Fixed client certificate handling with TLS 1.2
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 0e27677..79c3a38 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
- size_t n;
+ size_t n = 0, dn_size, total_dn_size;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
const x509_cert *crt;
@@ -707,7 +707,9 @@
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 4 cert type count
- * 5 .. n-1 cert types
+ * 5 .. m-1 cert types
+ * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
+ * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
* n .. n+1 length of all DNs
* n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1
* n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1
@@ -720,30 +722,60 @@
* At the moment, only RSA certificates are supported
*/
*p++ = 1;
- *p++ = 1;
+ *p++ = SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
+
+ /*
+ * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
+ * Only add current running algorithm that is already required for
+ * requested ciphersuite.
+ *
+ * Length is always 2
+ */
+ if( ssl->max_minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg = SSL_HASH_SHA256;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = 2;
+
+ if( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ||
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 )
+ {
+ ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg = SSL_HASH_SHA384;
+ }
+
+ *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg;
+ *p++ = SSL_SIG_RSA;
+
+ n += 4;
+ }
p += 2;
crt = ssl->ca_chain;
+ total_dn_size = 2;
while( crt != NULL )
{
if( p - buf > 4096 )
break;
- n = crt->subject_raw.len;
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
- *p++ = (unsigned char)( n );
- memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, n );
+ dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 );
+ *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size );
+ memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size );
+ p += dn_size;
- SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p, n );
- p += n; crt = crt->next;
+ SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p, dn_size );
+
+ total_dn_size += dn_size;
+ crt = crt->next;
}
- ssl->out_msglen = n = p - buf;
+ ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
ssl->out_msgtype = SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- ssl->out_msg[6] = (unsigned char)( ( n - 8 ) >> 8 );
- ssl->out_msg[7] = (unsigned char)( ( n - 8 ) );
+ ssl->out_msg[6 + n] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size >> 8 );
+ ssl->out_msg[7 + n] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size );
ret = ssl_write_record( ssl );
@@ -1170,8 +1202,10 @@
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
- size_t n1, n2;
+ size_t n = 0, n1, n2;
unsigned char hash[48];
+ int hash_id;
+ unsigned int hashlen;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
@@ -1204,17 +1238,49 @@
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
- n1 = ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->rsa.len;
- n2 = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
+ if( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
+ {
+ /*
+ * As server we know we either have SSL_HASH_SHA384 or
+ * SSL_HASH_SHA256
+ */
+ if( ssl->in_msg[4] != ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg ||
+ ssl->in_msg[5] != SSL_SIG_RSA )
+ {
+ SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg for verify message" ) );
+ return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
+ }
- if( n1 + 6 != ssl->in_hslen || n1 != n2 )
+ if( ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg == SSL_HASH_SHA384 )
+ {
+ hashlen = 48;
+ hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA384;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hashlen = 32;
+ hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA256;
+ }
+
+ n += 2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hashlen = 36;
+ hash_id = SIG_RSA_RAW;
+ }
+
+ n1 = ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->rsa.len;
+ n2 = ( ssl->in_msg[4 + n] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5 + 2];
+
+ if( n + n1 + 6 != ssl->in_hslen || n1 != n2 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
ret = rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC,
- SIG_RSA_RAW, 36, hash, ssl->in_msg + 6 );
+ hash_id, hashlen, hash, ssl->in_msg + 6 + n );
if( ret != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "rsa_pkcs1_verify", ret );