Update ChangeLog to make "fix" explicit
Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1404d36..639c8e9 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -106,11 +106,11 @@
* Fix potential heap buffer overread and overwrite in DTLS if
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID is enabled and
MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
- * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory
- accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
- enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim
- performing a single private-key operation if the window size used for the
- exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU,
+ * Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough information
+ about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking
+ a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the
+ victim performing a single private-key operation if the window size used
+ for the exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU,
Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. See "Cache Side-channel Attacks
and Defenses of the Sliding Window Algorithm in TEEs" - Design, Automation
and Test in Europe 2023.
@@ -969,16 +969,17 @@
signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a
large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in
Mbed TLS 2.20.0.
- * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory
- accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure
- enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim
- performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by
+ * Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough information
+ about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking
+ a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the
+ victim performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by
Zili KOU, Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG.
- * An adversary with access to precise enough timing information (typically, a
- co-located process) could recover a Curve25519 or Curve448 static ECDH key
- after inputting a chosen public key and observing the victim performing the
- corresponding private-key operation. Found and reported by Leila Batina,
- Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels Samwel and Peter Schwabe.
+ * Fix an issue where an adversary with access to precise enough timing
+ information (typically, a co-located process) could recover a Curve25519
+ or Curve448 static ECDH key after inputting a chosen public key and
+ observing the victim performing the corresponding private-key operation.
+ Found and reported by Leila Batina, Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels
+ Samwel and Peter Schwabe.
Bugfix
* Fix premature fopen() call in mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file which may