diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c
index dc75904..a0667e1 100644
--- a/library/error.c
+++ b/library/error.c
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@
         case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND):
             return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" );
         case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME):
-            return( "SSL - Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname. This is usually insecure.  In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its certificate, the client normally checks three things: - the certificate chain must be valid; - the chain must start from a trusted CA; - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.  Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.  The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios, such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks, or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are accredited by the root CA.  You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with \\p NULL as the server name.  This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:  - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default). - Certificate authentication is enabled. - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()" );
+            return( "SSL - Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname. This is usually insecure.  In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its certificate, the client normally checks three things: - the certificate chain must be valid; - the chain must start from a trusted CA; - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.  Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.  The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios, such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks, or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are accredited by the root CA.  You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with \\p NULL as the server name.  This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:  - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default). - Certificate authentication is enabled. - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). - The configuration option #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME is not enabled" );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)