Change some code style
Change-Id: I67bb642e81693489345867ca87d7e9daa22f83ea
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index 22d83de..bc992c9 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -1525,7 +1525,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
static int everest_import_public_raw( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end )
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end )
{
if( end - buf != MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 007b9fa..847f12d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@
if( tls13_supported == 0 )
{
/* When we support runtime negotiation of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, we need
- * a graceful fallback to TLS 1.2 in this case. */
+ * a graceful fallback to TLS 1.2 in this case.
+ */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS 1.3 is not supported by the client" ) );
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@
if( list_size % 2 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
- /* TODO: At the moment, this can happen when receiving a second
+ /* At the moment, this can happen when receiving a second
* ClientHello after an HRR. We should properly reset the
* state upon receiving an HRR, in which case we should
* not observe handshake->curves already being allocated. */
@@ -151,7 +152,8 @@
}
/* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
- * and leave room for a final 0 */
+ * and leave room for a final 0
+ */
our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX )
our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;
@@ -170,7 +172,8 @@
/* mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id() uses the mbedtls_ecp_curve_info
* data structure (defined in ecp.c), which only includes the list of
* curves implemented. Hence, we only add curves that are also supported
- * and implemented by the server. */
+ * and implemented by the server.
+ */
if( curve_info != NULL )
{
*curves++ = curve_info;
@@ -187,7 +190,6 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || ( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) )
-/* TODO: Code for MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED missing */
/*
* ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() verifies whether the information in the
* extension is correct and stores the provided key shares. Whether this is an
@@ -233,7 +235,8 @@
/* We try to find a suitable key share entry and copy it to the
* handshake context. Later, we have to find out whether we can do
* something with the provided key share or whether we have to
- * dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message. */
+ * dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message.
+ */
for( ; p < extentions_end; p += cur_share_len )
{
@@ -259,7 +262,8 @@
end_of_share = p + cur_share_len;
/* Continue parsing even if we have already found a match,
- * for input validation purposes. */
+ * for input validation purposes.
+ */
if( match_found == 1 )
continue;
@@ -280,9 +284,6 @@
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, their_curve ) != 0 )
continue;
- /* Type 2..X: Other kinds of shares */
- /* TO BE ADDED */
-
/* Skip if we no match succeeded. */
if( their_curve == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
{
@@ -296,7 +297,8 @@
/* KeyShare parsing
*
* Once we add more key share types, this needs to be a switch
- * over the (type of) the named curve */
+ * over the (type of) the named curve
+ */
/* Type 1: ECDHE shares
*
@@ -371,8 +373,8 @@
handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
- else {
- /* TBD: Check under what cases this is appropriate */
+ else
+ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) );
}
@@ -415,7 +417,6 @@
const unsigned char *end );
/* Update the handshake state machine */
-/* TODO: At the moment, this doesn't update the state machine - why? */
static int ssl_client_hello_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int hrr_required );
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@
* ClientHello layer:
* 0 . 1 protocol version
* 2 . 33 random bytes ( starting with 4 bytes of Unix time )
- * 34 . 35 session id length ( 1 byte )
+ * 34 . 34 session id length ( 1 byte )
* 35 . 34+x session id
* 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length ( 1 byte )
* 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie
@@ -554,7 +555,7 @@
* .. . .. extensions ( optional )
*/
- /* TBD: Needs to be updated due to mandatory extensions
+ /* Needs to be updated due to mandatory extensions
* Minimal length ( with everything empty and extensions ommitted ) is
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
@@ -584,13 +585,14 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 );
memcpy( &ssl->handshake->randbytes[0], p, 32 );
- p += 32; /* skip random bytes */
+ /* skip random bytes */
+ p += 32;
/*
* Parse session ID
*/
sess_len = p[0];
- p++; /* skip session id length */
+ p++;
if( sess_len > 32 )
{