -138,11 +141,12 @@
memset(buffer.buf, 0, 2000);
buffer.ptr = buffer.buf;
- mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
-
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
+ 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf, string_debug, &buffer);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
@@ -175,11 +179,12 @@
memset(buffer.buf, 0, 2000);
buffer.ptr = buffer.buf;
- mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
-
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
+ 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf, string_debug, &buffer);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
@@ -214,11 +219,12 @@
memset(buffer.buf, 0, 2000);
buffer.ptr = buffer.buf;
- mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT);
-
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
+ 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&conf, string_debug, &buffer);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data
index cc58432..8d06067 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data
@@ -100,3 +100,19 @@
ECDH get_params with mismatched groups: their SECP256R1, our BP256R1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
ecdh_exchange_get_params_fail:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:"1234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Context get ECP Group #1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+ecdh_context_grp:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1
+
+Context get ECP Group #2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1
+
+Context get ECP Group #3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1
+
+Context get ECP Group #4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ecdh_primitive_random:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
index cc193da..300916f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
@@ -464,3 +464,20 @@
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&their_key);
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ecdh_context_grp(int id)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdh_context srv;
+
+ mbedtls_ecdh_init(&srv);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&srv, id) == 0);
+
+ /* Test the retrieved group id matches/*/
+ TEST_ASSERT((int) mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(&srv) == id);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecdh_free(&srv);
+
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
index 989235d..561297c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
@@ -450,9 +450,13 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS >= 512:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0
-RSA encrypt-decrypt test
+RSA encrypt-decrypt test PKCS1 v1.5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":2048:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"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":"3":0
+pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":2048:MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"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":"3":0
+
+RSA encrypt-decrypt test PKCS1 v2.1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":2048:MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"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":"3":0
RSA decrypt test vector - PKCS1v1.5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
@@ -1451,3 +1455,136 @@
PSA import into PSA: opaque ECC to public, different family (bad)
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_HAVE_TWO_FAMILIES:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
pk_import_into_psa_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_ONE_FAMILY):MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_ONE_CURVE_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_ANOTHER_FAMILY):MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_ONE_CURVE_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH
+
+Copy from PSA: use wrong parameters
+pk_copy_from_psa_fail:
+
+# The following test is only possible for RSA keys and not for EC ones:
+# - for the former it is possible to have an accelerated RSA key in PSA while
+# having RSA_C disabled. Since RSA path is guarded by RSA_C in mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(),
+# any attempt to copy that key will fail.
+# - for the latter instead the guard is PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS which is enabled as soon
+# as there is any curve supported either builtin or in a driver. In a scenario
+# in which a certain EC key is only available through a driver and not as
+# builtin mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa() uses functions that will all succeed
+# and therefore it will succeed.
+Copy from PSA: accelerated key only, not available as built-in
+pk_copy_from_psa_builtin_fail:
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + ECDSA + ANY_HASH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + ECDSA + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + ECDSA + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + DET_ECDSA + ANY_HASH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + DET_ECDSA + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + DET_ECDSA + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_256 + ECDSA_ANY)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_R1_521 + ECDSA + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"005dbb8e12240a62932b88cdd93c31cdd8873a2c15e40cc3c9f8e695b77fae015a44fe5267ef7868cb28cfb9579282fe060de44fe6de26f74a0d94afdaa870befbc5":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid EC (SECP_K1_256 + ECDSA + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"7154f04fcc79ac9df1652dcf99031610592b2b27f74f5985690a987357ba0428":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+# The key's algorithm only allows ECDH, but pk_copy_from_psa() ignores this information
+# when building the PK context.
+Copy from PSA: valid EC, wrong alg (SECP_R1_256 + ECDH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_ECDH
+
+# The key's algorithm is absolutely wrong for an EC key, but pk_copy_from_psa()
+# ignores this information when building the PK context.
+Copy from PSA: valid EC, wrong alg (SECP_R1_256 + CMAC)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_CMAC
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PKCS1V15_SIGN + ANY_HASH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PKCS1V15_SIGN + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PKCS1V15_SIGN + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"308204a40201000282010100ef24d80f6b7a0f62ab2f750a8370c1c39781abe2f7ae5cbc698ebbc51067af68c8b02e5bfafe0b296a2fdca8ee5327bf3370bd26c529d173c4356d8ad51f606ac730e3be509d8535c9c51927222d6c4e770efec4d9b0bd11410e5e2e01e093700d358aab8292297483c65870ea6d4ca9299f4347790f6223480732726a97b34bb4d53cb3f188e3c97115b029fa9a2cce4c6d935977a90737ac8b2a2c5691ad928b22681ca05ee38ddba2278c854f51281c5e4856090aca59bf719a167e63bb932580ae2b599e1a297194696e637a919bc9d2caf214e59d46ed1a12e591b608f2031744111551430d9ac39082957ae1ce03a88068896701e6ce19a83890ff5761020301000102820100706fb53a02c13fcc9749d7d09a9e002c12e6bfc715c6a00961e3defab74cd896fe8c7f2f75e1cda3aa2e58a400718e65822d0671dd0f5d4ffdb7550a8a4b974c7cdccaa72745f864a2ba0daa6d9247b2d89d6f41644c89883c3b2222a5754e3cc7a91dcaa7b84acf6249763998aeccf558016e638352ad44835006f2ee94e691d0070ce561677f2a22a12f357bd762c57f80f1f4921f0f26b3ed758478d11086c182874355ef5039e8d854291b9ce7f8b284ec81f141b7255313507f5ea159d6b1c0ee176e7743d3c65d536e1e4aaf24089c1e00c8021012b8846a4971a0695030504ace362077e8b2fcb4fbdd70bfb734a3fe7d9e1a25bdd0cb0f2fcb56ecc502818100f8fdfbac1c033911b5a184980d081f700f4d450cebf18cbdc68f160a5abd580e6f8f5800fd0b60521dbe2d549e82617afe70d2ad004c2f45405d94e4418e8c2b8da6bcaa407bbfa5477b5a6fceccfcb99f51c6c16bd17202d997bdcaec83b870e3e101acc05e0754020ec207ef5ec9934ac81cd617af72cd94b2bb400eb2078302818100f5dfe74a548c04950178f50130d5aadbe5d1f4b52527c0bfad9aa0d73731fb24219cb5ea5c4b4fa56133d5ea9225fa7d0ccc9bdcc78b77303a2e73c17e9a46b9b09020604496a849f069d0d87713e06a5d374271b2629f5ba220506b606a101828d20da9fcfa3a7e75b135987260be6d37622fc3f4bf4fd2dfd9655da5ff0c4b02818100d4d797c959f0cf59fa1f65ceec64e32ad189c5daf3ddf9e747d28c8eb15e65e5812bd19896b6a0d1d126fe6cf54a92b5a6c71ef04feed001acb1d253044f2c3716d14f396201e6a30c65bfbb0fd65ebaf61bdb80ffff7c2c3f80dcf69813491907531231700770d0392a1066e411ecd201fce9d98149b32355572b85e889faad028181009d898bc165709d52f7b18f91e6bf508d3ab08ed12df04da0c2d40b7039ce4d72b61299c082c8424cdd7dfff71f13346ec12fac42069cc68e6108f86427012485bfaa6904258e3e5fb9a9a305bf2e3e21087eea94bcce51fabd63650397affd85ed49c1358480b3cfe90ad5234b4dcf555d220d26c9ff765ecfcc94152fd1be070281804bf77b4bae8386772de830cc75f2d1d4b8221b3f817208e08c002ac0549902677e4f0e7bce5ba1b3da74fbbe138758e6853b4a5b7bf0672bc1170c64fa502a5e24e3472db433b4e30761eab6ebb9e207235fd88b97b1b30e14f364b628219d6e17056543a4e29a4de1e41ad37927ce23d0442623744bc35a1874296960029044":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PKCS1V15_CRYPT)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (OAEP + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (OAEP + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS_ANY_SALT + ANY_HASH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS_ANY_SALT + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS_ANY_SALT + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS + ANY_HASH)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS + SHA_256)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA (PSS + SHA_512)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512)
+
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA, PSA_ALG_NONE
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_NONE
+
+# Key's algorithm is wrong for an RSA key, but pk_copy_from_psa() accepts
+# it anyway.
+Copy from PSA: valid RSA, wrong alg (CMAC)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST
+pk_copy_from_psa_success:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_ALG_CMAC
+
+Copy from PSA: non-exportable -> public, RSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pk_copy_public_from_psa:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
+
+Copy from PSA: non-exportable -> public, SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1
+pk_copy_public_from_psa:"587CF7C57EB7C6254CBF80CC59846521B4FBCBA8BC4B362A9B043F0DEB49CCA1":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)
+
+Copy from PSA: non-exportable -> public, Curve25519
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519
+pk_copy_public_from_psa:"a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY)
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index 3d75ad0..089202b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
/* For error codes */
@@ -8,6 +9,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#include "rsa_internal.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
#include <limits.h>
@@ -167,6 +169,19 @@
#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_ANOTHER_CURVE_BITS 0
#endif
+/* Get an available MD alg to be used in sign/verify tests. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
+#endif
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
static int pk_genkey_ec(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
{
@@ -307,6 +322,83 @@
expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY;
return expected_usage;
}
+
+#define RSA_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#define ECP_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+static int pk_public_same(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk1,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *pk2)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk1);
+ TEST_EQUAL(type, mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk2));
+
+ switch (type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ {
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa1 = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk1);
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa2 = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk2);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa1),
+ mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa2));
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa1),
+ mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa2));
+ unsigned char buf1[RSA_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *p1 = buf1 + sizeof(buf1);
+ int len1 = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa1, buf1, &p1);
+ TEST_LE_U(0, len1);
+ unsigned char buf2[RSA_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *p2 = buf2 + sizeof(buf2);
+ int len2 = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa2, buf2, &p2);
+ TEST_LE_U(0, len2);
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(p1, len1, p2, len2);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(pk1->pub_raw, pk1->pub_raw_len,
+ pk2->pub_raw, pk2->pub_raw_len);
+ TEST_EQUAL(pk1->ec_family, pk2->ec_family);
+ TEST_EQUAL(pk1->ec_bits, pk2->ec_bits);
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec1 = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk1);
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec2 = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk2);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(ec1),
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(ec2));
+ unsigned char buf1[ECP_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t len1 = 99999991;
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(
+ ec1, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &len1, buf1, sizeof(buf1)), 0);
+ unsigned char buf2[ECP_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t len2 = 99999992;
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(
+ ec2, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &len2, buf2, sizeof(buf2)), 0);
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf1, len1, buf2, len2);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+ default:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unsupported pk type in pk_public_same");
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+exit:
+ return ok;
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
@@ -425,7 +517,110 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+/* Create a new PSA key which will contain only the public part of the private
+ * key which is provided in input. For this new key:
+ * - Type is the public counterpart of the private key.
+ * - Usage is the copied from the original private key, but the PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT
+ * flag is removed. This is to prove that mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa() doesn't
+ * require the key to have the EXPORT flag.
+ * - Algorithm is copied from the original key pair.
+ */
+static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pub_key_from_priv(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t priv_id)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t type;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_key_usage_t usage;
+ unsigned char pub_key_buf[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t pub_key_len;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pub_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ /* Get attributes from the private key. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_get_key_attributes(priv_id, &attributes));
+ type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes);
+ alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+
+ /* Export the public key and then import it in a new slot. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_export_public_key(priv_id, pub_key_buf, sizeof(pub_key_buf), &pub_key_len));
+
+ /* Notes:
+ * - psa_import_key() automatically determines the key's bit length
+ * from the provided key data. That's why psa_set_key_bits() is not used
+ * below.
+ */
+ type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type);
+ usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type);
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, usage);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&attributes, pub_key_buf, pub_key_len, &pub_key));
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+ return pub_key;
+}
+
+/* Create a copy of a PSA key with same usage and algorithm policy and destroy
+ * the original one. */
+mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_copy_and_destroy(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t orig_key_id)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t orig_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t new_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t new_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_get_key_attributes(orig_key_id, &orig_attr));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&new_attr, psa_get_key_usage_flags(&orig_attr));
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&new_attr, psa_get_key_algorithm(&orig_attr));
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_copy_key(orig_key_id, &new_attr, &new_key_id));
+ psa_destroy_key(orig_key_id);
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&orig_attr);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&new_attr);
+ return new_key_id;
+}
+
+psa_status_t pk_psa_import_key(unsigned char *key_data, size_t key_len,
+ psa_key_type_t type, psa_key_usage_t usage,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ /* Note: psa_import_key() automatically determines the key's bit length
+ * from the provided key data. That's why psa_set_key_bits() is not used below. */
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, usage);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type);
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data, key_len, key);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+psa_status_t pk_psa_genkey_generic(psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage, psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, usage);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type);
+ psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits);
+ status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, key);
+
+ return status;
+}
/*
* Generate an ECC key using PSA and return the key identifier of that key,
@@ -435,18 +630,11 @@
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pk_psa_genkey_ecc(void)
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- const psa_key_type_t type =
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1);
- const size_t bits = 256;
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256));
- psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type);
- psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits);
- PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key));
+ pk_psa_genkey_generic(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), 256,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),
+ &key);
-exit:
return key;
}
@@ -457,20 +645,13 @@
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pk_psa_genkey_rsa(void)
{
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- const psa_key_type_t type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR;
- const size_t bits = 1024;
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW);
- psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type);
- psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits);
- PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key));
+ pk_psa_genkey_generic(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, 1024, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
+ PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW, &key);
-exit:
return key;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -1250,7 +1431,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-void pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test(data_t *message, int mod,
+void pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test(data_t *message, int mod, int padding,
char *input_P, char *input_Q,
char *input_N, char *input_E,
int ret)
@@ -1265,7 +1446,7 @@
mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E);
- USE_PSA_INIT();
+ MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
memset(&rnd_info, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(output));
@@ -1275,6 +1456,7 @@
/* init pk-rsa context */
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == 0);
rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk);
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, padding, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
/* load public key */
rsa->len = (mod + 7) / 8;
@@ -1294,6 +1476,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk,
mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == 0);
rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk);
+ mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, padding, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
/* load public key */
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&N, input_N) == 0);
@@ -1323,7 +1506,7 @@
mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); mbedtls_mpi_free(&P);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E);
mbedtls_pk_free(&pk);
- USE_PSA_DONE();
+ MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE();
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -1853,8 +2036,10 @@
mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE);
}
- /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a legacy context. */
- ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&pk, pkey, sizeof(pkey));
+ /* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a legacy context.
+ * Note: mbedtls_rsa_write_key() writes backwards in the data buffer. */
+ pkey_start = pkey + sizeof(pkey);
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk), pkey, &pkey_start);
TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0);
pkey_len = (size_t) ret;
@@ -1879,7 +2064,9 @@
TEST_EQUAL(PSA_SUCCESS, psa_destroy_key(key_id));
mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
- TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pk, pkey_start, pkey_len), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk,
+ mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_type)), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk), pkey_start, pkey_len), 0);
if (key_pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
@@ -2199,3 +2386,332 @@
PSA_DONE();
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C*/
+void pk_copy_from_psa_fail(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_ctx;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_ctx);
+ PSA_INIT();
+
+ /* Null pk pointer. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(key_id, NULL),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(key_id, NULL),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+
+ /* Invalid key ID. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(0, 0), &pk_ctx),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(0, 0), &pk_ctx),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+ /* Generate a key type that is not handled by the PK module. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_genkey_generic(PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919), 2048,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, PSA_ALG_NONE, &key_id));
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(key_id, &pk_ctx), MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(key_id, &pk_ctx), MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+ psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+ /* Generate an EC key which cannot be exported. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_genkey_generic(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), 256,
+ 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, &key_id));
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(key_id, &pk_ctx), MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 &&
+ PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_ctx);
+ psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:!MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+void pk_copy_from_psa_builtin_fail()
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_ctx;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_ctx);
+ PSA_INIT();
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_genkey_generic(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR,
+ PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT,
+ PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256),
+ &key_id));
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(key_id, &pk_ctx), MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_ctx);
+ psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C*/
+void pk_copy_from_psa_success(data_t *priv_key_data, int key_type_arg,
+ int key_alg_arg)
+{
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t key_alg = key_alg_arg;
+ psa_key_usage_t key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_priv, pk_priv_copy_public, pk_pub, pk_pub_copy_public;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t priv_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pub_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ unsigned char *in_buf = NULL;
+ size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE;
+ unsigned char out_buf[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char out_buf2[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t out_buf_len, out_buf2_len;
+
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_priv);
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_priv_copy_public);
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_pub);
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_pub_copy_public);
+ PSA_INIT();
+
+ if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ key_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ /* Create both a private key and its public counterpart in PSA. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_import_key(priv_key_data->x, priv_key_data->len,
+ key_type, key_usage, key_alg, &priv_key_id));
+ pub_key_id = psa_pub_key_from_priv(priv_key_id);
+
+ /* Create 4 PK contexts starting from the PSA keys we just created. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(priv_key_id, &pk_priv), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(priv_key_id, &pk_priv_copy_public), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(pub_key_id, &pk_pub), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(pub_key_id, &pk_pub_copy_public), 0);
+
+ /* Destoy both PSA keys to prove that generated PK contexts are independent
+ * from them. */
+ priv_key_id = psa_copy_and_destroy(priv_key_id);
+ pub_key_id = psa_copy_and_destroy(pub_key_id);
+
+ /* Test #1:
+ * - check that the generated PK contexts are of the correct type.
+ * - [only for RSA] check that the padding mode is correct.
+ */
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk_priv), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk_pub), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY);
+ } else {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk_priv), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk_pub), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_priv = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk_priv);
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_pub = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk_pub);
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(key_alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(key_alg)) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa_priv), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa_pub), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21);
+ } else {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa_priv), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa_pub), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+ }
+
+ /* Test #2: check that the 2 generated PK contexts form a valid private/public key pair. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_check_pair(&pk_pub, &pk_priv, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL), 0);
+
+ /* Get the MD alg to be used for the tests below from the provided key policy. */
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_for_test = MBEDTLS_MD_ALG_FOR_TEST; /* Default */
+ if ((PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(key_alg) != PSA_ALG_NONE) &&
+ (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(key_alg) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)) {
+ md_for_test = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(key_alg);
+ }
+ /* Use also the same MD algorithm for PSA sign/verify checks. This is helpful
+ * for the cases in which the key policy algorithm is ANY_HASH type. */
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_for_test =
+ (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) |
+ (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_for_test) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
+
+ in_buf_len = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_for_test);
+ TEST_CALLOC(in_buf, in_buf_len);
+ memset(in_buf, 0x1, in_buf_len);
+
+ /* Test #3: sign/verify with the following pattern:
+ * - Sign using the PK context generated from the private key.
+ * - Verify from the same PK context used for signature.
+ * - Verify with the PK context generated using public key.
+ * - Verify using the public PSA key directly.
+ */
+
+ /* Edge cases: in a build with RSA key support but not RSA padding modes,
+ * or with ECDSA verify support but not signature, the signature might be
+ * impossible. */
+ int pk_can_sign = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(key_alg) || key_alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) {
+ pk_can_sign = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(key_alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(key_alg)) {
+ pk_can_sign = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(key_alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(key_alg)) {
+ pk_can_sign = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (pk_can_sign) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_sign(&pk_priv, md_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), &out_buf_len,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL), 0);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_priv, md_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, out_buf_len), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_pub, md_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, out_buf_len), 0);
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(key_alg)) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+ /* ECDSA signature requires PK->PSA format conversion. */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(key_alg)) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk_pub),
+ out_buf, out_buf_len, out_buf,
+ sizeof(out_buf), &out_buf_len), 0);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_verify_hash(pub_key_id, psa_alg_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, out_buf_len));
+ }
+
+ /* Test #4: check sign/verify interoperability also in the opposite direction:
+ * sign with PSA and verify with PK. Key's policy must include a valid hash
+ * algorithm (not any).
+ */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(key_alg)) {
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_sign_hash(priv_key_id, psa_alg_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), &out_buf_len));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+ /* ECDSA signature requires PSA->PK format conversion */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(key_alg)) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk_pub),
+ out_buf, out_buf_len, out_buf,
+ sizeof(out_buf), &out_buf_len), 0);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_pub, md_for_test, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, out_buf_len), 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Test #5: in case of RSA key pair try also encryption/decryption. */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(key_alg)) {
+ /* Encrypt with the public key only PK context. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_encrypt(&pk_pub, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ out_buf, &out_buf_len, sizeof(out_buf),
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL), 0);
+
+ /* Decrypt with key pair PK context and compare with original data. */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_decrypt(&pk_priv, out_buf, out_buf_len,
+ out_buf2, &out_buf2_len, sizeof(out_buf2),
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL), 0);
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(in_buf, in_buf_len, out_buf2, out_buf2_len);
+
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(key_alg)) {
+ /* Decrypt with PSA private key directly and compare with original data. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_asymmetric_decrypt(priv_key_id, key_alg, out_buf, out_buf_len,
+ NULL, 0,
+ out_buf2, sizeof(out_buf2), &out_buf2_len));
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(in_buf, in_buf_len, out_buf2, out_buf2_len);
+
+ /* Encrypt with PSA public key directly, decrypt with public key PK context
+ * and compare with original data. */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_asymmetric_encrypt(pub_key_id, key_alg, in_buf, in_buf_len,
+ NULL, 0,
+ out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), &out_buf_len));
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_decrypt(&pk_priv, out_buf, out_buf_len,
+ out_buf2, &out_buf2_len, sizeof(out_buf2),
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL), 0);
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(in_buf, in_buf_len, out_buf2, out_buf2_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Test that the keys from mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa() are identical
+ * to the public key from mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(). */
+ mbedtls_test_set_step(1);
+ TEST_ASSERT(pk_public_same(&pk_pub, &pk_priv_copy_public));
+ mbedtls_test_set_step(2);
+ TEST_ASSERT(pk_public_same(&pk_pub, &pk_pub_copy_public));
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free(in_buf);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_priv);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_priv_copy_public);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_pub);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_pub_copy_public);
+ psa_destroy_key(priv_key_id);
+ psa_destroy_key(pub_key_id);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C*/
+void pk_copy_public_from_psa(data_t *priv_key_data, int key_type_arg)
+{
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_from_exportable;
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_from_exportable);
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_from_non_exportable;
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_from_non_exportable);
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_private;
+ mbedtls_pk_init(&pk_private);
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t non_exportable_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t exportable_key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ PSA_INIT();
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_import_key(priv_key_data->x, priv_key_data->len,
+ key_type,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT,
+ PSA_ALG_NONE,
+ &exportable_key_id));
+ PSA_ASSERT(pk_psa_import_key(priv_key_data->x, priv_key_data->len,
+ key_type,
+ 0,
+ PSA_ALG_NONE,
+ &non_exportable_key_id));
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(exportable_key_id,
+ &pk_from_exportable), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(non_exportable_key_id,
+ &pk_from_non_exportable), 0);
+
+ /* Check that the non-exportable key really is non-exportable */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(non_exportable_key_id, &pk_private),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+
+ psa_destroy_key(exportable_key_id);
+ psa_destroy_key(non_exportable_key_id);
+
+ /* The goal of this test function is mostly to check that
+ * mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa works with a non-exportable key pair.
+ * We check that the resulting key is the same as for an exportable
+ * key pair. We rely on pk_copy_from_psa_success tests to validate that
+ * the result is correct. */
+ TEST_ASSERT(pk_public_same(&pk_from_non_exportable, &pk_from_exportable));
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_from_non_exportable);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_from_exportable);
+ mbedtls_pk_free(&pk_private);
+ psa_destroy_key(exportable_key_id);
+ psa_destroy_key(non_exportable_key_id);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index c55af03..b633c6f 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -7532,6 +7532,150 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH
generate_key_ext:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:0:"2a":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+PSA concurrent key generation: bad type (RSA public key)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, 0 bits: invalid argument
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, 7 bits: invalid argument
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:7:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, 8 bits
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation- raw data, 9 bits: invalid argument
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:9:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8 bits
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, (2 * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8 bits
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:(2 * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST + 1) * 8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, 65528 bits (large key, ok if it fits)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:65528:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: raw data, 65536 bits (not supported)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:65536:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: AES, 128 bits, CTR
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: AES, 128 bits, GCM
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: DES, 64 bits, CBC-nopad
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: DES, 128 bits, CBC-nopad
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: DES, 192 bits, CBC-nopad
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: invalid key size: AES, 64 bits
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:64:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, minimum allowed key size, good, sign (PKCS#1 v1.5)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS > 128:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, 1032 bits, good, sign (PKCS#1 v1.5)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS <= 1032:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1032:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, 1024 bits, good, sign (PSS SHA-256)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS <= 1024:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, 1024 bits, good, sign (PSS-any-salt SHA-256)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS <= 1024:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, minimum allowed key size, good, encrypt (PKCS#1 v1.5)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS >= 256:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS <= 2048:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, 1024 bits, good, encrypt (OAEP SHA-256)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS <= 1024:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, 0 bits: invalid
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+# The spec allows either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, size not multiple of 8: not supported
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS + 62:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, size not multiple of 2: not supported
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS + 63:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: RSA, maximum size exceeded
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS+8:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: ECC, SECP256R1, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: ECC, SECP256R1, incorrect bit size
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+# INVALID_ARGUMENT would make more sense, but our code as currently structured
+# doesn't fully relate the curve with its size.
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: ECC, Curve25519, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):255:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: ECC, Curve448, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):448:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 2048 bits, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):2048:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 3072 bits, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):3072:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 4096 bits, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):4096:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 6144 bits, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):6144:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 8192 bits, good
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):8192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0:8:5
+
+PSA concurrent key generation: FFDH, 1024 bits, invalid bits
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+concurrently_generate_keys:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:8:5
+
Key production parameters initializers
key_production_parameters_init:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 09874a1..1141597 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
#define TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION 0x7fffff
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
/* If this comes up, it's a bug in the test code or in the test data. */
#define UNUSED 0xdeadbeef
@@ -1333,6 +1337,66 @@
return 0;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
+typedef struct generate_key_context {
+ psa_key_type_t type;
+ psa_key_usage_t usage;
+ size_t bits;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_status_t expected_status;
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes;
+ int is_large_key;
+ int reps;
+}
+generate_key_context;
+void *thread_generate_key(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t got_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ generate_key_context *gkc = (struct generate_key_context *) ctx;
+
+ /* If there are race conditions, it is likely the case that they do not
+ * arise every time the code runs. We repeat the code to increase the
+ * chance that any race conditions will be hit. */
+ for (int n = 0; n < gkc->reps; n++) {
+ /* Generate a key */
+ psa_status_t status = psa_generate_key(gkc->attributes, &key);
+
+ if (gkc->is_large_key > 0) {
+ TEST_ASSUME(status != PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
+ }
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(status, gkc->expected_status);
+ if (gkc->expected_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(key));
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Test the key information */
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_get_key_attributes(key, &got_attributes));
+ TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_type(&got_attributes), gkc->type);
+ TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_bits(&got_attributes), gkc->bits);
+
+ /* Do something with the key according
+ * to its type and permitted usage. */
+ if (!mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key(key, gkc->usage, gkc->alg)) {
+ psa_destroy_key(key);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&got_attributes);
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(key));
+ }
+exit:
+ /*
+ * Key attributes may have been returned by psa_get_key_attributes()
+ * thus reset them as required.
+ */
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&got_attributes);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */
+
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -9783,6 +9847,59 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */
+void concurrently_generate_keys(int type_arg,
+ int bits_arg,
+ int usage_arg,
+ int alg_arg,
+ int expected_status_arg,
+ int is_large_key_arg,
+ int arg_thread_count,
+ int reps_arg)
+{
+ size_t thread_count = (size_t) arg_thread_count;
+ mbedtls_test_thread_t *threads = NULL;
+ generate_key_context gkc;
+ gkc.type = type_arg;
+ gkc.usage = usage_arg;
+ gkc.bits = bits_arg;
+ gkc.alg = alg_arg;
+ gkc.expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ gkc.is_large_key = is_large_key_arg;
+ gkc.reps = reps_arg;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, usage_arg);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg_arg);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, type_arg);
+ psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits_arg);
+ gkc.attributes = &attributes;
+
+ TEST_CALLOC(threads, sizeof(mbedtls_test_thread_t) * thread_count);
+
+ /* Split threads to generate key then destroy key. */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < thread_count; i++) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(
+ mbedtls_test_thread_create(&threads[i], thread_generate_key,
+ (void *) &gkc), 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Join threads. */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < thread_count; i++) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_thread_join(&threads[i]), 0);
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free(threads);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+#endif
+
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void generate_key(int type_arg,
int bits_arg,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index 385682a..e95aada 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -3309,3 +3309,51 @@
TLS 1.3 write early data, hello retry request
tls13_write_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR
+
+TLS 1.3 cli, maximum early data size, default size
+tls13_cli_max_early_data_size:-1
+
+TLS 1.3 cli, maximum early data size, zero
+tls13_cli_max_early_data_size:0
+
+TLS 1.3 cli, maximum early data size, very small but not 0
+tls13_cli_max_early_data_size:3
+
+TLS 1.3 cli, maximum early data size, 93
+tls13_cli_max_early_data_size:93
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, dflt, wsz=96
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:-1:96
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, dflt, wsz=128
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:-1:128
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, 3, wsz=2
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:3:2
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, 3, wsz=3
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:3:3
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, 98, wsz=23
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:98:23
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, 98, wsz=49
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:98:49
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, server rejects, dflt, wsz=128
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS:-1:128
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, server rejects, 3, wsz=3
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS:3:3
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, server rejects, 98, wsz=49
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS:98:49
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, HRR, dflt, wsz=128
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:-1:128
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, HRR, 3, wsz=3
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:3:3
+
+TLS 1.3 srv, max early data size, HRR, 98, wsz=49
+tls13_srv_max_early_data_size:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:97:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index d327828..0c9ccf1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -18,6 +18,47 @@
#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS 2
#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR 3
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+/*
+ * Test function to write early data for negative tests where
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() cannot be used.
+ */
+static int write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(ssl);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0);
+ TEST_LE_U(len, (size_t) ret);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ssl->out_left, 0);
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = len;
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
+ if (len > 0) {
+ memcpy(ssl->out_msg, buf, len);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 1);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = len;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -1131,6 +1172,8 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT) == 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
+
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
/* Read previous record numbers */
@@ -2879,6 +2922,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(&conf, transport);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(&conf, min_tls_version);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, max_tls_version);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == expected_ssl_setup_result);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(
@@ -2920,6 +2964,8 @@
mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl);
MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT();
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
+
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(ssl.handshake != NULL && ssl.handshake->group_list != NULL);
@@ -2951,6 +2997,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&conf);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(&conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
@@ -3059,6 +3106,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT),
0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf), 0);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(&ssl, ssl.cli_id,
@@ -3113,6 +3161,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT)
== 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf) == 0);
@@ -3371,6 +3420,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT), 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&conf, mbedtls_test_random, NULL);
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&ssl, &conf), 0);
@@ -4159,6 +4209,10 @@
break;
case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:
+ /*
+ * Remove server support for the group negotiated in
+ * mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket() forcing a HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
server_options.group_list = group_list + 1;
break;
@@ -4448,3 +4502,407 @@
PSA_DONE();
}
/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+void tls13_cli_max_early_data_size(int max_early_data_size_arg)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep;
+ mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options;
+ mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ uint32_t buf_size = 64;
+ uint32_t max_early_data_size;
+ uint32_t written_early_data_size = 0;
+ uint32_t read_early_data_size = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep));
+ mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options);
+ mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options);
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session);
+
+ PSA_INIT();
+ TEST_CALLOC(buf, buf_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Run first handshake to get a ticket from the server.
+ */
+
+ client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+ client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED;
+ server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+ server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED;
+ server_options.max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size_arg;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options,
+ &saved_session);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare for handshake with the ticket.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
+ &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf,
+ mbedtls_test_ticket_write,
+ mbedtls_test_ticket_parse,
+ NULL);
+
+ max_early_data_size = saved_session.max_early_data_size;
+ /*
+ * (max_early_data_size + 1024) for the size of the socket buffers for the
+ * server one to be able to contain the maximum number of early data bytes
+ * plus the first flight of client messages. Needed because we cannot
+ * initiate the handshake on server side before doing all the calls to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() we want to test. See below for more
+ * information.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket),
+ &(server_ep.socket),
+ max_early_data_size + 1024);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ /* If our server is configured with max_early_data_size equal to zero, it
+ * does not set the MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA flag for
+ * the tickets it creates. To be able to test early data with a ticket
+ * allowing early data in its flags but with max_early_data_size equal to
+ * zero (case supported by our client) tweak the ticket flags here.
+ */
+ if (max_early_data_size == 0) {
+ saved_session.ticket_flags |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ while (written_early_data_size < max_early_data_size) {
+ uint32_t remaining = max_early_data_size - written_early_data_size;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
+ buf[i] = (unsigned char) (written_early_data_size + i);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl),
+ buf,
+ buf_size);
+
+ if (buf_size <= remaining) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, buf_size);
+ } else {
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, remaining);
+ }
+ written_early_data_size += buf_size;
+ }
+ TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size, max_early_data_size);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, 1);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size, max_early_data_size);
+ TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE);
+
+ /*
+ * Now, check data on server side. It is not done in the previous loop as
+ * in the first call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), the server ends up sending
+ * its Finished message and then in the following call to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() we go past the early data writing window
+ * and we cannot test multiple calls to the API is this writing window.
+ */
+ while (read_early_data_size < max_early_data_size) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl),
+ buf,
+ buf_size);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0);
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < (size_t) ret; i++) {
+ TEST_EQUAL(buf[i], (unsigned char) (read_early_data_size + i));
+ }
+
+ read_early_data_size += ret;
+ }
+ TEST_EQUAL(read_early_data_size, max_early_data_size);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
+ &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER)
+ == 0);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL);
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL);
+ mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options);
+ mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options);
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session);
+ mbedtls_free(buf);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/*
+ * The !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 dependency of tls13_early_data() below is
+ * a temporary workaround to not run the test in Windows-2013 where there is
+ * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf().
+ */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+void tls13_srv_max_early_data_size(int scenario, int max_early_data_size_arg, int write_size_arg)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep;
+ mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options;
+ mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session;
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 };
+ uint16_t group_list[3] = {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE
+ };
+ char pattern[128];
+ unsigned char *buf_write = NULL;
+ uint32_t write_size = (uint32_t) write_size_arg;
+ unsigned char *buf_read = NULL;
+ uint32_t read_size;
+ uint32_t expanded_early_data_chunk_size = 0;
+ uint32_t written_early_data_size = 0;
+ uint32_t max_early_data_size;
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep));
+ mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options);
+ mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options);
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session);
+ PSA_INIT();
+
+ TEST_CALLOC(buf_write, write_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a smaller buffer for early data reading to exercise the reading
+ * of data in one record in multiple calls.
+ */
+ read_size = (write_size / 2) + 1;
+ TEST_CALLOC(buf_read, read_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Run first handshake to get a ticket from the server.
+ */
+
+ client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+ client_options.group_list = group_list;
+ client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED;
+ server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+ server_options.group_list = group_list;
+ server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED;
+ server_options.max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size_arg;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options,
+ &saved_session);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare for handshake with the ticket.
+ */
+ server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer;
+ server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern;
+ server_pattern.pattern = pattern;
+
+ switch (scenario) {
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS:
+ server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED;
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(pattern, sizeof(pattern),
+ "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.");
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret < (int) sizeof(pattern));
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:
+ /*
+ * Remove server support for the group negotiated in
+ * mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket() forcing an HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+ server_options.group_list = group_list + 1;
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(
+ pattern, sizeof(pattern),
+ "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello");
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret < (int) sizeof(pattern));
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario.");
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
+ &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf,
+ mbedtls_test_ticket_write,
+ mbedtls_test_ticket_parse,
+ NULL);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket),
+ &(server_ep.socket), 1024);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ max_early_data_size = saved_session.max_early_data_size;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Start an handshake based on the ticket up to the point where early data
+ * can be sent from client side. Then send in a loop as much early data as
+ * possible without going over the maximum permitted size for the ticket.
+ * Finally, do a last writting to go past that maximum permitted size and
+ * check that we detect it.
+ */
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
+ &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl),
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status !=
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ);
+
+ /*
+ * Write and if possible read as much as possible chunks of write_size
+ * bytes data without getting over the max_early_data_size limit.
+ */
+ do {
+ uint32_t read_early_data_size = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The contents of the early data are not very important, write a
+ * pattern that varies byte-by-byte and is different for every chunk of
+ * early data.
+ */
+ if ((written_early_data_size + write_size) > max_early_data_size) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the server rejected early data, base the determination of when
+ * to stop the loop on the expanded size (padding and encryption
+ * expansion) of early data on server side and the number of early data
+ * received so far by the server (multiple of the expanded size).
+ */
+ if ((expanded_early_data_chunk_size != 0) &&
+ ((server_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size +
+ expanded_early_data_chunk_size) > max_early_data_size)) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < write_size; i++) {
+ buf_write[i] = (unsigned char) (written_early_data_size + i);
+ }
+
+ ret = write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl), buf_write, write_size);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, write_size);
+ written_early_data_size += write_size;
+
+ switch (scenario) {
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED:
+ while (read_early_data_size < write_size) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl),
+ buf_read, read_size);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0);
+
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf_read, ret,
+ buf_write + read_early_data_size, ret);
+ read_early_data_size += ret;
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size,
+ written_early_data_size);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ /*
+ * In this write loop we try to always stay below the
+ * max_early_data_size limit but if max_early_data_size is very
+ * small we may exceed the max_early_data_size limit on the
+ * first write. In TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS/
+ * TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR scenario, this is for sure the case if
+ * max_early_data_size is smaller than the smallest possible
+ * inner content/protected record. Take into account this
+ * possibility here but only for max_early_data_size values
+ * that are close to write_size. Below, '1' is for the inner
+ * type byte and '16' is to take into account some AEAD
+ * expansion (tag, ...).
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) {
+ if (scenario == TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS) {
+ TEST_LE_U(max_early_data_size,
+ write_size + 1 +
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY);
+ } else {
+ TEST_LE_U(max_early_data_size,
+ write_size + 1 + 16 +
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY);
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1);
+ server_pattern.counter = 0;
+ if (expanded_early_data_chunk_size == 0) {
+ expanded_early_data_chunk_size = server_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ TEST_LE_U(server_ep.ssl.total_early_data_size, max_early_data_size);
+ } while (1);
+
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ ret = write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl), buf_write, write_size);
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, write_size);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(pattern, sizeof(pattern),
+ "EarlyData: Too much early data received");
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret < (int) sizeof(pattern));
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL);
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL);
+ mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options);
+ mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options);
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session);
+ mbedtls_free(buf_write);
+ mbedtls_free(buf_read);
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0);
+ PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index 2b0920d..754660c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -3155,6 +3155,18 @@
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/parse_input/server5.crt":0
+X509 File parse & read the ca_istrue field (Not Set)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+mbedtls_x509_get_ca_istrue:"data_files/parse_input/server1.crt":0
+
+X509 File parse & read the ca_istrue field (Set)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+mbedtls_x509_get_ca_istrue:"data_files/test-ca.crt":1
+
+X509 File parse & read the ca_istrue field (Legacy Certificate)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+mbedtls_x509_get_ca_istrue:"data_files/server1-v1.crt":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS
+
X509 Get time (UTC no issues)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
x509_get_time:MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME:"500101000000Z":0:1950:1:1:0:0:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index 66477e0..f3ae0f4 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -1083,6 +1083,21 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+void mbedtls_x509_get_ca_istrue(char *crt_file, int result)
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_crt crt;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+ USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(&crt, crt_file), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(&crt), result);
+exit:
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&crt);
+ USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
void x509parse_crt(data_t *buf, char *result_str, int result)
{