diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 5cded9c..9aa87ec 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -39,112 +39,117 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
 
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#    include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#    include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
+#    include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#    include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#    include "mbedtls/error.h"
 
-#include <string.h>
+#    include <string.h>
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-#endif
+#    if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#    endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
+#    if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && \
+        !defined(__NetBSD__)
+#        include <stdlib.h>
+#    endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#else
-#include <stdio.h>
-#define mbedtls_printf printf
-#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
-#define mbedtls_free   free
-#endif
+#    if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#        include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#    else
+#        include <stdio.h>
+#        define mbedtls_printf printf
+#        define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+#        define mbedtls_free   free
+#    endif
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+#    if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
 
 /* Parameter validation macros */
-#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond )                                       \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
-#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond )                                           \
-    MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
+#        define RSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
+            MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
+#        define RSA_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
 /* constant-time buffer comparison */
-static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
+static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t n)
 {
     size_t i;
-    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a;
-    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b;
+    const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *)a;
+    const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *)b;
     unsigned char diff = 0;
 
-    for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
         diff |= A[i] ^ B[i];
 
-    return diff ;
+    return diff;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
-int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                        const mbedtls_mpi *N,
-                        const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                        const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E )
+int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                       const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                       const mbedtls_mpi *P,
+                       const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+                       const mbedtls_mpi *D,
+                       const mbedtls_mpi *E)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
-    if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q, Q ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) ||
+        (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) ||
+        (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->Q, Q)) != 0) ||
+        (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->D, D)) != 0) ||
+        (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->E, E)) != 0)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
     }
 
-    if( N != NULL )
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+    if (N != NULL)
+        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
-int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                            unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len,
-                            unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len,
-                            unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len,
-                            unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len,
-                            unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                           unsigned char const *N,
+                           size_t N_len,
+                           unsigned char const *P,
+                           size_t P_len,
+                           unsigned char const *Q,
+                           size_t Q_len,
+                           unsigned char const *D,
+                           size_t D_len,
+                           unsigned char const *E,
+                           size_t E_len)
 {
     int ret = 0;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
-    if( N != NULL )
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) );
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+    if (N != NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
+        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
     }
 
-    if( P != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) );
+    if (P != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
 
-    if( Q != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) );
+    if (Q != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
 
-    if( D != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) );
+    if (D != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
 
-    if( E != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) );
+    if (E != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
 
 cleanup:
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -152,19 +157,19 @@
  * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error.
  * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters.
  */
-static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv,
-                              int blinding_needed )
+static int rsa_check_context(mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx,
+                             int is_priv,
+                             int blinding_needed)
 {
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether
      * P,Q need to be present or not. */
-    ((void) blinding_needed);
-#endif
+    ((void)blinding_needed);
+#        endif
 
-    if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) ||
-        ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N) ||
+        ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
     /*
@@ -173,95 +178,87 @@
 
     /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for
      * RSA public key operations. */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0  )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) <= 0 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->N, 0) == 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only
      * used for private key operations and if CRT
      * is used. */
-    if( is_priv &&
-        ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 ||
-          mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ||
-          mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ||
-          mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0  ) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (is_priv && (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
+                    mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->P, 0) == 0 ||
+                    mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0 ||
+                    mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->Q, 0) == 0)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
     /*
      * 2. Exponents must be positive
      */
 
     /* Always need E for public key operations */
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) <= 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) <= 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ
      * as (unblinded) exponents. */
-    if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) <= 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-#else
-    if( is_priv &&
-        ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) <= 0 ||
-          mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) <= 0  ) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) <= 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+#        else
+    if (is_priv && (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) <= 0 ||
+                    mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) <= 0)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
-    /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
-     * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
-     * done as part of 1. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if( is_priv && blinding_needed &&
-        ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 ||
-          mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
+         * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
+         * done as part of 1. */
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    if (is_priv && blinding_needed &&
+        (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
+         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
-#endif
+#        endif
 
     /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied,
      * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if( is_priv &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) <= 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) <= 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
-#endif
+#        endif
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
-int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
-#endif
+#        endif
     int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
-    have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 );
+    have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0);
+    have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0);
+    have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0);
+    have_D = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0);
+    have_E = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0);
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 );
-    have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 );
-#endif
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    have_DP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) != 0);
+    have_DQ = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) != 0);
+    have_QP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) != 0);
+#        endif
 
     /*
      * Check whether provided parameters are enough
@@ -273,52 +270,43 @@
      *
      */
 
-    n_missing  =              have_P &&  have_Q &&  have_D && have_E;
-    pq_missing =   have_N && !have_P && !have_Q &&  have_D && have_E;
-    d_missing  =              have_P &&  have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
-    is_pub     =   have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
+    n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E;
+    pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E;
+    d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
+    is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
 
     /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */
     is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing;
 
-    if( !is_priv && !is_pub )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (!is_priv && !is_pub)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     /*
      * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided.
      */
 
-    if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q )
-    {
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P,
-                                         &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 )
-        {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    if (!have_N && have_P && have_Q) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
         }
 
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
     }
 
     /*
      * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters.
      */
 
-    if( pq_missing )
-    {
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D,
-                                         &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
-        if( ret != 0 )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    if (pq_missing) {
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(&ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, &ctx->P,
+                                        &ctx->Q);
+        if (ret != 0)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
 
-    }
-    else if( d_missing )
-    {
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P,
-                                                         &ctx->Q,
-                                                         &ctx->E,
-                                                         &ctx->D ) ) != 0 )
-        {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    } else if (d_missing) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(
+                 &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->E, &ctx->D)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
         }
     }
 
@@ -327,108 +315,108 @@
      *         to our current RSA implementation.
      */
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) )
-    {
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P,  &ctx->Q,  &ctx->D,
-                                      &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP );
-        if( ret != 0 )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    if (is_priv && !(have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP)) {
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+                                     &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP);
+        if (ret != 0)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
     }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
     /*
      * Step 3: Basic sanity checks
      */
 
-    return rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ;
+    return rsa_check_context(ctx, is_priv, 1);
 }
 
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                            unsigned char *N, size_t N_len,
-                            unsigned char *P, size_t P_len,
-                            unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len,
-                            unsigned char *D, size_t D_len,
-                            unsigned char *E, size_t E_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                           unsigned char *N,
+                           size_t N_len,
+                           unsigned char *P,
+                           size_t P_len,
+                           unsigned char *Q,
+                           size_t Q_len,
+                           unsigned char *D,
+                           size_t D_len,
+                           unsigned char *E,
+                           size_t E_len)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int is_priv;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
     /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+    is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
 
-    if( !is_priv )
-    {
+    if (!is_priv) {
         /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
          * something must be wrong. */
-        if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-
+        if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    if( N != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) );
+    if (N != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
 
-    if( P != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) );
+    if (P != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
 
-    if( Q != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) );
+    if (Q != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
 
-    if( D != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) );
+    if (D != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
 
-    if( E != NULL )
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) );
+    if (E != NULL)
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
 
 cleanup:
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
 
-int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                        mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                        mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                       mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                       mbedtls_mpi *P,
+                       mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+                       mbedtls_mpi *D,
+                       mbedtls_mpi *E)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     int is_priv;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
     /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+    is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
 
-    if( !is_priv )
-    {
+    if (!is_priv) {
         /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
          * something must be wrong. */
-        if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-
+        if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
     /* Export all requested core parameters. */
 
-    if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) )
-    {
-        return ret ;
+    if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(N, &ctx->N)) != 0) ||
+        (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(P, &ctx->P)) != 0) ||
+        (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &ctx->Q)) != 0) ||
+        (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(D, &ctx->D)) != 0) ||
+        (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(E, &ctx->E)) != 0)) {
+        return ret;
     }
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -437,111 +425,107 @@
  * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt
  * can be used in this case.
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                            mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP )
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                           mbedtls_mpi *DP,
+                           mbedtls_mpi *DQ,
+                           mbedtls_mpi *QP)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     int is_priv;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
     /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0;
+    is_priv = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
+              mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
 
-    if( !is_priv )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (!is_priv)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */
-    if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) ||
-        ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+    if ((DP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DP, &ctx->DP)) != 0) ||
+        (DQ != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DQ, &ctx->DQ)) != 0) ||
+        (QP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(QP, &ctx->QP)) != 0)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
     }
-#else
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                        DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ;
+#        else
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, DP, DQ, QP)) !=
+        0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
     }
-#endif
+#        endif
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Initialize an RSA context
  */
-void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL);
 
-    memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) );
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
 
     ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15;
     ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been
      * initialized and will need to be freed. */
     ctx->ver = 1;
-    mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
-#endif
+    mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+#        endif
 }
 
 /*
  * Set padding for an existing RSA context
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
-                             mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id )
+int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                            int padding,
+                            mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id)
 {
-    switch( padding )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+    switch (padding) {
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
             break;
-#endif
+#        endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
             break;
-#endif
+#        endif
         default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 
-    if( ( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) &&
-        ( hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) )
-    {
+    if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) {
         const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
 
-        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id );
-        if( md_info == NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id);
+        if (md_info == NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 
     ctx->padding = padding;
     ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus
  */
 
-size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
-    return ctx->len ;
+    return ctx->len;
 }
 
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
 
 /*
  * Generate an RSA keypair
@@ -549,31 +533,31 @@
  * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of
  * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072.
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                 void *p_rng,
-                 unsigned int nbits, int exponent )
+int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                        void *p_rng,
+                        unsigned int nbits,
+                        int exponent)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
     int prime_quality = 0;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
 
     /*
      * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
      * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
      * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
      */
-    if( nbits > 1024 )
+    if (nbits > 1024)
         prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &H );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &G );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &L );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
 
-    if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 )
-    {
+    if (nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -584,215 +568,210 @@
      * 2.  GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
      * 3.  E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 )
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent));
 
-    do
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
-                                                prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+    do {
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
+                                              prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
 
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
-                                                prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
+                                              prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
 
-        /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
-        if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &H ) <= ( ( nbits >= 200 ) ? ( ( nbits >> 1 ) - 99 ) : 0 ) )
+        /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4
+         * §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
+        if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&H) <=
+            ((nbits >= 200) ? ((nbits >> 1) - 99) : 0))
             continue;
 
-        /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */
-        if( H.s < 0 )
-            mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
+        /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P
+         * > Q */
+        if (H.s < 0)
+            mbedtls_mpi_swap(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
 
         /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
 
-        /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H  ) );
-        if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 )
+        /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a))
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
+        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0)
             continue;
 
-        /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &L, NULL, &H, &G ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L ) );
+        /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4
+         * §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L, NULL, &H, &G));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L));
 
-        if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->D ) <= ( ( nbits + 1 ) / 2 ) ) // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a))
+        if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->D) <= ((nbits + 1) / 2)) // (FIPS 186-4
+                                                              // §B.3.1
+                                                              // criterion 3(a))
             continue;
 
         break;
-    }
-    while( 1 );
+    } while (1);
 
     /* Restore P,Q */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P,  &ctx->P, 1 ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q,  &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
 
-    ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N );
+    ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#            if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /*
      * DP = D mod (P - 1)
      * DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
      * QP = Q^-1 mod P
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                             &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+                                           &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP));
+#            endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
     /* Double-check */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(ctx));
 
 cleanup:
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &H );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &G );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &L );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-    {
-        mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx );
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
 
-        if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 )
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret );
-        return ret ;
+        if ((-ret & ~0x7f) == 0)
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret);
+        return ret;
     }
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
 
 /*
  * Check a public RSA key
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
-    if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E )     < 2  ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->E, 0) == 0 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E) < 2 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 ||
-        rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 ||
+        rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q,
-                                     &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->E,
+                                    NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                       &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    else if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, &ctx->DP,
+                                      &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
-#endif
+#        endif
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
-                                const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv )
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
+                               const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL);
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub )  != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 ||
+        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ;
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 ||
+        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
     }
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA public key operation
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                const unsigned char *input,
-                unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                       const unsigned char *input,
+                       unsigned char *output)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t olen;
     mbedtls_mpi T;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
 
-    if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */))
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &T );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
-        return ret ;
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0)
+        return ret;
+#        endif
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
-    {
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     olen = ctx->len;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
 
 cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ;
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+#        endif
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ;
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -801,63 +780,64 @@
  *  DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
  *  Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
  */
-static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                void *p_rng)
 {
     int ret, count = 0;
     mbedtls_mpi R;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
 
-    if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
-    {
+    if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) {
         /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
 
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
     do {
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-        {
+        if (count++ > 10) {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
             goto cleanup;
         }
 
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+            mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
 
         /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+            mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R));
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
 
         /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R
          * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know
          * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them.
          * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */
-        ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N );
-        if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+        ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N);
+        if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)
             goto cleanup;
 
-    } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
+    } while (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE);
 
     /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
 
     /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N
      * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+        mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -879,16 +859,16 @@
  * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a
  * single trace.
  */
-#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
+#        define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA private key operation
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                 void *p_rng,
-                 const unsigned char *input,
-                 unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                        void *p_rng,
+                        const unsigned char *input,
+                        unsigned char *output)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t olen;
@@ -900,7 +880,7 @@
      * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */
     mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R;
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */
     mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ;
 
@@ -912,121 +892,118 @@
      * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
     mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP;
     mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ;
-#else
+#        else
     /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */
     mbedtls_mpi D_blind;
 
     /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded
      * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
     mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
     /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double
      * checked result; should be the same in the end. */
     mbedtls_mpi I, C;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input  != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
 
-    if( f_rng == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (f_rng == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
-                                1 /* blinding on        */ ) != 0 )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
+                          1 /* blinding on        */) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
-        return ret ;
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0)
+        return ret;
+#        endif
 
     /* MPI Initialization */
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &T );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind );
-#else
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind );
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind);
+#        else
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind);
+#        endif
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ );
-#endif
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ);
+#        endif
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &I );
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &C );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&I);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&C);
 
     /* End of MPI initialization */
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
-    {
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T));
 
     /*
      * Blinding
      * T = T * Vi mod N
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
 
     /*
      * Exponent blinding
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
     /*
      * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                     f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+        mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D));
 
     D = &D_blind;
-#else
+#        else
     /*
      * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                     f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind,
-                &ctx->DP ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+        mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, &ctx->DP));
 
     DP = &DP_blind;
 
     /*
      * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                     f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
-                &ctx->DQ ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+        mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, f_rng, p_rng));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, &ctx->DQ));
 
     DQ = &DQ_blind;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-#else
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+#        else
     /*
      * Faster decryption using the CRT
      *
@@ -1034,75 +1011,74 @@
      * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q
      */
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ));
 
     /*
      * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &TP, &TQ ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->QP ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &TP, &ctx->P ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &TP, &TQ));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->QP));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &TP, &ctx->P));
 
     /*
      * T = TQ + T * Q
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->Q ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->Q));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP));
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
     /*
      * Unblind
      * T = T * Vf mod N
      */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
 
     /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E,
-                                          &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 )
-    {
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
+    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     olen = ctx->len;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
 
 cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ;
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+#        endif
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind );
-#else
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind );
-#endif
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind);
+#        else
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind);
+#        endif
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &T );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TQ );
-#endif
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ);
+#        endif
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &C );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &I );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&C);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&I);
 
-    if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ;
+    if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret);
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 /**
  * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
  *
@@ -1112,8 +1088,11 @@
  * \param slen      length of the source buffer
  * \param md_ctx    message digest context to use
  */
-static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
-                      size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx )
+static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst,
+                    size_t dlen,
+                    unsigned char *src,
+                    size_t slen,
+                    mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx)
 {
     unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char counter[4];
@@ -1122,30 +1101,29 @@
     size_t i, use_len;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE );
-    memset( counter, 0, 4 );
+    memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE);
+    memset(counter, 0, 4);
 
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info );
+    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info);
 
     /* Generate and apply dbMask */
     p = dst;
 
-    while( dlen > 0 )
-    {
+    while (dlen > 0) {
         use_len = hlen;
-        if( dlen < hlen )
+        if (dlen < hlen)
             use_len = dlen;
 
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx)) != 0)
             goto exit;
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 )
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0)
             goto exit;
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 )
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0)
             goto exit;
-        if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 )
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask)) != 0)
             goto exit;
 
-        for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i )
+        for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i)
             *p++ ^= mask[i];
 
         counter[3]++;
@@ -1154,23 +1132,24 @@
     }
 
 exit:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) );
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask));
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                            int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                            void *p_rng,
-                            const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
-                            size_t ilen,
-                            const unsigned char *input,
-                            unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                   int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                   void *p_rng,
+                                   const unsigned char *label,
+                                   size_t label_len,
+                                   size_t ilen,
+                                   const unsigned char *input,
+                                   unsigned char *output)
 {
     size_t olen;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -1179,169 +1158,171 @@
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL);
 
-    if( f_rng == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (f_rng == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
-    if( md_info == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+    if (md_info == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     olen = ctx->len;
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
 
     /* first comparison checks for overflow */
-    if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    memset( output, 0, olen );
+    memset(output, 0, olen);
 
     *p++ = 0;
 
     /* Generate a random octet string seed */
-    if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+    if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
 
     p += hlen;
 
     /* Construct DB */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 )
-        return ret ;
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p)) != 0)
+        return ret;
     p += hlen;
     p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
     *p++ = 1;
-    if( ilen != 0 )
-        memcpy( p, input, ilen );
+    if (ilen != 0)
+        memcpy(p, input, ilen);
 
-    mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
     /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
-    if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
-                          &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
+                        &md_ctx)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
     /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */
-    if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
-                          &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
+                        &md_ctx)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
 exit:
-    mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return ret ;
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return ret;
 
-    return mbedtls_rsa_public(  ctx, output, output ) ;
+    return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                 void *p_rng, size_t ilen,
-                                 const unsigned char *input,
-                                 unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                        int (*f_rng)(void *,
+                                                     unsigned char *,
+                                                     size_t),
+                                        void *p_rng,
+                                        size_t ilen,
+                                        const unsigned char *input,
+                                        unsigned char *output)
 {
     size_t nb_pad, olen;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char *p = output;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
 
     olen = ctx->len;
 
     /* first comparison checks for overflow */
-    if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
 
     *p++ = 0;
 
-    if( f_rng == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (f_rng == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
 
-    while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
-    {
+    while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
         int rng_dl = 100;
 
         do {
-            ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
-        } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
+            ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1);
+        } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0);
 
         /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
-        if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+        if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
 
         p++;
     }
 
     *p++ = 0;
-    if( ilen != 0 )
-        memcpy( p, input, ilen );
+    if (ilen != 0)
+        memcpy(p, input, ilen);
 
-    return mbedtls_rsa_public(  ctx, output, output ) ;
+    return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
 /*
  * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                       int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                       void *p_rng,
-                       size_t ilen,
-                       const unsigned char *input,
-                       unsigned char *output )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                              int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                              void *p_rng,
+                              size_t ilen,
+                              const unsigned char *input,
+                              unsigned char *output)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL);
 
-    switch( ctx->padding )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+    switch (ctx->padding) {
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
-                                                        ilen, input, output );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, ilen,
+                                                       input, output);
+#        endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
-                                                   ilen, input, output );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
+                                                  ilen, input, output);
+#        endif
 
         default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                            int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                            void *p_rng,
-                            const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
-                            size_t *olen,
-                            const unsigned char *input,
-                            unsigned char *output,
-                            size_t output_max_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                   int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                   void *p_rng,
+                                   const unsigned char *label,
+                                   size_t label_len,
+                                   size_t *olen,
+                                   const unsigned char *input,
+                                   unsigned char *output,
+                                   size_t output_max_len)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
@@ -1352,66 +1333,64 @@
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
 
     /*
      * Parameters sanity checks
      */
-    if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     ilen = ctx->len;
 
-    if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf))
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
-    if( md_info == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+    if (md_info == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
 
     // checking for integer underflow
-    if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     /*
      * RSA operation
      */
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     /*
      * Unmask data and generate lHash
      */
-    mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
-    if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
-                          &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ||
-    /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
-        ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
-                          &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
+                        &md_ctx)) != 0 ||
+        /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
+        (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
+                        &md_ctx)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
 
     /* Generate lHash */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash)) != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     /*
@@ -1425,15 +1404,14 @@
     p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
 
     /* Check lHash */
-    for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ )
+    for (i = 0; i < hlen; i++)
         bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
 
     /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
      * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
     pad_len = 0;
     pad_done = 0;
-    for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ )
-    {
+    for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
         pad_done |= p[i];
         pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
     }
@@ -1447,49 +1425,47 @@
      * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
      * the different error conditions.
      */
-    if( bad != 0 )
-    {
+    if (bad != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len )
-    {
+    if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
-    if( *olen != 0 )
-        memcpy( output, p, *olen );
+    if (*olen != 0)
+        memcpy(output, p, *olen);
     ret = 0;
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) );
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(lhash, sizeof(lhash));
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
 /** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
  *
  * \param value     The value to analyze.
  * \return          Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
  */
-static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
+static unsigned all_or_nothing_int(unsigned value)
 {
     /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
      * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( push )
-#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
-#endif
-    return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
-#if defined(_MSC_VER)
-#pragma warning( pop )
-#endif
+#            if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#                pragma warning(push)
+#                pragma warning(disable : 4146)
+#            endif
+    return (-((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)));
+#            if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#                pragma warning(pop)
+#            endif
 }
 
 /** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches.
@@ -1502,10 +1478,10 @@
  * \return          \c 0 if `size <= max`.
  * \return          \c 1 if `size > max`.
  */
-static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
+static unsigned size_greater_than(size_t size, size_t max)
 {
     /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
-    return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
+    return ((max - size) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1));
 }
 
 /** Choose between two integer values, without branches.
@@ -1518,10 +1494,10 @@
  * \param if0       Value to use if \p cond is zero.
  * \return          \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
  */
-static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
+static unsigned if_int(unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0)
 {
-    unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
-    return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
+    unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int(cond);
+    return ((mask & if1) | (~mask & if0));
 }
 
 /** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
@@ -1540,40 +1516,38 @@
  * \param total     Total size of the buffer.
  * \param offset    Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
  */
-static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
-                              size_t total,
-                              size_t offset )
+static void mem_move_to_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)
 {
     volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
     size_t i, n;
-    if( total == 0 )
+    if (total == 0)
         return;
-    for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
-    {
-        unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
+    for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+        unsigned no_op = size_greater_than(total - offset, i);
         /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
          * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
          * zero out the last byte. */
-        for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
-        {
+        for (n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) {
             unsigned char current = buf[n];
-            unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
-            buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
+            unsigned char next = buf[n + 1];
+            buf[n] = if_int(no_op, current, next);
         }
-        buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
+        buf[total - 1] = if_int(no_op, buf[total - 1], 0);
     }
 }
 
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                 void *p_rng,
-                                 size_t *olen,
-                                 const unsigned char *input,
-                                 unsigned char *output,
-                                 size_t output_max_len )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                        int (*f_rng)(void *,
+                                                     unsigned char *,
+                                                     size_t),
+                                        void *p_rng,
+                                        size_t *olen,
+                                        const unsigned char *input,
+                                        unsigned char *output,
+                                        size_t output_max_len)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t ilen, i, plaintext_max_size;
@@ -1594,50 +1568,46 @@
     size_t plaintext_size = 0;
     unsigned output_too_large;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
 
     ilen = ctx->len;
-    plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ?
-                           ilen - 11 :
-                           output_max_len );
+    plaintext_max_size =
+        (output_max_len > ilen - 11 ? ilen - 11 : output_max_len);
 
-    if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf))
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
      * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
     bad |= buf[0];
 
-
     /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
-        * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
+     * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
     bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
 
     /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-        * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
-    for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
-    {
-        pad_done  |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+     * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
+    for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
+        pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
         pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
     }
 
-
     /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
-    bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
+    bad |= if_int(pad_done, 0, 1);
 
     /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
-    bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
+    bad |= size_greater_than(8, pad_count);
 
     /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
      * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
@@ -1646,23 +1616,21 @@
      * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
      * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
      * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
-    plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                             (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
+    plaintext_size = if_int(bad, (unsigned)plaintext_max_size,
+                            (unsigned)(ilen - pad_count - 3));
 
     /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
      * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
-    output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
-                                          plaintext_max_size );
+    output_too_large = size_greater_than(plaintext_size, plaintext_max_size);
 
     /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
      * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
      * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
      *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
      * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
-                  if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
-                          0 ) );
+    ret = -(int)if_int(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
+                       if_int(output_too_large,
+                              -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, 0));
 
     /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
      * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
@@ -1670,17 +1638,16 @@
      * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
      * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
      * through memory or cache access patterns. */
-    bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
-    for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
+    bad = all_or_nothing_int(bad | output_too_large);
+    for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++)
         buf[i] &= ~bad;
 
     /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
      * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
      * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
      * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
-    plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                             (unsigned) plaintext_size );
+    plaintext_size = if_int(output_too_large, (unsigned)plaintext_max_size,
+                            (unsigned)plaintext_size);
 
     /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
      * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
@@ -1688,9 +1655,8 @@
      * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
      * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
      * information. */
-    mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
-                      plaintext_max_size,
-                      plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
+    mem_move_to_left(buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size,
+                     plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
 
     /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
      * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
@@ -1699,8 +1665,8 @@
      * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
      * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
      * secrets. */
-    if( output_max_len != 0 )
-        memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+    if (output_max_len != 0)
+        memcpy(output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
 
     /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
      * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
@@ -1709,57 +1675,56 @@
     *olen = plaintext_size;
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                       int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                       void *p_rng,
-                       size_t *olen,
-                       const unsigned char *input,
-                       unsigned char *output,
-                       size_t output_max_len)
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                              int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                              void *p_rng,
+                              size_t *olen,
+                              const unsigned char *input,
+                              unsigned char *output,
+                              size_t output_max_len)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
 
-    switch( ctx->padding )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+    switch (ctx->padding) {
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
-                                                input, output, output_max_len );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(
+                ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len);
+#        endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
-                                           olen, input, output,
-                                           output_max_len );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
+                                                  olen, input, output,
+                                                  output_max_len);
+#        endif
 
         default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                         void *p_rng,
-                         mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                         unsigned int hashlen,
-                         const unsigned char *hash,
-                         int saltlen,
-                         unsigned char *sig )
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                               int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                               void *p_rng,
+                               mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                               unsigned int hashlen,
+                               const unsigned char *hash,
+                               int saltlen,
+                               unsigned char *sig)
 {
     size_t olen;
     unsigned char *p = sig;
@@ -1769,152 +1734,146 @@
     size_t msb;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
 
-    if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    if( f_rng == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (f_rng == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     olen = ctx->len;
 
-    if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
-    {
+    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
         /* Gather length of hash to sign */
-        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
-        if( md_info == NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+        if (md_info == NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-        if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
-    if( md_info == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id);
+    if (md_info == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
 
-    if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY)
-    {
-       /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
-        * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
-        * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
-        * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
-        * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
-        * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
-        * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
+    if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) {
+        /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
+         * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
+         * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
+         * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
+         * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at
+         * most the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC
+         * 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
         min_slen = hlen - 2;
-        if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-        else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 )
+        if (olen < hlen + min_slen + 2)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        else if (olen >= hlen + hlen + 2)
             slen = hlen;
         else
             slen = olen - hlen - 2;
-    }
-    else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) )
-    {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        slen = (size_t) saltlen;
+    } else if ((saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    } else {
+        slen = (size_t)saltlen;
     }
 
-    memset( sig, 0, olen );
+    memset(sig, 0, olen);
 
     /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
+    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
     p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
     *p++ = 0x01;
 
     /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */
     salt = p;
-    if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ;
+    if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
 
     p += slen;
 
-    mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
     /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0)
         goto exit;
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8)) != 0)
         goto exit;
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen)) != 0)
         goto exit;
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0)
         goto exit;
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
     /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
-    if( msb % 8 == 0 )
+    if (msb % 8 == 0)
         offset = 1;
 
     /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
-    if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
-                          &md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
+                        &md_ctx)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
-    sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
+    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
+    sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb);
 
     p += hlen;
     *p++ = 0xBC;
 
 exit:
-    mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return ret ;
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return ret;
 
-    return mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig );
+    return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig);
 }
 
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with
  * the option to pass in the salt length.
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                         void *p_rng,
-                         mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                         unsigned int hashlen,
-                         const unsigned char *hash,
-                         int saltlen,
-                         unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                    int (*f_rng)(void *,
+                                                 unsigned char *,
+                                                 size_t),
+                                    void *p_rng,
+                                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                    unsigned int hashlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *hash,
+                                    int saltlen,
+                                    unsigned char *sig)
 {
-    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                                hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig );
+    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+                               saltlen, sig);
 }
 
-
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                         void *p_rng,
-                         mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                         unsigned int hashlen,
-                         const unsigned char *hash,
-                         unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                void *p_rng,
+                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                unsigned int hashlen,
+                                const unsigned char *hash,
+                                unsigned char *sig)
 {
-    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                                hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig );
+    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+                               MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig);
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
  */
@@ -1936,61 +1895,58 @@
  * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len.
  *
  */
-static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                        unsigned int hashlen,
-                                        const unsigned char *hash,
-                                        size_t dst_len,
-                                        unsigned char *dst )
+static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                       unsigned int hashlen,
+                                       const unsigned char *hash,
+                                       size_t dst_len,
+                                       unsigned char *dst)
 {
-    size_t oid_size  = 0;
-    size_t nb_pad    = dst_len;
+    size_t oid_size = 0;
+    size_t nb_pad = dst_len;
     unsigned char *p = dst;
-    const char *oid  = NULL;
+    const char *oid = NULL;
 
     /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */
-    if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
-    {
-        const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
-        if( md_info == NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+        const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+        if (md_info == NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-        if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-        if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
         /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a
          * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */
-        if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size  >= 0x80         ||
-            10 + hashlen            <  hashlen      ||
-            10 + hashlen + oid_size <  10 + hashlen )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || 10 + hashlen < hashlen ||
+            10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
         /*
          * Static bounds check:
          * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs.
          *   (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of
-         *    Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification)
+         *    Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5
+         * verification)
          * - Need hashlen bytes for hash
          * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID.
          */
-        if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
         nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        if( nb_pad < hashlen )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    } else {
+        if (nb_pad < hashlen)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
         nb_pad -= hashlen;
     }
 
     /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes),
      * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */
-    if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (nb_pad < 3 + 8)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     nb_pad -= 3;
 
     /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled
@@ -1999,15 +1955,14 @@
     /* Write signature header and padding */
     *p++ = 0;
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
-    memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad );
+    memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad);
     p += nb_pad;
     *p++ = 0;
 
     /* Are we signing raw data? */
-    if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
-    {
-        memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
-        return 0 ;
+    if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+        memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
+        return 0;
     }
 
     /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure
@@ -2024,61 +1979,61 @@
      *                 TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ]
      */
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)(0x08 + oid_size + hashlen);
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)(0x04 + oid_size);
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size;
-    memcpy( p, oid, oid_size );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)oid_size;
+    memcpy(p, oid, oid_size);
     p += oid_size;
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL;
     *p++ = 0x00;
     *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen;
-    memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
+    *p++ = (unsigned char)hashlen;
+    memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
     p += hashlen;
 
     /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic
      * after the initial bounds check. */
-    if( p != dst + dst_len )
-    {
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( dst, dst_len );
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (p != dst + dst_len) {
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dst, dst_len);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    return 0 ;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                               int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                               void *p_rng,
-                               mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                               unsigned int hashlen,
-                               const unsigned char *hash,
-                               unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                      int (*f_rng)(void *,
+                                                   unsigned char *,
+                                                   size_t),
+                                      void *p_rng,
+                                      mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                      unsigned int hashlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *hash,
+                                      unsigned char *sig)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
 
-    if( ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     /*
      * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier)
      */
 
-    if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash,
-                                             ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 )
-        return ret ;
+    if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, ctx->len,
+                                           sig)) != 0)
+        return ret;
 
     /* Private key operation
      *
@@ -2086,83 +2041,79 @@
      * temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
      */
 
-    sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
-    if( sig_try == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+    sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
+    if (sig_try == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
 
-    verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
-    if( verif == NULL )
-    {
-        mbedtls_free( sig_try );
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ;
+    verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
+    if (verif == NULL) {
+        mbedtls_free(sig_try);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
     }
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif));
 
-    if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 )
-    {
+    if (mbedtls_safer_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
+    memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len);
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_free( sig_try );
-    mbedtls_free( verif );
+    mbedtls_free(sig_try);
+    mbedtls_free(verif);
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                    int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                    void *p_rng,
-                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                    unsigned int hashlen,
-                    const unsigned char *hash,
-                    unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                           int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                           void *p_rng,
+                           mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                           unsigned int hashlen,
+                           const unsigned char *hash,
+                           unsigned char *sig)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
 
-    switch( ctx->padding )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+    switch (ctx->padding) {
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
-                                                      md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+                                                     hashlen, hash, sig);
+#        endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                                                hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+                                               hashlen, hash, sig);
+#        endif
 
         default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                               mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                               unsigned int hashlen,
-                               const unsigned char *hash,
-                               mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
-                               int expected_salt_len,
-                               const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                      mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                      unsigned int hashlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *hash,
+                                      mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
+                                      int expected_salt_len,
+                                      const unsigned char *sig)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t siglen;
@@ -2176,89 +2127,84 @@
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
 
     siglen = ctx->len;
 
-    if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf))
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(  ctx, sig, buf );
+    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf);
 
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return ret ;
+    if (ret != 0)
+        return ret;
 
     p = buf;
 
-    if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+    if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
 
-    if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
-    {
+    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
         /* Gather length of hash to sign */
-        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
-        if( md_info == NULL )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+        if (md_info == NULL)
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-        if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+        if (hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id );
-    if( md_info == NULL )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id);
+    if (md_info == NULL)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
 
-    memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
+    memset(zeros, 0, 8);
 
     /*
      * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
      */
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
+    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
 
-    if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb))
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
     /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
-    if( msb % 8 == 0 )
-    {
+    if (msb % 8 == 0) {
         p++;
         siglen -= 1;
     }
 
-    if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ;
+    if (siglen < hlen + 2)
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
 
-    mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
+    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0)
         goto exit;
 
-    ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx );
-    if( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
 
-    buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
+    buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb);
 
-    while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 )
+    while (p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0)
         p++;
 
-    if( *p++ != 0x01 )
-    {
+    if (*p++ != 0x01) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
         goto exit;
     }
 
     observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
 
-    if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
-        observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
-    {
+    if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
+        observed_salt_len != (size_t)expected_salt_len) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
         goto exit;
     }
@@ -2266,82 +2212,76 @@
     /*
      * Generate H = Hash( M' )
      */
-    ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx );
-    if ( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
-    ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
-    if ( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
-    ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
-    if ( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
-    ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len );
-    if ( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
-    ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
-    if ( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto exit;
 
-    if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 )
-    {
+    if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto exit;
     }
 
 exit:
-    mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                           mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                           unsigned int hashlen,
-                           const unsigned char *hash,
-                           const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                  mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                  unsigned int hashlen,
+                                  const unsigned char *hash,
+                                  const unsigned char *sig)
 {
     mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
 
-    mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
-                             ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
-                             : md_alg;
+    mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) ?
+                       (mbedtls_md_type_t)ctx->hash_id :
+                       md_alg;
 
-    return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx,
-                                               md_alg, hashlen, hash,
-                                               mgf1_hash_id,
-                                               MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
-                                               sig ) );
-
+    return (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+                                              mgf1_hash_id,
+                                              MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig));
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
 /*
  * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                 unsigned int hashlen,
-                                 const unsigned char *hash,
-                                 const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                                        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                                        unsigned int hashlen,
+                                        const unsigned char *hash,
+                                        const unsigned char *sig)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     size_t sig_len;
     unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL;
 
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
 
     sig_len = ctx->len;
 
@@ -2349,372 +2289,359 @@
      * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash.
      */
 
-    if( ( encoded          = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ||
-        ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL )
-    {
+    if ((encoded = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL ||
+        (encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
-                                             encoded_expected ) ) != 0 )
+    if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
+                                           encoded_expected)) != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     /*
      * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash.
      */
 
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded );
-    if( ret != 0 )
+    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded);
+    if (ret != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     /*
      * Compare
      */
 
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected,
-                                      sig_len ) ) != 0 )
-    {
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected, sig_len)) != 0) {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
 cleanup:
 
-    if( encoded != NULL )
-    {
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded, sig_len );
-        mbedtls_free( encoded );
+    if (encoded != NULL) {
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded, sig_len);
+        mbedtls_free(encoded);
     }
 
-    if( encoded_expected != NULL )
-    {
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len );
-        mbedtls_free( encoded_expected );
+    if (encoded_expected != NULL) {
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded_expected, sig_len);
+        mbedtls_free(encoded_expected);
     }
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
 /*
  * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                      mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                      unsigned int hashlen,
-                      const unsigned char *hash,
-                      const unsigned char *sig )
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+                             mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+                             unsigned int hashlen,
+                             const unsigned char *hash,
+                             const unsigned char *sig)
 {
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg  == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
-                        hashlen == 0 ) ||
-                      hash != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hashlen == 0) ||
+                     hash != NULL);
 
-    switch( ctx->padding )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+    switch (ctx->padding) {
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, md_alg,
-                                                        hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen,
+                                                       hash, sig);
+#        endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
         case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, md_alg,
-                                                  hashlen, hash, sig );
-#endif
+            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash,
+                                                 sig);
+#        endif
 
         default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
     }
 }
 
 /*
  * Copy the components of an RSA key
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src )
+int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL );
-    RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL );
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL);
+    RSA_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL);
 
     dst->len = src->len;
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E));
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q));
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) );
-#endif
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ));
+#        endif
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN));
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf));
 
     dst->padding = src->padding;
     dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
 
 cleanup:
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        mbedtls_rsa_free( dst );
+    if (ret != 0)
+        mbedtls_rsa_free(dst);
 
-    return ret ;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * Free the components of an RSA key
  */
-void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx )
+void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
 {
-    if( ctx == NULL )
+    if (ctx == NULL)
         return;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D  );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q  );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P  );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E  );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N  );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N);
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ );
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
+#        if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP);
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */
-    if( ctx->ver != 0 )
-    {
-        mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
+    if (ctx->ver != 0) {
+        mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
         ctx->ver = 0;
     }
-#endif
+#        endif
 }
 
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+#    endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+#    if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
 
-#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+#        include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
 
 /*
  * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
  */
-#define KEY_LEN 128
+#        define KEY_LEN 128
 
-#define RSA_N   "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
-                "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
-                "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
-                "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
-                "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
-                "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
-                "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
-                "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
+#        define RSA_N                          \
+            "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
+            "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
+            "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
+            "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
+            "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
+            "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
+            "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
+            "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
 
-#define RSA_E   "10001"
+#        define RSA_E "10001"
 
-#define RSA_D   "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
-                "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
-                "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
-                "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
-                "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
-                "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
-                "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
-                "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
+#        define RSA_D                          \
+            "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
+            "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
+            "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
+            "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
+            "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
+            "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
+            "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
+            "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
 
-#define RSA_P   "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
-                "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
-                "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
-                "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
+#        define RSA_P                          \
+            "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
+            "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
+            "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
+            "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
 
-#define RSA_Q   "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
-                "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
-                "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
-                "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
+#        define RSA_Q                          \
+            "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
+            "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
+            "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
+            "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
 
-#define PT_LEN  24
-#define RSA_PT  "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
-                "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
+#        define PT_LEN 24
+#        define RSA_PT                                         \
+            "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
+            "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
 {
-#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
+#            if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
     size_t i;
 
-    if( rng_state != NULL )
-        rng_state  = NULL;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
-        output[i] = rand();
-#else
-    if( rng_state != NULL )
+    if (rng_state != NULL)
         rng_state = NULL;
 
-    arc4random_buf( output, len );
-#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
+    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+        output[i] = rand();
+#            else
+    if (rng_state != NULL)
+        rng_state = NULL;
 
-    return 0 ;
+    arc4random_buf(output, len);
+#            endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
+
+    return 0;
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
 
 /*
  * Checkup routine
  */
-int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
+int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose)
 {
     int ret = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#        if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
     size_t len;
     mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
     unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
     unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
     unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+#            if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
     unsigned char sha1sum[20];
-#endif
+#            endif
 
     mbedtls_mpi K;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &K );
-    mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
+    mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N  ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P  ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q  ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D  ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E  ) );
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_P));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_Q));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_D));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_E));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K));
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa));
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "  RSA key validation: " );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("  RSA key validation: ");
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(  &rsa ) != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 ||
+        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "passed\n  PKCS#1 encryption : " );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 encryption : ");
 
-    memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
+    memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN);
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                                   PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
-                                   rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
+                                  rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "passed\n  PKCS#1 decryption : " );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 decryption : ");
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                                   &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
-                                   sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext,
+                                  rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "  PKCS#1 data sign  : " );
+#            if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("  PKCS#1 data sign  : ");
 
-    if( mbedtls_sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_sha1(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
-        return 1 ;
+        return 1;
     }
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                                MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
-                                sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum,
+                               rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "passed\n  PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 sig. verify: ");
 
-    if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
-                                  sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
-    {
-        if( verbose != 0 )
-            mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
+    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum,
+                                 rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
+        if (verbose != 0)
+            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
 
         ret = 1;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+#            endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
 
-    if( verbose != 0 )
-        mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
+    if (verbose != 0)
+        mbedtls_printf("\n");
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &K );
-    mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa );
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-    ((void) verbose);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-    return ret ;
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
+    mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
+#        else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+    ((void)verbose);
+#        endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+    return ret;
 }
 
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+#    endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */