Fix heap corruption in ssl_decrypt_buf
Previously, MAC validation for an incoming record proceeded as follows:
1) Make a copy of the MAC contained in the record;
2) Compute the expected MAC in place, overwriting the presented one;
3) Compare both.
This resulted in a record buffer overflow if truncated MAC was used, as in this
case the record buffer only reserved 10 bytes for the MAC, but the MAC
computation routine in 2) always wrote a full digest.
For specially crafted records, this could be used to perform a controlled write of
up to 6 bytes past the boundary of the heap buffer holding the record, thereby
corrupting the heap structures and potentially leading to a crash or remote code
execution.
This commit fixes this by making the following change:
1) Compute the expected MAC in a temporary buffer that has the size of the
underlying message digest.
2) Compare to this to the MAC contained in the record, potentially
restricting to the first 10 bytes if truncated HMAC is used.
A similar fix is applied to the encryption routine `ssl_encrypt_buf`.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 8088e88..1b8d7df 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1284,14 +1284,17 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
+ unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
+
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_hdr, 3 );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, ssl->out_len, 2 );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc,
- ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen );
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc, mac );
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_out->md_ctx_enc );
+
+ memcpy( ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, mac, ssl->transform_out->maclen );
}
else
#endif
@@ -1553,8 +1556,6 @@
return( 0 );
}
-#define SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE 48
-
static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t i;
@@ -1722,7 +1723,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
{
- unsigned char computed_mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+ unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
@@ -1740,16 +1741,16 @@
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, computed_mac );
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", computed_mac,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, computed_mac,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+ ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@@ -1909,15 +1910,13 @@
#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
- unsigned char tmp[SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+ unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen );
- memcpy( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
-
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
@@ -1956,8 +1955,7 @@
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
ssl->in_msglen );
- mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
- ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
+ mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
/* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks */
for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
@@ -1972,12 +1970,12 @@
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", tmp, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
+ ssl->transform_in->maclen );
- if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
- ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
+ if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
+ ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );