diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 2d80b6f..1cf242a 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -2593,6 +2593,7 @@
                        void *p_rng)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    int have_rng;
     size_t i;
     unsigned char b;
     mbedtls_ecp_point RP;
@@ -2626,7 +2627,7 @@
     MOD_ADD(RP.X);
 
     /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
-    int have_rng = 1;
+    have_rng = 1;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
     if (f_rng == NULL) {
         have_rng = 0;
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index fdcdd43..d1e6b5c 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
 
     /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a
@@ -1498,7 +1499,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key(
@@ -2406,6 +2407,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
@@ -2423,7 +2425,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2594,6 +2596,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
     uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0;
 
@@ -2606,7 +2609,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2732,6 +2735,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
 
     *signature_length = 0;
@@ -2764,7 +2768,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t)  {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3303,6 +3307,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ?
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT :
@@ -3338,7 +3343,7 @@
     }
     operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg);
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3561,6 +3566,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t default_iv_length = 0;
@@ -3577,7 +3583,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3633,6 +3639,7 @@
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
@@ -3647,7 +3654,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4251,6 +4258,7 @@
     uint8_t *data = NULL;
     size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
     psa_status_t status;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!key_type_is_raw_bytes(slot->attr.type)) {
         return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4279,7 +4287,7 @@
     }
 
     slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4891,14 +4899,15 @@
                                                    size_t shared_secret_size,
                                                    size_t *shared_secret_length)
 {
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+    psa_status_t status;
     switch (alg) {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
         case PSA_ALG_ECDH:
             if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(private_key->attr.type)) {
                 return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
             }
-            mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
-            psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
+            status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
                 private_key->attr.type,
                 private_key->attr.bits,
                 private_key->key.data,
@@ -4916,6 +4925,8 @@
             return status;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */
         default:
+            (void) ecp;
+            (void) status;
             (void) private_key;
             (void) peer_key;
             (void) peer_key_length;
@@ -5011,6 +5022,7 @@
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    size_t expected_length;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -5030,7 +5042,7 @@
      * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot.
      * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily
      * be exact for it as well. */
-    size_t expected_length =
+    expected_length =
         PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits);
     if (output_size < expected_length) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
index bc9a204..52759aa 100644
--- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
+++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
@@ -806,13 +806,14 @@
                                int *written,
                                const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write(ssl, buf + *written, buf_len - *written);
     if (ret > 0) {
         *written += ret;
     }
@@ -852,13 +853,14 @@
                               int *read, int *fragments,
                               const int expected_fragments)
 {
+    int ret;
     /* Verify that calling mbedtls_ssl_write with a NULL buffer and zero length is
      * a valid no-op for TLS connections. */
     if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
         TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, NULL, 0) == 0);
     }
 
-    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(ssl, buf + *read, buf_len - *read);
     if (ret > 0) {
         (*fragments)++;
         *read += ret;