Merge pull request #4588 from TRodziewicz/remove_MD2_MD4_RC4_Blowfish_and_XTEA
Remove MD2, MD4, RC4, Blowfish and XTEA
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue4083.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue4083.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8457337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/issue4083.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Removals
+ * Remove the following functions: mbedtls_timing_self_test(),
+ mbedtls_hardclock_poll(), mbedtls_timing_hardclock() and
+ mbedtls_set_alarm(). Fixes #4083.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mandatory-rng-param.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mandatory-rng-param.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39ee335
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mandatory-rng-param.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+API changes
+ * For all functions that take a random number generator (RNG) as a
+ parameter, this parameter is now mandatory (that is, NULL is not an
+ acceptable value). Functions which previously accepted NULL and now
+ reject it are: the X.509 CRT and CSR writing functions; the PK and RSA
+ sign and decrypt function; mbedtls_rsa_private(); the functions
+ in DHM and ECDH that compute the shared secret; the scalar multiplication
+ functions in ECP.
+ * The following functions now require an RNG parameter:
+ mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(), mbedtls_pk_check_pair(),
+ mbedtls_pk_parse_key(), mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile().
+Removals
+ * The configuration option MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG has been removed as
+ it no longer had any effect.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_key_derivation-bad_workflow.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_key_derivation-bad_workflow.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fd03e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_key_derivation-bad_workflow.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+ * Fix PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF and PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS being too permissive
+ about missing inputs.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.txt b/ChangeLog.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.txt
index 854dda3..2590d3a 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.txt
@@ -6,4 +6,3 @@
decryption functions now always use the private key and verification and
encryption use the public key. Verification functions also no longer have
RNG parameters.
- * The RNG is now mandatory for all private-key RSA operations.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/mandatory-rng-param.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/mandatory-rng-param.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6aba08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/mandatory-rng-param.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+The RNG parameter is now mandatory for all functions that accept one
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This change affects all users who called a function accepting a `f_rng`
+parameter with `NULL` as the value of this argument; this is no longer
+supported.
+
+The changed functions are: the X.509 CRT and CSR writing functions; the PK and
+RSA sign and decrypt functions; `mbedtls_rsa_private()`; the functions in DHM
+and ECDH that compute the shared secret; the scalar multiplication functions in
+ECP.
+
+You now need to pass a properly seeded, cryptographically secure RNG to all
+functions that accept a `f_rng` parameter. It is of course still possible to
+pass `NULL` as the context pointer `p_rng` if your RNG function doesn't need a
+context.
+
+Alternative implementations of a module (enabled with the `MBEDTLS_module_ALT`
+configuration options) may have their own internal and are free to ignore the
+`f_rng` argument but must allow users to pass one anyway.
+
+Some functions gained an RNG parameter
+--------------------------------------
+
+This affects users of the following functions: `mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv()`,
+`mbedtls_pk_check_pair()`, `mbedtls_pk_parse_key()`, and
+`mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile()`.
+
+You now need to pass a properly seeded, cryptographically secure RNG when
+calling these functions. It is used for blinding, a counter-measure against
+side-channel attacks.
+
+The configuration option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG` was removed
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This doesn't affect users of the default configuration; it only affects people
+who were explicitly setting this option.
+
+This was a trade-off between code size and counter-measures; it is no longer
+relevant as the counter-measure is now always on at no cost in code size.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/move_part_of_timing_module_out_of_the_library.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/move_part_of_timing_module_out_of_the_library.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa61e27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/move_part_of_timing_module_out_of_the_library.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Move part of timing module out of the library
+--
+
+The change affects users who use any of the following functions:
+`mbedtls_timing_self_test()`, `mbedtls_hardclock_poll()`,
+`mbedtls_timing_hardclock()` and `mbedtls_set_alarm()`.
+
+If you were relying on these functions, you'll now need to change to using your
+platform's corresponding functions directly.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.md
index e400650..d21d5ed 100644
--- a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.md
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-rsa-mode-parameter.md
@@ -19,11 +19,3 @@
was only needed when using a private key). This affects all applications using
the RSA verify functions.
-RNG is now mandatory in all RSA private key operations
-------------------------------------------------------
-
-The random generator is now mandatory for blinding in all RSA private-key
-operations (`mbedtls_rsa_private`, `mbedtls_rsa_xxx_sign`,
-`mbedtls_rsa_xxx_decrypt`) as well as for encryption
-(`mbedtls_rsa_xxx_encrypt`). This means that passing a null `f_rng` is no longer
-supported.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-ssl-get-session_pointer.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-ssl-get-session_pointer.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4a4895
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove-ssl-get-session_pointer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Remove the SSL API mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer()
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This affects two classes of users:
+
+1. Users who manually inspect parts of the current session through
+ direct structure field access.
+
+2. Users of session resumption who query the current session
+ via `mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer()` prior to saving or exporting
+ it via `mbedtls_ssl_session_copy()` or `mbedtls_ssl_session_save()`,
+ respectively.
+
+Migration paths:
+
+1. Mbed TLS 3.0 does not offer a migration path for the usecase 1: Like many
+ other Mbed TLS structures, the structure of `mbedtls_ssl_session` is no
+ longer part of the public API in Mbed TLS 3.0, and direct structure field
+ access is no longer supported. Please see the corresponding migration guide.
+
+2. Users should replace calls to `mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer()` by
+ calls to `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()` as demonstrated in the example
+ program `programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c`.
diff --git a/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-ticket-api.md b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-ticket-api.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23c53d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ssl-ticket-api.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+Modified semantics of mbedtls_ssl_{get,set}_session()
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This affects users who call `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()` or
+`mbedtls_ssl_set_session()` multiple times on the same SSL context
+representing an established TLS 1.2 connection.
+Those users will now observe the second call to fail with
+`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE`.
+
+Migration path:
+- Exporting the same TLS 1.2 connection multiple times via
+ `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()` leads to multiple copies of
+ the same session. This use of `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()`
+ is discouraged, and the following should be considered:
+ * If the various session copies are later loaded into
+ fresh SSL contexts via `mbedtls_ssl_set_session()`,
+ export via `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()` only once and
+ load the same session into different contexts via
+ `mbedtls_ssl_set_session()`. Since `mbedtls_ssl_set_session()`
+ makes a copy of the session that's being loaded, this
+ is functionally equivalent.
+ * If the various session copies are later serialized
+ via `mbedtls_ssl_session_save()`, export and serialize
+ the session only once via `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()` and
+ `mbedtls_ssl_session_save()` and make copies of the raw
+ data instead.
+- Calling `mbedtls_ssl_set_session()` multiple times in Mbed TLS 2.x
+ is not useful since subsequent calls overwrite the effect of previous
+ calls. Applications achieve equivalent functional behaviour by
+ issuing only the very last call to `mbedtls_ssl_set_session()`.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 90dee6c..85f7efd 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -150,14 +150,6 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \
- defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG))
-#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used"
-#endif
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites"
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index e8e2b1b..16f93f9 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@
*
* Used in:
* library/aria.c
- * library/timing.c
* library/bn_mul.h
*
* Required by:
@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT
*
- * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(),
+ * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for
* mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay()
*
* Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled.
@@ -645,28 +644,6 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
- *
- * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an
- * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect
- * against some side-channel attacks.
- *
- * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the
- * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this
- * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification,
- * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel
- * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of
- * that dependency.
- *
- * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some
- * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for
- * your use case.
- *
- * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
-
-/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
*
* Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed.
@@ -1007,8 +984,7 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
*
- * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific
- * or mbedtls_timing_hardclock poll function.
+ * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init().
*
* This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an
* application.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
index e8c8a82..850813e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -279,10 +279,10 @@
* \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at
* least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P).
* \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may
- * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed.
- * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng
- * doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. Used for
+ * blinding.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
index 2a0980b..587035a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
@@ -222,10 +222,7 @@
* This must be initialized.
* \param d Our secret exponent (private key).
* This must be initialized.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization
- * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is
- * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of
- * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
* \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a
* context argument.
@@ -428,8 +425,7 @@
* \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This
* must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes.
* \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may
- * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng
* doesn't need a context argument.
*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
index 49e85d9..75ad808 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -911,15 +911,8 @@
* \note To prevent timing attacks, this function
* executes the exact same sequence of base-field
* operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or
- * array index depending on the value of \p m.
- *
- * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize
- * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks
- * targeting these results. We recommend always providing
- * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible.
- * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when
- * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value
- * of \p m) will be used instead.
+ * array index depending on the value of \p m. If also uses
+ * \p f_rng to randomize some intermediate results.
*
* \param grp The ECP group to use.
* This must be initialized and have group parameters
@@ -928,9 +921,9 @@
* This must be initialized.
* \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized.
* \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization
- * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged).
- * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private
@@ -959,9 +952,9 @@
* This must be initialized.
* \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized.
* \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized.
- * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization
- * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged).
- * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
@@ -1265,14 +1258,18 @@
* part is ignored.
* \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair.
* This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
* error code on calculation failure.
*/
-int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub,
- const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv );
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index 85bf7c9..dec5111 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
* given the key type.
* \param sig_len On successful return,
* the number of bytes written to \p sig.
- * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@
* given the key type.
* \param sig_len On successful return,
* the number of bytes written to \p sig.
- * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
* \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart)
*
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@
* \param output Decrypted output
* \param olen Decrypted message length
* \param osize Size of the output buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5.
@@ -584,9 +584,11 @@
* \param output Encrypted output
* \param olen Encrypted output length
* \param osize Size of the output buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for padding generation.
+ *
* \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5.
*
* \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
@@ -601,6 +603,8 @@
*
* \param pub Context holding a public key.
* \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not
@@ -608,7 +612,10 @@
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid.
* \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match.
*/
-int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv );
+int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief Export debug information
@@ -660,6 +667,8 @@
* The empty password is not supported.
* \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes.
* Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
* with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a
@@ -670,8 +679,9 @@
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
*/
int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen );
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
/** \ingroup pk_module */
/**
@@ -711,6 +721,8 @@
* Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted
* key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted.
* The empty password is not supported.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
* with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a
@@ -721,7 +733,8 @@
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
*/
int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
- const char *path, const char *password );
+ const char *path, const char *password,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
/** \ingroup pk_module */
/**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index b2f5c67..603615b 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -933,6 +933,8 @@
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */
+ unsigned char exported;
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
@@ -1535,7 +1537,7 @@
* \brief Set the random number generator callback
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
- * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory)
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
@@ -2391,18 +2393,49 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
- * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only)
- * Session data is copied from presented session structure.
+ * \brief Load a session for session resumption.
*
- * \param ssl SSL context
- * \param session session context
+ * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered
+ * for session resumption in the next handshake.
*
- * \return 0 if successful,
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed,
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or
- * arguments are otherwise invalid
+ * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that
+ * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the
+ * use of session resumption: The server is always free
+ * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to
+ * a full handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and
+ * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
+ * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and loading
+ * one or more sessions via this call will lead to their
+ * corresponding tickets being advertised as resumption PSKs
+ * by the client.
+ *
+ * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful
+ * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this
+ * function should be called at most once.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should
+ * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This
+ * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to
+ * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but
+ * the handshake must not yet have been started.
+ * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption.
+ * This must be a session previously exported via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and
+ * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session
+ * could not be loaded because of an implementation limitation.
+ * This error is non-fatal, and has no observable effect on
+ * the SSL context or the session that was attempted to be loaded.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
@@ -2451,7 +2484,6 @@
* of session cache or session tickets.
*
* \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
- * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer()
*
* \param session The session structure to be saved.
* \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
@@ -2475,23 +2507,6 @@
size_t *olen );
/**
- * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example
- * to serialize it.
- *
- * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and
- * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until
- * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context.
- *
- * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
- *
- * \param ssl The SSL context.
- *
- * \return A pointer to the current session if successful.
- * \return \c NULL if no session is active.
- */
-const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
-
-/**
* \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference
* order. First in the list has the highest preference.
* (Overrides all version-specific lists)
@@ -3642,32 +3657,41 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
- * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only)
- * Session data is copied to presented session structure.
+ * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later.
*
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to
+ * to export a session structure for later resumption.
+ * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session.
+ * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_init_session()
+ * but otherwise be unused.
*
- * \param ssl SSL context
- * \param session session context
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and
+ * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
+ * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and calling
+ * this function multiple times will export the available
+ * tickets one a time until no further tickets are available,
+ * in which case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE will
+ * be returned.
*
- * \return 0 if successful,
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed,
- * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or
- * arguments are otherwise invalid.
+ * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful
+ * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this
+ * function should be called at most once.
*
- * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain,
- * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again
- * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it.
- * Instead, you should use the results from the verification
- * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result()
- * after loading the session again into a new SSL context
- * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session().
- *
- * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should
- * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free().
+ * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for
+ * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(),
+ * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save().
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no further session
+ * is available for export.
+ * This error is a non-fatal, and has no observable effect on
+ * the SSL context or the destination session.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
*/
-int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/**
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
index 871eec3..1047dbb 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
* \brief Prepare context to be actually used
*
* \param ctx Context to be set up
- * \param f_rng RNG callback function
+ * \param f_rng RNG callback function (mandatory)
* \param p_rng RNG callback context
* \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection.
* Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/include/mbedtls/timing.h
index 7669bb9..6ffc812 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/timing.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/timing.h
@@ -61,52 +61,10 @@
#include "timing_alt.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */
-extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed;
-
-/**
- * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value
- *
- * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this!
- * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual
- * machines.
- *
- * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and
- * may wrap around.
- */
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void );
-
-/**
- * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds
- *
- * \param val points to a timer structure
- * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer.
- *
- * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When
- * restarting, this is always 0.
- *
- * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1.
- *
- * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not
- * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence
- * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 =
- * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately
- * the delay since the first reset.
- */
+/* Internal use */
unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset );
/**
- * \brief Setup an alarm clock
- *
- * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set
- * (must be >=0)
- *
- * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded
- * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per
- * thread.
- */
-void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds );
-
-/**
* \brief Set a pair of delays to watch
* (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().)
*
@@ -136,15 +94,6 @@
*/
int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-/**
- * \brief Checkup routine
- *
- * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed
- */
-int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose );
-#endif
-
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
index d383168..5c5509c 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -1108,16 +1108,13 @@
* \param ctx certificate to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
* error code
*
- * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
- * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
- * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
- * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@@ -1130,15 +1127,12 @@
* \param ctx certificate to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
*
- * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
- * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
- * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
- * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
index 0a069df..a0f1278 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
@@ -264,16 +264,13 @@
* \param ctx CSR to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
* error code
*
- * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
- * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
- * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
- * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@@ -287,15 +284,12 @@
* \param ctx CSR to write away
* \param buf buffer to write to
* \param size size of the buffer
- * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
*
- * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the
- * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable
- * for countermeasures against timing attacks).
- * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng.
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
diff --git a/library/dhm.c b/library/dhm.c
index e88f3a2..29ce755 100644
--- a/library/dhm.c
+++ b/library/dhm.c
@@ -444,6 +444,9 @@
DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+ if( f_rng == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
if( output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len( ctx ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -453,25 +456,17 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb );
/* Blind peer's value */
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) );
- }
- else
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) );
/* Do modular exponentiation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X,
&ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
/* Unblind secret value */
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) );
- }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) );
/* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory
* for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */
diff --git a/library/ecjpake.c b/library/ecjpake.c
index de43ddb..d229311 100644
--- a/library/ecjpake.c
+++ b/library/ecjpake.c
@@ -962,6 +962,28 @@
0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51
};
+/*
+ * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!!
+ *
+ * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes,
+ * except we only use the low byte as the output. See
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use
+ */
+static int self_test_rng( void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len )
+{
+ static uint32_t state = 42;
+
+ (void) ctx;
+
+ for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
+ {
+ state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u;
+ out[i] = (unsigned char) state;
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */
static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1,
@@ -972,9 +994,9 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1,
- &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
+ &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2,
- &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
+ &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 044bbe1..8f6e988 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -101,16 +101,6 @@
#include "ecp_internal_alt.h"
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#else
-#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
-#endif
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
-
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@@ -124,144 +114,6 @@
static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count;
#endif
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
-/*
- * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for
- * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was
- * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but
- * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with
- * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it.
- *
- * The obvious strategies for addressing that include:
- * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments;
- * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules.
- *
- * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is
- * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar.
- *
- * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with
- * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG.
- */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-
-/* DRBG context type */
-typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
-
-/* DRBG context init */
-static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx );
-}
-
-/* DRBG context free */
-static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx );
-}
-
-/* DRBG function */
-static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
- unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
-{
- return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
-}
-
-/* DRBG context seeding */
-static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
- const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
- /* The list starts with strong hashes */
- const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0];
- const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
-
- if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
- secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
-
- ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len );
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-
-/* DRBG context type */
-typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
-
-/* DRBG context init */
-static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx );
-}
-
-/* DRBG context free */
-static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
-{
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx );
-}
-
-/* DRBG function */
-static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
- unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
-{
- return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
-}
-
-/*
- * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does,
- * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy
- * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string.
- * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are
- * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.)
- */
-static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
-{
- (void) ctx;
- memset( out, 0, len );
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-/* DRBG context seeding */
-static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
- const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
-
- if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES )
- {
- ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
- secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
-
- ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
- secret_bytes, secret_len );
-
-cleanup:
- mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
-
- return( ret );
-}
-
-#else
-#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
-#endif /* DRBG modules */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row.
@@ -309,10 +161,6 @@
ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */
ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */
} state;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
- unsigned char drbg_seeded;
-#endif
};
/*
@@ -325,10 +173,6 @@
ctx->T = NULL;
ctx->T_size = 0;
ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_init( &ctx->drbg_ctx );
- ctx->drbg_seeded = 0;
-#endif
}
/*
@@ -350,10 +194,6 @@
mbedtls_free( ctx->T );
}
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_free( &ctx->drbg_ctx );
-#endif
-
ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx );
}
@@ -2068,9 +1908,7 @@
i = d;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, T_size, x[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
-#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
@@ -2204,9 +2042,7 @@
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
-#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) );
@@ -2286,42 +2122,9 @@
size_t d;
unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
-
- ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx );
-#endif
ECP_RS_ENTER( rsm );
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- if( f_rng == NULL )
- {
- /* Adjust pointers */
- f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL )
- p_rng = &rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_ctx;
- else
-#endif
- p_rng = &drbg_ctx;
-
- /* Initialize internal DRBG if necessary */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL ||
- rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0 )
-#endif
- {
- const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( p_rng, m, m_len ) );
- }
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
- if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL )
- rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded = 1;
-#endif
- }
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
-
/* Is P the base point ? */
#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 &&
@@ -2393,10 +2196,6 @@
cleanup:
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx );
-#endif
-
/* does T belong to the group? */
if( T == grp->T )
T = NULL;
@@ -2583,22 +2382,10 @@
unsigned char b;
mbedtls_ecp_point RP;
mbedtls_mpi PX;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
-
- ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx );
-#endif
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &PX );
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng == NULL )
- {
- const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) );
- f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random;
- p_rng = &drbg_ctx;
- }
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &PX, &P->X ) );
@@ -2613,10 +2400,7 @@
MOD_ADD( RP.X );
/* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- if( f_rng != NULL )
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */
i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( m ); /* one past the (zero-based) most significant bit */
@@ -2648,18 +2432,10 @@
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- if( f_rng != NULL )
-#endif
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
cleanup:
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
- ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx );
-#endif
-
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &PX );
return( ret );
@@ -2669,8 +2445,11 @@
/*
* Restartable multiplication R = m * P
+ *
+ * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know
+ * the inputs are not sensitive.
*/
-int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
@@ -2679,10 +2458,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
char is_grp_capable = 0;
#endif
- ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
- ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL );
- ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL );
- ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* reset ops count for this call if top-level */
@@ -2736,6 +2511,25 @@
}
/*
+ * Restartable multiplication R = m * P
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
+{
+ ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
+ ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL );
+ ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL );
+ ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL );
+
+ if( f_rng == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ return( ecp_mul_restartable_internal( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
+}
+
+/*
* Multiplication R = m * P
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
@@ -2828,8 +2622,8 @@
}
else
{
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P,
- NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_restartable_internal( grp, R, m, P,
+ NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) );
}
cleanup:
@@ -3272,7 +3066,9 @@
/*
* Check a public-private key pair
*/
-int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv )
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_ecp_point Q;
@@ -3296,7 +3092,7 @@
mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp );
/* Also checks d is valid */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) ||
@@ -3315,6 +3111,28 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!!
+ *
+ * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes,
+ * except we only use the low byte as the output. See
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use
+ */
+static int self_test_rng( void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len )
+{
+ static uint32_t state = 42;
+
+ (void) ctx;
+
+ for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
+ {
+ state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u;
+ out[i] = (unsigned char) state;
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve.
* This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents
* for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */
@@ -3370,7 +3188,7 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL ) );
for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ )
{
@@ -3383,7 +3201,7 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL ) );
if( add_count != add_c_prev ||
dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
@@ -3461,7 +3279,7 @@
mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " );
/* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL ) );
ret = self_test_point( verbose,
&grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
sw_exponents,
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index f12a239..9e31f84 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -73,11 +73,6 @@
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
- mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL,
- MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK,
- MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK );
-#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE,
diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.c b/library/entropy_poll.c
index e5d75c5..bccc034 100644
--- a/library/entropy_poll.c
+++ b/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -211,24 +211,6 @@
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
-int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data,
- unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen )
-{
- unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock();
- ((void) data);
- *olen = 0;
-
- if( len < sizeof(unsigned long) )
- return( 0 );
-
- memcpy( output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long) );
- *olen = sizeof(unsigned long);
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data,
unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen )
diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.h b/library/entropy_poll.h
index 9120fe5..bf26889 100644
--- a/library/entropy_poll.h
+++ b/library/entropy_poll.h
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
* Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */
-#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE)
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */
#endif
@@ -51,14 +50,6 @@
unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen );
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
-/**
- * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback
- */
-int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data,
- unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen );
-#endif
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
/**
* \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index 06021e2..275d34b 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -500,7 +500,10 @@
/*
* Check public-private key pair
*/
-int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv )
+int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
{
PK_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL );
PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL );
@@ -511,6 +514,9 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
+ if( f_rng == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
@@ -525,7 +531,7 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
- return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx ) );
+ return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
/*
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index 7c317c5..864e495 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -154,8 +154,12 @@
ilen, input, output ) );
}
-static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
{
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub,
(const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) );
}
@@ -388,10 +392,13 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
-static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
{
return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub,
- (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) );
+ (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void )
@@ -799,7 +806,9 @@
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
+static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
{
unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char hash[32];
@@ -813,7 +822,7 @@
if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
hash, sizeof( hash ),
- sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
+ sig, &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.h b/library/pk_wrap.h
index f7f938a..b2db637 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.h
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.h
@@ -85,7 +85,9 @@
void *p_rng );
/** Check public-private key pair */
- int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv );
+ int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
/** Allocate a new context */
void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void );
diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c
index 52b9ecc..fe6aaca 100644
--- a/library/pkparse.c
+++ b/library/pkparse.c
@@ -123,7 +123,8 @@
* Load and parse a private key
*/
int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
- const char *path, const char *pwd )
+ const char *path, const char *pwd,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
@@ -136,10 +137,10 @@
return( ret );
if( pwd == NULL )
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0 );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0, f_rng, p_rng );
else
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n,
- (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ) );
+ (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ), f_rng, p_rng );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n );
mbedtls_free( buf );
@@ -859,8 +860,8 @@
* Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key
*/
static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck,
- const unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen )
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int version, pubkey_done;
@@ -967,7 +968,7 @@
if( ! pubkey_done &&
( ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G,
- NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
+ f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck );
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
@@ -997,9 +998,9 @@
*
*/
static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
- mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- const unsigned char* key,
- size_t keylen )
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char* key, size_t keylen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret, version;
size_t len;
@@ -1009,6 +1010,11 @@
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+#endif
+
/*
* This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208)
*
@@ -1071,7 +1077,7 @@
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH )
{
if( ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ) ) != 0 ||
- ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 )
+ ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
return( ret );
@@ -1094,9 +1100,10 @@
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
- mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen )
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret, decrypted = 0;
size_t len;
@@ -1188,7 +1195,7 @@
if( decrypted == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
- return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len ) );
+ return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
@@ -1197,7 +1204,8 @@
*/
int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen )
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info;
@@ -1260,7 +1268,8 @@
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
- pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 )
+ pem.buf, pem.buflen,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
@@ -1287,7 +1296,7 @@
if( ret == 0 )
{
if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk,
- pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 )
+ pem.buf, pem.buflen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
@@ -1309,9 +1318,8 @@
key, NULL, 0, &len );
if( ret == 0 )
{
- if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk,
- pem.buf, pem.buflen,
- pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen,
+ pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
@@ -1344,7 +1352,7 @@
memcpy( key_copy, key, keylen );
ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, key_copy, keylen,
- pwd, pwdlen );
+ pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_copy, keylen );
mbedtls_free( key_copy );
@@ -1362,8 +1370,11 @@
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
- if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen ) ) == 0 )
+ if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
+ pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 )
+ {
return( 0 );
+ }
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
@@ -1385,7 +1396,7 @@
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY );
if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
- key, keylen ) == 0 )
+ key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 8416aa7..a9caa18 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -3710,6 +3710,17 @@
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t offset, length;
+ switch( tls12_prf->state )
+ {
+ case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET:
+ tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT;
+ break;
+ case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+ }
+
while( output_length != 0 )
{
/* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
index f2e9a1c..ef2adc1 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@
/* Parse the data. */
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) )
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
- mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) );
+ mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
else
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &ctx, data, data_length ) );
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index f7274ea..d4e63b6 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -929,8 +929,11 @@
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
- if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
- f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */ ) != 0 )
+ if( f_rng == NULL )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+ if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
+ 1 /* blinding on */ ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@@ -947,15 +950,12 @@
mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind );
#else
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind );
- mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind );
#endif
- }
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ );
@@ -975,57 +975,54 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) );
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
- /*
- * Blinding
- * T = T * Vi mod N
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+ /*
+ * Blinding
+ * T = T * Vi mod N
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
- /*
- * Exponent blinding
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+ /*
+ * Exponent blinding
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- /*
- * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) );
+ /*
+ * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) );
- D = &D_blind;
+ D = &D_blind;
#else
- /*
- * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind,
- &ctx->DP ) );
+ /*
+ * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind,
+ &ctx->DP ) );
- DP = &DP_blind;
+ DP = &DP_blind;
- /*
- * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
- f_rng, p_rng ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
- &ctx->DQ ) );
+ /*
+ * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
+ &ctx->DQ ) );
- DQ = &DQ_blind;
+ DQ = &DQ_blind;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
- }
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
@@ -1054,15 +1051,12 @@
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
- /*
- * Unblind
- * T = T * Vf mod N
- */
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) );
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
- }
+ /*
+ * Unblind
+ * T = T * Vf mod N
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
/* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E,
@@ -1086,15 +1080,12 @@
mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
- if( f_rng != NULL )
- {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind );
#else
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind );
- mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind );
+ mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind );
#endif
- }
mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 5c1bc32..2961637 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -3504,6 +3504,9 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
+ if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate,
session ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -4465,6 +4468,8 @@
int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_session *dst )
{
+ int ret;
+
if( ssl == NULL ||
dst == NULL ||
ssl->session == NULL ||
@@ -4473,18 +4478,30 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
- return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) );
+ /* Since Mbed TLS 3.0, mbedtls_ssl_get_session() is no longer
+ * idempotent: Each session can only be exported once.
+ *
+ * (This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 support where we will
+ * need the ability to export multiple sessions (aka tickets),
+ * which will be achieved by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session()
+ * multiple times until it fails.)
+ *
+ * Check whether we have already exported the current session,
+ * and fail if so.
+ */
+ if( ssl->session->exported == 1 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ /* Remember that we've exported the session. */
+ ssl->session->exported = 1;
+ return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
-const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
-{
- if( ssl == NULL )
- return( NULL );
-
- return( ssl->session );
-}
-
/*
* Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version
* and structure of the ticket.
diff --git a/library/timing.c b/library/timing.c
index 664fde0..a85ce67 100644
--- a/library/timing.c
+++ b/library/timing.c
@@ -19,13 +19,6 @@
#include "common.h"
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdio.h>
-#define mbedtls_printf printf
-#endif
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
@@ -38,10 +31,6 @@
#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h"
#endif
-#ifndef asm
-#define asm __asm
-#endif
-
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
@@ -67,174 +56,25 @@
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- ( defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) ) || defined(__WATCOMC__)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long tsc;
- __asm rdtsc
- __asm mov [tsc], eax
- return( tsc );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */
-
-/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__i386__) || ( \
- ( defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) ) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4 ) )
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long lo, hi;
- asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) );
- return( lo );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && __i386__ */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) )
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long lo, hi;
- asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) );
- return( lo | ( hi << 32 ) );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) )
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1;
-
- do
- {
- asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0) );
- asm volatile( "mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl ) );
- asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1) );
- }
- while( tbu0 != tbu1 );
-
- return( tbl );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__)
-
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
-#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead
-#else
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long tick;
- asm volatile( "rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick) );
- return( tick );
-}
-#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long tick;
- asm volatile( ".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00" );
- asm volatile( "mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick) );
- return( tick );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long cc;
- asm volatile( "rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc) );
- return( cc & 0xFFFFFFFF );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
- defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- unsigned long itc;
- asm volatile( "mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc) );
- return( itc );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
- __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \
- !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- LARGE_INTEGER offset;
-
- QueryPerformanceCounter( &offset );
-
- return( (unsigned long)( offset.QuadPart ) );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
-
-#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK)
-
-#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
-
-static int hardclock_init = 0;
-static struct timeval tv_init;
-
-unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
-{
- struct timeval tv_cur;
-
- if( hardclock_init == 0 )
- {
- gettimeofday( &tv_init, NULL );
- hardclock_init = 1;
- }
-
- gettimeofday( &tv_cur, NULL );
- return( ( tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec ) * 1000000
- + ( tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec ) );
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */
-
-volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
-
+/**
+ * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds
+ *
+ * \warning May change without notice
+ *
+ * \param val points to a timer structure
+ * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer.
+ *
+ * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When
+ * restarting, this is always 0.
+ *
+ * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1.
+ *
+ * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not
+ * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence
+ * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 =
+ * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately
+ * the delay since the first reset.
+ */
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset )
@@ -258,33 +98,6 @@
}
}
-/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */
-static DWORD alarmMs;
-
-static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext )
-{
- (void) TimerContext;
- Sleep( alarmMs );
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
- /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return
- * That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */
-}
-
-void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
-{
- if( seconds == 0 )
- {
- /* No need to create a thread for this simple case.
- * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
- return;
- }
-
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
- alarmMs = seconds * 1000;
- (void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL );
-}
-
#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset )
@@ -307,25 +120,6 @@
}
}
-static void sighandler( int signum )
-{
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
- signal( signum, sighandler );
-}
-
-void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
-{
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
- signal( SIGALRM, sighandler );
- alarm( seconds );
- if( seconds == 0 )
- {
- /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the
- handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
- }
-}
-
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
/*
@@ -365,178 +159,4 @@
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-
-/*
- * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds.
- * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock.
- */
-static void busy_msleep( unsigned long msec )
-{
- struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires;
- unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */
- volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */
-
- (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 );
-
- while( mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ) < msec )
- i++;
-
- j = i;
- (void) j;
-}
-
-static void print_timers( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *hires,
- mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx )
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT)
- mbedtls_printf( " elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=?? status(ctx)=%d\n",
- mbedtls_timing_get_timer( hires, 0 ),
- mbedtls_timing_get_delay( ctx ) );
-#else
- mbedtls_printf( " elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n",
- mbedtls_timing_get_timer( hires, 0 ),
- mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 0 ),
- mbedtls_timing_get_delay( ctx ) );
-#endif
-}
-
-#define FAIL do \
- { \
- if( verbose != 0 ) \
- { \
- mbedtls_printf( "failed at line %d\n", __LINE__ ); \
- mbedtls_printf( " cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \
- cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \
- (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b ); \
- print_timers( &hires, &ctx ); \
- } \
- return( 1 ); \
- } while( 0 )
-
-/*
- * Checkup routine
- *
- * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough
- * yet! False positives may happen.
- */
-int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose )
-{
- unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0;
- unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0;
- int hardfail = 0;
- struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires;
- uint32_t a = 0, b = 0;
- mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx;
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n" );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): " );
-
- {
- secs = 1;
-
- (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 );
-
- mbedtls_set_alarm( (int) secs );
- while( !mbedtls_timing_alarmed )
- ;
-
- millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 );
-
- /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay
- * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */
- if( millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300 )
- FAIL;
- }
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): " );
-
- {
- a = 800;
- b = 400;
- mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, a, a + b ); /* T = 0 */
-
- busy_msleep( a - a / 4 ); /* T = a - a/4 */
- if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 0 )
- FAIL;
-
- busy_msleep( a / 4 + b / 4 ); /* T = a + b/4 */
- if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 1 )
- FAIL;
-
- busy_msleep( b ); /* T = a + b + b/4 */
- if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 2 )
- FAIL;
- }
-
- mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, 0, 0 );
- busy_msleep( 200 );
- if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != -1 )
- FAIL;
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): " );
-
- /*
- * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping.
- * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second;
- * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row.
- */
-
-hard_test:
- if( hardfail > 1 )
- {
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "failed (ignored)\n" );
-
- goto hard_test_done;
- }
-
- /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */
- millisecs = 1;
- cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock();
- busy_msleep( millisecs );
- cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles;
- ratio = cycles / millisecs;
-
- /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */
- for( millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++ )
- {
- cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock();
- busy_msleep( millisecs );
- cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles;
-
- /* Allow variation up to 20% */
- if( cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 ||
- cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5 )
- {
- hardfail++;
- goto hard_test;
- }
- }
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-
-hard_test_done:
-
- if( verbose != 0 )
- mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
-
- return( 0 );
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
-
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
diff --git a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt
index 62a54c7..85bcd5f 100644
--- a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
install(TARGETS ${executables}
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
index 4f35d76..c7fcd35 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
endif()
set(executables_no_common_c
- fuzz_privkey
fuzz_pubkey
fuzz_x509crl
fuzz_x509crt
@@ -16,6 +15,7 @@
)
set(executables_with_common_c
+ fuzz_privkey
fuzz_client
fuzz_dtlsclient
fuzz_dtlsserver
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c
index 34ff63e..9a6e894 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c
+++ b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_dtlsserver.c
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0)
return 1;
if (mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ) != 0)
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0,
+ dummy_random, NULL ) != 0)
return 1;
#endif
dummy_init();
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c
index f76afd1..b9a160e 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c
+++ b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_privkey.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "common.h"
//4 Kb should be enough for every bug ;-)
#define MAX_LEN 0x1000
@@ -19,7 +20,8 @@
}
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, Data, Size, NULL, 0 );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, Data, Size, NULL, 0,
+ dummy_random, NULL );
if (ret == 0) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c
index 5480e3e..c35b425 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c
+++ b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_server.c
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@
options = Data[Size - 1];
if (initialized == 0) {
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg );
+ mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy );
+
+ if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 )
+ return 1;
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert );
mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey );
@@ -66,7 +73,8 @@
mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len ) != 0)
return 1;
if (mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 ) != 0)
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0,
+ dummy_random, &ctr_drbg ) != 0)
return 1;
#endif
@@ -80,17 +88,10 @@
}
mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
- mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg );
- mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( &ticket_ctx );
#endif
- if( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, dummy_entropy, &entropy,
- (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) != 0 )
- goto exit;
-
-
if( mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
diff --git a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt
index b2f2a1f..729474c 100644
--- a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
install(TARGETS ${executables}
diff --git a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt
index 9c6fe7d..3ad5643 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedtls)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedtls_target})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
set(executables_mbedcrypto
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedcrypto)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
install(TARGETS ${executables_mbedtls} ${executables_mbedcrypto}
diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app.c b/programs/pkey/key_app.c
index 7bd93c7..2145e07 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/key_app.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/key_app.c
@@ -35,10 +35,13 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && \
- defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include <string.h>
#endif
@@ -63,11 +66,13 @@
"\n"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and/or "
- "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n");
+ "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or "
+ "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n");
mbedtls_exit( 0 );
}
#else
@@ -92,12 +97,19 @@
int i;
char *p, *q;
+ const char *pers = "pkey/key_app";
+ mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
+
mbedtls_pk_context pk;
mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP;
/*
* Set to sane values
*/
+ mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy );
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg );
+
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) );
@@ -181,7 +193,16 @@
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the private key ..." );
fflush( stdout );
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, opt.filename, opt.password );
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers,
+ strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, opt.filename, opt.password,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
@@ -299,6 +320,9 @@
}
#endif
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg );
+ mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy );
+
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &P ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP );
@@ -311,4 +335,5 @@
mbedtls_exit( exit_code );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO &&
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
index 4b65262..89c67ed 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c
@@ -34,11 +34,16 @@
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#endif
@@ -88,10 +93,14 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
int main( void )
{
- mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n" );
+ mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or "
+ "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or "
+ "MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n" );
mbedtls_exit( 0 );
}
#else
@@ -201,12 +210,19 @@
int i;
char *p, *q;
+ const char *pers = "pkey/key_app";
+ mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
+
mbedtls_pk_context key;
mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, DP, DQ, QP;
/*
* Set to sane values
*/
+ mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy );
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg );
+
mbedtls_pk_init( &key );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
@@ -292,8 +308,16 @@
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the private key ..." );
fflush( stdout );
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, NULL );
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers,
+ strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, NULL,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_strerror( ret, (char *) buf, sizeof(buf) );
@@ -429,6 +453,9 @@
mbedtls_pk_free( &key );
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg );
+ mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy );
+
#if defined(_WIN32)
mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" );
fflush( stdout ); getchar();
@@ -436,4 +463,5 @@
mbedtls_exit( exit_code );
}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO &&
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c b/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c
index 810d6fb..e01f5d5 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_decrypt.c
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] );
fflush( stdout );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "",
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%04x\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
index 451e3de..422fa25 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/pk_sign.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] );
fflush( stdout );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "",
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not parse '%s'\n", argv[1] );
goto exit;
diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c
index 26056dd..bbbe0a9 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign_pss.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Reading private key from '%s'", argv[1] );
fflush( stdout );
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "" ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pk, argv[1], "",
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Could not read key from '%s'\n", argv[1] );
mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile returned %d\n\n", ret );
diff --git a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt
index f32dc31..e5edf7b 100644
--- a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
install(TARGETS ${executables}
diff --git a/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c b/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
index de47aab..d2cc450 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
+
#include "test/certs.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
@@ -138,7 +139,23 @@
#endif
/*
- * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key
+ * 1. Seed the RNG
+ */
+ printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
+ fflush( stdout );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers,
+ strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ printf( " ok\n" );
+
+ /*
+ * 2. Load the certificates and private RSA key
*/
printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
@@ -165,7 +182,7 @@
}
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret );
@@ -175,7 +192,7 @@
printf( " ok\n" );
/*
- * 2. Setup the "listening" UDP socket
+ * 3. Setup the "listening" UDP socket
*/
printf( " . Bind on udp/*/4433 ..." );
fflush( stdout );
@@ -189,22 +206,6 @@
printf( " ok\n" );
/*
- * 3. Seed the RNG
- */
- printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
- fflush( stdout );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
- (const unsigned char *) pers,
- strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
- {
- printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret );
- goto exit;
- }
-
- printf( " ok\n" );
-
- /*
* 4. Setup stuff
*/
printf( " . Setting up the DTLS data..." );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
index 98a3048..322cef8 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
@@ -1548,12 +1548,12 @@
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
if( strlen( opt.key_file ) )
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, opt.key_pwd );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, opt.key_pwd, rng_get, &rng );
else
#endif
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key,
- mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0, rng_get, &rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n",
@@ -2163,6 +2163,8 @@
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
+ mbedtls_ssl_session exported_session;
+
/* free any previously saved data */
if( session_data != NULL )
{
@@ -2171,27 +2173,40 @@
session_data = NULL;
}
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &exported_session );
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session( &ssl, &exported_session );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_printf(
+ "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_session() returned -%#02x\n",
+ (unsigned) -ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
/* get size of the buffer needed */
- mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ),
- NULL, 0, &session_data_len );
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &exported_session, NULL, 0, &session_data_len );
session_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_data_len );
if( session_data == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! alloc %u bytes for session data\n",
(unsigned) session_data_len );
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &exported_session );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
/* actually save session data */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ),
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( &exported_session,
session_data, session_data_len,
&session_data_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_saved returned -0x%04x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &exported_session );
goto exit;
}
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &exported_session );
}
else
{
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
index 5732108..7419010 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_fork_server.c
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@
}
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
index 09bbc3d..f223977 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_mail_client.c
@@ -556,12 +556,17 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
if( strlen( opt.key_file ) )
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, "" );
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, "",
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
+ }
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+ {
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key,
- mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
+ }
#else
{
mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C not defined.");
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c
index 93eab46..a083e4b 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c
@@ -360,7 +360,23 @@
mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy );
/*
- * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key
+ * 1a. Seed the random number generator
+ */
+ mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers,
+ strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_printf( " failed: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n",
+ ( unsigned int ) -ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
+
+ /*
+ * 1b. Load the certificates and private RSA key
*/
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
@@ -388,7 +404,8 @@
mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey );
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret );
@@ -398,22 +415,6 @@
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
- * 1b. Seed the random number generator
- */
- mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
- (const unsigned char *) pers,
- strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_printf( " failed: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n",
- ( unsigned int ) -ret );
- goto exit;
- }
-
- mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
-
- /*
* 1c. Prepare SSL configuration
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL data...." );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
index 42196ff..aaccb58 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server.c
@@ -125,7 +125,23 @@
#endif
/*
- * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key
+ * 1. Seed the RNG
+ */
+ mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
+ fflush( stdout );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
+ (const unsigned char *) pers,
+ strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret );
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
+
+ /*
+ * 2. Load the certificates and private RSA key
*/
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Loading the server cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
@@ -152,7 +168,8 @@
}
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned %d\n\n", ret );
@@ -162,7 +179,7 @@
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
- * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket
+ * 3. Setup the listening TCP socket
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on https://localhost:4433/ ..." );
fflush( stdout );
@@ -176,22 +193,6 @@
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
- * 3. Seed the RNG
- */
- mbedtls_printf( " . Seeding the random number generator..." );
- fflush( stdout );
-
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy,
- (const unsigned char *) pers,
- strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned %d\n", ret );
- goto exit;
- }
-
- mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
-
- /*
* 4. Setup stuff
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL data...." );
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index de4eb6d..51125bd 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -525,6 +525,8 @@
(out_be)[(i) + 7] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 0 ) & 0xFF ); \
}
+/* This is global so it can be easily accessed by callback functions */
+rng_context_t rng;
/*
* global options
@@ -727,7 +729,7 @@
mbedtls_pk_init( new->key );
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( new->cert, crt_file ) != 0 ||
- mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( new->key, key_file, "" ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( new->key, key_file, "", rng_get, &rng ) != 0 )
goto error;
if( strcmp( ca_file, "-" ) != 0 )
@@ -1045,7 +1047,8 @@
for( slot = 0; slot < config_data->slots_used; slot++ )
{
if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &cert->pk,
- config_data->slots[slot].pk ) == 0 )
+ config_data->slots[slot].pk,
+ rng_get, &rng ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( slot == config_data->slots_used )
@@ -1271,7 +1274,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
- rng_context_t rng;
mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
@@ -2257,7 +2259,7 @@
{
key_cert_init++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file,
- opt.key_pwd ) ) != 0 )
+ opt.key_pwd, rng_get, &rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
@@ -2283,7 +2285,7 @@
{
key_cert_init2++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey2, opt.key_file2,
- opt.key_pwd2 ) ) != 0 )
+ opt.key_pwd2, rng_get, &rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(2) returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
@@ -2314,7 +2316,8 @@
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len, NULL, 0,
+ rng_get, &rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
@@ -2333,7 +2336,8 @@
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey2,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len, NULL, 0,
+ rng_get, &rng ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! pk_parse_key2 returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c
index 3eceec0..6a53647 100644
--- a/programs/test/benchmark.c
+++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c
@@ -74,10 +74,41 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#ifndef asm
+#define asm __asm
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <process.h>
+
+struct _hr_time
+{
+ LARGE_INTEGER start;
+};
+
+#else
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+struct _hr_time
+{
+ struct timeval start;
+};
+
+#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h"
#endif
+static void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds );
+
/*
* For heap usage estimates, we need an estimate of the overhead per allocated
* block. ptmalloc2/3 (used in gnu libc for instance) uses 2 size_t per block,
@@ -209,6 +240,226 @@
} \
} while( 0 )
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ ( defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) ) || defined(__WATCOMC__)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long tsc;
+ __asm rdtsc
+ __asm mov [tsc], eax
+ return( tsc );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */
+
+/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__i386__) || ( \
+ ( defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) ) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4 ) )
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long lo, hi;
+ asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) );
+ return( lo );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && __i386__ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) )
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long lo, hi;
+ asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) );
+ return( lo | ( hi << 32 ) );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) )
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1;
+
+ do
+ {
+ asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0) );
+ asm volatile( "mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl ) );
+ asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1) );
+ }
+ while( tbu0 != tbu1 );
+
+ return( tbl );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__)
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead
+#else
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long tick;
+ asm volatile( "rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick) );
+ return( tick );
+}
+#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long tick;
+ asm volatile( ".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00" );
+ asm volatile( "mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick) );
+ return( tick );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long cc;
+ asm volatile( "rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc) );
+ return( cc & 0xFFFFFFFF );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ unsigned long itc;
+ asm volatile( "mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc) );
+ return( itc );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM &&
+ __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \
+ !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ LARGE_INTEGER offset;
+
+ QueryPerformanceCounter( &offset );
+
+ return( (unsigned long)( offset.QuadPart ) );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK)
+
+#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK
+
+static int hardclock_init = 0;
+static struct timeval tv_init;
+
+static unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void )
+{
+ struct timeval tv_cur;
+
+ if( hardclock_init == 0 )
+ {
+ gettimeofday( &tv_init, NULL );
+ hardclock_init = 1;
+ }
+
+ gettimeofday( &tv_cur, NULL );
+ return( ( tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec ) * 1000000
+ + ( tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec ) );
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */
+
+volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+
+/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */
+static DWORD alarmMs;
+
+static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext )
+{
+ (void) TimerContext;
+ Sleep( alarmMs );
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
+ /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return
+ * That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
+{
+ if( seconds == 0 )
+ {
+ /* No need to create a thread for this simple case.
+ * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
+ alarmMs = seconds * 1000;
+ (void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL );
+}
+
+#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+static void sighandler( int signum )
+{
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
+ signal( signum, sighandler );
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
+{
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
+ signal( SIGALRM, sighandler );
+ alarm( seconds );
+ if( seconds == 0 )
+ {
+ /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the
+ handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */
+ mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
{
size_t use_len;
diff --git a/programs/test/selftest.c b/programs/test/selftest.c
index 8829d54..87d8a13 100644
--- a/programs/test/selftest.c
+++ b/programs/test/selftest.c
@@ -330,10 +330,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
{"pkcs5", mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test},
#endif
-/* Slower test after the faster ones */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
- {"timing", mbedtls_timing_self_test},
-#endif
/* Heap test comes last */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
{"memory_buffer_alloc", mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free_and_self_test},
diff --git a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt
index 2a11212..7fc58cb 100644
--- a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
install(TARGETS ${executables}
diff --git a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
index cf57ca4..a04fa8b 100644
--- a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
foreach(exe IN LISTS executables)
add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $<TARGET_OBJECTS:mbedtls_test>)
target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs})
+ target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include)
endforeach()
target_link_libraries(cert_app ${mbedtls_target})
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_req.c b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
index 18d2e8c..0ea2607 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_req.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
@@ -346,7 +346,8 @@
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the private key ..." );
fflush( stdout );
- ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, opt.password );
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, opt.filename, opt.password,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
index c22f5a4..f1e5c6b 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_write.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@
fflush( stdout );
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &loaded_subject_key, opt.subject_key,
- opt.subject_pwd );
+ opt.subject_pwd, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 );
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@
fflush( stdout );
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &loaded_issuer_key, opt.issuer_key,
- opt.issuer_pwd );
+ opt.issuer_pwd, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, 1024 );
@@ -606,7 +606,8 @@
//
if( strlen( opt.issuer_crt ) )
{
- if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &issuer_crt.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk), issuer_key ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &issuer_crt.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk), issuer_key,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! issuer_key does not match "
"issuer certificate\n\n" );
diff --git a/scripts/config.py b/scripts/config.py
index e27f322..cbce1eb 100755
--- a/scripts/config.py
+++ b/scripts/config.py
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@
'MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING', # conflicts with deprecated options
'MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED', # influences the use of ECDH in TLS
'MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK', # removes internal ECP implementation
- 'MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG', # removes a feature
'MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE', # incompatible with USE_PSA_CRYPTO
'MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256', # interacts with CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY
'MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2', # hardware dependency
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 88f8b35..1a3bede 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1000,7 +1000,6 @@
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
- scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
# When MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled and there is no DRBG,
# the SSL test programs don't have an RNG and can't work. Explicitly
# make them use the PSA RNG with -DMBEDTLS_TEST_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_RNG.
@@ -1023,7 +1022,6 @@
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
- scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O2" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
msg "test: PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG minus *_DRBG, PSA crypto - main suites"
@@ -1048,43 +1046,6 @@
if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f 'Default\|opaque'
}
-component_test_ecp_no_internal_rng () {
- msg "build: Default plus ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG minus DRBG modules"
- scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires a DRBG
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto
-
- CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
- make
-
- msg "test: ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG module"
- make test
-
- # no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
-}
-
-component_test_ecp_restartable_no_internal_rng () {
- msg "build: Default plus ECP_RESTARTABLE and ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG"
- scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
- scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires CTR_DRBG
- scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto
-
- CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
- make
-
- msg "test: ECP_RESTARTABLE and ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG module"
- make test
-
- # no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
-}
-
component_test_everest () {
msg "build: Everest ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
index 62e634a..5286bc7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function
@@ -150,7 +150,10 @@
&sec_srv_len,
&mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
&rnd_info ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ), &sec_cli_len, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ),
+ &sec_cli_len,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len == sec_cli_len );
TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len != 0 );
@@ -206,7 +209,10 @@
&sec_srv_len,
&mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
&rnd_info ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ), &sec_cli_len, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, sec_cli, sizeof( sec_cli ),
+ &sec_cli_len,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len == sec_cli_len );
TEST_ASSERT( sec_srv_len != 0 );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
index 6e8459d..94030d8 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@
&mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
&rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB,
- NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &zB ) == 0 );
@@ -106,11 +107,13 @@
mbedtls_ecp_point qA, qB;
mbedtls_mpi dA, dB, zA, zB, check;
mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info_A, rnd_info_B;
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qA ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &qB );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &zA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &zB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &check );
+ memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 );
@@ -169,9 +172,13 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &qB.Y, &check ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &check, 16, z_str ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &check ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &zB, &check ) == 0 );
exit:
@@ -215,7 +222,8 @@
&mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
&rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &res_len, res_buf, 1000,
- NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( len == res_len );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, res_buf, len ) == 0 );
@@ -235,12 +243,14 @@
const unsigned char *vbuf;
size_t len;
mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info_A, rnd_info_B;
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
int cnt_restart;
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv );
mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli );
+ memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
rnd_info_A.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
rnd_info_A.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
@@ -315,7 +325,8 @@
cnt_restart = 0;
do {
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ),
- NULL, NULL );
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -332,7 +343,8 @@
cnt_restart = 0;
do {
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, sizeof( buf ),
- NULL, NULL );
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
+ &rnd_info );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restart );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index f2b6376..d795fe2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -124,12 +124,14 @@
mbedtls_mpi dA, xA, yA, dB, xZ, yZ;
int cnt_restarts;
int ret;
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx );
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &dA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &dB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &xZ ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &yZ );
+ memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, id ) == 0 );
@@ -147,7 +149,8 @@
cnt_restarts = 0;
do {
ECP_PT_RESET( &R );
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G, NULL, NULL, &ctx );
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, &ctx );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restarts );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -162,7 +165,8 @@
cnt_restarts = 0;
do {
ECP_PT_RESET( &R );
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P, NULL, NULL, &ctx );
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, &ctx );
} while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && ++cnt_restarts );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
@@ -176,7 +180,8 @@
* This test only makes sense when we actually restart */
if( min_restarts > 0 )
{
- ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P, NULL, NULL, &ctx );
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( &grp, &R, &dB, &P,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, &ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS );
}
@@ -294,12 +299,14 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xA ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yA ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xB ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yB ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
@@ -351,11 +358,13 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xS ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xB ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xS ) == 0 );
@@ -767,9 +776,11 @@
int ret )
{
mbedtls_ecp_keypair pub, prv;
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &pub );
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &prv );
+ memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
if( id_pub != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &pub.grp, id_pub ) == 0 );
@@ -780,7 +791,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( &prv.Q, 16, Qx, Qy ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &prv.d, 16, d ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( &pub, &prv ) == ret );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( &pub, &prv,
+ &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret );
exit:
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &pub );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
index 573c9d4..5ccb072 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@
/* unsupported functions: check_pair, debug */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk2,
mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pk, &pk2 )
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pk, &pk2,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &pk, &dbg )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
@@ -278,7 +279,8 @@
MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, NULL, 0, NULL, 1 ) ==
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, NULL, 0, NULL, 1,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) ==
MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, NULL, 0 ) ==
@@ -295,8 +297,8 @@
/* For the write tests to be effective, we need a valid key pair. */
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk,
- key_data->x, key_data->len,
- NULL, 0 ) == 0 );
+ key_data->x, key_data->len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, NULL, 0 ) ==
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
@@ -348,9 +350,13 @@
mbedtls_pk_init( &alt );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( &pub, pub_file ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &prv, prv_file, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &prv, prv_file, NULL,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &prv ) == ret );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &prv,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &prv ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
@@ -358,7 +364,9 @@
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( &alt, mbedtls_pk_rsa( prv ),
mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func, mbedtls_rsa_sign_func,
mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func ) == 0 );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &alt ) == ret );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pub, &alt,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL )
+ == ret );
}
#endif
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
index 4650d33..4c7f3d2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
if( strcmp( pwd, "NULL" ) == 0 )
pwd = NULL;
- res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, pwd );
+ res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, pwd,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( res == result );
@@ -96,7 +97,8 @@
mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx );
- res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, password );
+ res = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &ctx, key_file, password,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( res == result );
@@ -120,7 +122,8 @@
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, buf->x, buf->len, NULL, 0 ) == result );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, buf->x, buf->len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == result );
exit:
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function
index 2bad4ed..d1e029a 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function
@@ -63,7 +63,8 @@
memset( check_buf, 0, sizeof( check_buf ) );
mbedtls_pk_init( &key );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( &key, buf, sizeof( buf ));
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index b4df5ec..5ed485e 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -2761,6 +2761,22 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, omitted salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, info first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, info after salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, omitted salt, info first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, good case, key output
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -2795,6 +2811,10 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing secret, key output
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+
PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, RAW_DATA key as salt
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"412073616c74":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -2817,14 +2837,94 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"4120696e666f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, salt after secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, missing info
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate salt step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (direct, direct)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (direct, key)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (key, direct)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0a0a0a0a":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate secret step (key, key)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0a0a0a0a":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate info step (non-consecutive)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, duplicate info step (consecutive)
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, reject label step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256, reject seed step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, good case
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_SUCCESS
+PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, good case
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label and secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, missing label and secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, no inputs
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, no inputs
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, key first
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+PSA key derivation: ECDH with TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, key first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, label first
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
@@ -2877,20 +2977,36 @@
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, omitted salt
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, info first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, key output
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:PSA_SUCCESS
-PSA key derivation: HKDF invalid state (double generate + read past capacity)
+PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, salt after secret
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation: ECDH on P256 with HKDF-SHA256, missing info
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA key derivation over capacity: HKDF
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-test_derive_invalid_key_derivation_state:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+derive_over_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
-PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF invalid state (double generate + read past capacity)
+PSA key derivation over capacity: TLS 1.2 PRF
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
-test_derive_invalid_key_derivation_state:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+derive_over_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
-PSA key derivation: invalid state (call read/get_capacity after init and abort)
-test_derive_invalid_key_derivation_tests:
+PSA key derivation: actions without setup
+derive_actions_without_setup:
PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, RFC5869 #1, output 42+0
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 5b5531f..7a774e5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
#include "test/psa_crypto_helpers.h"
#include "test/psa_exercise_key.h"
+/* If this comes up, it's a bug in the test code or in the test data. */
+#define UNUSED 0xdeadbeef
+
/** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */
static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U;
@@ -4027,7 +4030,12 @@
for( i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH( steps ); i++ )
{
- if( key_types[i] != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE )
+ mbedtls_test_set_step( i );
+ if( steps[i] == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Skip this step */
+ }
+ else if( key_types[i] != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE )
{
psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_types[i] );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes,
@@ -4086,7 +4094,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void test_derive_invalid_key_derivation_state( int alg_arg )
+void derive_over_capacity( int alg_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
@@ -4137,7 +4145,7 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void test_derive_invalid_key_derivation_tests( )
+void derive_actions_without_setup( )
{
uint8_t output_buffer[16];
size_t buffer_size = 16;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function
index d612548..9f72b47 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function
@@ -85,12 +85,6 @@
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
- if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_TIMING )
- mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL,
- MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK,
- MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK );
-#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_HARDWARE )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index c555d74..d4aad60 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -800,7 +800,8 @@
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ),
(const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
}
else
@@ -812,7 +813,8 @@
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ),
(const unsigned char*) mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der,
- mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
}
}
@@ -827,7 +829,8 @@
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ),
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der,
- mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
}
else
@@ -839,7 +842,8 @@
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &( cert->pkey ),
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der,
- mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0 );
+ mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len, NULL, 0,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
}
}
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
index 2522da1..de89239 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.data
@@ -1,15 +1,6 @@
-Timing: hardclock
-timing_hardclock:
-
Timing: get timer
timing_get_timer:
-Timing: set alarm with no delay
-timing_set_alarm:0:
-
-Timing: set alarm with 1s delay
-timing_set_alarm:1:
-
Timing: delay 0ms
timing_delay:0:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function
index 74dc823..3483d85 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_timing.function
@@ -17,15 +17,6 @@
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void timing_hardclock( )
-{
- (void) mbedtls_timing_hardclock();
- /* This goto is added to avoid warnings from the generated code. */
- goto exit;
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE */
void timing_get_timer( )
{
struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time time;
@@ -37,23 +28,6 @@
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void timing_set_alarm( int seconds )
-{
- if( seconds == 0 )
- {
- mbedtls_set_alarm( seconds );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 1 );
- }
- else
- {
- mbedtls_set_alarm( seconds );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 0 ||
- mbedtls_timing_alarmed == 1 );
- }
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE */
void timing_delay( int fin_ms )
{
mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
index 44f846f..c9b7cf9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@
memset( &rnd_info, 0x2a, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
mbedtls_pk_init( &key );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( &req );
mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( &req, md_type );
@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@
TEST_ASSERT( md_alg_psa != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
mbedtls_pk_init( &key );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL ) == 0 );
+ TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &key, key_file, NULL,
+ mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &key, &key_id, md_alg_psa ) == 0 );
mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( &req );
@@ -225,10 +227,10 @@
mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( &crt );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &subject_key, subject_key_file,
- subject_pwd ) == 0 );
+ subject_pwd, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &issuer_key, issuer_key_file,
- issuer_pwd ) == 0 );
+ issuer_pwd, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/* For RSA PK contexts, create a copy as an alternative RSA context. */