diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index 85e0e76..1ea79de 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -310,19 +310,19 @@
         dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
 }
 
-void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
-                               const unsigned char *src_base,
-                               size_t offset_secret,
+void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+                               const unsigned char *src,
+                               size_t offset,
                                size_t offset_min,
                                size_t offset_max,
                                size_t len )
 {
-    size_t offset;
+    size_t offsetval;
 
-    for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
+    for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ )
     {
-        mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
-                                 offset, offset_secret );
+        mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len,
+                                 offsetval, offset );
     }
 }
 
@@ -564,11 +564,11 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
 
 int mbedtls_cf_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode,
+                                          unsigned char *input,
                                           size_t ilen,
-                                          size_t *olen,
                                           unsigned char *output,
                                           size_t output_max_len,
-                                          unsigned char *buf )
+                                          size_t *olen )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
@@ -594,19 +594,19 @@
 
     /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
      * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
-    bad |= buf[0];
+    bad |= input[0];
 
     if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
     {
         /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
          * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
-        bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
+        bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
 
         /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
          * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
         for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
         {
-            pad_done  |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+            pad_done  |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
             pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
         }
     }
@@ -614,16 +614,16 @@
     {
         /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
          * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
-        bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
+        bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
 
         /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
          * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count.
          * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
         for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
         {
-            pad_done |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( buf[i], 0, 1 );
+            pad_done |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( input[i], 0, 1 );
             pad_count += mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
-            bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
+            bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF );
         }
     }
 
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
      * through memory or cache access patterns. */
     bad = mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large );
     for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
-        buf[i] &= ~bad;
+        input[i] &= ~bad;
 
     /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
      * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@
      * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
      * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
      * information. */
-    mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+    mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
                                  plaintext_max_size,
                                  plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
 
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@
      * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
      * secrets. */
     if( output_max_len != 0 )
-        memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+        memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
 
     /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
      * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen