Merge pull request #1009 from paul-elliott-arm/mbedtls-2.28.3rc0-pr
Mbedtls 2.28.3rc0 pr - DO NOT MERGE
diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index eb01a44..ada8fc5 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
os: windows
script:
- scripts/windows_msbuild.bat v141 # Visual Studio 2017
+ - visualc/VS2010/x64/Release/selftest.exe --ci
after_failure:
- tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md
index d4fa506..680c0ca 100644
--- a/BRANCHES.md
+++ b/BRANCHES.md
@@ -71,6 +71,6 @@
- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
maintained until at least the end of 2024, see
- <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.2>.
+ <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.3>.
Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 23be7dd..4033839 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,84 @@
Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
+= Mbed TLS 2.28.3 branch released 2023-03-28
+
+Features
+ * Use HOSTCC (if it is set) when compiling C code during generation of the
+ configuration-independent files. This allows them to be generated when
+ CC is set for cross compilation.
+ * AES-NI is now supported with Visual Studio.
+ * AES-NI is now supported in 32-bit builds, or when MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+ is disabled, when compiling with GCC or Clang or a compatible compiler
+ for a target CPU that supports the requisite instructions (for example
+ gcc -m32 -msse2 -maes -mpclmul). (Generic x86 builds with GCC-like
+ compilers still require MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM and a 64-bit target.)
+
+Security
+ * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C, which is enabled by default, was silently ignored on
+ builds that couldn't compile the GCC-style assembly implementation
+ (most notably builds with Visual Studio), leaving them vulnerable to
+ timing side-channel attacks. There is now an intrinsics-based AES-NI
+ implementation as a fallback for when the assembly one cannot be used.
+
+Bugfix
+ * Fix a build issue on Windows where the source and build directory could
+ not be on different drives (#5751).
+ * Fix possible integer overflow in mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), which
+ could cause a crash for certain platforms & compiler options.
+ * Fix IAR compiler warnings. Fixes #6924.
+ * Fix a bug in the build where directory names containing spaces were
+ causing generate_errors.pl to error out resulting in a build failure.
+ Fixes issue #6879.
+ * Fix compile error where MBEDTLS_RSA_C and MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C are
+ defined, but MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT is not defined. Fixes #3174.
+ * Fix a build issue when defining MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT and MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST.
+ The library would not link if the user didn't provide an external self-test
+ function. The self-test is now provided regardless of the choice of
+ internal/alternative timing implementation. Fixes #6923.
+ * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial() now explicitly rejects serial numbers
+ whose binary representation is longer than 20 bytes. This was already
+ forbidden by the standard (RFC5280 - section 4.1.2.2) and now it's being
+ enforced also at code level.
+ * Fix potential undefined behavior in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(). Reported by
+ Pascal Cuoq using TrustInSoft Analyzer in #6701; observed independently by
+ Aaron Ucko under Valgrind.
+ * Fix behavior of certain sample programs which could, when run with no
+ arguments, access uninitialized memory in some cases. Fixes #6700 (which
+ was found by TrustInSoft Analyzer during REDOCS'22) and #1120.
+ * Fix build errors in test programs when MBEDTLS_CERTS_C is disabled.
+ Fixes #6243.
+ * Fix parsing of X.509 SubjectAlternativeName extension. Previously,
+ malformed alternative name components were not caught during initial
+ certificate parsing, but only on subsequent calls to
+ mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(). Fixes #2838.
+ * Fix bug in conversion from OID to string in
+ mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(). OIDs such as 2.40.0.25 are now printed
+ correctly.
+ * Reject OIDs with overlong-encoded subidentifiers when converting
+ them to a string.
+ * Reject OIDs with subidentifier values exceeding UINT_MAX. Such
+ subidentifiers can be valid, but Mbed TLS cannot currently handle them.
+ * Reject OIDs that have unterminated subidentifiers, or (equivalently)
+ have the most-significant bit set in their last byte.
+ * Silence a warning about an unused local variable in bignum.c on
+ some architectures. Fixes #7166.
+ * Silence warnings from clang -Wdocumentation about empty \retval
+ descriptions, which started appearing with Clang 15. Fixes #6960.
+ * Fix undefined behavior in mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() if
+ len argument is 0 and buffer is NULL.
+
+Changes
+ * The C code follows a new coding style. This is transparent for users but
+ affects contributors and maintainers of local patches. For more
+ information, see
+ https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/rewrite-branch-for-coding-style/
+ * Changed the default MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE from 6 to 2.
+ As tested in issue 6790, the correlation between this define and
+ RSA decryption performance has changed lately due to security fixes.
+ To fix the performance degradation when using default values the
+ window was reduced from 6 to 2, a value that gives the best or close
+ to best results when tested on Cortex-M4 and Intel i7.
+
= Mbed TLS 2.28.2 branch released 2022-12-14
Security
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/build-without-certs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/build-without-certs.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index dcb5c77..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/build-without-certs.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix build errors in test programs when MBEDTLS_CERTS_C is disabled.
- Fixes #6243.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 86182c3..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Features
- * Use HOSTCC (if it is set) when compiling C code during generation of the
- configuration-independent files. This allows them to be generated when
- CC is set for cross compilation.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/clang-15-bignum-warning.txt b/ChangeLog.d/clang-15-bignum-warning.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index d3308b4..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/clang-15-bignum-warning.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Silence a warning about an unused local variable in bignum.c on
- some architectures. Fixes #7166.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt b/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index b2cff5c..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Changes
- * The C code follows a new coding style. This is transparent for users but
- affects contributors and maintainers of local patches. For more
- information, see
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/rewrite-branch-for-coding-style/
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt b/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a90721..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix potential undefined behavior in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(). Reported by
- Pascal Cuoq using TrustInSoft Analyzer in #6701; observed independently by
- Aaron Ucko under Valgrind.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt b/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 491adf5..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/empty-retval-description.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Silence warnings from clang -Wdocumentation about empty \retval
- descriptions, which started appearing with Clang 15. Fixes #6960.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 57fe37a..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix behavior of certain sample programs which could, when run with no
- arguments, access uninitialized memory in some cases. Fixes #6700 (which
- was found by TrustInSoft Analyzer during REDOCS'22) and #1120.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-gettimeofday-overflow.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-gettimeofday-overflow.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 99a049d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-gettimeofday-overflow.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix possible integer overflow in mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), which
- could cause a crash for certain platforms & compiler options.
-
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-warnings.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-warnings.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a30132..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-iar-warnings.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix IAR compiler warnings. Fixes #6924.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 3cf02c3..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-oid-to-string-bugs.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix bug in conversion from OID to string in
- mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(). OIDs such as 2.40.0.25 are now printed
- correctly.
- * Reject OIDs with overlong-encoded subidentifiers when converting
- them to a string.
- * Reject OIDs with subidentifier values exceeding UINT_MAX. Such
- subidentifiers can be valid, but Mbed TLS cannot currently handle them.
- * Reject OIDs that have unterminated subidentifiers, or (equivalently)
- have the most-significant bit set in their last byte.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsaalt-test-guards.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsaalt-test-guards.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index f4f39c9..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-rsaalt-test-guards.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix compile error where MBEDTLS_RSA_C and MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C are
- defined, but MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT is not defined. Fixes #3174.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_for_directory_names_containing_spaces.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_for_directory_names_containing_spaces.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e7643b7..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_for_directory_names_containing_spaces.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix a bug in the build where directory names containing spaces were
- causing generate_errors.pl to error out resulting in a build failure.
- Fixes issue #6879.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives b/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c55c30..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix a build issue on Windows where the source and build directory could not be on
- different drives (#5751).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_timing_alt.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_timing_alt.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 86ec16d..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_timing_alt.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix a build issue when defining MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT and MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST.
- The library would not link if the user didn't provide an external self-test
- function. The self-test is now provided regardless of the choice of
- internal/alternative timing implementation. Fixes #6923.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt b/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index a85c79b..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial() now explicitly rejects serial numbers
- whose binary representation is longer than 20 bytes. This was already
- forbidden by the standard (RFC5280 - section 4.1.2.2) and now it's being
- enforced also at code level.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_read_undefined_behavior.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_read_undefined_behavior.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f2c563..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_ssl_read_undefined_behavior.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix undefined behavior in mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() if
- len argument is 0 and buffer is NULL.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f75d6a..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mpi-window-perf
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Changes
- * Changed the default MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE from 6 to 2.
- As tested in issue 6790, the correlation between this define and
- RSA decryption performance has changed lately due to security fixes.
- To fix the performance degradation when using default values the
- window was reduced from 6 to 2, a value that gives the best or close
- to best results when tested on Cortex-M4 and Intel i7.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/x509-subaltname-ext b/ChangeLog.d/x509-subaltname-ext
deleted file mode 100644
index 7845f18..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/x509-subaltname-ext
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
- * Fix parsing of X.509 SubjectAlternativeName extension. Previously,
- malformed alternative name components were not caught during initial
- certificate parsing, but only on subsequent calls to
- mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(). Fixes #2838.
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 33bbc2f..732335b 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -18,3 +18,120 @@
Only the maintained branches, as listed in [`BRANCHES.md`](BRANCHES.md),
get security fixes.
Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
+
+## Threat model
+
+We classify attacks based on the capabilities of the attacker.
+
+### Remote attacks
+
+In this section, we consider an attacker who can observe and modify data sent
+over the network. This includes observing the content and timing of individual
+packets, as well as suppressing or delaying legitimate messages, and injecting
+messages.
+
+Mbed TLS aims to fully protect against remote attacks and to enable the user
+application in providing full protection against remote attacks. Said
+protection is limited to providing security guarantees offered by the protocol
+being implemented. (For example Mbed TLS alone won't guarantee that the
+messages will arrive without delay, as the TLS protocol doesn't guarantee that
+either.)
+
+**Warning!** Block ciphers do not yet achieve full protection against attackers
+who can measure the timing of packets with sufficient precision. For details
+and workarounds see the [Block Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
+
+### Local attacks
+
+In this section, we consider an attacker who can run software on the same
+machine. The attacker has insufficient privileges to directly access Mbed TLS
+assets such as memory and files.
+
+#### Timing attacks
+
+The attacker is able to observe the timing of instructions executed by Mbed TLS
+by leveraging shared hardware that both Mbed TLS and the attacker have access
+to. Typical attack vectors include cache timings, memory bus contention and
+branch prediction.
+
+Mbed TLS provides limited protection against timing attacks. The cost of
+protecting against timing attacks widely varies depending on the granularity of
+the measurements and the noise present. Therefore the protection in Mbed TLS is
+limited. We are only aiming to provide protection against **publicly
+documented attack techniques**.
+
+As attacks keep improving, so does Mbed TLS's protection. Mbed TLS is moving
+towards a model of fully timing-invariant code, but has not reached this point
+yet.
+
+**Remark:** Timing information can be observed over the network or through
+physical side channels as well. Remote and physical timing attacks are covered
+in the [Remote attacks](remote-attacks) and [Physical
+attacks](physical-attacks) sections respectively.
+
+**Warning!** Block ciphers do not yet achieve full protection. For
+details and workarounds see the [Block Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
+
+#### Local non-timing side channels
+
+The attacker code running on the platform has access to some sensor capable of
+picking up information on the physical state of the hardware while Mbed TLS is
+running. This could for example be an analogue-to-digital converter on the
+platform that is located unfortunately enough to pick up the CPU noise.
+
+Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against local non-timing-based
+side channel attacks. If local non-timing attacks are present in a use case or
+a user application's threat model, they need to be mitigated by the platform.
+
+#### Local fault injection attacks
+
+Software running on the same hardware can affect the physical state of the
+device and introduce faults.
+
+Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against local fault injection
+attacks. If local fault injection attacks are present in a use case or a user
+application's threat model, they need to be mitigated by the platform.
+
+### Physical attacks
+
+In this section, we consider an attacker who has access to physical information
+about the hardware Mbed TLS is running on and/or can alter the physical state
+of the hardware (e.g. power analysis, radio emissions or fault injection).
+
+Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against physical attacks. If
+physical attacks are present in a use case or a user application's threat
+model, they need to be mitigated by physical countermeasures.
+
+### Caveats
+
+#### Out-of-scope countermeasures
+
+Mbed TLS has evolved organically and a well defined threat model hasn't always
+been present. Therefore, Mbed TLS might have countermeasures against attacks
+outside the above defined threat model.
+
+The presence of such countermeasures don't mean that Mbed TLS provides
+protection against a class of attacks outside of the above described threat
+model. Neither does it mean that the failure of such a countermeasure is
+considered a vulnerability.
+
+#### Block ciphers
+
+Currently there are four block ciphers in Mbed TLS: AES, CAMELLIA, ARIA and
+DES. The pure software implementation in Mbed TLS implementation uses lookup
+tables, which are vulnerable to timing attacks.
+
+These timing attacks can be physical, local or depending on network latency
+even a remote. The attacks can result in key recovery.
+
+**Workarounds:**
+
+- Turn on hardware acceleration for AES. This is supported only on selected
+ architectures and currently only available for AES. See configuration options
+ `MBEDTLS_AESNI_C` and `MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C` for details.
+- Add a secure alternative implementation (typically hardware acceleration) for
+ the vulnerable cipher. See the [Alternative Implementations
+Guide](docs/architecture/alternative-implementations.md) for more information.
+- Use cryptographic mechanisms that are not based on block ciphers. In
+ particular, for authenticated encryption, use ChaCha20/Poly1305 instead of
+ block cipher modes. For random generation, use HMAC\_DRBG instead of CTR\_DRBG.
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
index 54b2f7a..4c76246 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
*/
/**
- * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.28.2 source code documentation
+ * @mainpage mbed TLS v2.28.3 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
index 1f1a9cd..1b73cf6 100644
--- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
+++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.28.2"
+PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.28.3"
OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/
FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO
OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/include/mbedtls/aesni.h
index 653b146..6741dea 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aesni.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aesni.h
@@ -36,13 +36,49 @@
#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u
#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \
+/* Can we do AESNI with inline assembly?
+ * (Only implemented with gas syntax, only for 64-bit.)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \
(defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+
+/* Can we do AESNI with intrinsics?
+ * (Only implemented with certain compilers, only for certain targets.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS and MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE are internal
+ * macros that may change in future releases.
+ */
+#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+/* Visual Studio supports AESNI intrinsics since VS 2008 SP1. We only support
+ * VS 2013 and up for other reasons anyway, so no need to check the version. */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+/* GCC-like compilers: currently, we only support intrinsics if the requisite
+ * target flag is enabled when building the library (e.g. `gcc -mpclmul -msse2`
+ * or `clang -maes -mpclmul`). */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__)
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+
+/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. */
+#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE
+/* To minimize disruption when releasing the intrinsics-based implementation,
+ * favor the assembly-based implementation if it's available. We intend to
+ * revise this in a later release of Mbed TLS 3.x. In the long run, we will
+ * likely remove the assembly implementation. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 1 // via assembly
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS)
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
@@ -131,6 +167,7 @@
}
#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 2ab9982..2cb36e9 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -69,10 +69,6 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
-#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
-#endif
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index acdb7ac..1381c1f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
* include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h
*
* Required by:
- * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
+ * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C (on some platforms)
* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
*
* Comment to disable the use of assembly code.
@@ -2344,14 +2344,32 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
*
- * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64.
+ * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64 or x86-32.
+ *
+ * \note AESNI is only supported with certain compilers and target options:
+ * - Visual Studio 2013: supported.
+ * - GCC, x86-64, target not explicitly supporting AESNI:
+ * requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM.
+ * - GCC, x86-32, target not explicitly supporting AESNI:
+ * not supported.
+ * - GCC, x86-64 or x86-32, target supporting AESNI: supported.
+ * For this assembly-less implementation, you must currently compile
+ * `library/aesni.c` and `library/aes.c` with machine options to enable
+ * SSE2 and AESNI instructions: `gcc -msse2 -maes -mpclmul` or
+ * `clang -maes -mpclmul`.
+ * - Non-x86 targets: this option is silently ignored.
+ * - Other compilers: this option is silently ignored.
+ *
+ * \note
+ * Above, "GCC" includes compatible compilers such as Clang.
+ * The limitations on target support are likely to be relaxed in the future.
*
* Module: library/aesni.c
* Caller: library/aes.c
*
- * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM (on some platforms, see note)
*
- * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64
+ * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/version.h b/include/mbedtls/version.h
index 1324eae..0ef5213 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -38,16 +38,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 3
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0200
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.2"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.28.2"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0300
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.3"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.28.3"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index fd3a3e7..553569e 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -204,15 +204,15 @@
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
- set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 7)
+ set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.3 SOVERSION 7)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
- set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 1)
+ set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.3 SOVERSION 1)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
- set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 14)
+ set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.3 SOVERSION 14)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index bcdf3c7..f08a21f 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@
#define AES_VALIDATE(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \
- (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16))
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
static int aes_padlock_ace = -1;
#endif
@@ -512,6 +511,53 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+/* Some implementations need the round keys to be aligned.
+ * Return an offset to be added to buf, such that (buf + offset) is
+ * correctly aligned.
+ * Note that the offset is in units of elements of buf, i.e. 32-bit words,
+ * i.e. an offset of 1 means 4 bytes and so on.
+ */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2)
+#define MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN
+#endif
+static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf)
+{
+#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN)
+ int align_16_bytes = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
+ if (aes_padlock_ace == -1) {
+ aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE);
+ }
+ if (aes_padlock_ace) {
+ align_16_bytes = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ align_16_bytes = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (align_16_bytes) {
+ /* These implementations needs 16-byte alignment
+ * for the round key array. */
+ unsigned delta = ((uintptr_t) buf & 0x0000000fU) / 4;
+ if (delta == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return 4 - delta; // 16 bytes = 4 uint32_t
+ }
+ }
+#else /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */
+ (void) buf;
+#endif /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* AES key schedule (encryption)
*/
@@ -539,18 +585,9 @@
}
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16)
- if (aes_padlock_ace == -1) {
- aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE);
- }
+ ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
- if (aes_padlock_ace) {
- ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(ctx->buf);
- } else
-#endif
- ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits);
}
@@ -640,16 +677,7 @@
mbedtls_aes_init(&cty);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16)
- if (aes_padlock_ace == -1) {
- aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE);
- }
-
- if (aes_padlock_ace) {
- ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(ctx->buf);
- } else
-#endif
- ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf;
+ ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
/* Also checks keybits */
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) {
@@ -658,7 +686,7 @@
ctx->nr = cty.nr;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) ctx->rk,
(const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr);
@@ -964,6 +992,30 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN)
+/* VIA Padlock and our intrinsics-based implementation of AESNI require
+ * the round keys to be aligned on a 16-byte boundary. We take care of this
+ * before creating them, but the AES context may have moved (this can happen
+ * if the library is called from a language with managed memory), and in later
+ * calls it might have a different alignment with respect to 16-byte memory.
+ * So we may need to realign.
+ * NOTE: In the LTS branch, the context contains a pointer to within itself,
+ * so if it has been moved, things will probably go pear-shaped. We keep this
+ * code for compatibility with the development branch, in case of future changes.
+ */
+static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned current_offset = (unsigned) (ctx->rk - ctx->buf);
+ unsigned new_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
+ if (new_offset != current_offset) {
+ memmove(ctx->buf + new_offset, // new address
+ ctx->buf + current_offset, // current address
+ (ctx->nr + 1) * 16); // number of round keys * bytes per rk
+ ctx->rk = ctx->buf + new_offset;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* AES-ECB block encryption/decryption
*/
@@ -978,7 +1030,11 @@
AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ||
mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN)
+ aes_maybe_realign(ctx);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
return mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
}
@@ -986,13 +1042,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
if (aes_padlock_ace) {
- if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to
- // unaccelerated mode
- //
+ return mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
}
#endif
@@ -1785,6 +1835,32 @@
memset(key, 0, 32);
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT)
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: alternative implementation.\n");
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
+ if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI via ");
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1
+ mbedtls_printf("assembly");
+#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ mbedtls_printf("intrinsics");
+#else
+ mbedtls_printf("(unknown)");
+#endif
+ mbedtls_printf(".\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n");
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+ }
+
/*
* ECB mode
*/
diff --git a/library/aesni.c b/library/aesni.c
index 2a44b0e..c909f65 100644
--- a/library/aesni.c
+++ b/library/aesni.c
@@ -18,21 +18,14 @@
*/
/*
- * [AES-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set
- * [CLMUL-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode/
+ * [AES-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set.html
+ * [CLMUL-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode.html
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
-#if defined(__has_feature)
-#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
-#warning \
- "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code."
-#endif
-#endif
-
#include "mbedtls/aesni.h"
#include <string.h>
@@ -43,7 +36,14 @@
#endif
/* *INDENT-ON* */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+#if !defined(_WIN32)
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#endif
+#include <immintrin.h>
+#endif
/*
* AES-NI support detection routine
@@ -54,17 +54,355 @@
static unsigned int c = 0;
if (!done) {
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ static unsigned info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+ __cpuid(info, 1);
+#else
+ __cpuid(1, info[0], info[1], info[2], info[3]);
+#endif
+ c = info[2];
+#else /* AESNI using asm */
asm ("movl $1, %%eax \n\t"
"cpuid \n\t"
: "=c" (c)
:
: "eax", "ebx", "edx");
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
done = 1;
}
return (c & what) != 0;
}
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+
+/*
+ * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->rk);
+ unsigned nr = ctx->nr; // Number of remaining rounds
+
+ // Load round key 0
+ __m128i state;
+ memcpy(&state, input, 16);
+ state = _mm_xor_si128(state, rk[0]); // state ^= *rk;
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+
+ if (mode == 0) {
+ while (nr != 0) {
+ state = _mm_aesdec_si128(state, *rk);
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+ }
+ state = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(state, *rk);
+ } else {
+ while (nr != 0) {
+ state = _mm_aesenc_si128(state, *rk);
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+ }
+ state = _mm_aesenclast_si128(state, *rk);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, &state, 16);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128)
+ * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5.
+ */
+
+static void gcm_clmul(const __m128i aa, const __m128i bb,
+ __m128i *cc, __m128i *dd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Caryless multiplication dd:cc = aa * bb
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12).
+ */
+ *cc = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x00); // a0*b0 = c1:c0
+ *dd = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x11); // a1*b1 = d1:d0
+ __m128i ee = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x10); // a0*b1 = e1:e0
+ __m128i ff = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x01); // a1*b0 = f1:f0
+ ff = _mm_xor_si128(ff, ee); // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ ee = ff; // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ ff = _mm_srli_si128(ff, 8); // 0:e1+f1
+ ee = _mm_slli_si128(ee, 8); // e0+f0:0
+ *dd = _mm_xor_si128(*dd, ff); // d1:d0+e1+f1
+ *cc = _mm_xor_si128(*cc, ee); // c1+e0+f0:c0
+}
+
+static void gcm_shift(__m128i *cc, __m128i *dd)
+{
+ /* [CMUCL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 1: shift cc:dd one bit to the left,
+ * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18). */
+ // // *cc = r1:r0
+ // // *dd = r3:r2
+ __m128i cc_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*cc, 1); // r1<<1:r0<<1
+ __m128i dd_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*dd, 1); // r3<<1:r2<<1
+ __m128i cc_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*cc, 63); // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ __m128i dd_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*dd, 63); // r3>>63:r2>>63
+ __m128i xmm5 = _mm_srli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63
+ cc_hi = _mm_slli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // r0>>63:0
+ dd_hi = _mm_slli_si128(dd_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63
+
+ *cc = _mm_or_si128(cc_lo, cc_hi); // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1
+ *dd = _mm_or_si128(_mm_or_si128(dd_lo, dd_hi), xmm5); // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63
+}
+
+static __m128i gcm_reduce(__m128i xx)
+{
+ // // xx = x1:x0
+ /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 2 */
+ __m128i aa = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 63); // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a
+ __m128i bb = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 62); // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b
+ __m128i cc = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 57); // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c
+ __m128i dd = _mm_slli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(aa, bb), cc), 8); // a+b+c:0
+ return _mm_xor_si128(dd, xx); // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0
+}
+
+static __m128i gcm_mix(__m128i dx)
+{
+ /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Steps 3 and 4 */
+ __m128i ee = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 1); // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0'
+ __m128i ff = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 2); // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0'
+ __m128i gg = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 7); // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0'
+
+ // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, except for some missing
+ // bits carried from d. Now get those bits back in.
+ __m128i eh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 63); // d<<63:stuff
+ __m128i fh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 62); // d<<62:stuff
+ __m128i gh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 57); // d<<57:stuff
+ __m128i hh = _mm_srli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(eh, fh), gh), 8); // 0:missing bits of d
+
+ return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(ee, ff), gg), hh), dx);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16])
+{
+ __m128i aa, bb, cc, dd;
+
+ /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ ((uint8_t *) &aa)[i] = a[15 - i];
+ ((uint8_t *) &bb)[i] = b[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ gcm_clmul(aa, bb, &cc, &dd);
+ gcm_shift(&cc, &dd);
+ /*
+ * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18).
+ * Currently dd:cc holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted).
+ */
+ __m128i dx = gcm_reduce(cc);
+ __m128i xh = gcm_mix(dx);
+ cc = _mm_xor_si128(xh, dd); // x3+h1:x2+h0
+
+ /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ c[i] = ((uint8_t *) &cc)[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr)
+{
+ __m128i *ik = (__m128i *) invkey;
+ const __m128i *fk = (const __m128i *) fwdkey + nr;
+
+ *ik = *fk;
+ for (--fk, ++ik; fk > (const __m128i *) fwdkey; --fk, ++ik) {
+ *ik = _mm_aesimc_si128(*fk);
+ }
+ *ik = *fk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 128-bit case
+ */
+static __m128i aesni_set_rk_128(__m128i state, __m128i xword)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next round key.
+ *
+ * On entry state is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff
+ * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, xword is r7:r6:r5:r4
+ * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3
+ * and this is returned, to be written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // X:X:X:X
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r1:r0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2+r1:r6:r5:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r0:0:0:0
+ state = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // r7:r6:r5:r4
+ return state;
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk_bytes,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16);
+ rk[1] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[0], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[0], 0x01));
+ rk[2] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x02));
+ rk[3] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[2], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[2], 0x04));
+ rk[4] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x08));
+ rk[5] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[4], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[4], 0x10));
+ rk[6] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x20));
+ rk[7] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[6], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[6], 0x40));
+ rk[8] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x80));
+ rk[9] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[8], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[8], 0x1B));
+ rk[10] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x36));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 192-bit case
+ */
+static void aesni_set_rk_192(__m128i *state0, __m128i *state1, __m128i xword,
+ unsigned char *rk)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys.
+ *
+ * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4
+ * and xword is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON
+ * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, state0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and state1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+ * and those are written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0x55); // X:X:X:X
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r1:r0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r0:0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1+r0:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = xword; // = r9:r8:r7:r6
+
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // r9:r9:r9:r9
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r9+r4
+ *state1 = _mm_slli_si128(*state1, 4); // stuff:stuff:r4:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5+r4:r9+r4
+ *state1 = xword; // = stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+
+ /* Store state0 and the low half of state1 into rk, which is conceptually
+ * an array of 24-byte elements. Since 24 is not a multiple of 16,
+ * rk is not necessarily aligned so just `*rk = *state0` doesn't work. */
+ memcpy(rk, state0, 16);
+ memcpy(rk + 16, state1, 8);
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ /* First round: use original key */
+ memcpy(rk, key, 24);
+ /* aes.c guarantees that rk is aligned on a 16-byte boundary. */
+ __m128i state0 = ((__m128i *) rk)[0];
+ __m128i state1 = _mm_loadl_epi64(((__m128i *) rk) + 1);
+
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x01), rk + 24 * 1);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x02), rk + 24 * 2);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x04), rk + 24 * 3);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x08), rk + 24 * 4);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x10), rk + 24 * 5);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x20), rk + 24 * 6);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x40), rk + 24 * 7);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x80), rk + 24 * 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 256-bit case
+ */
+static void aesni_set_rk_256(__m128i state0, __m128i state1, __m128i xword,
+ __m128i *rk0, __m128i *rk1)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next two round keys.
+ *
+ * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and
+ * xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON
+ * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, *rk0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and *rk1 is r15:r14:r13:r12
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ state0 = _mm_xor_si128(state0, xword);
+ *rk0 = state0;
+
+ /* Set xword to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 )
+ * and proceed to generate next round key from there */
+ xword = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state0, 0x00);
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xaa);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ state1 = _mm_xor_si128(state1, xword);
+ *rk1 = state1;
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk_bytes,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16);
+ memcpy(&rk[1], key + 16, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary,
+ * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf
+ */
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[0], rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x01), &rk[2], &rk[3]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[2], rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x02), &rk[4], &rk[5]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[4], rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x04), &rk[6], &rk[7]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[6], rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x08), &rk[8], &rk[9]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[8], rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x10), &rk[10], &rk[11]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[10], rk[11], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[11], 0x20), &rk[12], &rk[13]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[12], rk[13], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[13], 0x40), &rk[14], &rk[15]);
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 */
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+#warning \
+ "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code."
+#endif
+#endif
+
/*
* Binutils needs to be at least 2.19 to support AES-NI instructions.
* Unfortunately, a lot of users have a lower version now (2014-04).
@@ -75,13 +413,13 @@
* Operand macros are in gas order (src, dst) as opposed to Intel order
* (dst, src) in order to blend better into the surrounding assembly code.
*/
-#define AESDEC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE,"
-#define AESDECLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF,"
-#define AESENC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC,"
-#define AESENCLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD,"
-#define AESIMC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB,"
-#define AESKEYGENA ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF,"
-#define PCLMULQDQ ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44,"
+#define AESDEC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESDECLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESENC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESENCLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESIMC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESKEYGENA(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF," regs "," imm "\n\t"
+#define PCLMULQDQ(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44," regs "," imm "\n\t"
#define xmm0_xmm0 "0xC0"
#define xmm0_xmm1 "0xC8"
@@ -109,25 +447,25 @@
"1: \n\t" // encryption loop
"movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
- AESENC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round
- "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key
- "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop
- "jnz 1b \n\t"
- "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
- AESENCLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round
- "jmp 3f \n\t"
+ AESENC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round
+ "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key
+ "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop
+ "jnz 1b \n\t"
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
+ AESENCLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round
+ "jmp 3f \n\t"
- "2: \n\t" // decryption loop
- "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t"
- AESDEC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round
- "add $16, %1 \n\t"
- "subl $1, %0 \n\t"
- "jnz 2b \n\t"
- "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
- AESDECLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round
+ "2: \n\t" // decryption loop
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ AESDEC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round
+ "add $16, %1 \n\t"
+ "subl $1, %0 \n\t"
+ "jnz 2b \n\t"
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
+ AESDECLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round
- "3: \n\t"
- "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output
+ "3: \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output
:
: "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output)
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1");
@@ -158,84 +496,84 @@
/*
* Caryless multiplication xmm2:xmm1 = xmm0 * xmm1
- * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 13).
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12).
*/
"movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // copy of b1:b0
"movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same
"movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same
- PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm1 ",0x00 \n\t" // a0*b0 = c1:c0
- PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm2 ",0x11 \n\t" // a1*b1 = d1:d0
- PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm3 ",0x10 \n\t" // a0*b1 = e1:e0
- PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm4 ",0x01 \n\t" // a1*b0 = f1:f0
- "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0
- "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same
- "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1
- "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0
- "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1
- "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm1, "0x00") // a0*b0 = c1:c0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm2, "0x11") // a1*b1 = d1:d0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm3, "0x10") // a0*b1 = e1:e0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm4, "0x01") // a1*b0 = f1:f0
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0
/*
* Now shift the result one bit to the left,
- * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 20)
+ * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18)
*/
- "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0
- "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2
- "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1
- "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1
- "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
- "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63
- "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
- "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0
- "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0
- "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63
- "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1
- "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1
- "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0
+ "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2
+ "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1
+ "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1
+ "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63
+ "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63
+ "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1
+ "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1
+ "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63
/*
* Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
- * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 20).
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18).
* Currently xmm2:xmm1 holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted).
*/
/* Step 2 (1) */
- "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0
- "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same
- "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same
- "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a
- "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b
- "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a
+ "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b
+ "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c
/* Step 2 (2) */
- "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b
- "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c
- "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0
- "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0
/* Steps 3 and 4 */
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
- "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0'
- "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0'
- "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0'
- "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0'
- "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0'
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0'
+ "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0'
+ "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0'
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0'
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0'
// e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, ex\tcept for some missing
// bits carried from d. Now get those\t bits back in.
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
- "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
- "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff
- "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff
- "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff
- "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff
- "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff
- "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d
- "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0
- "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0
- "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff
+ "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff
+ "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0
- "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done
:
: "r" (aa), "r" (bb), "r" (cc)
: "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5");
@@ -261,8 +599,8 @@
for (fk -= 16, ik += 16; fk > fwdkey; fk -= 16, ik += 16) {
asm ("movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t"
- AESIMC xmm0_xmm0 "\n\t"
- "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t"
+ AESIMC(xmm0_xmm0)
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t"
:
: "r" (fk), "r" (ik)
: "memory", "xmm0");
@@ -306,16 +644,16 @@
/* Main "loop" */
"2: \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x1B \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x36 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x1B") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x36") "call 1b \n\t"
:
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
: "memory", "cc", "0");
@@ -364,14 +702,14 @@
"ret \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t"
:
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
@@ -414,36 +752,38 @@
/* Set xmm2 to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 )
* and proceed to generate next round key from there */
- AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm2 ",0x00 \n\t"
- "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t"
- "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
- "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
- "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
- "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
- "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
- "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
- "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t"
- "add $16, %0 \n\t"
- "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
- "ret \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm2, "0x00")
+ "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
+ "ret \n\t"
/*
* Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary,
* see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf
*/
- "2: \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
- AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t"
+ "2: \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
:
: "r" (rk), "r" (key)
: "memory", "cc", "0");
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+
/*
* Key expansion, wrapper
*/
@@ -461,6 +801,6 @@
return 0;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index f7db0d4..0c958c7 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
ctx->HL[8] = vl;
ctx->HH[8] = vh;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
/* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */
if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) {
return 0;
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
unsigned char lo, hi, rem;
uint64_t zh, zl;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) {
unsigned char h[16];
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, h);
return;
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
lo = x[15] & 0xf;
@@ -754,6 +754,27 @@
int i, j, ret;
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: alternative implementation.\n");
+#else /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI via ");
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1
+ mbedtls_printf("assembly");
+#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ mbedtls_printf("intrinsics");
+#else
+ mbedtls_printf("(unknown)");
+#endif
+ mbedtls_printf(".\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: built-in implementation.\n");
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+ }
+
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
int key_len = 128 + 64 * j;
diff --git a/programs/test/selftest.c b/programs/test/selftest.c
index 598c66e..229f0d8 100644
--- a/programs/test/selftest.c
+++ b/programs/test/selftest.c
@@ -353,6 +353,9 @@
unsigned char buf[1000000];
#endif
void *pointer;
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+ int ci = 0; /* ci = 1 => running in CI, so don't wait for a key press */
+#endif
/*
* The C standard doesn't guarantee that all-bits-0 is the representation
@@ -380,6 +383,10 @@
} else if (strcmp(*argp, "--exclude") == 0 ||
strcmp(*argp, "-x") == 0) {
exclude_mode = 1;
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+ } else if (strcmp(*argp, "--ci") == 0) {
+ ci = 1;
+#endif
} else {
break;
}
@@ -450,8 +457,10 @@
mbedtls_printf(" [ All tests PASS ]\n\n");
}
#if defined(_WIN32)
- mbedtls_printf(" Press Enter to exit this program.\n");
- fflush(stdout); getchar();
+ if (!ci) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" Press Enter to exit this program.\n");
+ fflush(stdout); getchar();
+ }
#endif
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data
index 6349034..faf69c0 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ecb.data
@@ -228,3 +228,12 @@
AES-256-ECB Decrypt NIST KAT #12
aes_decrypt_ecb:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"9b80eefb7ebe2d2b16247aa0efc72f5d":"e0000000000000000000000000000000":0
+
+AES-128-ECB context alignment
+aes_ecb_context_alignment:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f"
+
+AES-192-ECB context alignment
+aes_ecb_context_alignment:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617"
+
+AES-256-ECB context alignment
+aes_ecb_context_alignment:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
index 6b92b87..e96e407 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function
@@ -1,5 +1,52 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+
+/* Test AES with a copied context.
+ *
+ * enc and dec must be AES context objects. They don't need to
+ * be initialized, and are left freed.
+ */
+static int test_ctx_alignment(const data_t *key,
+ mbedtls_aes_context *enc,
+ mbedtls_aes_context *dec)
+{
+ unsigned char plaintext[16] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ };
+ unsigned char ciphertext[16];
+ unsigned char output[16];
+
+ // Set key and encrypt with original context
+ mbedtls_aes_init(enc);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(enc, key->x, key->len * 8) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(enc, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ plaintext, ciphertext) == 0);
+
+ // Set key for decryption with original context
+ mbedtls_aes_init(dec);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(dec, key->x, key->len * 8) == 0);
+
+ // Wipe the original context to make sure nothing from it is used
+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+ mbedtls_aes_free(enc);
+
+ // Decrypt
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(dec, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT,
+ ciphertext, output) == 0);
+ ASSERT_COMPARE(plaintext, 16, output, 16);
+
+ mbedtls_aes_free(dec);
+
+ return 1;
+
+exit:
+ /* Bug: we may be leaving something unfreed. This is harmless
+ * in our built-in implementations, but might cause a memory leak
+ * with alternative implementations. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -621,6 +668,77 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aes_ecb_context_alignment(data_t *key)
+{
+ /* We test alignment multiple times, with different alignments
+ * of the context and of the plaintext/ciphertext. */
+
+ struct align0 {
+ mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
+ };
+ struct align0 *enc0 = NULL;
+ struct align0 *dec0 = NULL;
+
+ struct align1 {
+ char bump;
+ mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
+ };
+ struct align1 *enc1 = NULL;
+ struct align1 *dec1 = NULL;
+
+ /* All peak alignment */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(enc0, 1);
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(dec0, 1);
+ if (!test_ctx_alignment(key, &enc0->ctx, &dec0->ctx)) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(enc0);
+ enc0 = NULL;
+ mbedtls_free(dec0);
+ dec0 = NULL;
+
+ /* Enc aligned, dec not */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(enc0, 1);
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(dec1, 1);
+ if (!test_ctx_alignment(key, &enc0->ctx, &dec1->ctx)) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(enc0);
+ enc0 = NULL;
+ mbedtls_free(dec1);
+ dec1 = NULL;
+
+ /* Dec aligned, enc not */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(enc1, 1);
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(dec0, 1);
+ if (!test_ctx_alignment(key, &enc1->ctx, &dec0->ctx)) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(enc1);
+ enc1 = NULL;
+ mbedtls_free(dec0);
+ dec0 = NULL;
+
+ /* Both shifted */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(enc1, 1);
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(dec1, 1);
+ if (!test_ctx_alignment(key, &enc1->ctx, &dec1->ctx)) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(enc1);
+ enc1 = NULL;
+ mbedtls_free(dec1);
+ dec1 = NULL;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free(enc0);
+ mbedtls_free(dec0);
+ mbedtls_free(enc1);
+ mbedtls_free(dec1);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
void aes_selftest()
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
index 69f8a84..4b57192 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Check compile time library version
-check_compiletime_version:"2.28.2"
+check_compiletime_version:"2.28.3"
Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"2.28.2"
+check_runtime_version:"2.28.3"
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0