Fix a few more typos
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
index 0986f1b..f4d357b 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
- salt length: either <= hashlen (see note), or any depending on algorithm
Note: above, "<= hashlen" means that hashlen is used if possible, but if it
-doesn't fit because the key is too short, then the maximum lenght that fits is
+doesn't fit because the key is too short, then the maximum length that fits is
used.
The RSA/PK API is in principle more flexible than the PSA Crypto API. The
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
index 8fb8ce5..205c6cd 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/strategy.md
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
both of them, but then `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` won't have the desired
effect)
- to avoid a hard/default dependency of TLS, X.509 and PK on
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backwards compatibility reasons:
+ `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, for backward compatibility reasons:
- when `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` is enabled and used, applications need to call
`psa_crypto_init()` before TLS/X.509 uses PSA functions
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` has a hard depend on `MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C ||
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
whereas extending to more protocol features will require the same amount of
work either way.
-### Backwards compatibility issues with making it always on
+### Backward compatibility issues with making it always on
1. Existing applications may not be calling `psa_crypto_init()` before using
TLS, X.509 or PK. We can try to work around that by calling (the relevant
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
There are two variants of this strategy: one where using the new setup
function also allows for key isolation (the key is only held by PSA,
supporting both G1 and G2 in that area), and one without isolation (the key is
-still stored outsede of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
+still stored outside of PSA most of the time, supporting only G1).
This strategy, with support for key isolation, is currently (end of 2021) used for ECDSA
signature generation in the PK layer - see `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()`. This