Merge pull request #6816 from nick-child-ibm/pkcs7_coverage
Pkcs7 coverage
diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index eaf817a..54df776 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
- tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
- tests/ssl-opt.sh
# Modern OpenSSL does not support fixed ECDH or null ciphers.
- - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH-'
+ - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH_'
- tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
# GnuTLS supports CAMELLIA but compat.sh doesn't properly enable it.
- tests/compat.sh -p GnuTLS -e 'CAMELLIA'
diff --git a/.uncrustify.cfg b/.uncrustify.cfg
index 7ce0905..92b8ce9 100644
--- a/.uncrustify.cfg
+++ b/.uncrustify.cfg
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
# limitations under the License.
-# Line length options
-
# Wrap lines at 100 characters
code_width = 100
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md
index fc79e49..a7bf198 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
Coding Standards
----------------
-- We would ask that contributions conform to [our coding standards](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards/), and that contributions are fully tested before submission, as mentioned in the [Tests](#tests) and [Continuous Integration](#continuous-integration-tests) sections.
-- The code should be written in a clean and readable style.
+- Contributions should include tests, as mentioned in the [Tests](#tests) and [Continuous Integration](#continuous-integration-tests) sections. Please check that your contribution passes basic tests before submission, and check the CI results after making a pull request.
+- The code should be written in a clean and readable style, and must follow [our coding standards](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards/).
- The code should be written in a portable generic way, that will benefit the whole community, and not only your own needs.
- The code should be secure, and will be reviewed from a security point of view as well.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86182c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/c-build-helper-hostcc.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Features
+ * Use HOSTCC (if it is set) when compiling C code during generation of the
+ configuration-independent files. This allows them to be generated when
+ CC is set for cross compilation.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt b/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2cff5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/coding-style.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Changes
+ * The C code follows a new coding style. This is transparent for users but
+ affects contributors and maintainers of local patches. For more
+ information, see
+ https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/rewrite-branch-for-coding-style/
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt b/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a90721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/conditionalize-mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs-memcpy.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix potential undefined behavior in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(). Reported by
+ Pascal Cuoq using TrustInSoft Analyzer in #6701; observed independently by
+ Aaron Ucko under Valgrind.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/csr_v3_extensions.txt b/ChangeLog.d/csr_v3_extensions.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9274017
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/csr_v3_extensions.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+ * Add parsing of V3 extensions (key usage, Netscape cert-type,
+ Subject Alternative Names) in x509 Certificate Sign Requests.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57fe37a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-example-programs-no-args.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix behavior of certain sample programs which could, when run with no
+ arguments, access uninitialized memory in some cases. Fixes #6700 (which
+ was found by TrustInSoft Analyzer during REDOCS'22) and #1120.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt b/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1764c2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/improve_x509_cert_writing_serial_number_management.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+Bugfix
+ * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial() now explicitly rejects serial numbers
+ whose binary representation is longer than 20 bytes. This was already
+ forbidden by the standard (RFC5280 - section 4.1.2.2) and now it's being
+ enforced also at code level.
+
+New deprecations
+ * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial() is now being deprecated in favor of
+ mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(). The goal here is to remove any
+ direct dependency of X509 on BIGNUM_C.
+
+Changes
+ * programs/x509/cert_write:
+ - now it accepts the serial number in 2 different formats: decimal and
+ hex. They cannot be used simultaneously
+ - "serial" is used for the decimal format and it's limted in size to
+ unsigned long long int
+ - "serial_hex" is used for the hex format; max length here is
+ MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN*2
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index e09bd92..2f89040 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -71,16 +71,16 @@
/**
* \brief Supported cipher types.
*
- * \warning DES is considered weak cipher and its use
- * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
* ciphers instead.
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher ID lists. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, /**< The identity cipher, treated as a stream cipher. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@
/**
* \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs.
*
- * \warning DES is considered weak cipher and its use
- * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
* ciphers instead.
*/
typedef enum {
@@ -126,12 +126,12 @@
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. */
- MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */
@@ -217,11 +217,11 @@
enum {
/** Undefined key length. */
MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE = 0,
- /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. */
+ /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. \warning DES is considered weak. */
MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES = 64,
- /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. */
+ /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE = 128,
- /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. */
+ /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 = 192,
};
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/des.h b/include/mbedtls/des.h
index 5a18634..f445102 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/des.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/des.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* \brief DES block cipher
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
/**
* \brief DES context structure
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@
/**
* \brief Triple-DES context structure
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context {
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */
@@ -79,7 +83,7 @@
*
* \param ctx DES context to be initialized
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -90,7 +94,7 @@
*
* \param ctx DES context to be cleared
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -100,6 +104,10 @@
* \brief Initialize Triple-DES context
*
* \param ctx DES3 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
void mbedtls_des3_init(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx);
@@ -107,6 +115,10 @@
* \brief Clear Triple-DES context
*
* \param ctx DES3 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
void mbedtls_des3_free(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx);
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@
*
* \param key 8-byte secret key
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -134,7 +146,7 @@
*
* \return 0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct.
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -148,7 +160,7 @@
*
* \return 0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified.
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -163,7 +175,7 @@
*
* \return 0
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -178,7 +190,7 @@
*
* \return 0
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -192,6 +204,10 @@
* \param key 16-byte secret key
*
* \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -204,6 +220,10 @@
* \param key 16-byte secret key
*
* \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -216,6 +236,10 @@
* \param key 24-byte secret key
*
* \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -228,6 +252,10 @@
* \param key 24-byte secret key
*
* \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -242,7 +270,7 @@
*
* \return 0 if successful
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -270,7 +298,7 @@
* \param input buffer holding the input data
* \param output buffer holding the output data
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
@@ -291,6 +319,10 @@
* \param output 64-bit output block
*
* \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -317,6 +349,10 @@
* \param output buffer holding the output data
*
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
@@ -335,7 +371,7 @@
* \param SK Round keys
* \param key Base key
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index 0a42040..9847a68 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
* \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same
* ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type
* should not be shared between multiple threads.
+ *
+ * \note pk_wrap module assumes that "ecdsa_context" is identical
+ * to "ecp_keypair" (see for example structure
+ * "mbedtls_eckey_info" where ECDSA sign/verify functions
+ * are used also for EC key)
*/
typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context;
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index 2a2c039..9ae51c9 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -2428,7 +2428,7 @@
*
* PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys.
*
- * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index 0392bd4..29cac27 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -156,6 +156,28 @@
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */
/**
+ * \brief The following defines are meant to list ECDSA capabilities of the
+ * PK module in a general way (without any reference to how this
+ * is achieved, which can be either through PSA driver or
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY
+#endif
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+/**
* \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module
*/
typedef enum {
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index dbc37e8..8bc8fd0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -533,7 +533,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8 // NEW IN TLS 1.3
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
@@ -671,10 +672,12 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
index 52fadad..aa1cd08 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
/*
* X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags
- * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags.
+ * Reminder: update mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */
#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */
@@ -250,6 +250,56 @@
}
mbedtls_x509_time;
+/**
+ * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name {
+ /**
+ * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280.
+ * To check the value of the type id, you should use
+ * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
+ */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */
+ union {
+ /**
+ * From RFC 4108 section 5:
+ * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
+ */
+ struct {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */
+ }
+ hardware_module_name;
+ }
+ value;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
+
+/**
+ * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name,
+ * according to type.
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name {
+ int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
+ union {
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
+ }
+ san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
+
/** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */
/**
@@ -326,6 +376,36 @@
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from);
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
+ * extension.
+ *
+ * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
+ * alternative name.
+ * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
+ * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
+ *
+ * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name
+ * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported.
+ *
+ * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
+ * subject alternative name. For example, after successful
+ * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
+ * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
+ * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
+ * lifetime of the certificate.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
+ * SAN type.
+ * \return Another negative value for any other failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
+
/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
/*
@@ -370,6 +450,23 @@
int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t size);
+int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *ns_cert_type);
+int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned int *key_usage);
+int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name);
+int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence
+ *subject_alt_name,
+ const char *prefix);
+int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type);
+int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ unsigned int key_usage);
#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \
do { \
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index 661f8aa..187e60a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -103,56 +103,6 @@
mbedtls_x509_crt;
/**
- * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
- * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
- *
- * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
- * to its embedded union and structure.
- */
-typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name {
- /**
- * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280.
- * To check the value of the type id, you should use
- * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
- */
- mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */
- union {
- /**
- * From RFC 4108 section 5:
- * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
- */
- struct {
- mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
- mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */
- }
- hardware_module_name;
- }
- value;
-}
-mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
-
-/**
- * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name,
- * according to type.
- *
- * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
- * to its embedded union and structure.
- */
-typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name {
- int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
- union {
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */
- mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */
- }
- san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
-}
-mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
-
-/**
* Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp)
* Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it.
*/
@@ -197,7 +147,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1
#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2
-#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 20
#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN)
@@ -277,7 +227,8 @@
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert {
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
- mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial);
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN];
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial_len);
mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_key);
mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_key);
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject);
@@ -589,36 +540,6 @@
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
-/**
- * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
- * extension.
- *
- * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
- * alternative name.
- * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
- * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw.
- *
- * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name
- * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported.
- *
- * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
- * subject alternative name. For example, after successful
- * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
- * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
- * this function.
- *
- * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
- * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
- * lifetime of the certificate.
- *
- * \return \c 0 on success
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
- * SAN type.
- * \return Another negative value for any other failure.
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
-
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
/**
* \brief Returns an informational string about the
@@ -986,15 +907,43 @@
*/
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
*
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library. Please use
+ * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw() instead.
+ *
+ * \note Even though the MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C guard looks redundant since
+ * X509 depends on PK and PK depends on BIGNUM, this emphasizes
+ * a direct dependency between X509 and BIGNUM which is going
+ * to be deprecated in the future.
+ *
* \param ctx CRT context to use
* \param serial serial number to set
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
-int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial);
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(
+ mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial);
+#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param serial A raw array of bytes containing the serial number in big
+ * endian format
+ * \param serial_len Length of valid bytes (expressed in bytes) in \p serial
+ * input buffer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the provided input buffer
+ * is too big (longer than MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN)
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len);
/**
* \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
index 50998c4..0c204be 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@
mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
+ unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
+
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid;
mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 9bc1c2d..41b3a26 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@
/* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs
* because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the
* significant digits of B. */
- if (A->n > n) {
+ if (A->n > n && A != X) {
memcpy(X->p + n, A->p + n, (A->n - n) * ciL);
}
if (X->n > A->n) {
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.h b/library/bignum_core.h
index 44d5c5a..4fb8f65 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.h
+++ b/library/bignum_core.h
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
* most significant zero bytes in the input).
*
* \param[out] X The address of the MPI.
- * May only be #NULL if \X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length
+ * May only be #NULL if \p X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length
* is 0.
* \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X.
* \param[in] input The input buffer to import from.
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod.h b/library/bignum_mod.h
index d8c8b7d..d4c1d5d 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod.h
+++ b/library/bignum_mod.h
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@
* limbs as the modulus \p N. (\p r is an input parameter, but
* its value will be modified during execution and restored
* before the function returns.)
- * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \r.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \p r.
* \param[out] buf The output buffer to export to.
* \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf.
* \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
index 826dd07..bf0cb25 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
+++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include "bignum_mod.h"
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h"
+
void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
@@ -118,6 +120,19 @@
(void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c);
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs);
+
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h b/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ead8394
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of Low-level
+ * modular bignum.
+ */
+/**
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+/** Convert the result of a quasi-reduction to its canonical representative.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. Must have the
+ * same number of limbs as \p N. The input value must
+ * be in range 0 <= X < 2N.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index 0b02d77..36c999e 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@
mbedtls_ccm_init(&ctx);
if (mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data,
- 8 * sizeof key_test_data) != 0) {
+ 8 * sizeof(key_test_data)) != 0) {
if (verbose != 0) {
mbedtls_printf(" CCM: setup failed");
}
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index 7f4d509..b3bf874 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@
*/
uint32_t r;
#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)
- asm ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :);
+ asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :);
#elif defined(__aarch64__)
- asm ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :);
+ asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :);
#endif
return r;
}
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 727283f..7987c3f 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -4507,7 +4507,7 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
/*
* Create an MPI from embedded constants
- * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint)
+ * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
*/
static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len)
{
@@ -5370,7 +5370,7 @@
if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) {
M.n = p_limbs + adjust;
}
- memset(Mp, 0, sizeof Mp);
+ memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp));
memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
if (shift != 0) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift));
@@ -5396,7 +5396,7 @@
if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) {
M.n = p_limbs + adjust;
}
- memset(Mp, 0, sizeof Mp);
+ memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp));
memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
if (shift != 0) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift));
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index 7e25f28..e55410c 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@
goto cleanup;
}
- if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(&ctx, buf, sizeof buf)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(&ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index b01694c..ed3ca41 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
return &mbedtls_eckeydh_info;
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
return &mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
#endif
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index aaf516e..fa296e8 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -620,56 +620,396 @@
return ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-/* Forward declarations */
-static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/*
+ * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
+ * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
+ */
+static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *to, size_t to_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) {
+ (*from)++;
+ unpadded_len--;
+ }
+
+ if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
+ memset(to, 0x00, padding_len);
+ memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len);
+ (*from) += unpadded_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
+ * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
+ * twice as big as int_size.
+ */
+static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t tmp_size;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract r */
+ if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ /* Extract s */
+ if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = ctx_arg;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_pk_context key;
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+ const size_t signature_part_size = (ctx->grp.nbits + 7) / 8;
+ ((void) md_alg);
-static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
+ if (curve == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
-static int eckey_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
+ * re-construct one to make it happy */
+ key.pk_info = &pk_info;
+ key.pk_ctx = ctx;
+ p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key);
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
+ * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
+ if (2 * signature_part_size > sizeof(buf)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *) sig;
+ if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, buf,
+ signature_part_size)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md,
+ hash, hash_len,
+ buf, 2 * signature_part_size);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (p != sig + sig_len) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
+ ((void) md_alg);
- mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
- if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) {
- ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
}
- mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
-
return ret;
}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
-static int eckey_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/*
+ * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
+ * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
+ * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
+ *
+ * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
+ * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
+ * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
+ */
+static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ size_t n_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ len = n_len;
+ *p -= len;
+ memmove(*p, start, len);
+
+ /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
+ * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
+ * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
+ while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) {
+ ++(*p);
+ --len;
+ }
+
+ /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
+ * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
+ if (**p & 0x80) {
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ *--(*p) = 0x00;
+ len += 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
+
+ return (int) len;
+}
+
+/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
+ * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
+ * MPIs, and in-place.
+ *
+ * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
+ * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
+ * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
+ */
+static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
+ size_t buf_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
+ unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len));
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
+
+ memmove(sig, p, len);
+ *sig_len = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Locate an ECDSA privateKey in a RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 ASN.1 buffer
+ *
+ * [in/out] buf: ASN.1 buffer start as input - ECDSA privateKey start as output
+ * [in] end: ASN.1 buffer end
+ * [out] key_len: the ECDSA privateKey length in bytes
+ */
+static int find_ecdsa_private_key(unsigned char **buf, unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *key_len)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4
+ *
+ * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING,
+ * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
+ * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ */
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* version */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *buf += len;
+
+ /* privateKey */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *key_len = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
{
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = ctx_arg;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_pk_context key;
+ size_t key_len;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(psa_hash);
+#else
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash);
+#endif
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
- mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
+ /* PSA has its own RNG */
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
- if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) {
- ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
- sig, sig_size, sig_len,
- f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (curve == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
- mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
+ /* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context;
+ * re-construct one to make it happy */
+ key.pk_info = &mbedtls_eckey_info;
+ key.pk_ctx = ctx;
+ key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ p = buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len;
+ ret = find_ecdsa_private_key(&p, buf + sizeof(buf), &key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ p, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
return ret;
}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* Forward declarations */
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
@@ -817,17 +1157,20 @@
"EC",
eckey_get_bitlen,
eckey_can_do,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
- eckey_verify_wrap,
- eckey_sign_wrap,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+ ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
-#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
- NULL,
- NULL,
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair,
@@ -873,398 +1216,13 @@
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
{
return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-/*
- * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
- * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
- */
-static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned char *to, size_t to_len)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) {
- (*from)++;
- unpadded_len--;
- }
-
- if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
- }
-
- padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
- memset(to, 0x00, padding_len);
- memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len);
- (*from) += unpadded_len;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
- * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
- * twice as big as int_size.
- */
-static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t tmp_size;
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* Extract r */
- if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- /* Extract s */
- if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
-{
- mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_status_t status;
- mbedtls_pk_context key;
- int key_len;
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
- unsigned char *p;
- mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
- psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
- size_t curve_bits;
- psa_ecc_family_t curve =
- mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
- const size_t signature_part_size = (ctx->grp.nbits + 7) / 8;
- ((void) md_alg);
-
- if (curve == 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
- /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
- * re-construct one to make it happy */
- key.pk_info = &pk_info;
- key.pk_ctx = ctx;
- p = buf + sizeof(buf);
- key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key);
- if (key_len <= 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
- psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve));
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
-
- status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
- buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
- &key_id);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
- * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
- if (2 * signature_part_size > sizeof(buf)) {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *) sig;
- if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, buf,
- signature_part_size)) != 0) {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md,
- hash, hash_len,
- buf, 2 * signature_part_size);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(status);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if (p != sig + sig_len) {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- ret = 0;
-
-cleanup:
- status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
- if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- ((void) md_alg);
-
- ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
- hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
-
- if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-/*
- * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
- * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
- * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
- *
- * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
- * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
- * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
- */
-static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
- size_t n_len)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len = 0;
-
- if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
- }
-
- len = n_len;
- *p -= len;
- memmove(*p, start, len);
-
- /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
- * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
- * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
- while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) {
- ++(*p);
- --len;
- }
-
- /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
- if (len == 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
- }
-
- /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
- * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
- if (**p & 0x80) {
- if (*p - start < 1) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
- }
-
- *--(*p) = 0x00;
- len += 1;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
-
- return (int) len;
-}
-
-/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
- * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
- * MPIs, and in-place.
- *
- * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
- * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
- * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
- */
-static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
- size_t buf_len)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len = 0;
- const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
- unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
-
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len));
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len));
-
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len));
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
-
- memmove(sig, p, len);
- *sig_len = len;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Locate an ECDSA privateKey in a RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 ASN.1 buffer
- *
- * [in/out] buf: ASN.1 buffer start as input - ECDSA privateKey start as output
- * [in] end: ASN.1 buffer end
- * [out] key_len: the ECDSA privateKey length in bytes
- */
-static int find_ecdsa_private_key(unsigned char **buf, unsigned char *end,
- size_t *key_len)
-{
- size_t len;
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4
- *
- * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
- * privateKey OCTET STRING,
- * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
- * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
- * }
- */
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* version */
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- *buf += len;
-
- /* privateKey */
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(buf, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- *key_len = len;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
-{
- mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg;
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
- psa_status_t status;
- mbedtls_pk_context key;
- size_t key_len;
- unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES];
- unsigned char *p;
- psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(psa_hash);
-#else
- psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash);
-#endif
- size_t curve_bits;
- psa_ecc_family_t curve =
- mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
-
- /* PSA has its own RNG */
- ((void) f_rng);
- ((void) p_rng);
-
- if (curve == 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
- /* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context;
- * re-construct one to make it happy */
- key.pk_info = &mbedtls_eckey_info;
- key.pk_ctx = ctx;
- key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (key_len <= 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
- p = buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len;
- ret = find_ecdsa_private_key(&p, buf + sizeof(buf), &key_len);
- if (ret != 0) {
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
- psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
- psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
-
- status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
- p, key_len,
- &key_id);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len,
- sig, sig_size, sig_len);
- if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(status);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- ret = pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size);
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
- status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
- if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
- ret = mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-#else
-static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
- const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
- unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
-{
- return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
- md_alg, hash, hash_len,
- sig, sig_size, sig_len,
- f_rng, p_rng);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
@@ -1297,26 +1255,7 @@
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap(void)
-{
- void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_context));
-
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- mbedtls_ecdsa_init((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx);
- }
-
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void ecdsa_free_wrap(void *ctx)
-{
- mbedtls_ecdsa_free((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx);
- mbedtls_free(ctx);
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void)
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx));
@@ -1333,31 +1272,39 @@
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx);
mbedtls_free(ctx);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
"ECDSA",
eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */
ecdsa_can_do,
- ecdsa_verify_wrap,
- ecdsa_sign_wrap,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+ ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */
- ecdsa_alloc_wrap,
- ecdsa_free_wrap,
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+ eckey_free_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_rs_alloc,
ecdsa_rs_free,
#endif
eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
};
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/*
@@ -1546,7 +1493,7 @@
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
{
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
((void) ctx);
((void) md_alg);
((void) hash);
@@ -1557,7 +1504,7 @@
((void) f_rng);
((void) p_rng);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN && !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key = (const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *) ctx;
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
@@ -1576,11 +1523,11 @@
type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg));
} else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) {
alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md(md_alg));
@@ -1592,11 +1539,11 @@
status = psa_sign_hash(*key, alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_size, sig_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
return mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(status);
} else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) {
return mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_rsa(status);
@@ -1605,15 +1552,15 @@
return mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(status);
}
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
/* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */
return pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size);
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
return 0;
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN && !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
}
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_ecdsa_opaque_info = {
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.h b/library/pk_wrap.h
index 67d0989..ac5c72f 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.h
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.h
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME
+#endif
+
struct mbedtls_pk_info_t {
/** Public key type */
mbedtls_pk_type_t type;
@@ -125,7 +129,7 @@
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info;
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
#endif
diff --git a/library/ripemd160.c b/library/ripemd160.c
index eed664f..ba97c1f 100644
--- a/library/ripemd160.c
+++ b/library/ripemd160.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@
int i, ret = 0;
unsigned char output[20];
- memset(output, 0, sizeof output);
+ memset(output, 0, sizeof(output));
for (i = 0; i < TESTS; i++) {
if (verbose != 0) {
diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c
index ab897c4..963f8bb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_client.c
@@ -961,9 +961,20 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl,
buf_len,
msg_len));
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
- }
+ /*
+ * Set next state. Note that if TLS 1.3 is proposed, this may be
+ * overwritten by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello().
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 &&
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(ssl);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
cleanup:
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 146dae0..ef05dca 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -2740,4 +2740,8 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif
+
#endif /* ssl_misc.h */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index 4aea61c..1e79afa 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int configured_psk_count = 0;
unsigned char *p = buf;
- psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
const unsigned char *identity;
size_t identity_len;
size_t l_binders_len = 0;
@@ -1092,6 +1092,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2);
selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0);
+ ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity));
@@ -1118,6 +1119,16 @@
return ret;
}
+ if (mbedtls_psa_translate_md(ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
+ != hash_alg) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk."));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
@@ -1211,6 +1222,80 @@
return 0;
}
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ ((void) ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+ const unsigned char *psk;
+ size_t psk_len;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+ if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO);
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk"));
+
+ ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite
+ * associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake.
+ * Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake
+ * based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully
+ * with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite
+ * associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the
+ * two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the
+ * encrypted handshake data and application data are
+ * encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for
+ * the rejected early data.
+ */
+ ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+
+ /* Enable psk and psk_ephermal to make stage early happy */
+ ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
+
+ /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule:
+ * Set the PSK and derive early secret.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Derive early data key material */
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello
*/
@@ -1627,8 +1712,6 @@
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info);
handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
-
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s",
cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name));
@@ -1824,8 +1907,39 @@
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
+ (handshake->selected_identity != 0 ||
+ handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) {
+ /* RFC8446 4.2.11
+ * If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the
+ * client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity
+ * is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST
+ * abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 4.2.10
+ * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK
+ * cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's
+ * "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the
+ * following values are the same as those associated with the
+ * selected PSK:
+ * - The TLS version number
+ * - The selected cipher suite
+ * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any
+ *
+ * We check here that when early data is involved the server
+ * selected the cipher suite associated to the pre-shared key
+ * as it must have.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+#endif
- if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(
+ ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.",
@@ -1837,16 +1951,27 @@
("Selected key exchange mode: %s",
ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode)));
- /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: Set the PSK and derive early secret.
+ /* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done.
*
- * TODO: We don't have to do this in case we offered 0-RTT and the
- * server accepted it. In this case, we could skip generating
- * the early secret. */
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
- if (ret != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early",
- ret);
- goto cleanup;
+ * If we proposed early data then we have already derived an
+ * early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash.
+ * It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or
+ * psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the
+ * early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other
+ * cases we compute it here.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT ||
+ handshake->key_exchange_mode ==
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL)
+#endif
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+ 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl);
@@ -1859,6 +1984,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic"));
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
cleanup:
@@ -1889,6 +2015,7 @@
return ret;
}
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
return 0;
}
@@ -2108,6 +2235,44 @@
}
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 section 4.5
+ *
+ * struct {} EndOfEarlyData;
+ *
+ * If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the
+ * client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server
+ * Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message.
+ */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ size_t buf_len;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+ &buf, &buf_len));
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+ mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0));
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData"));
+ return ret;
+}
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
/*
* STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest
@@ -2367,13 +2532,21 @@
return ret;
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA);
+ } else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+ {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
- ssl,
- MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED);
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+ ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED);
#else
- mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -2789,6 +2962,10 @@
ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl);
break;
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl);
+ break;
+
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl);
break;
@@ -2828,6 +3005,20 @@
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
}
break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(
+ ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata);
+#endif
+ }
+ break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 513937e..4fb73f9 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -1378,9 +1378,8 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4];
size_t hash_len;
- const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
- uint16_t cipher_suite = ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite;
- ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite);
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR"));
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index ecfdab3..2e34ee8 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -644,7 +644,24 @@
return 0;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+/**
+ * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
+ *
+ * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
+ * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
+ * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition.
+ *
+ * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys()
+ * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
+ * stage \c Handshake.
+ *
+ * \returns \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
@@ -1221,7 +1238,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_earlydata,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+ handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
@@ -1282,10 +1299,25 @@
return 0;
}
-/* mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for
- * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of TLS 1.3. */
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
+/**
+ * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for
+ * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of
+ * RFC 8446.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
+ * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see
+ * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake().
+ * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic
+ * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
+ *
+ * \returns \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
@@ -1300,7 +1332,7 @@
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = handshake->ciphersuite_info;
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len);
if (ret != 0) {
@@ -1386,14 +1418,31 @@
traffic_keys->server_write_iv,
traffic_keys->iv_len);
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys"));
exit:
return ret;
}
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+/**
+ * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
+ *
+ * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
+ * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
+ * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition.
+ *
+ * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys()
+ * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
+ * stage \c Early.
+ *
+ * \returns \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
@@ -1479,10 +1528,24 @@
return ret;
}
-/* Generate application traffic keys since any records following a 1-RTT Finished message
- * MUST be encrypted under the application traffic key.
+/**
+ * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys.
+ *
+ * ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic
+ * keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be
+ * encrypted under the application traffic key.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
+ * key schedule stage \c Application, see
+ * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application().
+ * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic
+ * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
+ *
+ * \returns \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns A negative error code on failure.
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys)
{
@@ -1612,7 +1675,7 @@
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Compute handshake secret */
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl);
+ ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret);
goto cleanup;
@@ -1620,9 +1683,9 @@
/* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and
* key material. */
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
+ ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys",
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys",
ret);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1636,7 +1699,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_handshake,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+ handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
@@ -1702,17 +1765,17 @@
mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL;
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl);
+ ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
- "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret);
+ "ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
- ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
+ ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys);
if (ret != 0) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
- "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret);
+ "ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -1726,7 +1789,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
transform_application,
ssl->conf->endpoint,
- ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
&traffic_keys,
ssl);
if (ret != 0) {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
index d4f2b40..21e9b4d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
@@ -554,76 +554,6 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
- * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
- *
- * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
- * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
- * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition.
- *
- * In the handshake stage, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys()
- * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
- *
- * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
- * stage \c Early.
- *
- * \returns \c 0 on success.
- * \returns A negative error code on failure.
- */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-
-/**
- * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys.
- *
- * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
- * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see
- * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake().
- * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic key
- * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
- *
- * \returns \c 0 on success.
- * \returns A negative error code on failure.
- */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys);
-
-/**
- * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule.
- *
- * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine
- * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and
- * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition.
- *
- * In the handshake stage, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys()
- * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys.
- *
- * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule
- * stage \c Handshake.
- *
- * \returns \c 0 on success.
- * \returns A negative error code on failure.
- */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
-
-/**
- * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys.
- *
- * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
- * key schedule stage \c Application, see
- * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application().
- * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic key
- * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized.
- *
- * \returns \c 0 on success.
- * \returns A negative error code on failure.
- */
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
- mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys);
-
-/**
* \brief Compute TLS 1.3 resumption master secret.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index ef90f69..81c289a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -2100,7 +2100,7 @@
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_tls13_finalize_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl);
@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
- MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_write_server_hello(ssl));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(ssl));
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
/* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately
diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c
index 1b3701c..81e30e4 100644
--- a/library/x509.c
+++ b/library/x509.c
@@ -1107,4 +1107,489 @@
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
+
+/* Common functions for parsing CRT and CSR. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C)
+/*
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ *
+ * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
+ *
+ * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName,
+ * as defined in RFC 4108.
+ */
+static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name,
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p;
+ const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid;
+
+ if ((subject_alt_name->tag &
+ (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) !=
+ (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) {
+ /*
+ * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername".
+ */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+ cur_oid.p = p;
+ cur_oid.len = len;
+
+ /*
+ * Only HwModuleName is currently supported.
+ */
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (p + len >= end) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name, sizeof(*other_name));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+ p += len;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) !=
+ 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p;
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len;
+
+ if (p + len >= end) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name, sizeof(*other_name));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+ p += len;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p;
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len;
+ p += len;
+ if (p != end) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name,
+ sizeof(*other_name));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
+ *
+ * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
+ *
+ * GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+ * otherName [0] OtherName,
+ * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
+ * dNSName [2] IA5String,
+ * x400Address [3] ORAddress,
+ * directoryName [4] Name,
+ * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
+ * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
+ * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
+ *
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ *
+ * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
+ * partyName [1] DirectoryString }
+ *
+ * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName
+ * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len, tag_len;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
+ unsigned char tag;
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
+
+ /* Get main sequence tag */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (*p + len != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ while (*p < end) {
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf;
+ memset(&dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof(dummy_san_buf));
+
+ tag = **p;
+ (*p)++;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) !=
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the SAN is structured correctly.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf);
+ /*
+ * In case the extension is malformed, return an error,
+ * and clear the allocated sequences.
+ */
+ if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(subject_alt_name->next);
+ subject_alt_name->next = NULL;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
+ if (cur->buf.p != NULL) {
+ if (cur->next != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
+ }
+
+ cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
+
+ if (cur->next == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED);
+ }
+
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ buf = &(cur->buf);
+ buf->tag = tag;
+ buf->p = *p;
+ buf->len = tag_len;
+ *p += buf->len;
+ }
+
+ /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
+ cur->next = NULL;
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *ns_cert_type)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean
+ that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */
+ if (bs.len == 0) {
+ *ns_cert_type = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (bs.len != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ /* Get actual bitstring */
+ *ns_cert_type = *bs.p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned int *key_usage)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean
+ that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */
+ if (bs.len == 0) {
+ *key_usage = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Get actual bitstring */
+ *key_usage = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) {
+ *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ switch (san_buf->tag &
+ (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK |
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) {
+ /*
+ * otherName
+ */
+ case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME):
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name;
+
+ ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
+ san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME;
+ memcpy(&san->san.other_name,
+ &other_name, sizeof(other_name));
+
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * dNSName
+ */
+ case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME):
+ {
+ memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
+ san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME;
+
+ memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name,
+ san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf));
+
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Type not supported
+ */
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence
+ *subject_alt_name,
+ const char *prefix)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ size_t n = *size;
+ char *p = *buf;
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san;
+ int parse_ret;
+
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san));
+ parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san);
+ if (parse_ret != 0) {
+ if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ }
+ cur = cur->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (san.type) {
+ /*
+ * otherName
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME:
+ {
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME,
+ &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid) != 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ ret =
+ mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p,
+ n,
+ &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ ret =
+ mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p,
+ n,
+ "%02X",
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ }
+ }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * dNSName
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len);
+ p += san.san.unstructured_name.len;
+ n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Type not supported, skip item.
+ */
+ default:
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ *size = n;
+ *buf = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \
+ { \
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \
+ sep = ", "; \
+ }
+
+#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \
+ if (ns_cert_type & (type)) \
+ PRINT_ITEM(name);
+
+int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n = *size;
+ char *p = *buf;
+ const char *sep = "";
+
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA");
+ CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA");
+
+ *size = n;
+ *buf = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \
+ if (key_usage & (code)) \
+ PRINT_ITEM(name);
+
+int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
+ unsigned int key_usage)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n = *size;
+ char *p = *buf;
+ const char *sep = "";
+
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only");
+ KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only");
+
+ *size = n;
+ *buf = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */
diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c
index 0330097..ecb903f 100644
--- a/library/x509_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509_crt.c
@@ -562,53 +562,6 @@
return 0;
}
-static int x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned char *ns_cert_type)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if (bs.len != 1) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
- }
-
- /* Get actual bitstring */
- *ns_cert_type = *bs.p;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- unsigned int *key_usage)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t i;
- mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if (bs.len < 1) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
- }
-
- /* Get actual bitstring */
- *key_usage = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) {
- *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
*
@@ -634,118 +587,6 @@
}
/*
- * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
- *
- * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
- *
- * GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
- * otherName [0] OtherName,
- * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
- * dNSName [2] IA5String,
- * x400Address [3] ORAddress,
- * directoryName [4] Name,
- * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
- * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
- * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
- * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
- *
- * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
- *
- * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
- * partyName [1] DirectoryString }
- *
- * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName
- * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.
- */
-static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p,
- const unsigned char *end,
- mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t len, tag_len;
- mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
- unsigned char tag;
- mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
-
- /* Get main sequence tag */
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if (*p + len != end) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- }
-
- while (*p < end) {
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf;
- memset(&dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof(dummy_san_buf));
-
- tag = **p;
- (*p)++;
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if ((tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) !=
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
- }
-
- /*
- * Check that the SAN is structured correctly.
- */
- ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf);
- /*
- * In case the extension is malformed, return an error,
- * and clear the allocated sequences.
- */
- if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
- mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(subject_alt_name->next);
- subject_alt_name->next = NULL;
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
- if (cur->buf.p != NULL) {
- if (cur->next != NULL) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
- }
-
- cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
-
- if (cur->next == NULL) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED);
- }
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- buf = &(cur->buf);
- buf->tag = tag;
- buf->p = *p;
- buf->len = tag_len;
- *p += buf->len;
- }
-
- /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
- cur->next = NULL;
-
- if (*p != end) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
* id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }
*
* anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
@@ -1029,8 +870,8 @@
case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:
/* Parse key usage */
- if ((ret = x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
break;
@@ -1045,16 +886,16 @@
case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
/* Parse subject alt name */
- if ((ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
break;
case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
/* Parse netscape certificate type */
- if ((ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet,
- &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet,
+ &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
break;
@@ -1652,10 +1493,10 @@
memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
- snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof entry_name,
+ snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof(entry_name),
"%s/%s", path, entry->d_name);
- if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name) {
+ if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof(entry_name)) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto cleanup;
} else if (stat(entry_name, &sb) == -1) {
@@ -1703,319 +1544,7 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
-/*
- * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
- *
- * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
- * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
- *
- * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName,
- * as defined in RFC 4108.
- */
-static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name,
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p;
- const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len;
- mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid;
-
- if ((subject_alt_name->tag &
- (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) !=
- (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) {
- /*
- * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername".
- */
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
- }
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- cur_oid.p = p;
- cur_oid.len = len;
-
- /*
- * Only HwModuleName is currently supported.
- */
- if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
- }
-
- if (p + len >= end) {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name, sizeof(*other_name));
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- }
- p += len;
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) !=
- 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len;
-
- if (p + len >= end) {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name, sizeof(*other_name));
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- }
- p += len;
- if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
- }
-
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p;
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len;
- p += len;
- if (p != end) {
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize(other_name,
- sizeof(*other_name));
- return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
- MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- switch (san_buf->tag &
- (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK |
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) {
- /*
- * otherName
- */
- case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME):
- {
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name;
-
- ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name);
- if (ret != 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
- san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME;
- memcpy(&san->san.other_name,
- &other_name, sizeof(other_name));
-
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * dNSName
- */
- case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME):
- {
- memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name));
- san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME;
-
- memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name,
- san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf));
-
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * Type not supported
- */
- default:
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
-static int x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size,
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence
- *subject_alt_name,
- const char *prefix)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t i;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
- mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san;
- int parse_ret;
-
- while (cur != NULL) {
- memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san));
- parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san);
- if (parse_ret != 0) {
- if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- } else {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
- cur = cur->next;
- continue;
- }
-
- switch (san.type) {
- /*
- * otherName
- */
- case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME:
- {
- mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name;
-
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME,
- &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid) != 0) {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- ret =
- mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p,
- n,
- &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- ret =
- mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
- for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p,
- n,
- "%02X",
- other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- }
- }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * dNSName
- */
- case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
- {
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) {
- *p = '\0';
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
- }
-
- memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len);
- p += san.san.unstructured_name.len;
- n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len;
- }
- break;
-
- /*
- * Type not supported, skip item.
- */
- default:
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix);
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- break;
- }
-
- cur = cur->next;
- }
-
- *p = '\0';
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \
- { \
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \
- MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \
- sep = ", "; \
- }
-
-#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \
- if (ns_cert_type & (type)) \
- PRINT_ITEM(name);
-
-static int x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size,
- unsigned char ns_cert_type)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA");
- CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA");
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \
- if (key_usage & (code)) \
- PRINT_ITEM(name);
-
-static int x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
- unsigned int key_usage)
-{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- size_t n = *size;
- char *p = *buf;
- const char *sep = "";
-
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only");
- KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only");
-
- *size = n;
- *buf = p;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage)
{
@@ -2167,9 +1696,9 @@
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- if ((ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n,
- &crt->subject_alt_names,
- prefix)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n,
+ &crt->subject_alt_names,
+ prefix)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
@@ -2178,7 +1707,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- if ((ret = x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
@@ -2187,7 +1716,7 @@
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
- if ((ret = x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
diff --git a/library/x509_csr.c b/library/x509_csr.c
index 0c664d9..cd117cb 100644
--- a/library/x509_csr.c
+++ b/library/x509_csr.c
@@ -70,6 +70,165 @@
}
/*
+ * Parse CSR extension requests in DER format
+ */
+static int x509_csr_parse_extensions(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
+ unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *end_ext_data;
+ while (*p < end) {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL };
+ int ext_type = 0;
+
+ /* Read sequence tag */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ end_ext_data = *p + len;
+
+ /* Get extension ID */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+ extn_oid.p = *p;
+ *p += extn_oid.len;
+
+ /* Data should be octet string type */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (*p + len != end_ext_data) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Detect supported extensions and skip unsupported extensions
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /* Forbid repeated extensions */
+ if ((csr->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA);
+ }
+
+ csr->ext_types |= ext_type;
+
+ switch (ext_type) {
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:
+ /* Parse key usage */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_data,
+ &csr->key_usage)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
+ /* Parse subject alt name */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_data,
+ &csr->subject_alt_names)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
+ /* Parse netscape certificate type */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_data,
+ &csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ *p = end_ext_data;
+ }
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse CSR attributes in DER format
+ */
+static int x509_csr_parse_attributes(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
+ const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *end_attr_data;
+ unsigned char **p = (unsigned char **) &start;
+
+ while (*p < end) {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf attr_oid = { 0, 0, NULL };
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+ end_attr_data = *p + len;
+
+ /* Get attribute ID */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_attr_data, &attr_oid.len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ attr_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+ attr_oid.p = *p;
+ *p += attr_oid.len;
+
+ /* Check that this is an extension-request attribute */
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, &attr_oid) == 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) !=
+ 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_extensions(csr, p, *p + len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (*p != end_attr_data) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p = end_attr_data;
+ }
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Parse a CSR in DER format
*/
int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
@@ -197,6 +356,11 @@
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
+ if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_attributes(csr, p, p + len)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
p += len;
end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len;
@@ -345,6 +509,44 @@
(int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&csr->pk));
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ /*
+ * Optional extensions
+ */
+
+ if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n,
+ &csr->subject_alt_names,
+ prefix)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix);
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, csr->key_usage)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (csr->ext_types != 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n");
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+ }
+
return (int) (size - n);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
@@ -373,6 +575,7 @@
#endif
mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(csr->subject.next);
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(csr->subject_alt_names.next);
if (csr->raw.p != NULL) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len);
diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c
index febd0e6..4f23395 100644
--- a/library/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/library/x509write_crt.c
@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@
{
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_cert));
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->serial);
ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3;
}
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx)
{
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->serial);
-
mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->subject);
mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->issuer);
mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->extensions);
@@ -103,17 +100,42 @@
return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->issuer, issuer_name);
}
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *serial)
{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int ret;
+ size_t tmp_len;
- if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->serial, serial)) != 0) {
+ /* Ensure that the MPI value fits into the buffer */
+ tmp_len = mbedtls_mpi_size(serial);
+ if (tmp_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->serial_len = tmp_len;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(serial, ctx->serial, tmp_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
+#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len)
+{
+ if (serial_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->serial_len = serial_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->serial, serial, serial_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
const char *not_before,
@@ -510,9 +532,29 @@
/*
* Serial ::= INTEGER
+ *
+ * Written data is:
+ * - "ctx->serial_len" bytes for the raw serial buffer
+ * - if MSb of "serial" is 1, then prepend an extra 0x00 byte
+ * - 1 byte for the length
+ * - 1 byte for the TAG
*/
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf,
- &ctx->serial));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf,
+ ctx->serial, ctx->serial_len));
+ if (*c & 0x80) {
+ if (c - buf < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ *(--c) = 0x0;
+ len++;
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf,
+ ctx->serial_len + 1));
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf,
+ ctx->serial_len));
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
diff --git a/programs/hash/generic_sum.c b/programs/hash/generic_sum.c
index e2e49e3..995694a 100644
--- a/programs/hash/generic_sum.c
+++ b/programs/hash/generic_sum.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
- if (argc == 1) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
const int *list;
mbedtls_printf("print mode: generic_sum <mbedtls_md> <file> <file> ...\n");
diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
index 25371ba..1f4cd59 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c b/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c
index d880a1a..9804417 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/ecdh_curve25519.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func,
&entropy,
(const unsigned char *) pers,
- sizeof pers)) != 0) {
+ sizeof(pers))) != 0) {
mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n",
ret);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
index be2ca90..953c144 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
size_t len;
if (mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp), &key->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q),
- MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &len, buf, sizeof buf) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &len, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
mbedtls_printf("internal error\n");
return;
}
diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
index 85ee435..029558d 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app.c b/programs/pkey/key_app.c
index 8ed88da..c80dcd0 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/key_app.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/key_app.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ); mbedtls_mpi_init(&QP);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
index 2dbb79e..862c93f 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ); mbedtls_mpi_init(&QP);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index b124065..03034d1 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@
mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng();
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
if (ret == 0) {
ret = 1;
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
index 4e54be8..3b040aa 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@
mbedtls_pk_init(&pkey);
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index b3d9f5a..2fa9a81 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -1374,6 +1374,11 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+static inline void put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
+{
+ memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
+}
+
/* Functions for session ticket tests */
int dummy_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end,
@@ -1387,7 +1392,7 @@
if (end - p < 4) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
- *((uint32_t *) p) = 7 * 24 * 3600;
+ put_unaligned_uint32(p, 7 * 24 * 3600);
*ticket_lifetime = 7 * 24 * 3600;
p += 4;
@@ -1633,7 +1638,7 @@
signal(SIGINT, term_handler);
#endif
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
if (ret == 0) {
ret = 1;
diff --git a/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c b/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c
index 8f763fa..df0fe4a 100644
--- a/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c
+++ b/programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
{
int i;
- if (argc == 1 || strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2 || strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) {
mbedtls_printf(USAGE, argv[0]);
return MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE;
}
diff --git a/programs/util/pem2der.c b/programs/util/pem2der.c
index 4a25f21..5dd367a 100644
--- a/programs/util/pem2der.c
+++ b/programs/util/pem2der.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memset(der_buffer, 0, sizeof(der_buffer));
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_app.c b/programs/x509/cert_app.c
index 6135238..a9656c6 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_app.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_app.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
memset(&cacrl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl));
#endif
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_req.c b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
index 1126e60..8ef5932 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_req.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
index 3e134dd..0daee56 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_write.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
@@ -43,10 +43,12 @@
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "test/helpers.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#define SET_OID(x, oid) \
do { x.len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid); x.p = (unsigned char *) oid; } while (0)
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@
#define DFL_NOT_BEFORE "20010101000000"
#define DFL_NOT_AFTER "20301231235959"
#define DFL_SERIAL "1"
+#define DFL_SERIAL_HEX "1"
#define DFL_SELFSIGN 0
#define DFL_IS_CA 0
#define DFL_MAX_PATHLEN -1
@@ -110,6 +113,13 @@
" issuer_pwd=%%s default: (empty)\n" \
" output_file=%%s default: cert.crt\n" \
" serial=%%s default: 1\n" \
+ " In decimal format; it can be used as\n" \
+ " alternative to serial_hex, but it's\n" \
+ " limited in max length to\n" \
+ " unsigned long long int\n" \
+ " serial_hex=%%s default: 1\n" \
+ " In hex format; it can be used as\n" \
+ " alternative to serial\n" \
" not_before=%%s default: 20010101000000\n" \
" not_after=%%s default: 20301231235959\n" \
" is_ca=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
@@ -159,6 +169,11 @@
" format=pem|der default: pem\n" \
"\n"
+typedef enum {
+ SERIAL_FRMT_UNSPEC,
+ SERIAL_FRMT_DEC,
+ SERIAL_FRMT_HEX
+} serial_format_t;
/*
* global options
@@ -175,7 +190,8 @@
const char *issuer_name; /* issuer name for certificate */
const char *not_before; /* validity period not before */
const char *not_after; /* validity period not after */
- const char *serial; /* serial number string */
+ const char *serial; /* serial number string (decimal) */
+ const char *serial_hex; /* serial number string (hex) */
int selfsign; /* selfsign the certificate */
int is_ca; /* is a CA certificate */
int max_pathlen; /* maximum CA path length */
@@ -235,6 +251,44 @@
return 0;
}
+int parse_serial_decimal_format(unsigned char *obuf, size_t obufmax,
+ const char *ibuf, size_t *len)
+{
+ unsigned long long int dec;
+ unsigned int remaining_bytes = sizeof(dec);
+ unsigned char *p = obuf;
+ unsigned char val;
+ char *end_ptr = NULL;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ dec = strtoull(ibuf, &end_ptr, 10);
+
+ if ((errno != 0) || (end_ptr == ibuf)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *len = 0;
+
+ while (remaining_bytes > 0) {
+ if (obufmax < (*len + 1)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ val = (dec >> ((remaining_bytes - 1) * 8)) & 0xFF;
+
+ /* Skip leading zeros */
+ if ((val != 0) || (*len != 0)) {
+ *p = val;
+ (*len)++;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ remaining_bytes--;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret = 1;
@@ -252,7 +306,9 @@
mbedtls_x509_csr csr;
#endif
mbedtls_x509write_cert crt;
- mbedtls_mpi serial;
+ serial_format_t serial_frmt = SERIAL_FRMT_UNSPEC;
+ unsigned char serial[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN];
+ size_t serial_len;
mbedtls_asn1_sequence *ext_key_usage;
mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
@@ -264,7 +320,6 @@
mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(&crt);
mbedtls_pk_init(&loaded_issuer_key);
mbedtls_pk_init(&loaded_subject_key);
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&serial);
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C)
@@ -272,8 +327,9 @@
#endif
mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&issuer_crt);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(serial, 0, sizeof(serial));
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
@@ -291,6 +347,7 @@
opt.not_before = DFL_NOT_BEFORE;
opt.not_after = DFL_NOT_AFTER;
opt.serial = DFL_SERIAL;
+ opt.serial_hex = DFL_SERIAL_HEX;
opt.selfsign = DFL_SELFSIGN;
opt.is_ca = DFL_IS_CA;
opt.max_pathlen = DFL_MAX_PATHLEN;
@@ -335,7 +392,19 @@
} else if (strcmp(p, "not_after") == 0) {
opt.not_after = q;
} else if (strcmp(p, "serial") == 0) {
+ if (serial_frmt != SERIAL_FRMT_UNSPEC) {
+ mbedtls_printf("Invalid attempt to set the serial more than once\n");
+ goto usage;
+ }
+ serial_frmt = SERIAL_FRMT_DEC;
opt.serial = q;
+ } else if (strcmp(p, "serial_hex") == 0) {
+ if (serial_frmt != SERIAL_FRMT_UNSPEC) {
+ mbedtls_printf("Invalid attempt to set the serial more than once\n");
+ goto usage;
+ }
+ serial_frmt = SERIAL_FRMT_HEX;
+ opt.serial_hex = q;
} else if (strcmp(p, "authority_identifier") == 0) {
opt.authority_identifier = atoi(q);
if (opt.authority_identifier != 0 &&
@@ -514,10 +583,16 @@
mbedtls_printf(" . Reading serial number...");
fflush(stdout);
- if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&serial, 10, opt.serial)) != 0) {
- mbedtls_strerror(ret, buf, sizeof(buf));
- mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_string "
- "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf);
+ if (serial_frmt == SERIAL_FRMT_HEX) {
+ ret = mbedtls_test_unhexify(serial, sizeof(serial),
+ opt.serial_hex, &serial_len);
+ } else { // SERIAL_FRMT_DEC || SERIAL_FRMT_UNSPEC
+ ret = parse_serial_decimal_format(serial, sizeof(serial),
+ opt.serial, &serial_len);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Unable to parse serial\n");
goto exit;
}
@@ -661,10 +736,10 @@
mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(&crt, opt.version);
mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg(&crt, opt.md);
- ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(&crt, &serial);
+ ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(&crt, serial, serial_len);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_strerror(ret, buf, sizeof(buf));
- mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial "
+ mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw "
"returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf);
goto exit;
}
@@ -807,7 +882,6 @@
mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(&crt);
mbedtls_pk_free(&loaded_subject_key);
mbedtls_pk_free(&loaded_issuer_key);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&serial);
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctr_drbg);
mbedtls_entropy_free(&entropy);
diff --git a/programs/x509/crl_app.c b/programs/x509/crl_app.c
index f06987c..d74a488 100644
--- a/programs/x509/crl_app.c
+++ b/programs/x509/crl_app.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
*/
mbedtls_x509_crl_init(&crl);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/x509/req_app.c b/programs/x509/req_app.c
index 8cfe4a4..83e2546 100644
--- a/programs/x509/req_app.c
+++ b/programs/x509/req_app.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
*/
mbedtls_x509_csr_init(&csr);
- if (argc == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2) {
usage:
mbedtls_printf(USAGE);
goto exit;
diff --git a/scripts/code_style.py b/scripts/code_style.py
index 3958e87..dd8305f 100755
--- a/scripts/code_style.py
+++ b/scripts/code_style.py
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Check or fix the code style by running Uncrustify.
-Note: The code style enforced by this script is not yet introduced to
-Mbed TLS. At present this script will only be used to prepare for a future
-change of code style.
+This script must be run from the root of a Git work tree containing Mbed TLS.
"""
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
@@ -20,7 +18,6 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import argparse
-import io
import os
import re
import subprocess
@@ -31,12 +28,10 @@
CONFIG_FILE = ".uncrustify.cfg"
UNCRUSTIFY_EXE = "uncrustify"
UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS = ["-c", CONFIG_FILE]
-STDOUT_UTF8 = io.TextIOWrapper(sys.stdout.buffer, encoding='utf-8')
-STDERR_UTF8 = io.TextIOWrapper(sys.stderr.buffer, encoding='utf-8')
CHECK_GENERATED_FILES = "tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh"
def print_err(*args):
- print("Error: ", *args, file=STDERR_UTF8)
+ print("Error: ", *args, file=sys.stderr)
# Match FILENAME(s) in "check SCRIPT (FILENAME...)"
CHECK_CALL_RE = re.compile(r"\n\s*check\s+[^\s#$&*?;|]+([^\n#$&*?;|]+)",
@@ -69,8 +64,8 @@
"tests/suites/*.function",
"scripts/data_files/*.fmt"]
- result = subprocess.run(git_ls_files_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
- stderr=STDERR_UTF8, check=False)
+ result = subprocess.run(git_ls_files_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+ check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
print_err("git ls-files returned: " + str(result.returncode))
@@ -90,8 +85,9 @@
"""
Get the version string from Uncrustify
"""
- result = subprocess.run([UNCRUSTIFY_EXE, "--version"], \
- stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False)
+ result = subprocess.run([UNCRUSTIFY_EXE, "--version"],
+ stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+ check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
print_err("Could not get Uncrustify version:", str(result.stderr, "utf-8"))
return ""
@@ -106,26 +102,25 @@
style_correct = True
for src_file in src_file_list:
uncrustify_cmd = [UNCRUSTIFY_EXE] + UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS + [src_file]
- result = subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
- stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False)
+ result = subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+ stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
- print_err("Uncrustify returned " + str(result.returncode) + \
- " correcting file " + src_file)
+ print_err("Uncrustify returned " + str(result.returncode) +
+ " correcting file " + src_file)
return False
# Uncrustify makes changes to the code and places the result in a new
# file with the extension ".uncrustify". To get the changes (if any)
# simply diff the 2 files.
diff_cmd = ["diff", "-u", src_file, src_file + ".uncrustify"]
- result = subprocess.run(diff_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
- stderr=STDERR_UTF8, check=False)
- if len(result.stdout) > 0:
- print(src_file + " - Incorrect code style.", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
- print("File changed - diff:", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
- print(str(result.stdout, "utf-8"), file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+ cp = subprocess.run(diff_cmd, check=False)
+
+ if cp.returncode == 1:
+ print(src_file + " changed - code style is incorrect.")
style_correct = False
- else:
- print(src_file + " - OK.", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+ elif cp.returncode != 0:
+ raise subprocess.CalledProcessError(cp.returncode, cp.args,
+ cp.stdout, cp.stderr)
# Tidy up artifact
os.remove(src_file + ".uncrustify")
@@ -139,12 +134,11 @@
code_change_args = UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS + ["--no-backup"]
for src_file in src_file_list:
uncrustify_cmd = [UNCRUSTIFY_EXE] + code_change_args + [src_file]
- result = subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, check=False, \
- stdout=STDOUT_UTF8, stderr=STDERR_UTF8)
+ result = subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
- print_err("Uncrustify with file returned: " + \
- str(result.returncode) + " correcting file " + \
- src_file)
+ print_err("Uncrustify with file returned: " +
+ str(result.returncode) + " correcting file " +
+ src_file)
return False
return True
@@ -160,7 +154,7 @@
# Guard against future changes that cause the codebase to require
# more passes.
if not check_style_is_correct(src_file_list):
- print("Code style still incorrect after second run of Uncrustify.")
+ print_err("Code style still incorrect after second run of Uncrustify.")
return 1
else:
return 0
@@ -172,9 +166,9 @@
uncrustify_version = get_uncrustify_version().strip()
if UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION not in uncrustify_version:
print("Warning: Using unsupported Uncrustify version '" +
- uncrustify_version + "'", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+ uncrustify_version + "'")
print("Note: The only supported version is " +
- UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION, file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+ UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION)
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument('-f', '--fix', action='store_true',
@@ -203,6 +197,7 @@
else:
# Check mode
if check_style_is_correct(src_files):
+ print("Checked {} files, style ok.".format(len(src_files)))
return 0
else:
return 1
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
index f9d9899..d197b54 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
@@ -51,6 +51,37 @@
result = (self.int_a - self.int_b) % self.int_n
return [self.format_result(result)]
+class BignumModRawFixQuasiReduction(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+ BignumModRawTarget):
+ """Test cases for ecp quasi_reduction()."""
+ symbol = "-"
+ test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction"
+ test_name = "fix_quasi_reduction"
+ input_style = "fixed"
+ arity = 1
+
+ # Extend the default values with n < x < 2n
+ input_values = bignum_common.ModOperationCommon.input_values + [
+ "73",
+
+ # First number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(3,2)
+ "ea7b5bf55eb561a4216363698b529b4a97b750923ceb3ffd",
+
+ # First number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(1,2)
+ ("cd447e35b8b6d8fe442e3d437204e52db2221a58008a05a6c4647159c324c985"
+ "9b810e766ec9d28663ca828dd5f4b3b2e4b06ce60741c7a87ce42c8218072e8c"
+ "35bf992dc9e9c616612e7696a6cecc1b78e510617311d8a3c2ce6f447ed4d57b"
+ "1e2feb89414c343c1027c4d1c386bbc4cd613e30d8f16adf91b7584a2265b1f5")
+ ] # type: List[str]
+
+ def result(self) -> List[str]:
+ result = self.int_a % self.int_n
+ return [self.format_result(result)]
+
+ @property
+ def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+ return bool(self.int_a < 2 * self.int_n)
+
class BignumModRawMul(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
BignumModRawTarget):
"""Test cases for bignum mpi_mod_raw_mul()."""
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py
index 459afba..9bd17d6 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/c_build_helper.py
@@ -89,6 +89,37 @@
}
''')
+def compile_c_file(c_filename, exe_filename, include_dirs):
+ """Compile a C source file with the host compiler.
+
+ * ``c_filename``: the name of the source file to compile.
+ * ``exe_filename``: the name for the executable to be created.
+ * ``include_dirs``: a list of paths to include directories to be passed
+ with the -I switch.
+ """
+ # Respect $HOSTCC if it is set
+ cc = os.getenv('HOSTCC', None)
+ if cc is None:
+ cc = os.getenv('CC', 'cc')
+ cmd = [cc]
+
+ proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd,
+ stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+ stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+ universal_newlines=True)
+ cc_is_msvc = 'Microsoft (R) C/C++' in proc.communicate()[1]
+
+ cmd += ['-I' + dir for dir in include_dirs]
+ if cc_is_msvc:
+ # MSVC has deprecated using -o to specify the output file,
+ # and produces an object file in the working directory by default.
+ obj_filename = exe_filename[:-4] + '.obj'
+ cmd += ['-Fe' + exe_filename, '-Fo' + obj_filename]
+ else:
+ cmd += ['-o' + exe_filename]
+
+ subprocess.check_call(cmd + [c_filename])
+
def get_c_expression_values(
cast_to, printf_format,
expressions,
@@ -128,24 +159,8 @@
expressions)
)
c_file.close()
- cc = os.getenv('CC', 'cc')
- cmd = [cc]
- proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd,
- stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
- stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
- universal_newlines=True)
- cc_is_msvc = 'Microsoft (R) C/C++' in proc.communicate()[1]
-
- cmd += ['-I' + dir for dir in include_path]
- if cc_is_msvc:
- # MSVC has deprecated using -o to specify the output file,
- # and produces an object file in the working directory by default.
- obj_name = exe_name[:-4] + '.obj'
- cmd += ['-Fe' + exe_name, '-Fo' + obj_name]
- else:
- cmd += ['-o' + exe_name]
- subprocess.check_call(cmd + [c_name])
+ compile_c_file(c_name, exe_name, include_path)
if keep_c:
sys.stderr.write('List of {} tests kept at {}\n'
.format(caller, c_name))
diff --git a/tests/compat.sh b/tests/compat.sh
index 7693400..ef82736 100755
--- a/tests/compat.sh
+++ b/tests/compat.sh
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
# - NULL: excluded from our default config + requires OpenSSL legacy
# - ARIA: requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.1
# - ChachaPoly: requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0
-EXCLUDE='NULL\|ARIA\|CHACHA20-POLY1305'
+EXCLUDE='NULL\|ARIA\|CHACHA20_POLY1305'
VERBOSE=""
MEMCHECK=0
PEERS="OpenSSL$PEER_GNUTLS mbedTLS"
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
check_openssl_server_bug()
{
if test "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" && is_dtls "$MODE" && \
- echo "$1" | grep "^TLS-PSK" >/dev/null;
+ test "$TYPE" = "PSK";
then
SKIP_NEXT="YES"
fi
@@ -239,9 +239,14 @@
G_CIPHERS=""
}
-check_translation()
+# translate_ciphers {g|m|o} {STANDARD_CIPHER_SUITE_NAME...}
+# Set $ciphers to the cipher suite name translations for the specified
+# program (gnutls, mbedtls or openssl). $ciphers is a space-separated
+# list of entries of the form "STANDARD_NAME=PROGRAM_NAME".
+translate_ciphers()
{
- if [ $1 -ne 0 ]; then
+ ciphers=$(scripts/translate_ciphers.py "$@")
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "translate_ciphers.py failed with exit code $1" >&2
echo "$2" >&2
exit 1
@@ -258,71 +263,66 @@
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
"
;;
esac
+ O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
+ G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
-
- T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py g $CIPHERS)
- check_translation $? "$T"
- G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $T"
-
- T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py o $CIPHERS)
- check_translation $? "$T"
- O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $T"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and OpenSSL
-# A list of ciphersuites in the Mbed TLS convention is compiled and
-# appended to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS. The same list
-# is translated to the OpenSSL naming convention and appended to the list of
-# OpenSSL ciphersuites $O_CIPHERS.
+# A list of ciphersuites in the standard naming convention is appended
+# to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS and
+# to the list of OpenSSL ciphersuites $O_CIPHERS respectively.
+# Based on client's naming convention, all ciphersuite names will be
+# translated into another naming format before sent to the client.
#
# NOTE: for some reason RSA-PSK doesn't work with OpenSSL,
# so RSA-PSK ciphersuites need to go in other sections, see
@@ -337,57 +337,55 @@
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
"
;;
esac
+ O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
-
- T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py o $CIPHERS)
- check_translation $? "$T"
- O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $T"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and GnuTLS
-# A list of ciphersuites in the Mbed TLS convention is compiled and
-# appended to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS. The same list
-# is translated to the GnuTLS naming convention and appended to the list of
-# GnuTLS ciphersuites $G_CIPHERS.
+# A list of ciphersuites in the standard naming convention is appended
+# to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS and
+# to the list of GnuTLS ciphersuites $G_CIPHERS respectively.
+# Based on client's naming convention, all ciphersuite names will be
+# translated into another naming format before sent to the client.
add_gnutls_ciphersuites()
{
CIPHERS=""
@@ -395,107 +393,104 @@
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
"
;;
esac
+ G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
-
- T=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py g $CIPHERS)
- check_translation $? "$T"
- G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $T"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS (not currently supported by another
-# peer usable in this script). This provide only very rudimentaty testing, as
+# peer usable in this script). This provides only very rudimentaty testing, as
# this is not interop testing, but it's better than nothing.
add_mbedtls_ciphersuites()
{
@@ -503,48 +498,48 @@
"ECDSA")
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
"
;;
"RSA")
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
- # *PSK-NULL-SHA suites supported by GnuTLS 3.3.5 but not 3.2.15
+ # *PSK_NULL_SHA suites supported by GnuTLS 3.3.5 but not 3.2.15
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 \
- TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
+ TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
"
;;
esac
@@ -684,7 +679,11 @@
# is_mbedtls <cmd_line>
is_mbedtls() {
- echo "$1" | grep 'ssl_server2\|ssl_client2' > /dev/null
+ case $1 in
+ *ssl_client2*) true;;
+ *ssl_server2*) true;;
+ *) false;;
+ esac
}
# has_mem_err <log_file_name>
@@ -803,16 +802,14 @@
echo "EXIT: $EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT
}
-# run_client <name> <cipher>
+# run_client PROGRAM_NAME STANDARD_CIPHER_SUITE PROGRAM_CIPHER_SUITE
run_client() {
# announce what we're going to do
TESTS=$(( $TESTS + 1 ))
- VERIF=$(echo $VERIFY | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
- TITLE="`echo $1 | head -c1`->`echo $SERVER_NAME | head -c1`"
+ TITLE="${1%"${1#?}"}->${SERVER_NAME%"${SERVER_NAME#?}"}"
TITLE="$TITLE $MODE,$VERIF $2"
- printf "%s " "$TITLE"
- LEN=$(( 72 - `echo "$TITLE" | wc -c` ))
- for i in `seq 1 $LEN`; do printf '.'; done; printf ' '
+ DOTS72="........................................................................"
+ printf "%s %.*s " "$TITLE" "$((71 - ${#TITLE}))" "$DOTS72"
# should we skip?
if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then
@@ -825,7 +822,7 @@
# run the command and interpret result
case $1 in
[Oo]pen*)
- CLIENT_CMD="$OPENSSL s_client $O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher $2"
+ CLIENT_CMD="$OPENSSL s_client $O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher $3"
log "$CLIENT_CMD"
echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
@@ -850,7 +847,7 @@
else
G_HOST="localhost"
fi
- CLIENT_CMD="$GNUTLS_CLI $G_CLIENT_ARGS --priority $G_PRIO_MODE:$2 $G_HOST"
+ CLIENT_CMD="$GNUTLS_CLI $G_CLIENT_ARGS --priority $G_PRIO_MODE:$3 $G_HOST"
log "$CLIENT_CMD"
echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
@@ -872,7 +869,7 @@
;;
mbed*)
- CLIENT_CMD="$M_CLI $M_CLIENT_ARGS force_ciphersuite=$2"
+ CLIENT_CMD="$M_CLI $M_CLIENT_ARGS force_ciphersuite=$3"
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
CLIENT_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLIENT_CMD"
fi
@@ -1005,6 +1002,7 @@
trap cleanup INT TERM HUP
for VERIFY in $VERIFIES; do
+ VERIF=$(echo $VERIFY | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
for MODE in $MODES; do
for TYPE in $TYPES; do
for PEER in $PEERS; do
@@ -1035,17 +1033,19 @@
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "OpenSSL"
- for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
- check_openssl_server_bug $i
- run_client mbedTLS $i
+ translate_ciphers m $M_CIPHERS
+ for i in $ciphers; do
+ check_openssl_server_bug
+ run_client mbedTLS ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
done
stop_server
fi
if [ "X" != "X$O_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
- for i in $O_CIPHERS; do
- run_client OpenSSL $i
+ translate_ciphers o $O_CIPHERS
+ for i in $ciphers; do
+ run_client OpenSSL ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
done
stop_server
fi
@@ -1061,16 +1061,18 @@
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "GnuTLS"
- for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
- run_client mbedTLS $i
+ translate_ciphers m $M_CIPHERS
+ for i in $ciphers; do
+ run_client mbedTLS ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
done
stop_server
fi
if [ "X" != "X$G_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
- for i in $G_CIPHERS; do
- run_client GnuTLS $i
+ translate_ciphers g $G_CIPHERS
+ for i in $ciphers; do
+ run_client GnuTLS ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
done
stop_server
fi
@@ -1088,8 +1090,9 @@
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
- for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
- run_client mbedTLS $i
+ translate_ciphers m $M_CIPHERS
+ for i in $ciphers; do
+ run_client mbedTLS ${i%%=*} ${i#*=}
done
stop_server
fi
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index 7121b5b..070f538 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -93,6 +93,53 @@
cert_example_multi.crt: cert_example_multi.csr
$(OPENSSL) x509 -req -CA $(test_ca_crt) -CAkey $(test_ca_key_file_rsa) -extfile $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions dns_alt_names -passin "pass:$(test_ca_pwd_rsa)" -set_serial 17 -days 3653 -sha256 -in $< > $@
+test_csr_v3_keyUsage.csr.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem
+ $(OPENSSL) req -new -subj '/CN=etcd' -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem -outform DER -out $@ -reqexts csr_ext_v3_keyUsage
+test_csr_v3_subjectAltName.csr.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem
+ $(OPENSSL) req -new -subj '/CN=etcd' -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem -outform DER -out $@ -reqexts csr_ext_v3_subjectAltName
+test_csr_v3_nsCertType.csr.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem
+ $(OPENSSL) req -new -subj '/CN=etcd' -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem -outform DER -out $@ -reqexts csr_ext_v3_nsCertType
+test_csr_v3_all.csr.der: rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem
+ $(OPENSSL) req -new -subj '/CN=etcd' -config $(test_ca_config_file) -key rsa_pkcs1_1024_clear.pem -outform DER -out $@ -reqexts csr_ext_v3_all
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extensions_sequence_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/300B0603551D0F040403/200B0603551D0F040403/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_id_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/0603551D0F0404030201/0703551D0F0404030201/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/040403020102302F0603/050403020102302F0603/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len1.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/040403020102302F0603/040503020102302F0603/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len2.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/040403020102302F0603/040303020102302F0603/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_key_usage_bitstream_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/03020102302F0603551D/04020102302F0603551D/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_subject_alt_name_sequence_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/3026A02406082B060105/4026A02406082B060105/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_ns_cert_bitstream_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/03020780300D06092A86/04020780300D06092A86/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_duplicated_extension.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/551D11/551D0F/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_type_oid.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/551D11/551DFF/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_sequence_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/306006092A864886F70D/406006092A864886F70D/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_id_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/06092A864886F70D0109/07092A864886F70D0109/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/2A864886F70D01090E/2A864886F70D01090F/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_set_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/31533051300B0603551D/32533051300B0603551D/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_tag.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/3051300B0603551D0F04/3151300B0603551D0F04/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len1.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/306006092A864886F70D/306106092A864886F70D/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len2.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/306006092A864886F70D/305906092A864886F70D/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len1.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/3051300B0603551D0F04/3052300B0603551D0F04/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len2.csr.der: test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
+ (hexdump -ve '1/1 "%.2X"' $< | sed "s/3051300B0603551D0F04/3050300B0603551D0F04/" | xxd -r -p ) > $@
+
$(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt):test-ca.opensslconf
$(OPENSSL) genrsa -out $@ 2048
test-ca-alt.csr: $(test_ca_key_file_rsa_alt) $(test_ca_config_file)
@@ -972,6 +1019,15 @@
server1.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) version=1 not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 version=3 output_file=$@
+server1.long_serial.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
+ echo "112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0011223344" > test-ca.server1.tmp.serial
+ $(OPENSSL) ca -in server1.req.sha256 -key PolarSSLTest -config test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf -notext -batch -out $@
+server1.80serial.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
+ echo "8011223344" > test-ca.server1.tmp.serial
+ $(OPENSSL) ca -in server1.req.sha256 -key PolarSSLTest -config test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf -notext -batch -out $@
+server1.long_serial_FF.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
+ echo "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" > test-ca.server1.tmp.serial
+ $(OPENSSL) ca -in server1.req.sha256 -key PolarSSLTest -config test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf -notext -batch -out $@
server1.noauthid.crt: server1.key server1.req.sha256 $(test_ca_crt) $(test_ca_key_file_rsa)
$(MBEDTLS_CERT_WRITE) request_file=server1.req.sha256 issuer_crt=$(test_ca_crt) issuer_key=$(test_ca_key_file_rsa) issuer_pwd=$(test_ca_pwd_rsa) not_before=20190210144406 not_after=20290210144406 md=SHA1 authority_identifier=0 version=3 output_file=$@
server1.crt.der: server1.crt
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.80serial.crt b/tests/data_files/server1.80serial.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ce8570
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.80serial.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial.crt b/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bd6955
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial_FF.crt b/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial_FF.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8094fd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/server1.long_serial_FF.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
index b2c2fa1..bd12760 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
@@ -82,3 +82,17 @@
# these IPs are the ascii values for 'abcd' and 'abcd.example.com'
[tricky_ip_san]
subjectAltName=IP:97.98.99.100,IP:6162:6364:2e65:7861:6d70:6c65:2e63:6f6d
+
+[csr_ext_v3_keyUsage]
+keyUsage = digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
+
+[csr_ext_v3_subjectAltName]
+subjectAltName=DNS:example.com, DNS:example.net, DNS:*.example.org
+
+[csr_ext_v3_nsCertType]
+nsCertType=server
+
+[csr_ext_v3_all]
+keyUsage = cRLSign
+subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:nonprintable_hw_module_name
+nsCertType=client
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43a520e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.server1.test_serial.opensslconf
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+ [ ca ]
+ default_ca = test-ca
+
+ [ test-ca ]
+ certificate = test-ca.crt
+ private_key = test-ca.key
+ serial = test-ca.server1.tmp.serial
+ default_md = sha1
+ default_startdate = 20190210144406Z
+ default_enddate = 20290210144406Z
+ x509_extensions = v3_ca
+ new_certs_dir = ./
+ database = ./test-ca.server1.db
+ policy = policy_match
+ unique_subject = no
+
+ [v3_ca]
+ basicConstraints = CA:false
+ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always
+
+ [policy_match]
+ countryName = supplied
+ organizationName = supplied
+ commonName = supplied
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e717f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all.csr.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96a11e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request.csr.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len1.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len1.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61c7c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len1.csr.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len2.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len2.csr.der
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_tag.csr.der
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_set_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_set_tag.csr.der
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_id_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_id_tag.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8d0689
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len1.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len1.csr.der
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000..38273ca
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_duplicated_extension.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_duplicated_extension.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e2a221
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len1.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len1.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_id_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_id_tag.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_key_usage_bitstream_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_key_usage_bitstream_tag.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6fd2d7
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_ns_cert_bitstream_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_ns_cert_bitstream_tag.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fdcfc8
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_subject_alt_name_sequence_tag.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_subject_alt_name_sequence_tag.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_type_oid.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_type_oid.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_keyUsage.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_keyUsage.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8be020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_keyUsage.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_nsCertType.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_nsCertType.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf9588d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_nsCertType.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_subjectAltName.csr.der b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_subjectAltName.csr.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ccb3bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/test_csr_v3_subjectAltName.csr.der
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diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
index 821a37b..46c371f 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
@@ -275,14 +275,16 @@
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: EarlyData: basic check, good" \
"$G_NEXT_SRV -d 10 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:+ECDHE-PSK:+PSK --earlydata --disable-client-cert" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1 reco_delay=900" \
- 1 \
+ 0 \
-c "Reconnecting with saved session" \
-c "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension received." \
-c "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \
-c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension received." \
-c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \
+ -c "<= write EndOfEarlyData" \
-s "Parsing extension 'Early Data/42' (0 bytes)" \
-s "Sending extension Early Data/42 (0 bytes)" \
+ -s "END OF EARLY DATA (5) was received." \
-s "early data accepted"
requires_gnutls_tls1_3
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 2221d59..92050eb 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1768,6 +1768,9 @@
msg "test: make, full_no_deprecated config" # ~ 5s
make test
+
+ msg "test: ensure that X509 has no direct dependency on BIGNUM_C"
+ not grep mbedtls_mpi library/libmbedx509.a
}
component_test_full_no_deprecated_deprecated_warning () {
@@ -2105,6 +2108,10 @@
# TODO: make these work - #6862
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ # Restartable feature is not yet supported by PSA. Once it will in
+ # the future, the following line could be removed (see issues
+ # 6061, 6332 and following ones)
+ scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
}
# Keep in sync with component_test_psa_crypto_config_reference_ecdsa_use_psa
@@ -3262,7 +3269,7 @@
}
support_test_m32_o0 () {
case $(uname -m) in
- *64*) true;;
+ amd64|x86_64) true;;
*) false;;
esac
}
diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
index eeded5f..5ec867b 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py
@@ -61,24 +61,32 @@
# fixed this branch to have full coverage of test cases.
results.warning('Test case not executed: {}', key)
-def analyze_driver_vs_reference(outcomes, component_ref, component_driver, ignored_tests):
+def analyze_driver_vs_reference(outcomes, component_ref, component_driver,
+ ignored_suites, ignored_test=None):
"""Check that all tests executed in the reference component are also
executed in the corresponding driver component.
- Skip test suites provided in ignored_tests list.
+ Skip:
+ - full test suites provided in ignored_suites list
+ - only some specific test inside a test suite, for which the corresponding
+ output string is provided
"""
available = check_test_cases.collect_available_test_cases()
result = True
for key in available:
- # Skip ignored test suites
- test_suite = key.split(';')[0] # retrieve test suit name
- test_suite = test_suite.split('.')[0] # retrieve main part of test suit name
- if test_suite in ignored_tests:
- continue
# Continue if test was not executed by any component
hits = outcomes[key].hits() if key in outcomes else 0
if hits == 0:
continue
+ # Skip ignored test suites
+ full_test_suite = key.split(';')[0] # retrieve full test suite name
+ test_string = key.split(';')[1] # retrieve the text string of this test
+ test_suite = full_test_suite.split('.')[0] # retrieve main part of test suite name
+ if test_suite in ignored_suites:
+ continue
+ if ((full_test_suite in ignored_test) and
+ (test_string in ignored_test[full_test_suite])):
+ continue
# Search for tests that run in reference component and not in driver component
driver_test_passed = False
reference_test_passed = False
@@ -129,13 +137,14 @@
def do_analyze_driver_vs_reference(outcome_file, args):
"""Perform driver vs reference analyze."""
- ignored_tests = ['test_suite_' + x for x in args['ignored_suites']]
+ ignored_suites = ['test_suite_' + x for x in args['ignored_suites']]
outcomes = read_outcome_file(outcome_file)
print("\n*** Analyze driver {} vs reference {} ***\n".format(
args['component_driver'], args['component_ref']))
return analyze_driver_vs_reference(outcomes, args['component_ref'],
- args['component_driver'], ignored_tests)
+ args['component_driver'], ignored_suites,
+ args['ignored_tests'])
# List of tasks with a function that can handle this task and additional arguments if required
TASKS = {
@@ -154,7 +163,11 @@
'ignored_suites': [
'shax', 'mdx', # the software implementations that are being excluded
'md', # the legacy abstraction layer that's being excluded
- ]}},
+ ],
+ 'ignored_tests': {
+ }
+ }
+ },
'analyze_driver_vs_reference_ecdsa': {
'test_function': do_analyze_driver_vs_reference,
'args': {
@@ -164,15 +177,18 @@
'ecdsa', # the software implementation that's excluded
# the following lines should not be needed,
# they will be removed by upcoming work
- 'psa_crypto_se_driver_hal', # #6856
- 'random', # #6856
- 'ecp', # #6856
- 'pk', # #6857
'x509parse', # #6858
'x509write', # #6858
'debug', # #6860
'ssl', # #6860
- ]}},
+ ],
+ 'ignored_tests': {
+ 'test_suite_random': [
+ 'PSA classic wrapper: ECDSA signature (SECP256R1)',
+ ],
+ }
+ }
+ },
}
def main():
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_files.py b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
index d20ec2e..352b55e 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_files.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
heading = "Invalid UTF-8 or forbidden character:"
- # Only allow valid UTF-8, and only white-listed characters.
+ # Only allow valid UTF-8, and only other explicitly allowed characters.
# We deliberately exclude all characters that aren't a simple non-blank,
# non-zero-width glyph, apart from a very small set (tab, ordinary space,
# line breaks, "basic" no-break space and soft hyphen). In particular,
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
'\u2070\u2071\u2074-\u208E\u2090-\u209C', # Superscripts and Subscripts
'\u2190-\u21FF', # Arrows
'\u2200-\u22FF', # Mathematical Symbols
+ '\u2500-\u257F' # Box Drawings characters used in markdown trees
])
# Allow any of the characters and ranges above, and anything classified
# as a word constituent.
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
index 7398f3c..e6a38ba 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_names.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@@ -268,13 +268,13 @@
"3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
"3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
])
- identifiers = self.parse_identifiers([
+ identifiers, excluded_identifiers = self.parse_identifiers([
"include/mbedtls/*.h",
"include/psa/*.h",
"library/*.h",
"3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
"3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
- ])
+ ], ["3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h"])
mbed_psa_words = self.parse_mbed_psa_words([
"include/mbedtls/*.h",
"include/psa/*.h",
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
"private_macros": all_macros["private"],
"enum_consts": enum_consts,
"identifiers": identifiers,
+ "excluded_identifiers": excluded_identifiers,
"symbols": symbols,
"mbed_psa_words": mbed_psa_words
}
@@ -324,12 +325,42 @@
return True
return False
- def get_files(self, include_wildcards, exclude_wildcards):
+ def get_all_files(self, include_wildcards, exclude_wildcards):
"""
- Get all files that match any of the UNIX-style wildcards. While the
- check_names script is designed only for use on UNIX/macOS (due to nm),
- this function alone would work fine on Windows even with forward slashes
- in the wildcard.
+ Get all files that match any of the included UNIX-style wildcards
+ and filter them into included and excluded lists.
+ While the check_names script is designed only for use on UNIX/macOS
+ (due to nm), this function alone will work fine on Windows even with
+ forward slashes in the wildcard.
+
+ Args:
+ * include_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to match filepaths.
+ * exclude_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to exclude.
+
+ Returns:
+ * inc_files: A List of relative filepaths for included files.
+ * exc_files: A List of relative filepaths for excluded files.
+ """
+ accumulator = set()
+ all_wildcards = include_wildcards + (exclude_wildcards or [])
+ for wildcard in all_wildcards:
+ accumulator = accumulator.union(glob.iglob(wildcard))
+
+ inc_files = []
+ exc_files = []
+ for path in accumulator:
+ if self.is_file_excluded(path, exclude_wildcards):
+ exc_files.append(path)
+ else:
+ inc_files.append(path)
+ return (inc_files, exc_files)
+
+ def get_included_files(self, include_wildcards, exclude_wildcards):
+ """
+ Get all files that match any of the included UNIX-style wildcards.
+ While the check_names script is designed only for use on UNIX/macOS
+ (due to nm), this function alone will work fine on Windows even with
+ forward slashes in the wildcard.
Args:
* include_wildcards: a List of shell-style wildcards to match filepaths.
@@ -360,7 +391,7 @@
"asm", "inline", "EMIT", "_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE", "MULADDC_"
)
- files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+ files = self.get_included_files(include, exclude)
self.log.debug("Looking for macros in {} files".format(len(files)))
macros = []
@@ -395,7 +426,7 @@
mbed_regex = re.compile(r"\b(MBED.+?|PSA)_[A-Z0-9_]*")
exclusions = re.compile(r"// *no-check-names|#error")
- files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+ files = self.get_included_files(include, exclude)
self.log.debug(
"Looking for MBED|PSA words in {} files"
.format(len(files))
@@ -428,7 +459,7 @@
Returns a List of Match objects for the findings.
"""
- files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
+ files = self.get_included_files(include, exclude)
self.log.debug("Looking for enum consts in {} files".format(len(files)))
# Emulate a finite state machine to parse enum declarations.
@@ -611,23 +642,34 @@
"""
Parse all lines of a header where a function/enum/struct/union/typedef
identifier is declared, based on some regex and heuristics. Highly
- dependent on formatting style.
+ dependent on formatting style. Identifiers in excluded files are still
+ parsed
Args:
* include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
* exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
- Returns a List of Match objects with identifiers.
+ Returns: a Tuple of two Lists of Match objects with identifiers.
+ * included_identifiers: A List of Match objects with identifiers from
+ included files.
+ * excluded_identifiers: A List of Match objects with identifiers from
+ excluded files.
"""
- files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
- self.log.debug("Looking for identifiers in {} files".format(len(files)))
+ included_files, excluded_files = \
+ self.get_all_files(include, exclude)
- identifiers = []
- for header_file in files:
- self.parse_identifiers_in_file(header_file, identifiers)
+ self.log.debug("Looking for included identifiers in {} files".format \
+ (len(included_files)))
- return identifiers
+ included_identifiers = []
+ excluded_identifiers = []
+ for header_file in included_files:
+ self.parse_identifiers_in_file(header_file, included_identifiers)
+ for header_file in excluded_files:
+ self.parse_identifiers_in_file(header_file, excluded_identifiers)
+
+ return (included_identifiers, excluded_identifiers)
def parse_symbols(self):
"""
@@ -789,10 +831,12 @@
Returns the number of problems that need fixing.
"""
problems = []
+ all_identifiers = self.parse_result["identifiers"] + \
+ self.parse_result["excluded_identifiers"]
for symbol in self.parse_result["symbols"]:
found_symbol_declared = False
- for identifier_match in self.parse_result["identifiers"]:
+ for identifier_match in all_identifiers:
if symbol == identifier_match.name:
found_symbol_declared = True
break
diff --git a/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py b/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
index 779a16f..6b41607 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/list_internal_identifiers.py
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
result = name_check.parse_identifiers([
"include/mbedtls/*_internal.h",
"library/*.h"
- ])
+ ])[0]
result.sort(key=lambda x: x.name)
identifiers = ["{}\n".format(match.name) for match in result]
diff --git a/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py b/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py
index d5f847f..a8db4bb 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/translate_ciphers.py
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@
# limitations under the License.
"""
-Translate ciphersuite names in Mbed TLS format to OpenSSL and GNUTLS
-standards.
+Translate standard ciphersuite names to GnuTLS, OpenSSL and Mbed TLS standards.
To test the translation functions run:
python3 -m unittest translate_cipher.py
@@ -36,124 +35,158 @@
"""
def test_translate_all_cipher_names(self):
"""
- Translate MbedTLS ciphersuite names to their OpenSSL and
- GnuTLS counterpart. Use only a small subset of ciphers
- that exercise each step of the translate functions
+ Translate standard ciphersuite names to GnuTLS, OpenSSL and
+ Mbed TLS counterpart. Use only a small subset of ciphers
+ that exercise each step of the translation functions
"""
ciphers = [
- ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
+ ("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
"+ECDHE-ECDSA:+NULL:+SHA1",
- "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"),
- ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256",
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA",
+ "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA"),
+ ("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
"+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AEAD",
- "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"),
- ("TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256",
+ "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256"),
+ ("TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
"+DHE-RSA:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1",
- "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"),
- ("TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA",
+ "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA",
+ "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"),
+ ("TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
"+RSA:+AES-256-CBC:+SHA1",
- "AES256-SHA"),
- ("TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
+ "AES256-SHA",
+ "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA"),
+ ("TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
"+PSK:+3DES-CBC:+SHA1",
- "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"),
- ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256",
+ "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
+ "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"),
+ ("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
None,
- "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"),
- ("TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM",
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305",
+ "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"),
+ ("TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM",
"+ECDHE-ECDSA:+AES-128-CCM:+AEAD",
- None),
- ("TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384",
None,
- "ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384"),
+ "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM"),
+ ("TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384",
+ None,
+ "ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384",
+ "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384"),
]
- for m, g_exp, o_exp in ciphers:
+ for s, g_exp, o_exp, m_exp in ciphers:
if g_exp is not None:
- g = translate_gnutls(m)
+ g = translate_gnutls(s)
self.assertEqual(g, g_exp)
if o_exp is not None:
- o = translate_ossl(m)
+ o = translate_ossl(s)
self.assertEqual(o, o_exp)
-def translate_gnutls(m_cipher):
+ if m_exp is not None:
+ m = translate_mbedtls(s)
+ self.assertEqual(m, m_exp)
+
+def translate_gnutls(s_cipher):
"""
- Translate m_cipher from Mbed TLS ciphersuite naming convention
+ Translate s_cipher from standard ciphersuite naming convention
and return the GnuTLS naming convention
"""
- m_cipher = re.sub(r'\ATLS-', '+', m_cipher)
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-WITH-", ":+")
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
+ # Replace "_" with "-" to handle ciphersuite names based on Mbed TLS
+ # naming convention
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("_", "-")
+
+ s_cipher = re.sub(r'\ATLS-', '+', s_cipher)
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("-WITH-", ":+")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
# SHA in Mbed TLS == SHA1 GnuTLS,
# if the last 3 chars are SHA append 1
- if m_cipher[-3:] == "SHA":
- m_cipher = m_cipher+"1"
+ if s_cipher[-3:] == "SHA":
+ s_cipher = s_cipher+"1"
# CCM or CCM-8 should be followed by ":+AEAD"
# Replace "GCM:+SHAxyz" with "GCM:+AEAD"
- if "CCM" in m_cipher or "GCM" in m_cipher:
- m_cipher = re.sub(r"GCM-SHA\d\d\d", "GCM", m_cipher)
- m_cipher = m_cipher+":+AEAD"
+ if "CCM" in s_cipher or "GCM" in s_cipher:
+ s_cipher = re.sub(r"GCM-SHA\d\d\d", "GCM", s_cipher)
+ s_cipher = s_cipher+":+AEAD"
# Replace the last "-" with ":+"
else:
- index = m_cipher.rindex("-")
- m_cipher = m_cipher[:index] + ":+" + m_cipher[index+1:]
+ index = s_cipher.rindex("-")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher[:index] + ":+" + s_cipher[index+1:]
- return m_cipher
+ return s_cipher
-def translate_ossl(m_cipher):
+def translate_ossl(s_cipher):
"""
- Translate m_cipher from Mbed TLS ciphersuite naming convention
+ Translate s_cipher from standard ciphersuite naming convention
and return the OpenSSL naming convention
"""
- m_cipher = re.sub(r'^TLS-', '', m_cipher)
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-WITH", "")
+ # Replace "_" with "-" to handle ciphersuite names based on Mbed TLS
+ # naming convention
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("_", "-")
+
+ s_cipher = re.sub(r'^TLS-', '', s_cipher)
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("-WITH", "")
# Remove the "-" from "ABC-xyz"
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("AES-", "AES")
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("CAMELLIA-", "CAMELLIA")
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("ARIA-", "ARIA")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("AES-", "AES")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("CAMELLIA-", "CAMELLIA")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("ARIA-", "ARIA")
# Remove "RSA" if it is at the beginning
- m_cipher = re.sub(r'^RSA-', r'', m_cipher)
+ s_cipher = re.sub(r'^RSA-', r'', s_cipher)
# For all circumstances outside of PSK
- if "PSK" not in m_cipher:
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("3DES-CBC", "DES-CBC3")
+ if "PSK" not in s_cipher:
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("-EDE", "")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("3DES-CBC", "DES-CBC3")
# Remove "CBC" if it is not prefixed by DES
- m_cipher = re.sub(r'(?<!DES-)CBC-', r'', m_cipher)
+ s_cipher = re.sub(r'(?<!DES-)CBC-', r'', s_cipher)
# ECDHE-RSA-ARIA does not exist in OpenSSL
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("ECDHE-RSA-ARIA", "ECDHE-ARIA")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("ECDHE-RSA-ARIA", "ECDHE-ARIA")
# POLY1305 should not be followed by anything
- if "POLY1305" in m_cipher:
- index = m_cipher.rindex("POLY1305")
- m_cipher = m_cipher[:index+8]
+ if "POLY1305" in s_cipher:
+ index = s_cipher.rindex("POLY1305")
+ s_cipher = s_cipher[:index+8]
# If DES is being used, Replace DHE with EDH
- if "DES" in m_cipher and "DHE" in m_cipher and "ECDHE" not in m_cipher:
- m_cipher = m_cipher.replace("DHE", "EDH")
+ if "DES" in s_cipher and "DHE" in s_cipher and "ECDHE" not in s_cipher:
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("DHE", "EDH")
- return m_cipher
+ return s_cipher
+
+def translate_mbedtls(s_cipher):
+ """
+ Translate s_cipher from standard ciphersuite naming convention
+ and return Mbed TLS ciphersuite naming convention
+ """
+
+ # Replace "_" with "-"
+ s_cipher = s_cipher.replace("_", "-")
+
+ return s_cipher
def format_ciphersuite_names(mode, names):
- t = {"g": translate_gnutls, "o": translate_ossl}[mode]
- return " ".join(t(c) for c in names)
+ t = {"g": translate_gnutls,
+ "o": translate_ossl,
+ "m": translate_mbedtls
+ }[mode]
+ return " ".join(c + '=' + t(c) for c in names)
def main(target, names):
print(format_ciphersuite_names(target, names))
if __name__ == "__main__":
PARSER = argparse.ArgumentParser()
- PARSER.add_argument('target', metavar='TARGET', choices=['o', 'g'])
+ PARSER.add_argument('target', metavar='TARGET', choices=['o', 'g', 'm'])
PARSER.add_argument('names', metavar='NAMES', nargs='+')
ARGS = PARSER.parse_args()
main(ARGS.target, ARGS.names)
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
index 9310b0e..24ecba3 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include "test/constant_flow.h"
+#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h"
+
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -338,6 +340,56 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(char *input_N,
+ char *input_X,
+ char *result)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *res = NULL;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *tmp = NULL;
+ size_t limbs_X;
+ size_t limbs_N;
+ size_t limbs_res;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&m);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&X, &limbs_X, input_X), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&N, &limbs_N, input_N), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core(&res, &limbs_res, result), 0);
+
+ size_t limbs = limbs_N;
+ size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(limbs_X, limbs);
+ TEST_EQUAL(limbs_res, limbs);
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC(tmp, limbs);
+ memcpy(tmp, X, bytes);
+
+ /* Check that 0 <= X < 2N */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(tmp, X, N, limbs);
+ TEST_ASSERT(c || mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(tmp, N, limbs));
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
+ &m, N, limbs,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY), 0);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(X, &m);
+ ASSERT_COMPARE(X, bytes, res, bytes);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free(X);
+ mbedtls_free(res);
+ mbedtls_free(tmp);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&m);
+ mbedtls_free(N);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mpi_mod_raw_mul(char *input_A,
char *input_B,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function
index 85c00eb..7d81608 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
}
TEST_EQUAL(test_offset_idx, expected_idx);
- /* Call update with too much data (sizeof entropy > MAX(_SEED)_INPUT).
+ /* Call update with too much data (sizeof(entropy) > MAX(_SEED)_INPUT).
* Make sure it's detected as an error and doesn't cause memory
* corruption. */
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
index 9311200..9a13793 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
@@ -1038,4 +1038,3 @@
ECP check order for CURVE448
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
ecp_check_order:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:"3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7cca23e9c44edb49aed63690216cc2728dc58f552378c292ab5844f3"
-
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index 394253d..c8a0a82 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ecp_group_metadata(int id, int bit_size, int crv_type,
char *P, char *A, char *B,
char *G_x, char *G_y, char *N,
@@ -903,9 +903,13 @@
// Check curve type, and if it can be used for ECDH/ECDSA
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp), crv_type);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdh_can_do(id), 1);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(id),
crv_type == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS);
+#endif
// Copy group and compare with original
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&grp_cpy, &grp), 0);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
index 93f4101..df94d16 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mdx.function
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
unsigned char src_str[100];
unsigned char output[16];
- memset(src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str);
- memset(output, 0x00, sizeof output);
+ memset(src_str, 0x00, sizeof(src_str));
+ memset(output, 0x00, sizeof(output));
strncpy((char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1);
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_hexcmp(output, hash->x,
- sizeof output, hash->len) == 0);
+ sizeof(output), hash->len) == 0);
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
unsigned char src_str[100];
unsigned char output[20];
- memset(src_str, 0x00, sizeof src_str);
- memset(output, 0x00, sizeof output);
+ memset(src_str, 0x00, sizeof(src_str));
+ memset(output, 0x00, sizeof(output));
strncpy((char *) src_str, text_src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1);
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_hexcmp(output, hash->x,
- sizeof output, hash->len) == 0);
+ sizeof(output), hash->len) == 0);
}
/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
index d796f6f..531a2f1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
@@ -29,23 +29,23 @@
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:448:56:"EC_DH"
PK utils: ECDSA SECP192R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:192:24:"ECDSA"
PK utils: ECDSA SECP256R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:256:32:"ECDSA"
PK utils: ECDSA SECP384R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:384:48:"ECDSA"
PK utils: ECDSA SECP521R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:521:66:"ECDSA"
PK PSA utilities: ECDSA setup/free, info functions, unsupported operations
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_utils:0
PK PSA utilities: RSA setup/free, info functions, unsupported operations
@@ -53,95 +53,95 @@
pk_psa_utils:1
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, invalid check STREAM_CIPHER
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, invalid check RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, invalid check RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, invalid check RSA_PSS(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, invalid check ECDH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(ANY)/NONE, check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDSA(SHA256)/NONE, check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: NONE/ECDSA(ANY_HASH), check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: NONE/ECDSA(SHA256), check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDSA(SHA256)/NONE, invalid check ECDSA(ANY)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDSA(SHA1)/NONE, invalid check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, invalid check STREAM_CIPHER
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, invalid check RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, invalid check RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, invalid check RSA_PSS(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, invalid check ECDSA(SHA256)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0
PK can do ext: ECDH/NONE, check ECDH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:256:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDH+SIGN
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDH+DERIVE
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDH+DERIVE|SIGN
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDSA(SHA256)+DERIVE|SIGN
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDSA(SHA256)+SIGN
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1
PK can do ext: ECDH/ECDSA(ANY), check ECDSA(SHA256)+DERIVE
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_can_do_ext:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE|PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):256:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1
PK can do ext: RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(ANY)/NONE, check not allowed COPY usage
@@ -369,31 +369,31 @@
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30430220685a6994daa6a14e4411b5267edc2a00beee907f2dddd956b2a5a1df791c15f8021f675db4538c000c734489ac737fddd5a739c5a23cd6c6eceea70c286ca4fac9":0
ECDSA sign-verify: SECP192R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:0:0
ECDSA sign-verify: SECP256R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:0:0
ECDSA sign-verify: SECP384R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:0:0
ECDSA sign-verify: SECP521R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:0:0
ECDSA sign-verify: BP256R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:0:0
ECDSA sign-verify: BP512R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:0:0
EC(DSA) sign-verify: SECP192R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:0:0
EC_DH (no) sign-verify: SECP192R1
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@
pk_ec_nocrypt:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH
ECDSA nocrypt
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN
pk_ec_nocrypt:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA
RSA_ALT consistency
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED
Verify ext RSA #11 (PKCS1 v2.1, asking for ECDSA)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_LOWLEVEL_OR_PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_LOWLEVEL_OR_PSA
pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec:"c0719e9a8d5d838d861dc6f675c899d2b309a3a65bb9fe6b11e5afcbf9a2c0b1":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1024:"00dd118a9f99bab068ca2aea3b6a6d5997ed4ec954e40deecea07da01eaae80ec2bb1340db8a128e891324a5c5f5fad8f590d7c8cacbc5fe931dafda1223735279461abaa0572b761631b3a8afe7389b088b63993a0a25ee45d21858bab9931aedd4589a631b37fcf714089f856549f359326dd1e0e86dde52ed66b4a90bda4095":"010001":"0d2bdb0456a3d651d5bd48a4204493898f72cf1aaddd71387cc058bc3f4c235ea6be4010fd61b28e1fbb275462b53775c04be9022d38b6a2e0387dddba86a3f8554d2858044a59fddbd594753fc056fe33c8daddb85dc70d164690b1182209ff84824e0be10e35c379f2f378bf176a9f7cb94d95e44d90276a298c8810f741c9":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:-1:MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:128:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH
Verify ext RSA #12 (PKCS1 v1.5, good)
@@ -581,40 +581,40 @@
pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":250:2:64
PSA wrapped sign: SECP256R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256
PSA wrapped sign: SECP384R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):384
PSA wrapped sign: SECP521R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):521
PSA wrapped sign: SECP192K1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):192
## Currently buggy: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/336
# PSA wrapped sign: SECP224K1
-# depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+# depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
# pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):224
PSA wrapped sign: SECP256K1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1):256
PSA wrapped sign: BP256R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):256
PSA wrapped sign: BP384R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):384
PSA wrapped sign: BP512R1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
pk_psa_sign:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1):512
PSA wrapped sign: RSA PKCS1 v1.5
@@ -646,15 +646,15 @@
pk_psa_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:2048:MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
PK Sign ext:SECP256R1,PK_ECDSA,MD_SHA256
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
pk_psa_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
PK Sign ext:SECP384R1,PK_ECDSA,MD_SHA384
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
pk_psa_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
PK Sign ext:SECP521R1,PK_ECDSA,MD_SHA512
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_512_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_512_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
pk_psa_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
PK wrapped Sign ext:RSA2048,PK_RSA,MD_SHA256
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index 13b5162..d8a8f86 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
void pk_ec_test_vec(int type, int id, data_t *key, data_t *hash,
data_t *sig, int ret)
{
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@
slen = sizeof(sig);
ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(&prv, md_alg, hash->x, hash->len,
- sig, sizeof sig, &slen,
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &slen,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL,
&rs_ctx);
TEST_ASSERT(ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS);
@@ -763,15 +763,15 @@
mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
USE_PSA_INIT();
- memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash);
- memset(sig, 0, sizeof sig);
+ memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(type)) == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(pk_genkey(&pk, parameter) == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
hash, hash_len,
- sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL,
rs_ctx) == sign_ret);
if (sign_ret == 0) {
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@
}
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, hash, hash_len,
- sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand,
NULL) == sign_ret);
if (sign_ret == 0) {
@@ -811,12 +811,12 @@
if (verify_ret == 0) {
hash[0]++;
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx) != 0);
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len, rs_ctx) != 0);
hash[0]--;
sig[0]++;
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx) != 0);
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len, rs_ctx) != 0);
sig[0]--;
}
@@ -1068,8 +1068,8 @@
return;
}
- memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash);
- memset(sig, 0, sizeof sig);
+ memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@
sig, sig_len) == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, hash_len,
- sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL)
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
@@ -1116,11 +1116,11 @@
mbedtls_rsa_init(&raw);
mbedtls_pk_init(&rsa); mbedtls_pk_init(&alt);
- memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash);
- memset(sig, 0, sizeof sig);
- memset(msg, 0x2a, sizeof msg);
- memset(ciph, 0, sizeof ciph);
- memset(test, 0, sizeof test);
+ memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
+ memset(msg, 0x2a, sizeof(msg));
+ memset(ciph, 0, sizeof(ciph));
+ memset(test, 0, sizeof(test));
/* Initialize PK RSA context with random key */
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&rsa,
@@ -1145,34 +1145,34 @@
/* Test signature */
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, SIZE_MAX,
- sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL)
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
- TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof hash,
- sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof(hash),
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL)
== 0);
TEST_ASSERT(sig_len == RSA_KEY_LEN);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len) == 0);
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) == 0);
/* Test decrypt */
- TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_encrypt(&rsa, msg, sizeof msg,
- ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_encrypt(&rsa, msg, sizeof(msg),
+ ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof(ciph),
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL) == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_decrypt(&alt, ciph, ciph_len,
- test, &test_len, sizeof test,
+ test, &test_len, sizeof(test),
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL) == 0);
- TEST_ASSERT(test_len == sizeof msg);
+ TEST_ASSERT(test_len == sizeof(msg));
TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(test, msg, test_len) == 0);
/* Test forbidden operations */
- TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_encrypt(&alt, msg, sizeof msg,
- ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof ciph,
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_encrypt(&alt, msg, sizeof(msg),
+ ciph, &ciph_len, sizeof(ciph),
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL) == ret);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify(&alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len) == ret);
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) == ret);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_debug(&alt, dbg_items) == ret);
exit:
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@
alg_psa = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(psa_type_arg)) {
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid = parameter_arg;
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL) == 0);
alg_psa = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
} else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
{
(void) parameter_arg;
TEST_ASSUME(!"Opaque PK key not supported in this configuration");
@@ -1260,11 +1260,11 @@
TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes),
PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE);
- memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash);
- memset(sig, 0, sizeof sig);
+ memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sizeof sig, &sig_len,
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
NULL, NULL) == 0);
/* Export underlying public key for re-importing in a psa context. */
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pk, pkey_legacy_start,
klen_legacy) == 0);
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
- hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len) == 0);
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) == 0);
exit:
/*
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
index 2bcf4e4..22b0570 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.data
@@ -178,25 +178,25 @@
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
Import-sign-verify: sign in driver, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
Import-sign-verify: sign in driver then export_public, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
Import-sign-verify: sign in software, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
Generate-sign-verify: sign in driver, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
Generate-sign-verify: sign in driver then export_public, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_DRIVER_THEN_EXPORT_PUBLIC:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
Generate-sign-verify: sign in software, ECDSA
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
sign_verify:SIGN_IN_SOFTWARE_AND_PARALLEL_CREATION:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:256:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":"54686973206973206e6f74206120686173682e"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
index 002f3dc..6821fe1 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
@@ -308,48 +308,64 @@
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_224_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA224\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA224\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA256\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA384\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA384\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information EC with SHA512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_512_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA512\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server5.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA512\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA1, MGF1-SHA1, 0x6A)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha1":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA1, MGF1-SHA1, 0x6A)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_224_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA224, MGF1-SHA224, 0x62)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha224":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA224, MGF1-SHA224, 0x62)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA256, MGF1-SHA256, 0x5E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA256, MGF1-SHA256, 0x5E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA384, MGF1-SHA384, 0x4E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha384":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA384, MGF1-SHA384, 0x4E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA-PSS with SHA512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_512_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA512, MGF1-SHA512, 0x3E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n"
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server9.req.sha512":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: RSASSA-PSS (SHA512, MGF1-SHA512, 0x3E)\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n"
X509 CSR Information RSA with SHA-256 - Microsoft header
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/server1-ms.req.sha256":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=PolarSSL Server 1\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 2048 bits\n"
+X509 CSR Information v3 extensions #1 (all)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nsubject alt name \:\n otherName \:\n hardware module name \:\n hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3\n hardware serial number \: 3132338081008180333231\ncert. type \: SSL Client\nkey usage \: CRL Sign\n"
+
+X509 CSR Information v3 extensions #2 (nsCertType only)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/test_csr_v3_nsCertType.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\ncert. type \: SSL Server\n"
+
+X509 CSR Information v3 extensions #3 (subjectAltName only)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/test_csr_v3_subjectAltName.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nsubject alt name \:\n dNSName \: example.com\n dNSName \: example.net\n dNSName \: *.example.org\n"
+
+X509 CSR Information v3 extensions #4 (keyUsage only)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+mbedtls_x509_csr_info:"data_files/test_csr_v3_keyUsage.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment\n"
+
X509 Verify Information: empty
x509_verify_info:0:"":""
@@ -2573,7 +2589,7 @@
X509 CSR ASN.1 (OK)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
-mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"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":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n":0
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"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":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: C=NL, O=PolarSSL, CN=localhost\nsigned using \: ECDSA with SHA1\nEC key size \: 256 bits\n\nkey usage \: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment\n":0
X509 CSR ASN.1 (bad first tag)
mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3100":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT
@@ -2664,6 +2680,84 @@
X509 CSR ASN.1 (invalid version overflow)
mbedtls_x509_csr_parse:"3008300602047fffffff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION
+# Used test_csr_v3_all.csr.der as a base for malforming CSR extenstions/attributes
+# Please see makefile for data_files to check malformation details (test_csr_v3_all_malformed_xxx.csr files)
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid sequence tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_sequence_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid attribute id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_id_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: not extension request)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n":0
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid extenstion request set tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_set_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid extenstion request sequence tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid len (len > data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len1.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: invalid len (len < data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_len2.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: extension request invalid len (len > data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len1.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (attributes: extension request invalid len (len < data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_attributes_extension_request_sequence_len2.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid sequence tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extensions_sequence_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension id tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_id_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension data tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension data len (len > data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len1.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension data len (len < data))
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_data_len2.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension key usage bitstream tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_key_usage_bitstream_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension subject alt name sequence tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_subject_alt_name_sequence_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension ns cert bitstream tag)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_ns_cert_bitstream_tag.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: duplicated extension)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_duplicated_extension.csr.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS+MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA
+
+X509 CSR ASN.1 (extensions: invalid extension type data)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file:"data_files/test_csr_v3_all_malformed_extension_type_oid.csr.der":"CSR version \: 1\nsubject name \: CN=etcd\nsigned using \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size \: 1024 bits\n\ncert. type \: SSL Client\nkey usage \: CRL Sign\n":0
+
X509 File parse (no issues)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
x509parse_crt_file:"data_files/server7_int-ca.crt":0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
index 5d896bf..7e68d1e 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function
@@ -1169,6 +1169,30 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C:!MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+void mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(char *csr_file, char *ref_out, int ref_ret)
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_csr csr;
+ char my_out[1000];
+ int my_ret;
+
+ mbedtls_x509_csr_init(&csr);
+ memset(my_out, 0, sizeof(my_out));
+
+ my_ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(&csr, csr_file);
+ TEST_ASSERT(my_ret == ref_ret);
+
+ if (ref_ret == 0) {
+ size_t my_out_len = mbedtls_x509_csr_info(my_out, sizeof(my_out), "", &csr);
+ TEST_ASSERT(my_out_len == strlen(ref_out));
+ TEST_ASSERT(strcmp(my_out, ref_out) == 0);
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_x509_csr_free(&csr);
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
void mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(char *crt_path, int ret, int nb_crt)
{
@@ -1217,9 +1241,9 @@
/* Load a chain with nb_int intermediates (from 01 to nb_int),
* plus one "end-entity" cert (nb_int + 1) */
- ret = mbedtls_snprintf(file_buf, sizeof file_buf, "%s/c%02d.pem", chain_dir,
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(file_buf, sizeof(file_buf), "%s/c%02d.pem", chain_dir,
nb_int + 1);
- TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0 && (size_t) ret < sizeof file_buf);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0 && (size_t) ret < sizeof(file_buf));
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(&chain, file_buf) == 0);
/* Try to verify that chain */
@@ -1312,13 +1336,13 @@
mbedtls_x509_buf oid;
char num_buf[100];
- memset(num_buf, 0x2a, sizeof num_buf);
+ memset(num_buf, 0x2a, sizeof(num_buf));
oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
oid.p = oid_buf->x;
oid.len = oid_buf->len;
- TEST_ASSERT((size_t) blen <= sizeof num_buf);
+ TEST_ASSERT((size_t) blen <= sizeof(num_buf));
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(num_buf, blen, &oid) == ret);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
index c55c9d1..885ba00 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data
@@ -60,95 +60,107 @@
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 1970
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"19700210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"19700210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not after 2050
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 1970, not after 2050
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"19700210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"19700210144406":"20500210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, not before 2050, not after 2059
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20500210144406":"20590210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20500210144406":"20590210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, key_usage
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, one ext_key_usage
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20110212144406":"20210212144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"serverAuth":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_ext_usage.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20110212144406":"20210212144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"serverAuth":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_ext_usage.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, two ext_key_usages
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20110212144406":"20210212144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"codeSigning,timeStamping":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_ext_usages.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20110212144406":"20210212144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"codeSigning,timeStamping":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_ext_usages.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, ns_cert_type
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:1:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:1:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, version 1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, CA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.ca.crt":0:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.ca.crt":0:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, key_usage
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage_noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, ns_cert_type
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:0:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:0:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type_noauthid.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, version 1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":1:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, RSA_ALT, CA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.ca_noauthid.crt":1:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:0:-1:"data_files/server1.ca_noauthid.crt":1:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Opaque
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Opaque, key_usage
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:1:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.key_usage.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Opaque, ns_cert_type
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:1:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER:1:1:-1:"data_files/server1.cert_type.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Opaque, version 1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1:"data_files/server1.v1.crt":2:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Opaque, CA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.ca.crt":2:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.ca.crt":2:1:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+
+Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Full length serial
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0011223344":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.long_serial.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+
+Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, Serial starting with 0x80
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"8011223344":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.80serial.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
+
+Certificate write check Server1 SHA1, All 0xFF full length serial
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server1.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Test CA":"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server1.long_serial_FF.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca.crt"
Certificate write check Server5 ECDSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server5.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca2.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server5.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca2.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server5.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca2.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"data_files/server5.crt":0:0:"data_files/test-ca2.crt"
Certificate write check Server5 ECDSA, Opaque
depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
-x509_crt_check:"data_files/server5.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca2.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA":"1":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":2:0:"data_files/test-ca2.crt"
+x509_crt_check:"data_files/server5.key":"":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=PolarSSL Server 1":"data_files/test-ca2.key":"PolarSSLTest":"C=NL,O=PolarSSL,CN=Polarssl Test EC CA":"01":"20190210144406":"20290210144406":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:0:"NULL":0:0:1:-1:"":2:0:"data_files/test-ca2.crt"
X509 String to Names #1
mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL,O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":"C=NL, O=Offspark\, Inc., OU=PolarSSL":0
@@ -167,3 +179,6 @@
X509 String to Names #6 (Escape at end)
mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, O=Offspark\":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME
+
+Check max serial length
+x509_set_serial_check:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
index 03b9bae..056d26a 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
void x509_crt_check(char *subject_key_file, char *subject_pwd,
char *subject_name, char *issuer_key_file,
char *issuer_pwd, char *issuer_name,
- char *serial_str, char *not_before, char *not_after,
+ data_t *serial_arg, char *not_before, char *not_after,
int md_type, int key_usage, int set_key_usage,
char *ext_key_usage,
int cert_type, int set_cert_type, int auth_ident,
@@ -315,7 +315,9 @@
unsigned char check_buf[5000];
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char tag, sz;
- mbedtls_mpi serial;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi serial_mpi;
+#endif
int ret, before_tag, after_tag;
size_t olen = 0, pem_len = 0, buf_index = 0;
int der_len = -1;
@@ -327,7 +329,9 @@
mbedtls_pk_type_t issuer_key_type;
memset(&rnd_info, 0x2a, sizeof(mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info));
- mbedtls_mpi_init(&serial);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&serial_mpi);
+#endif
USE_PSA_INIT();
@@ -384,13 +388,18 @@
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&issuer_key) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE);
}
- TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&serial, serial_str) == 0);
-
if (ver != -1) {
mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(&crt, ver);
}
- TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(&crt, &serial) == 0);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&serial_mpi, serial_arg->x,
+ serial_arg->len) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(&crt, &serial_mpi) == 0);
+#else
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(&crt, serial_arg->x,
+ serial_arg->len) == 0);
+#endif
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(&crt, not_before,
not_after) == 0);
mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg(&crt, md_type);
@@ -549,7 +558,9 @@
mbedtls_pk_free(&issuer_key_alt);
mbedtls_pk_free(&subject_key);
mbedtls_pk_free(&issuer_key);
- mbedtls_mpi_free(&serial);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&serial_mpi);
+#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
#endif
@@ -557,6 +568,37 @@
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */
+void x509_set_serial_check()
+{
+ mbedtls_x509write_cert ctx;
+ uint8_t invalid_serial[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN + 1];
+
+ memset(invalid_serial, 0x01, sizeof(invalid_serial));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi serial_mpi;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&serial_mpi);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&serial_mpi, invalid_serial,
+ sizeof(invalid_serial)), 0);
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(&ctx, &serial_mpi),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+#endif
+
+ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(&ctx, invalid_serial,
+ sizeof(invalid_serial)),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED) && defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&serial_mpi);
+#else
+ ;
+#endif
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C:MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */
void mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(char *name, char *parsed_name, int result
)