Remove negative tests from multipart_decrypt
Multipart decrypt now always expects positive result (i.e. the plaintext
that is passed in). Added new test that expects fail, and does no
multipart versions and concentrates on aead_verify.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index b6d52f7..f25872d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -309,7 +309,6 @@
int data_part_len_arg,
setlengths_method set_lengths_method,
data_t *expected_output,
- int expect_valid_signature,
int is_encrypt,
int do_zero_parts )
{
@@ -518,25 +517,11 @@
&tag_size ) );
else
{
- status = psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_verify( &operation, final_data,
final_output_size,
&output_part_length,
( input_data->x + data_true_size ),
- tag_length );
-
- if( expect_valid_signature )
- PSA_ASSERT( status );
- else
- {
- TEST_ASSERT( status != PSA_SUCCESS );
-
- if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
- {
- /* Expected failure. */
- test_ok = 1;
- goto exit;
- }
- }
+ tag_length ) );
}
if( output_data && output_part_length )
@@ -3522,7 +3507,7 @@
input_data, -1,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- 1, 1, 0 ) )
+ 1, 0 ) )
break;
/* length(0) part, length(ad_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
@@ -3535,7 +3520,7 @@
input_data, -1,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- 1, 1, 1 ) )
+ 1, 1 ) )
break;
}
}
@@ -3563,7 +3548,7 @@
input_data, data_part_len,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- 1, 1, 0 ) )
+ 1, 0 ) )
break;
/* length(0) part, length(data_part_len) part, length(0) part... */
@@ -3575,7 +3560,7 @@
input_data, data_part_len,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- 1, 1, 1 ) )
+ 1, 1 ) )
break;
}
}
@@ -3596,8 +3581,7 @@
data_t *input_data,
int do_test_data_chunked,
int do_set_lengths,
- data_t *expected_output,
- int expect_valid_signature )
+ data_t *expected_output )
{
size_t ad_part_len = 0;
size_t data_part_len = 0;
@@ -3631,7 +3615,6 @@
input_data, -1,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- expect_valid_signature,
0, 0 ) )
break;
@@ -3645,7 +3628,6 @@
input_data, -1,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- expect_valid_signature,
0, 1 ) )
break;
}
@@ -3674,7 +3656,6 @@
input_data, data_part_len,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- expect_valid_signature,
0, 0 ) )
break;
@@ -3687,7 +3668,6 @@
input_data, data_part_len,
set_lengths_method,
expected_output,
- expect_valid_signature,
0, 1 ) )
break;
}
@@ -4085,6 +4065,90 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void aead_multipart_verify( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
+ int alg_arg,
+ data_t *nonce,
+ data_t *additional_data,
+ data_t *input_data,
+ data_t *tag,
+ int expected_status_arg )
+{
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+ psa_aead_operation_t operation;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+ psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+ unsigned char *plaintext = NULL;
+ unsigned char *finish_plaintext = NULL;
+ size_t plaintext_size = 0;
+ size_t plaintext_length = 0;
+ size_t verify_plaintext_size = 0;
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
+ psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+ psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
+ &key ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) );
+
+ plaintext_size = PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg,
+ input_data->len );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( plaintext, plaintext_size );
+
+ verify_plaintext_size = PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, alg );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( finish_plaintext, verify_plaintext_size );
+
+ operation = psa_aead_operation_init( );
+
+ status = psa_aead_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg );
+
+ /* If the operation is not supported, just skip and not fail in case the
+ * encryption involves a common limitation of cryptography hardwares and
+ * an alternative implementation. */
+ if( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_AES_192( key_type, key_data->len * 8 );
+ MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_SKIP_IF_ALT_GCM_NOT_12BYTES_NONCE( alg, nonce->len );
+ }
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( status );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update_ad( &operation, additional_data->x,
+ additional_data->len ) );
+
+ PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_update( &operation, input_data->x,
+ input_data->len,
+ plaintext, plaintext_size,
+ &plaintext_length ) );
+
+ status = psa_aead_verify( &operation, finish_plaintext,
+ verify_plaintext_size,
+ &plaintext_length,
+ tag->x, tag->len );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status );
+
+exit:
+ psa_destroy_key( key );
+ mbedtls_free( plaintext );
+ mbedtls_free( finish_plaintext );
+ psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+ PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aead_multipart_state_test( int key_type_arg, data_t *key_data,
int alg_arg,
data_t *nonce,