fix various issues
Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu <jerry.h.yu@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index d42e463..c83c98b 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -221,14 +221,14 @@
/*
* STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify
*/
-/* Macro to express the length of the verify structure length.
+/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure.
*
* The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as:
* - 64 bytes of octet 32,
* - 33 bytes for the context string
* (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"
* or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"),
- * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which servers as a separator,
+ * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator,
* - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
* (depending on the size of the transcript_hash)
*
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@
* The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least
* SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes.
*/
-static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( unsigned char *transcript_hash,
+static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( const unsigned char *transcript_hash,
size_t transcript_hash_len,
unsigned char *verify_buffer,
size_t *verify_buffer_len,
@@ -291,23 +291,24 @@
*verify_buffer_len = idx;
}
-static int ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t sig_alg )
+static int ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ uint16_t sig_alg )
{
const uint16_t *tls13_sig_alg = ssl->conf->tls13_sig_algs;
- for( ; *tls13_sig_alg !=MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE ; tls13_sig_alg++ )
+ for( ; *tls13_sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE ; tls13_sig_alg++ )
{
if( *tls13_sig_alg == sig_alg )
- return 1;
+ return( 1 );
}
- return 0;
+ return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
- const unsigned char *buf,
- const unsigned char *end,
- const unsigned char *verify_buffer,
- size_t verify_buffer_len )
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ const unsigned char *verify_buffer,
+ size_t verify_buffer_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const unsigned char *p = buf;
@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@
size_t signature_len;
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
- unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_hash_len;
/*
@@ -340,7 +341,7 @@
* certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake
* with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate").
*
- * Check if algorithm in offered signature algorithms. Send `unsupported_certificate`
+ * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm. Send `unsupported_certificate`
* alert message on failure.
*/
if( ! ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, algorithm ) )
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
/* We currently only support ECDSA-based signatures */
@@ -441,7 +442,7 @@
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, NULL,
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
- buf, signature_len ) ) != 0 )
+ p, signature_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret );
@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@
return( ret );
}
- return( ret );
+ return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */