diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 5ce7d25..bf6c221 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -2532,8 +2532,8 @@
 static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     int ret;
-    unsigned char *buf, *p;
-    size_t n = 0, m = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t n = 0;
     size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
     const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
 
@@ -2588,11 +2588,26 @@
      *        supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
      *      DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
      *  } CertificateRequest;
+     *
+     *  Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
+     *  ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
+     *  certificate.
+     *
+     *  We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
+     *  if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
+     *  and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
+     *  the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
+     *
+     *  Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
+     *  point we only have one hash available (see comments in
+     *  write_certificate_verify), so let's jsut use what we have.
+     *
+     *  However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
+     *  superficially sane.
      */
     buf = ssl->in_msg;
 
-    // Retrieve cert types
-    //
+    /* certificate_types */
     cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
     n = cert_type_len;
 
@@ -2602,45 +2617,14 @@
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
     }
 
-    p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1;
-    while( cert_type_len > 0 )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-        if( *p == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN &&
-            mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
-        {
-            ssl->handshake->cert_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
-            break;
-        }
-        else
-#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
-        if( *p == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN &&
-            mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
-        {
-            ssl->handshake->cert_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
-            break;
-        }
-        else
-#endif
-        {
-            ; /* Unsupported cert type, ignore */
-        }
-
-        cert_type_len--;
-        p++;
-    }
-
+    /* supported_signature_algorithms */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
     if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
     {
-        /* Ignored, see comments about hash in write_certificate_verify */
-        // TODO: should check the signature part against our pk_key though
         size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] <<  8 )
                              | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n]       ) );
 
-        m += 2;
-        n += sig_alg_len;
+        n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
 
         if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
         {
@@ -2650,13 +2634,12 @@
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
 
-    /* Ignore certificate_authorities, we only have one cert anyway */
-    // TODO: should not send cert if no CA matches
-    dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + m + n] <<  8 )
-             | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + m + n]       ) );
+    /* certificate_authorities */
+    dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] <<  8 )
+             | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n]       ) );
 
     n += dn_len;
-    if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + m + n )
+    if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );