Add safety for keys larger than we currently support.
Prevent buffer overflow with keys whos grp.nbits is greater than
PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 39da74b..36d48ad 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -3577,6 +3577,11 @@
required_hash_length = (hash_length < operation->coordinate_bytes ?
hash_length : operation->coordinate_bytes);
+ if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */
+ return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length);
operation->hash_length = required_hash_length;
@@ -3812,6 +3817,11 @@
required_hash_length = (hash_length < coordinate_bytes ? hash_length :
coordinate_bytes);
+ if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */
+ return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length);
operation->hash_length = required_hash_length;