Merge pull request #8727 from ronald-cron-arm/tls13-ignore-early-data-when-rejected
TLS 1.3: SRV: Ignore early data when rejected
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index b063360..e0cd79d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -353,6 +353,26 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000
+/*
+ * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how.
+ *
+ * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them.
+ * The server has then to skip past early data by either:
+ * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic
+ * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
+ * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
+ * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
+ * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
+ * - skipping all records with an external content type of
+ * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the
+ * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the
+ * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores
+ * application data message before 2nd ClientHello.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2
+
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
@@ -1782,6 +1802,16 @@
* within a single datagram. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /*
+ * One of:
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD
+ */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
+#endif
+
/*
* Record layer (outgoing data)
*/
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index ccf3eca..c2e64c6 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -3985,6 +3985,31 @@
rec)) != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /*
+ * Although the server rejected early data, it might receive early
+ * data as long as it has not received the client Finished message.
+ * It is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as stated
+ * in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446:
+ *
+ * "Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The
+ * server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect
+ * received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding
+ * records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
+ * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
+ * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
+ * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake."
+ */
+ if ((old_msg_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (ssl->discard_early_data_record ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."));
+ /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID &&
ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid
@@ -3994,9 +4019,27 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ /*
+ * The decryption of the record failed, no reason to ignore it,
+ * return in error with the decryption error code.
+ */
return ret;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /*
+ * If the server were discarding protected records that it fails to
+ * deprotect because it has rejected early data, as we have just
+ * deprotected successfully a record, the server has to resume normal
+ * operation and fail the connection if the deprotection of a record
+ * fails.
+ */
+ if (ssl->discard_early_data_record ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD) {
+ ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
if (old_msg_type != rec->type) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d",
old_msg_type, rec->type));
@@ -4070,6 +4113,32 @@
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /*
+ * Although the server rejected early data because it needed to send an
+ * HelloRetryRequest message, it might receive early data as long as it has
+ * not received the client Finished message.
+ * The early data is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as
+ * stated in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446 (second case):
+ *
+ * "The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with an
+ * external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are
+ * encrypted), up to the configured max_early_data_size. Ignore application
+ * data message before 2nd ClientHello when early_data was received in 1st
+ * ClientHello."
+ */
+ if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) {
+ if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"));
+ /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index ecfecf2..8afedde 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1098,9 +1098,14 @@
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT;
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD;
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/* Initialize structures */
mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index dc0ea78..f4987b3 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -1182,7 +1182,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) &&
- ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) {
+ ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED &&
+ ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) {
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(
ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index c837032..62b117c 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -1533,6 +1533,12 @@
unsigned int extension_type;
size_t extension_data_len;
const unsigned char *extension_data_end;
+ uint32_t allowed_exts = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH;
+
+ if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0) {
+ /* Do not accept early data extension in 2nd ClientHello */
+ allowed_exts &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA);
+ }
/* RFC 8446, section 4.2.11
*
@@ -1560,7 +1566,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, extension_type,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH);
+ allowed_exts);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -1780,28 +1786,15 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
-static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- int hrr_required)
+static int ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
- if ((handshake->received_extensions &
- MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) == 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
- 1, ("EarlyData: no early data extension received."));
- return 0;
- }
-
if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
1,
("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration."));
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (hrr_required) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, HRR required."));
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
if (!handshake->resume) {
@@ -1810,7 +1803,7 @@
resumption. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption."));
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
/* RFC 8446 4.2.10
@@ -1833,7 +1826,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in "
"`pre_shared_key` is not the first one."));
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
@@ -1841,7 +1834,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one "
"of the selected pre-shared key."));
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
@@ -1850,10 +1843,10 @@
1,
("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket "
"permission bits."));
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
@@ -1885,15 +1878,22 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
- ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted =
- ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(ssl, hrr_required);
+ if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) {
+ ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted =
+ (!hrr_required) && (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0);
- if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) {
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl);
- if (ret != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
- 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret);
- return ret;
+ if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl->discard_early_data_record =
+ hrr_required ?
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD :
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD;
}
}
#else
diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
index b6894de..4e6bf87 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
@@ -502,8 +502,8 @@
"$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+GROUP-ALL:+KX-ALL \
-d 10 -r --earlydata $EARLY_DATA_INPUT " \
0 \
- -s "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension exists." \
-s "Sent max_early_data_size=$EARLY_DATA_INPUT_LEN" \
+ -s "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension exists." \
-s "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \
-s "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \
-s "$( head -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" \
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index c06c0a7..86945cc 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -3274,5 +3274,11 @@
TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket
tls13_resume_session_with_ticket
-TLS 1.3 early data
-tls13_early_data
+TLS 1.3 early data, reference
+tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE
+
+TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard
+tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
+
+TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR
+tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 2d1a757..8687a4d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -12,7 +12,13 @@
#define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
+/* Mnemonics for the early data test scenarios */
+#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE 0
+#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
+#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 2
+
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
@@ -3661,8 +3667,13 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
-void tls13_early_data()
+/*
+ * The !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 dependency of tls13_early_data() below is
+ * a temporary workaround to not run the test in Windows-2013 where there is
+ * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf().
+ */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+void tls13_early_data(int scenario)
{
int ret = -1;
unsigned char buf[64];
@@ -3672,6 +3683,12 @@
mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options;
mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options;
mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session;
+ mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 };
+ uint16_t group_list[3] = {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE
+ };
/*
* Test set-up
@@ -3687,20 +3704,22 @@
client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
&client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ group_list);
TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED);
server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+ server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer;
+ server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern;
ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
&server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL);
+ group_list);
TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED);
mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf,
mbedtls_test_ticket_write,
mbedtls_test_ticket_parse,
NULL);
- mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED);
ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket),
&(server_ep.socket), 1024);
@@ -3740,6 +3759,35 @@
ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session);
TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+ switch (scenario) {
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE:
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD:
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ server_pattern.pattern =
+ "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.";
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED);
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR:
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ server_pattern.pattern =
+ "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello";
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(&server_ep.conf, group_list + 1);
+ /*
+ * Need to reset again to reconstruct the group list in the
+ * handshake structure from the configured one.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl));
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario.");
+ }
+
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
&(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl),
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0);
@@ -3751,14 +3799,26 @@
early_data_len);
TEST_EQUAL(ret, early_data_len);
- TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
- &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl),
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA);
+ ret = mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
+ &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl),
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP);
- TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1);
- TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)),
- early_data_len);
- TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len);
+ switch (scenario) {
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE:
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA);
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl),
+ buf, sizeof(buf)), early_data_len);
+ TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len);
+ break;
+
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: /* Intentional fallthrough */
+ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR:
+ TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1);
+ break;
+ }
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state(
&(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl),
@@ -3770,6 +3830,7 @@
mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options);
mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options);
mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session);
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0);
PSA_DONE();
}
/* END_CASE */