diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 741ce41..5255626 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -971,41 +971,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
 
 /**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
- *
- * Force the use of blinding in RSA private key operations.
- * This makes these operations fail when the caller doesn't
- * provide a PRNG.
- *
- * Comment this macro to allow RSA private key operations
- * without blinding.
- *
- * \deprecated Disabling this option is deprecated and only
- *             disabled by default for backwards compatibility.
- *             Future versions of Mbed TLS will remove this
- *             option and enforce blinding unconditionally.
- *
- * \warning   Disabling this can be a security risk!
- *            Blinding RSA private key operations is a way
- *            to prevent statistical timing attacks as in
- *            [P. Kocher ', Timing Attacks on Implementations
- *             of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems]
- *
- * \note      Disabling this does not mean that blinding
- *            will never be used: if a PRNG is provided,
- *            blinding will be in place. Instead, disabling this
- *            option may result in private key operations being
- *            performed in a way potentially leaking sensitive
- *            information through side-channels when no PRNG
- *            is supplied by the user.
- *
- * \note      For more on the use of blinding in RSA
- *            private key operations, see the documentation
- *            of \c mbedtls_rsa_private.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
-
-/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
  *
  * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
@@ -1017,48 +982,6 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
 
 /**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION
- *
- * Force verification of results of RSA private key operations
- * when RSA-CRT is used.
- *
- * Comment this macro to disable RSA-CRT verification.
- *
- * \warning Disabling this can be a security risk!
- *          Omitting verification makes the RSA-CRT
- *          signing vulnerable to the Bellcore
- *          glitch attack leading to private key
- *          compromise if an attacker can cause a
- *          glitch in a certain timeframe during
- *          the signing operation. Uncomment only
- *          if you're sure that glitches are out of
- *          your attack model.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION
-
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION
- *
- * Force verification of results of any RSA private key
- * operation regardless of the algorithm used.
- *
- * Uncomment this to enable unconditional RSA verification.
- *
- * \note     This is to prevent the RSA signing operation
- *           (regardless of the particular algorithm chosen)
- *           from potential future glitch attacks. We are
- *           currently not aware of any such for our default
- *           implementation, therefore disabling the option
- *           by default.
- *
- * \note     Enabling it comes at the cost of roughly an
- *           additional public key operation at the end of
- *           signing (low compared to private key operations),
- *           as well as minor memory consumption.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION
-
-/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
  *
  * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test).
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index e34fea0..bc2f810 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -64,15 +64,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY    -1
 
 /*
- * RSA configuration
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION)              || \
-    ( ! defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)  &&                     \
-      defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_RSA_REQUIRE_VERIFICATION
-#endif
-
-/*
  * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out,
  * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implemenations in the PK layers.
  */
@@ -239,28 +230,16 @@
  * \note           The input and output buffers must be large
  *                 enough (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used).
  *
- * \note           Enabling and disabling of blinding:
- *                 - If f_rng is NULL and MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
- *                   is disabled, blinding is disabled.
- *                 - If f_rng is NULL and MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
- *                   is enabled, the function fails.
+ * \note           Blinding is used if and onlf if a PRNG is provided.
  *
  * \note           If blinding is used, both the base of exponentation
  *                 and the exponent are blinded, preventing both statistical
  *                 timing and power analysis attacks.
  *
- * \note           Depending on the way RSA is implemented, a failure
- *                 in the computation can lead to disclosure of the private
- *                 key if the wrong result is passed to attacker - e.g.,
- *                 implementing RSA through CRT is vulnerable to the
- *                 Bellcore glitch attack.
- *
- *                 As a remedy, the user can force double checking the
- *                 result of the private key operation through the option
- *                 MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION. If verification is
- *                 to be enabled only when RSA-CRT is used (as controlled
- *                 by the configuration option MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT), the
- *                 option MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION can be used.
+ * \warning        It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide
+ *                 a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding.
+ *                 Future versions of the library may enforce the presence
+ *                 of a PRNG.
  *
  */
 int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,