diff --git a/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt b/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
index eefc151..e0e5ade 100644
--- a/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/3rdparty/everest/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 # everest is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
 # so does not inherit the compile definitions.
 if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
-    target_compile_definitions(everest
+    target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
         PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
 endif()
 if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
-    target_compile_definitions(everest
+    target_compile_definitions(${everest_target}
         PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
 endif()
 
diff --git a/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt b/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
index 41be3c4..2ef0d48 100644
--- a/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/3rdparty/p256-m/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@
 # p256m is not directly linked against any mbedtls targets
 # so does not inherit the compile definitions.
 if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
-    target_compile_definitions(p256m
+    target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
         PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
 endif()
 if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
-    target_compile_definitions(p256m
+    target_compile_definitions(${p256m_target}
         PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
 endif()
 
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db8ed07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-3rdparty-target-prefix.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix accidental omission of MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX in 3rdparty modules
+     in CMake.
diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety.md b/docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety.md
index b0ca808..06bdcc0 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety.md
@@ -67,16 +67,32 @@
 
 We may want to go directly to a more sophisticated approach because when a system works with a global lock, it's typically hard to get rid of it to get more fine-grained concurrency.
 
+### Key destruction short-term requirements
+
+#### Summary of guarantees in the short term
+
+When `psa_destroy_key` returns:
+
+1. The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
+2. The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
+3. The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system. In particular, it is only acceptable for `psa_destroy_key` to block, when waiting for another thread to complete a PSA Cryptography API call that it had already started.
+
+When `psa_destroy_key` is called on a key that is in use, guarantee 2. might be violated. (This is consistent with the requirement [“Correctness out of the box”](#correctness-out-of-the-box), as destroying a key while it's in use is undefined behavior.)
+
 ### Key destruction long-term requirements
 
-As noted above in [“Correctness out of the box”](#correctness-out-of-the-box), when a key is destroyed, it's ok if `psa_destroy_key` allows copies of the key to live until ongoing operations using the key return. In the long term, it would be good to guarantee that `psa_destroy_key` wipes all copies of the key material.
+The [PSA Crypto API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/management.html#key-destruction) mandates that implementations make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered. In the long term, it would be good to guarantee that `psa_destroy_key` wipes all copies of the key material.
 
-#### Summary of guarantees when `psa_destroy_key` returns
+#### Summary of guarantees in the long term
 
-* The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
-* The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
-* The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system.
-* In the long term, no copy of the key material exists. Rationale: this is a security requirement. We do not have this requirement yet, but we need to document this as a security weakness, and we would like to become compliant.
+When `psa_destroy_key` returns:
+
+1. The key identifier doesn't exist. Rationale: this is a functional requirement for persistent keys: the caller can immediately create a new key with the same identifier.
+2. The resources from the key have been freed. Rationale: in a low-resource condition, this may be necessary for the caller to re-create a similar key, which should be possible.
+3. The call must not block indefinitely, and in particular cannot wait for an event that is triggered by application code such as calling an abort function. Rationale: this may not strictly be a functional requirement, but it is an expectation `psa_destroy_key` does not block forever due to another thread, which could potentially be another process on a multi-process system. In particular, it is only acceptable for `psa_destroy_key` to block, when waiting for another thread to complete a PSA Cryptography API call that it had already started.
+4. No copy of the key material exists. Rationale: this is a security requirement. We do not have this requirement yet, but we need to document this as a security weakness, and we would like to satisfy this security requirement in the future.
+
+As opposed to the short term requirements, all the above guarantees hold even if `psa_destroy_key` is called on a key that is in use.
 
 ## Resources to protect
 
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
index 6ec59f1..495cd5a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
 #endif
 
-/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in MbedTLS version 3.5, while
+/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while
  * in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long
  * as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward
  * compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 0a7b26c..9bbe598 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -34,23 +34,15 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 #include "mbedtls/error.h"
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
-#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64)
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \
+    (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64)   && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \
+    (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)   && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)))
 #error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
-#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
 #error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index 4a3fef7..436876a 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -208,9 +208,11 @@
         PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
     size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
 
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
     if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
+#endif
 
     if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
diff --git a/library/pkcs12.c b/library/pkcs12.c
index dd3a240..4db2a4b 100644
--- a/library/pkcs12.c
+++ b/library/pkcs12.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@
     unsigned char iv[16];
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
     mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx;
+    size_t iv_len = 0;
     size_t finish_olen = 0;
     unsigned int padlen = 0;
 
@@ -196,9 +197,10 @@
         }
     }
 
+    iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info);
     if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen,
                                         key, keylen,
-                                        iv, mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info))) != 0) {
+                                        iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
         return ret;
     }
 
@@ -208,9 +210,8 @@
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    if ((ret =
-             mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
-                                   (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
+                                     (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
 
@@ -233,22 +234,8 @@
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
 
-    if ((ret =
-             mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_ctx, iv,
-                                   mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info))) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(&cipher_ctx)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&cipher_ctx, data, len,
-                                     output, output_len)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(&cipher_ctx, output + (*output_len), &finish_olen)) != 0) {
+    ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen);
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
     }
 
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
index 7a904d9..db00cbd 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
@@ -304,10 +304,10 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
     /*
-     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
+     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different
      * handling of output sequencing.
      *
-     * The MbedTLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
+     * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data
      * at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
      * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be
      * retrieved in sequence.
@@ -423,17 +423,17 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
     /*
-     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and MbedTLS JPAKE API have a different
+     * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different
      * handling of input sequencing.
      *
-     * The MbedTLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
+     * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data
      * at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires
      * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be
      * given in sequence.
      *
      * In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data
      * is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the
-     * MbedTLS JPAKE API on the last step.
+     * Mbed TLS JPAKE API on the last step.
      *
      * This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step.
      */
diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
index 736b142..2368489 100644
--- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg;
     size_t key_bits;
 
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(info->cipher,
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher,
                                        info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16,
                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits);
 
@@ -1969,10 +1969,10 @@
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
             return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(
-                mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(info->mac));
+                mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac));
 
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
-            return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(info->mac));
+            return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac));
 
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
         case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index fc3fb85..d3a7ddb 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -2427,7 +2427,8 @@
     psa_algorithm_t alg;
     psa_key_type_t type;
     size_t size;
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(suite->cipher, 0, &alg, &type, &size);
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher,
+                                       0, &alg, &type, &size);
     if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
         base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode(alg);
     }
@@ -6406,7 +6407,7 @@
         mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk;
         psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
             PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
-        mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+        mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion"));
 
@@ -8208,7 +8209,7 @@
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher,
+    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher,
                                             transform->taglen,
                                             &alg,
                                             &key_type,
@@ -8227,7 +8228,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     if (mac_alg == 0) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type for %u not found",
                                   (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac));
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index d018bee..c6fa3b3 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
     ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite);
 
     if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
-        return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     }
 
     return PSA_ALG_NONE;
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
+    if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
         != hash_alg) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
             1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk."));
@@ -2858,7 +2858,7 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg);
     if (hash_length == -1 ||
         (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 7072677..3c8d448 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@
      */
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
         ssl,
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
         transcript, sizeof(transcript),
         &transcript_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg,
                                                    mbedtls_pk_context *key)
 {
-    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key);
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = (mbedtls_pk_type_t) mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key);
     size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(key);
 
     switch (pk_type) {
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@
     }
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
-        ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
+        ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
         handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash), &handshake_hash_len);
     if (ret != 0) {
         return ret;
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR"));
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, ciphersuite_info->mac,
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac,
                                                hash_transcript + 4,
                                                PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE,
                                                &hash_len);
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index afd84a9..6905d92 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
 
     /*
      * Compute MasterSecret
@@ -797,10 +797,10 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets =
         &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets;
 
-    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
     psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data"));
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
     /*
      * Setup psa keys and alg
      */
-    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher,
+    if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher,
                                             transform->taglen,
                                             &alg,
                                             &key_type,
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@
         taglen = 16;
     }
 
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
         return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
@@ -1168,9 +1168,9 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
     if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) {
         ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len);
@@ -1370,9 +1370,9 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
-        handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+        (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL;
     size_t shared_secret_len = 0;
 
@@ -1617,9 +1617,9 @@
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
-    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
 
     /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility
@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
         2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret"));
 
-    md_type = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
+    md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac;
 
     ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type,
                                                transcript, sizeof(transcript),
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 89bba04..b8201f0 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -408,7 +408,8 @@
         /* MAC of selected ciphersuite MUST be same with PSK binder if exist.
          * Otherwise, client should reject.
          */
-        if (psk_hash_alg == mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac)) {
+        if (psk_hash_alg ==
+            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac)) {
             *selected_ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
             *selected_ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
             return 0;
@@ -614,7 +615,7 @@
 
         ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(
             ssl, binder, binder_len, psk_type,
-            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac));
+            mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac));
         if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_OFFERED_PSK_MATCH) {
             /* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we
              * fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2
@@ -2793,7 +2794,7 @@
 
     ciphersuite_info =
         (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
-    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac);
     hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg);
     if (hash_length == -1 ||
         (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) {
@@ -3015,7 +3016,7 @@
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("tls13 server state: %s(%d)",
-                              mbedtls_ssl_states_str(ssl->state),
+                              mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state),
                               ssl->state));
 
     switch (ssl->state) {
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
index 855b091..9744c58 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_context_info.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  MbedTLS SSL context deserializer from base64 code
+ *  Mbed TLS SSL context deserializer from base64 code
  *
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
diff --git a/scripts/code_size_compare.py b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
index 53d859e..e764e9d 100755
--- a/scripts/code_size_compare.py
+++ b/scripts/code_size_compare.py
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@
         '-c', '--config', type=str, default=SupportedConfig.DEFAULT.value,
         choices=list(map(lambda s: s.value, SupportedConfig)),
         help='Specify configuration type for code size comparison. '
-             '(Default is the current MbedTLS configuration.)')
+             '(Default is the current Mbed TLS configuration.)')
     group_optional.add_argument(
         '--markdown', action='store_true', dest='markdown',
         help='Show comparision of code size in a markdown table. '
diff --git a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
index de16284..8670bbd 100644
--- a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
+++ b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
@@ -527,6 +527,7 @@
     size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg,
     const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length )
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
                                                     attributes->core.lifetime );
 
@@ -548,18 +549,21 @@
 
             /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
             operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
-            return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
-                                                 attributes,
-                                                 key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
-                                                 alg, hash, hash_length ) );
+            status = mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                  attributes,
+                                                  key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                                                  alg, hash, hash_length );
             break;
 
             /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
 
         default:
             /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
-            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+            break;
     }
+
+    return( status );
 }
 
 static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(
@@ -615,6 +619,7 @@
     const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
     const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
                                                     attributes->core.lifetime );
 
@@ -636,20 +641,22 @@
 
             /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */
             operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
-            return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
-                                                   attributes,
-                                                   key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
-                                                   alg, hash, hash_length,
-                                                   signature, signature_length
-                                                   ) );
+            status = mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx,
+                                                    attributes,
+                                                    key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                                                    alg, hash, hash_length,
+                                                    signature, signature_length );
             break;
 
             /* Add cases for opaque driver here */
 
         default:
             /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
-            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+            break;
     }
+
+    return( status );
 }
 
 static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 02bf510..19f927d 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -1164,21 +1164,6 @@
     tests/context-info.sh
 }
 
-component_test_full_cmake_gcc_asan_new_bignum_test_hooks () {
-    msg "build: full config, cmake, gcc, ASan"
-    scripts/config.py full
-    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS
-    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT
-    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
-    make
-
-    msg "test: main suites (inc. selftests) (full config, ASan build)"
-    make test
-
-    msg "test: selftest (ASan build)" # ~ 10s
-    programs/test/selftest
-}
-
 component_test_psa_crypto_key_id_encodes_owner () {
     msg "build: full config + PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER, cmake, gcc, ASan"
     scripts/config.py full
diff --git a/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py b/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
index 623fd23..5128dc7 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/audit-validity-dates.py
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@
 
     @staticmethod
     def find_test_dir():
-        """Get the relative path for the MbedTLS test directory."""
+        """Get the relative path for the Mbed TLS test directory."""
         return os.path.relpath(build_tree.guess_mbedtls_root() + '/tests')
 
 
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
index f812929..86a7c09 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_names.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@
             "This script confirms that the naming of all symbols and identifiers "
             "in Mbed TLS are consistent with the house style and are also "
             "self-consistent.\n\n"
-            "Expected to be run from the MbedTLS root directory.")
+            "Expected to be run from the Mbed TLS root directory.")
     )
     parser.add_argument(
         "-v", "--verbose",
diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
index f80a0be..9cd220f 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 }
 
 # We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches
-# that allow it to build with MbedTLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite.
+# that allow it to build with Mbed TLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite.
 # These fixes allow the tests numbered 216, 248 and 249 to complete successfully.
 #
 # Once all the fixes are upstreamed, this fork should be replaced with an upstream commit/tag.
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
index c4e4d77..64c9991 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs12.data
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PKCS#12 derive key : MD5: Zero length password and hash
+PKCS#12 derive key: MD5: Zero length password and hash
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
 pkcs12_derive_key:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:48:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:"":USE_GIVEN_INPUT:3:"6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b6afdcbd5ebf943272134f1c3de2dc11b":0