diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c15e335..7cbbb3f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,12 +2,45 @@
 
 = mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-xx
 
+Security
+   * Added fix for CVE-2015-xxxxx to prevent heap corruption due to buffer
+     overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks.
+   * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() is called more than
+     once in the same handhake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used.
+     Found and patch provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced
+     remotely.
+   * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by
+     mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes.
+     Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely.
+   * Fix potential buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_read_string().
+     Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not exploitable remotely in the context
+     of TLS, but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a
+     string of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would
+     require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes.
+   * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer()
+     on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you
+     accept PEM data from an untrusted source.
+   * Fix possible heap buffer overflow in base64_encoded() when the input
+     buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms. Found by Guido Vranken,
+     Intelworks. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS.
+   * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_conf_psk() is called repeatedly on
+     the same mbedtls_ssl_config object and memory allocation fails. Found by
+     Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely.
+   * Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client
+     authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely
+     unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth.
+     Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks.
+
 Bugfix
    * Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc. Found and patch provided by
      zhasha (#278).
    * Fix macroization of 'inline' keyword when building as C++. (#279)
 
 Changes
+   * Added checking of hostname length in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to ensure
+     domain names are compliant with RFC 1035.
    * Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp)
      (#291)
 
@@ -19,7 +52,8 @@
      https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/
    * Fix possible client-side NULL pointer dereference (read) when the client
      tries to continue the handshake after it failed (a misuse of the API).
-     (Found and patch provided by Fabian Foerg, Gotham Digital Science using afl-fuzz.)
+     (Found and patch provided by Fabian Foerg, Gotham Digital Science using
+     afl-fuzz.)
 
 Bugfix
    * Fix warning when using a 64bit platform. (found by embedthis) (#275)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/include/mbedtls/base64.h
index 28a3a4c..352c652 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/base64.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/base64.h
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
  * \return         0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
  *                 *olen is always updated to reflect the amount
  *                 of data that has (or would have) been written.
+ *                 If that length cannot be represented, then no data is
+ *                 written to the buffer and *olen is set to the maximum
+ *                 length representable as a size_t.
  *
  * \note           Call this function with dlen = 0 to obtain the
  *                 required buffer size in *olen
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index d23b1be..a017ec0 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM            0   /*!< TLS      */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM          1   /*!< DTLS     */
 
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN           255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */
+
 /* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c
  * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE           0   /*!< don't use this extension   */
diff --git a/library/base64.c b/library/base64.c
index 16c254d..3432e5f 100644
--- a/library/base64.c
+++ b/library/base64.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
      49,  50,  51, 127, 127, 127, 127, 127
 };
 
+#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX   ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */
+
 /*
  * Encode a buffer into base64 format
  */
@@ -85,15 +87,16 @@
         return( 0 );
     }
 
-    n = ( slen << 3 ) / 6;
+    n = slen / 3 + ( slen % 3 != 0 );
 
-    switch( ( slen << 3 ) - ( n * 6 ) )
+    if( n > ( BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX - 1 ) / 4 )
     {
-        case  2: n += 3; break;
-        case  4: n += 2; break;
-        default: break;
+        *olen = BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX;
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     }
 
+    n *= 4;
+
     if( dlen < n + 1 )
     {
         *olen = n + 1;
@@ -184,7 +187,10 @@
     }
 
     if( n == 0 )
+    {
+        *olen = 0;
         return( 0 );
+    }
 
     n = ( ( n * 6 ) + 7 ) >> 3;
     n -= j;
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 15cbf73..628a6ee 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -58,11 +58,14 @@
 #define biL    (ciL << 3)               /* bits  in limb  */
 #define biH    (ciL << 2)               /* half limb size */
 
+#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX  ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */
+
 /*
  * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs
+ * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows
  */
-#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i)  (((i) + biL - 1) / biL)
-#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) (((i) + ciL - 1) / ciL)
+#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i)  ( (i) / biL + ( (i) % biL != 0 ) )
+#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / ciL + ( (i) % ciL != 0 ) )
 
 /*
  * Initialize one MPI
@@ -409,6 +412,9 @@
 
     if( radix == 16 )
     {
+        if( slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
         n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( slen << 2 );
 
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n ) );
diff --git a/library/pem.c b/library/pem.c
index 541e870..1ee3966 100644
--- a/library/pem.c
+++ b/library/pem.c
@@ -316,6 +316,9 @@
           ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */
     }
 
+    if( s1 == s2 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA );
+
     ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1 );
 
     if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER )
diff --git a/library/pkcs12.c b/library/pkcs12.c
index f1777eb..7023b9d 100644
--- a/library/pkcs12.c
+++ b/library/pkcs12.c
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+#define PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN 128
+
 static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
                                      const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
                                      unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
@@ -94,7 +96,10 @@
     int ret, iterations;
     mbedtls_asn1_buf salt;
     size_t i;
-    unsigned char unipwd[258];
+    unsigned char unipwd[PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN * 2 + 2];
+
+    if( pwdlen > PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     memset( &salt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) );
     memset( &unipwd, 0, sizeof(unipwd) );
@@ -125,6 +130,8 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+#undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN
+
 int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
                              const unsigned char *pwd,  size_t pwdlen,
                              const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index c82e2e7..32eae0f 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
                                     size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     size_t hostname_len;
 
     *olen = 0;
@@ -72,6 +73,12 @@
 
     hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * struct {
      *     NameType name_type;
@@ -115,6 +122,7 @@
                                          size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
@@ -123,6 +131,12 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Secure renegotiation
      */
@@ -149,6 +163,7 @@
                                                 size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
     const int *md;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
@@ -162,9 +177,27 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
 
+    for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+        sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+        sig_alg_len += 2;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2)
      */
+    sig_alg_len = 0;
+
     for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
@@ -214,6 +247,7 @@
                                                      size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6;
     size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
     const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
@@ -235,6 +269,25 @@
     for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ )
     {
 #endif
+        elliptic_curve_len += 2;
+    }
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
+    elliptic_curve_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+    for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; grp_id++ )
+    {
+        info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
+#else
+    for( info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; info++ )
+    {
+#endif
 
         elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id >> 8;
         elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = info->tls_id & 0xFF;
@@ -260,12 +313,18 @@
                                                    size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
-    ((void) ssl);
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -285,14 +344,22 @@
                                                size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -310,15 +377,23 @@
                                           unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -334,17 +409,25 @@
                                        unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
         ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac "
                         "extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -360,17 +443,25 @@
                                        unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
 
     if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
         ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret "
                         "extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -386,16 +477,24 @@
                                           unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
 
+    *olen = 0;
+
     if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
 
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -404,8 +503,7 @@
 
     *olen = 4;
 
-    if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL ||
-        ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len == 0 )
+    if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
     {
         return;
     }
@@ -423,16 +521,28 @@
                                 unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
 {
     unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
+    size_t alpnlen = 0;
     const char **cur;
 
+    *olen = 0;
+
     if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
     {
-        *olen = 0;
         return;
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
 
+    for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
+        alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1;
+
+    if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
+        return;
+    }
+
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
     *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN      ) & 0xFF );
 
@@ -799,13 +909,13 @@
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+    ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
-    ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
     ext_len += olen;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index b48a609..1bda53c 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -2351,6 +2351,7 @@
     size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
     size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
     unsigned char *buf, *p;
+    const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
     const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
     int authmode;
 
@@ -2471,10 +2472,14 @@
     total_dn_size = 0;
     while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 )
     {
-        if( p - buf > 4096 )
-            break;
-
         dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
+
+        if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
+            break;
+        }
+
         *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 );
         *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size      );
         memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 9213290..9142be8 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -5707,7 +5707,9 @@
         ( conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ) ) == NULL )
     {
         mbedtls_free( conf->psk );
+        mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
         conf->psk = NULL;
+        conf->psk_identity = NULL;
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
     }
 
@@ -5730,7 +5732,7 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
-        mbedtls_free( ssl->conf->psk );
+        mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
 
     if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
     {
@@ -5833,6 +5835,9 @@
     if( hostname_len + 1 == 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
+    if( hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
     ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc( 1, hostname_len + 1 );
 
     if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
index 3b66da1..da99ffa 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data
@@ -1,23 +1,41 @@
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #1
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"":"":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #1 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"":"":0:0
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #2
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"f":"Zg==":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #2 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"f":"Zg==":5:0
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #3
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"fo":"Zm8=":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #2 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"f":"Zg==":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #4
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"foo":"Zm9v":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #3 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"fo":"Zm8=":5:0
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #5
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"foob":"Zm9vYg==":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #3 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"fo":"Zm8=":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #6
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"fooba":"Zm9vYmE=":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #4 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foo":"Zm9v":5:0
 
-Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #7
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":1000:0
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #4 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foo":"Zm9v":4:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #5 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foob":"Zm9vYg==":9:0
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #5 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foob":"Zm9vYg==":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #6 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"fooba":"Zm9vYmE=":9:0
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #6 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"fooba":"Zm9vYmE=":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #7 buffer just right
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":9:0
+
+Test case mbedtls_base64_encode #7 buffer too small
+mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
 
 Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #1
 mbedtls_base64_decode:"":"":0
@@ -40,12 +58,6 @@
 Test case mbedtls_base64_decode #7
 mbedtls_base64_decode:"Zm9vYmFy":"foobar":0
 
-Base64 encode (buffer size just right)
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"Zm9vYmFy":9:0
-
-Base64 encode (buffer size too small)
-mbedtls_base64_encode:"foobar":"":8:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-
 Base64 decode (Illegal character)
 mbedtls_base64_decode:"zm#=":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER