Merge branch 'development' into ccm_chunked
Conflicts:
library/ccm.c
Conflict resolved by re-applying the MBEDTLS_BYTE_0 macro.
Conflict resolved by ignoring the MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE macro
used in development branch on the 'b' buffer, because the 'b'
buffer is removed in current branch.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt b/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67faecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/chunked_ccm.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Changes
+ * Implement multi-part CCM API.
+ The multi-part functions: mbedtls_ccm_starts(), mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
+ mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(), mbedtls_ccm_update(), mbedtls_ccm_finish()
+ were introduced in mbedTLS 3.0 release, however their implementation was
+ postponed until now.
+ Implemented functions support chunked data input for both CCM and CCM*
+ algorithms.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
index b3adecc..8aacfce 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D
/** Authenticated decryption failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F
+/** CCM functions called in the wrong sequence. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE -0x0011
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
@@ -76,7 +78,27 @@
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context
{
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working buffer */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16]; /*!< The counter buffer */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len); /*!< Total plaintext length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< Total authentication data length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len); /*!< Total tag length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed); /*!< Track how many bytes of input data
+ were processed (chunked input).
+ Used indepenedantly for both auth data
+ and plaintext/ciphertext.
+ This variable is set to zero after
+ auth data input is finished. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q); /*!< The Q working value */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform:
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's
+ state. Used for chunked data
+ input */
}
mbedtls_ccm_context;
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index a21a37f..0a90461 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -36,31 +36,23 @@
#include <string.h>
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
-#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
- MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT )
-#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
- MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
-
-#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0
-#define CCM_DECRYPT 1
/*
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx )
{
- CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
}
@@ -72,9 +64,6 @@
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
-
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits,
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
@@ -108,82 +97,67 @@
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
}
-/*
- * Macros for common operations.
- * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions.
- */
-
-/*
- * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b
- * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.)
- */
-#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \
- for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \
- y[i] ^= b[i]; \
- \
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \
- return( ret );
+#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0
+#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0)
+#define CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET (1 << 1)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3)
+#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4)
/*
* Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR
- * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b!
- * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst.
*/
-#define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len ) \
- do \
- { \
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \
- 16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \
- { \
- return( ret ); \
- } \
- \
- for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ ) \
- (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \
- } while( 0 )
+static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ size_t offset, size_t use_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output )
+{
+ size_t i;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = {0};
-/*
- * Authenticated encryption or decryption
- */
-static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
- const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
- unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf,
+ &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+ output[i] = input[i] ^ tmp_buf[offset + i];
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) {
+ ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR;
+ memset( ctx->y, 0, 16);
+ memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+}
+
+static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
- unsigned char q;
size_t len_left, olen;
- unsigned char b[16];
- unsigned char y[16];
- unsigned char ctr[16];
- const unsigned char *src;
- unsigned char *dst;
- /*
- * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
- * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
- * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
- *
- * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
+ /* length calulcation can be done only after both
+ * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed
*/
- if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+ if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET) )
+ return 0;
- /* Also implies q is within bounds */
- if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
+ if( ctx->tag_len == 0 && \
+ ( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
- if( add_len >= 0xFF00 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
- q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
-
/*
- * First block B_0:
+ * First block:
* 0 .. 0 flags
- * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv)
+ * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts()
* iv_len+1 .. 15 length
*
* With flags as (bits):
@@ -192,56 +166,40 @@
* 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2
* 2 .. 0 q - 1
*/
- b[0] = 0;
- b[0] |= ( add_len > 0 ) << 6;
- b[0] |= ( ( tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
- b[0] |= q - 1;
+ ctx->y[0] |= ( ctx->add_len > 0 ) << 6;
+ ctx->y[0] |= ( ( ctx->tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3;
+ ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1;
- memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len );
-
- for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
- b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
+ for( i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8 )
+ ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left );
if( len_left > 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+ }
+
+ /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return( ret );
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len )
+{
+ /* Also implies q is within bounds */
+ if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
- /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */
- memset( y, 0, 16 );
- UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
- /*
- * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with
- * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary)
- */
- if( add_len > 0 )
- {
- size_t use_len;
- len_left = add_len;
- src = add;
-
- memset( b, 0, 16 );
- MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 );
-
- use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2;
- memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len );
- len_left -= use_len;
- src += use_len;
-
- UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
- while( len_left > 0 )
- {
- use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
-
- memset( b, 0, 16 );
- memcpy( b, src, use_len );
- UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
-
- len_left -= use_len;
- src += use_len;
- }
- }
+ ctx->mode = mode;
+ ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
/*
* Prepare counter block for encryption:
@@ -253,62 +211,290 @@
* 7 .. 3 0
* 2 .. 0 q - 1
*/
- ctr[0] = q - 1;
- memcpy( ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
- memset( ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q );
- ctr[15] = 1;
+ memset( ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+ ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1;
+ memcpy( ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len );
+ memset( ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q );
+ ctx->ctr[15] = 1;
/*
- * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message.
- *
- * The only difference between encryption and decryption is
- * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption.
+ * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description
*/
- len_left = length;
- src = input;
- dst = output;
+ memcpy( ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len );
- while( len_left > 0 )
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED;
+ return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ size_t total_ad_len,
+ size_t plaintext_len,
+ size_t tag_len )
+{
+ /*
+ * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
+ * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
+ * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
+ *
+ * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
+ */
+ if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+
+ if( total_ad_len >= 0xFF00 )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+
+ ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len;
+ ctx->add_len = total_ad_len;
+ ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+ ctx->processed = 0;
+
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGHTS_SET;
+ return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+ size_t olen, use_len, offset;
+
+ if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
{
- size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left;
+ return ret;
+ }
- if( mode == CCM_ENCRYPT )
+ if( ctx->add_len > 0 && add_len > 0 )
+ {
+ if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED )
{
- memset( b, 0, 16 );
- memcpy( b, src, use_len );
- UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE;
}
- CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, use_len );
-
- if( mode == CCM_DECRYPT )
+ if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED) )
{
- memset( b, 0, 16 );
- memcpy( b, dst, use_len );
- UPDATE_CBC_MAC;
+ if ( add_len > ctx->add_len )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+ ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char)( ( ctx->add_len ) & 0xFF );
+
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED;
+ }
+ else if ( ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
- dst += use_len;
- src += use_len;
- len_left -= use_len;
+ while( add_len > 0 )
+ {
+ offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1]
+ * holding total auth data length */
+ use_len = 16 - offset;
- /*
- * Increment counter.
- * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above.
- */
- for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
- if( ++ctr[15-i] != 0 )
+ if( use_len > add_len )
+ use_len = add_len;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+ ctx->y[i + offset] ^= add[i];
+
+ ctx->processed += use_len;
+ add_len -= use_len;
+ add += use_len;
+
+ if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return( ret );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( ctx->processed == ctx->add_len )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED;
+ ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update()
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+ size_t use_len, offset, olen;
+
+ unsigned char local_output[16];
+
+ if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
+ if( ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if( output_size < input_len )
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
+ *output_len = input_len;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ while ( input_len > 0 )
+ {
+ offset = ctx->processed % 16;
+
+ use_len = 16 - offset;
+
+ if( use_len > input_len )
+ use_len = input_len;
+
+ ctx->processed += use_len;
+
+ if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
+ ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT )
+ {
+ for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+ ctx->y[i + offset] ^= input[i];
+
+ if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, output );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \
+ ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT )
+ {
+ /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that
+ * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using
+ * it as input to any operations.
+ * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as
+ * input in the XOR operation for Y.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+
+ for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
+ ctx->y[i + offset] ^= local_output[i];
+
+ memcpy( output, local_output, use_len );
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
+
+ if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+ {
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
+ {
+ for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
+ if( ++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0 )
break;
+ }
+
+ input_len -= use_len;
+ input += use_len;
+ output += use_len;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+
+ if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
+ if( ctx->add_len > 0 && !( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED ) )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE;
+ }
+
+ if( ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len )
+ {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE;
}
/*
* Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag
*/
- for( i = 0; i < q; i++ )
- ctr[15-i] = 0;
+ for( i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++ )
+ ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0;
- CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
- memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt( ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ return ret;
+ if( tag != NULL )
+ memcpy( tag, ctx->y, tag_len );
+ mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx);
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated encryption or decryption
+ */
+static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add_len, length, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input, length,
+ output, length, &olen ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
+
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
+ return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
@@ -322,13 +508,7 @@
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
- return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+ return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
}
@@ -338,78 +518,75 @@
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
- if( tag_len == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
- return( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
- add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
+ return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+ add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
}
/*
* Authenticated decryption
*/
-int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
- const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
- const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
- const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
- const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, const unsigned char *tag2, size_t tag_len)
{
- int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
- unsigned char check_tag[16];
unsigned char i;
int diff;
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
+ /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+ for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
+ diff |= tag1[i] ^ tag2[i];
- if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length,
+ if( diff != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ return( 0 );
+}
+
+static int ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char check_tag[16];
+
+ if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, mode, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
- /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
- for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
- diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i];
-
- if( diff != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length );
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
+ return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
+{
+ return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, tag, tag_len );
+}
+
int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
- CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
-
- if( tag_len == 0 )
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
-
- return( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add,
- add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) );
+ return ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, tag, tag_len );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
index a14d4be..91aa98b 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.data
@@ -1517,3 +1517,143 @@
CCM-Camellia encrypt and tag RFC 5528 #24
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip ad NIST VADT AES-128 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"d24a3d3dde8c84830280cb87abad0bb3":"7c86135ed9c2a515aaae0e9a208133897269220f30870006":"f1100035bb24a8d26004e0e24b":"1faeb0ee2ca2cd52f0aa3966578344f24e69b742c4ab37ab":"1123301219c70599b7c373ad4b3ad67b"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip ad NIST DVPT AES-192 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":"ddc93a54"
+
+CCM encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
+
+CCM* encrypt, skip update NIST VPT AES-128 #1 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"2ebf60f0969013a54a3dedb19d20f6c8":"1de8c5e21f9db33123ff870add":"e1de6c6119d7db471136285d10b47a450221b16978569190ef6a22b055295603":"0ead29ef205fbb86d11abe5ed704b880"
+
+CCM decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
+
+CCM* decrypt, skip update NIST DVPT AES-256 #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_skip_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5"
+
+CCM encrypt, overflow ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, overflow update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, incomplete update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, overflow ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, overflow update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, incomplete update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, overflow ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, overflow update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, incomplete update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* encrypt, full update and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, overflow ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete ad NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, full ad and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, overflow update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, incomplete update NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM* decrypt, full update and overflow NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
+mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"3726c1aaf85ee8099a7ebd3268700e07d4b3f292c65bba34":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a":"ead4c45ff9db54f9902a6de181"
+
+CCM encrypt, instant finish NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a"
+
+CCM decrypt, instant finish NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a"
+
+CCM* encrypt, instant finish NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a"
+
+CCM* decrypt, instant finish NIST VADT AES-192 #14 (P=24, N=13, A=13, T=16)
+mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT:"b5f43f3ae38a6165f0f990abe9ee50cd9ad7e847a0a51731":"13501aebda19a9bf1b5ffaa42a"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
index 840583c..48c4fe9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ccm.function
@@ -1,5 +1,64 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+
+/* Use the multipart interface to process the encrypted data in two parts
+ * and check that the output matches the expected output.
+ * The context must have been set up with the key. */
+static int check_multipart( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const data_t *iv,
+ const data_t *add,
+ const data_t *input,
+ const data_t *expected_output,
+ const data_t *tag,
+ size_t n1,
+ size_t n1_add)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+ size_t n2 = input->len - n1;
+ size_t n2_add = add->len - n1_add;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ /* Sanity checks on the test data */
+ TEST_ASSERT( n1 <= input->len );
+ TEST_ASSERT( n1_add <= add->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( input->len, expected_output->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( ctx, add->len, input->len, tag->len ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x, n1_add) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( ctx, add->x + n1_add, n2_add ) );
+
+ /* Allocate a tight buffer for each update call. This way, if the function
+ * tries to write beyond the advertised required buffer size, this will
+ * count as an overflow for memory sanitizers and static checkers. */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n1 );
+ olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x, n1, output, n1, &olen ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( n1, olen );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x, n1 );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, n2 );
+ olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( ctx, input->x + n1, n2, output, n2, &olen ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( n2, olen );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, expected_output->x + n1, n2 );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+ ok = 1;
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ return( ok );
+}
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -122,71 +181,115 @@
data_t * add, data_t * result )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
- size_t tag_len;
- uint8_t * msg_n_tag = (uint8_t *)malloc( result->len + 2 );
+ size_t n1, n1_add;
+ uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+ uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
+ const size_t expected_tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
+ const uint8_t* expected_tag = result->x + msg->len;
+
+ /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
+ if( msg->len != 0 )
+ memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
+
+ /* Prepare tag buffer */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
- memset( msg_n_tag, 0, result->len + 2 );
- memcpy( msg_n_tag, msg->x, msg->len );
-
- tag_len = result->len - msg->len;
-
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
-
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
- msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag, msg_n_tag + msg->len, tag_len ) == 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
+ io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len ), 0);
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg_n_tag, result->x, result->len ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, result->x, msg->len );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
- /* Check we didn't write past the end */
- TEST_ASSERT( msg_n_tag[result->len] == 0 && msg_n_tag[result->len + 1] == 0 );
+ /* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
+ const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = result->x,
+ .len = msg->len };
+ const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag, /* cast to conform with data_t x type */
+ .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+ for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
+ {
+ for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+ if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT,
+ iv, add, msg,
+ &encrypted_expected,
+ &tag_expected,
+ n1, n1_add ) )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
- free( msg_n_tag );
+ mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+ mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( int cipher_id, data_t * key,
data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
- data_t * add, int tag_len, int result,
+ data_t * add, int expected_tag_len, int result,
data_t * expected_msg )
{
- unsigned char tag[16];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ size_t n1, n1_add;
+
+ const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
+ const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
+
+ /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+ uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
+ if( expected_msg_len )
+ memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
- memset( tag, 0x00, sizeof( tag ) );
-
- msg->len -= tag_len;
- memcpy( tag, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len );
-
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
-
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
/* Test with input == output */
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
- msg->x, msg->x, msg->x + msg->len, tag_len ) == result );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv->x, iv->len, add->x, add->len,
+ io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf, expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), result );
if( result == 0 )
{
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x, expected_msg->x, expected_msg->len ) == 0 );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_msg->x, expected_msg_len );
+
+ /* Prepare data_t structures for multipart testing */
+ const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
+ .len = expected_msg_len };
+
+ const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
+ .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+ for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
+ {
+ for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+ if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT,
+ iv, add, &encrypted,
+ expected_msg,
+ &tag_expected,
+ n1, n1_add ) )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
}
else
{
size_t i;
- for( i = 0; i < msg->len; i++ )
- TEST_ASSERT( msg->x[i] == 0 );
+ for( i = 0; i < expected_msg_len; i++ )
+ TEST_EQUAL( io_msg_buf[i], 0 );
}
- /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( msg->x + msg->len, tag, tag_len ) == 0 );
-
exit:
+ mbedtls_free(io_msg_buf);
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -199,20 +302,32 @@
data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
{
unsigned char iv[13];
- unsigned char result[50];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
- size_t iv_len, tag_len;
- int ret;
+ size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
+ size_t n1, n1_add;
+ uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+ uint8_t* tag_buf = NULL;
- mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ const uint8_t* expected_tag = expected_result->x + msg->len;
- memset( result, 0x00, sizeof( result ) );
-
+ /* Calculate tag length */
if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
- tag_len = 0;
+ expected_tag_len = 0;
else
- tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+ expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+ /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, msg->len );
+ if( msg->len )
+ memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, msg->len );
+
+ /* Prepare tag buffer */
+ if( expected_tag_len == 0 )
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, 16 );
+ else
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( tag_buf, expected_tag_len );
+
+ /* Calculate iv */
TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@@ -220,24 +335,46 @@
iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
iv_len = sizeof( iv );
- TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
- key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id,
+ key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ /* Test with input == output */
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
+ add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf,
+ io_msg_buf, tag_buf, expected_tag_len), output_ret );
- ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg->len, iv, iv_len,
- add->x, add->len, msg->x,
- result, result + msg->len, tag_len );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, msg->len, expected_result->x, msg->len );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( tag_buf, expected_tag_len, expected_tag, expected_tag_len );
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
+ if( output_ret == 0 )
+ {
+ const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
+ .len = iv_len };
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result,
- expected_result->x, expected_result->len ) == 0 );
+ const data_t encrypted_expected = { .x = expected_result->x,
+ .len = msg->len };
+ const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*)expected_tag,
+ .len = expected_tag_len };
- /* Check we didn't write past the end */
- TEST_ASSERT( result[expected_result->len] == 0 &&
- result[expected_result->len + 1] == 0 );
+ for( n1 = 0; n1 <= msg->len; n1 += 1 )
+ {
+ for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+ if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT,
+ &iv_data, add, msg,
+ &encrypted_expected,
+ &tag_expected,
+ n1, n1_add ) )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ }
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+ mbedtls_free( tag_buf );
}
/* END_CASE */
@@ -249,21 +386,27 @@
data_t *expected_result, int output_ret )
{
unsigned char iv[13];
- unsigned char result[50];
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
- size_t iv_len, tag_len;
- int ret;
+ size_t iv_len, expected_tag_len;
+ size_t n1, n1_add;
- mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
-
- memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
- memset( result, '+', sizeof( result ) );
-
+ /* Calculate tag length */
if( sec_level % 4 == 0)
- tag_len = 0;
+ expected_tag_len = 0;
else
- tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+ expected_tag_len = 1 << ( sec_level % 4 + 1);
+ const size_t expected_msg_len = msg->len - expected_tag_len;
+ const uint8_t* expected_tag = msg->x + expected_msg_len;
+
+ /* Prepare input/output message buffer */
+ uint8_t* io_msg_buf = NULL;
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len );
+ if( expected_msg_len )
+ memcpy( io_msg_buf, msg->x, expected_msg_len );
+
+ /* Calculate iv */
+ memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
TEST_ASSERT( source_address->len == 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( frame_counter->len == 4 );
memcpy( iv, source_address->x, source_address->len );
@@ -271,23 +414,295 @@
iv[source_address->len + frame_counter->len] = sec_level;
iv_len = sizeof( iv );
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ) == 0 );
+ /* Test with input == output */
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, expected_msg_len, iv, iv_len,
+ add->x, add->len, io_msg_buf, io_msg_buf,
+ expected_tag, expected_tag_len ), output_ret );
- ret = mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg->len - tag_len, iv, iv_len,
- add->x, add->len, msg->x, result,
- msg->x + msg->len - tag_len, tag_len );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( io_msg_buf, expected_msg_len, expected_result->x, expected_msg_len );
- TEST_ASSERT( ret == output_ret );
+ if( output_ret == 0 )
+ {
+ const data_t iv_data = { .x = iv,
+ .len = iv_len };
- TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( result, expected_result->x,
- expected_result->len ) == 0 );
+ const data_t encrypted = { .x = msg->x,
+ .len = expected_msg_len} ;
- /* Check we didn't write past the end (where the original tag is) */
- TEST_ASSERT( ( msg->len + 2 ) <= sizeof( result ) );
- TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len], '+' );
- TEST_EQUAL( result[msg->len + 1], '+' );
+ const data_t tag_expected = { .x = (uint8_t*) expected_tag,
+ .len = expected_tag_len };
+
+ for( n1 = 0; n1 <= expected_msg_len; n1 += 1 )
+ {
+ for( n1_add = 0; n1_add <= add->len; n1_add += 1 )
+ {
+ mbedtls_test_set_step( n1 * 10000 + n1_add );
+ if( !check_multipart( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT,
+ &iv_data, add, &encrypted,
+ expected_result,
+ &tag_expected,
+ n1, n1_add ) )
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ }
exit:
mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+ mbedtls_free( io_msg_buf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Skip auth data, provide full text */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_skip_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * result, data_t * tag )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ /* Sanity checks on the test data */
+ TEST_EQUAL( msg->len, result->len );
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 0, msg->len, tag->len ) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, result->len );
+ olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, result->len, &olen ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( result->len, olen );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, olen, result->x, result->len );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide auth data, skip full text */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_skip_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add,
+ data_t * tag )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, tag->len ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, tag->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, tag->len ) );
+ ASSERT_COMPARE( output, tag->len, tag->x, tag->len );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide too much auth data */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+ // set half of auth data length to provoke an overflow
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len / 2, 16, 16 ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete auth data and finish */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_ad( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * iv, data_t* add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 0, 16 ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len/2) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide complete auth data on first update_ad.
+ * Provide unexpected auth data on second update_ad */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_full_ad_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded values for msg length and tag length. They are not a part of this test
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, 16, 16 ) );
+
+ // pass full auth data
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+ // pass 1 extra byte
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, 1) );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide too much plaintext/ciphertext */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_overflow_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
+ // set half of msg length to provoke an overflow
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len / 2, 16 ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
+ mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide incomplete plaintext/ciphertext and finish */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_incomplete_update( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is not a part of this test
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+ olen = 0xdeadbeef;
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len/2, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ output = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Provide full plaintext/ciphertext of first update
+ * Provide unexpected plaintext/ciphertext on second update */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_full_update_and_overflow( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * msg, data_t * iv,
+ data_t * add )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded value for tag length. It is a not a part of this test
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, add->len, msg->len, 16 ) );
+
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( &ctx, add->x, add->len) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, msg->len );
+ // pass full text
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, msg->len, output, msg->len, &olen ) );
+ // pass 1 extra byte
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT, \
+ mbedtls_ccm_update( &ctx, msg->x, 1, output, 1, &olen ) );
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* Finish without passing any auth data or plaintext/ciphertext input */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_ccm_instant_finish( int cipher_id, int mode,
+ data_t * key, data_t * iv )
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ uint8_t *output = NULL;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx );
+ TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, cipher_id, key->x, key->len * 8 ), 0 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_starts( &ctx, mode, iv->x, iv->len ) );
+ // use hardcoded values for add length, msg length and tag length.
+ // They are not a part of this test
+ TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( &ctx, 16, 16, 16 ) );
+
+ ASSERT_ALLOC( output, 16 );
+ TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_SEQUENCE, mbedtls_ccm_finish( &ctx, output, 16 ) );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_free( output );
+ mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */