Revert a part of sensitive information duplication from tinycrypt
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc.c b/tinycrypt/ecc.c
index 8055432..bf54fe8 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc.c
@@ -1239,8 +1239,6 @@
int ret = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
- volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
- volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(
_private,
@@ -1266,8 +1264,6 @@
uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(
public_key +
NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES, _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
- if (private_key_dup != private_key || public_key_dup != public_key){
- return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
- }
+
return ret;
}
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
index bf3a803..5a7a9e5 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
@@ -170,9 +170,6 @@
wordcount_t num_words = NUM_ECC_WORDS;
wordcount_t num_bytes = NUM_ECC_BYTES;
int r = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
- volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
- volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
- volatile const uint8_t *secret_dup = secret;
/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
@@ -190,11 +187,6 @@
/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
- if (public_key_dup != public_key || private_key_dup != private_key || secret_dup != secret) {
- /* Erase secret in case of FI */
- mbedtls_platform_memset(secret, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
- return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
- }
return r;
}
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c b/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
index 2a676dc..d432a2e 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
@@ -204,10 +204,6 @@
bitcount_t i;
bitcount_t flow_control;
volatile uECC_word_t diff;
- volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
- volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
- volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
- volatile const uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
uECC_word_t r[NUM_ECC_WORDS], s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -309,10 +305,6 @@
* 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
*/
if (diff == 0 && flow_control == (num_bits + 5)) {
- if (public_key_dup != public_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
- hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
- return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
- }
return UECC_SUCCESS;
}
else {