tree a318fda0a0a5d483f7cc025245ff022c4f362e85
parent 5a1c0e716242acfc7027c78e36487f8df1786c83
author Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com> 1498481534 +0100
committer Hanno Becker <hanno.becker@arm.com> 1498482595 +0100

Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing

The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.

This commit replaces the check by a safe version.