diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 417b37f..a6bcdf1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 
 = PolarSSL 1.3 branch
 
+Security
+   * Avoid potential timing leak in ecdsa_sign() by blinding modular division.
+     (Found by Watson Ladd.)
+
 Bugfix
    * The length of various ClientKeyExchange messages was not properly checked.
    * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert.
diff --git a/include/polarssl/ecp.h b/include/polarssl/ecp.h
index 61d6a1d..1cafc46 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ecp.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ecp.h
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@
  * short weierstrass, this subgroup is actually the whole curve, and its
  * cardinal is denoted by N.
  *
+ * In the case of Short Weierstrass curves, our code requires that N is an odd
+ * prime. (Use odd in ecp_mul() and prime in ecdsa_sign() for blinding.)
+ *
  * In the case of Montgomery curves, we don't store A but (A + 2) / 4 which is
  * the quantity actualy used in the formulas. Also, nbits is not the size of N
  * but the required size for private keys.
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 94522a4..c9ab62f 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -99,17 +99,16 @@
                 const mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
                 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
 {
-    int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
+    int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
     ecp_point R;
-    mpi k, e;
+    mpi k, e, t;
 
     /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
     if( grp->N.p == NULL )
         return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     ecp_point_init( &R );
-    mpi_init( &k );
-    mpi_init( &e );
+    mpi_init( &k ); mpi_init( &e ); mpi_init( &t );
 
     sign_tries = 0;
     do
@@ -138,10 +137,30 @@
         MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
 
         /*
-         * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k mod n
+         * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
+         * avoiding a potential timing leak.
+         */
+        blind_tries = 0;
+        do
+        {
+            size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8;
+            MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+            MPI_CHK( mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
+
+            /* See ecp_gen_keypair() */
+            if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
+                return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
+        }
+        while( mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
+               mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
+
+        /*
+         * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
          */
         MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
         MPI_CHK( mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
+        MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
+        MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
         MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
         MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
         MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
@@ -156,8 +175,7 @@
 
 cleanup:
     ecp_point_free( &R );
-    mpi_free( &k );
-    mpi_free( &e );
+    mpi_free( &k ); mpi_free( &e ); mpi_free( &t );
 
     return( ret );
 }