diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index 0bc08cc..0303361 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -619,6 +619,28 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
+ *
+ * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an
+ * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect
+ * against some side-channel attacks.
+ *
+ * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the
+ * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this
+ * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification,
+ * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel
+ * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of
+ * that dependency.
+ *
+ * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some
+ * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for
+ * your use case.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
+
+/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
  *
  * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979).