diff --git a/include/polarssl/ecdh.h b/include/polarssl/ecdh.h
index 2184ab9..d91aea5 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ecdh.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ecdh.h
@@ -70,12 +70,20 @@
  * \param z         Destination MPI (shared secret)
  * \param Q         Public key from other party
  * \param d         Our secret exponent
+ * \param f_rng     RNG function (see notes)
+ * \param p_rng     RNG parameter
  *
  * \return          0 if successful,
  *                  or a POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_XXX or POLARSSL_MPI_XXX error code
+ *
+ * \note            If f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement
+ *                  countermeasures against potential elaborate timing
+ *                  attacks, see \c ecp_mul() for details.
  */
 int ecdh_compute_shared( const ecp_group *grp, mpi *z,
-                         const ecp_point *Q, const mpi *d );
+                         const ecp_point *Q, const mpi *d,
+                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                         void *p_rng );
 
 /**
  * \brief           Initialize context
@@ -156,11 +164,15 @@
  * \param olen      number of bytes written
  * \param buf       destination buffer
  * \param blen      buffer length
+ * \param f_rng     RNG function, see notes for \c ecdh_compute_shared()
+ * \param p_rng     RNG parameter
  *
  * \return          0 if successful, or an POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_XXX error code
  */
 int ecdh_calc_secret( ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
-                      unsigned char *buf, size_t blen );
+                      unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                      void *p_rng );
 
 /**
  * \brief          Checkup routine
diff --git a/include/polarssl/ecp.h b/include/polarssl/ecp.h
index ad31bff..5942231 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ecp.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ecp.h
@@ -411,17 +411,29 @@
  * \param R         Destination point
  * \param m         Integer by which to multiply
  * \param P         Point to multiply
+ * \param f_rng     RNG function (see notes)
+ * \param p_rng     RNG parameter
  *
  * \return          0 if successful,
  *                  POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
- *                  POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_GENERIC if m < 0 of m has greater bit
- *                  length than N, the number of points in the group.
+ *                  POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if m < 0 of m has greater
+ *                  bit length than N, the number of points in the group.
  *
- * \note            This function executes a constant number of operations
- *                  for random m in the allowed range.
+ * \note            In order to prevent simple timing attacks, this function
+ *                  executes a constant number of operations (that is, point
+ *                  doubling and addition of distinct points) for random m in
+ *                  the allowed range.
+ *
+ * \note            If f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize projective
+ *                  coordinates of indermediate results, in order to prevent
+ *                  more elaborate timing attacks relying on intermediate
+ *                  operations. (This is a prophylactic measure since so such
+ *                  attack has been published yet.)
  */
 int ecp_mul( const ecp_group *grp, ecp_point *R,
-             const mpi *m, const ecp_point *P );
+             const mpi *m, const ecp_point *P,
+             int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
+
 
 /**
  * \brief           Check that a point is a valid public key on this curve
diff --git a/library/ecdh.c b/library/ecdh.c
index d76596e..8ef02f5 100644
--- a/library/ecdh.c
+++ b/library/ecdh.c
@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
  * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
  */
 int ecdh_compute_shared( const ecp_group *grp, mpi *z,
-                         const ecp_point *Q, const mpi *d )
+                         const ecp_point *Q, const mpi *d,
+                         int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                         void *p_rng )
 {
     int ret;
     ecp_point P;
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@
      */
     MPI_CHK( ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
 
-    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &P, d, Q ) );
+    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &P, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
 
     if( ecp_is_zero( &P ) )
     {
@@ -202,16 +204,20 @@
  * Derive and export the shared secret
  */
 int ecdh_calc_secret( ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
-                      unsigned char *buf, size_t blen )
+                      unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                      void *p_rng )
 {
     int ret;
 
     if( ctx == NULL )
         return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
-    if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d ) )
-                != 0 )
+    if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d,
+                                     f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
+    {
         return( ret );
+    }
 
     if( mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen )
         return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index 67774c9..bbdb5d5 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -161,9 +161,12 @@
 
     /*
      * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
+     *
+     * Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
+     * ecp_mul() for countermesures.
      */
-    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G ) );
-    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &P, &u2, Q ) );
+    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, NULL, NULL ) );
+    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( grp, &P, &u2, Q, NULL, NULL ) );
     MPI_CHK( ecp_add( grp, &R, &R, &P ) );
 
     if( ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 09a021b..b4ee042 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -1166,7 +1166,8 @@
  * random m in the range 0 .. 2^nbits - 1.
  */
 int ecp_mul( const ecp_group *grp, ecp_point *R,
-             const mpi *m, const ecp_point *P )
+             const mpi *m, const ecp_point *P,
+             int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
 {
     int ret;
     unsigned char w, m_is_odd;
@@ -1175,18 +1176,21 @@
     ecp_point Q, T[ MAX_PRE_LEN ];
     mpi M;
 
+    ((void) f_rng);
+    ((void) p_rng);
+
     if( mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) < 0 || mpi_msb( m ) > grp->nbits )
-        return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_GENERIC );
+        return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     w = grp->nbits >= 521 ? 6 :
         grp->nbits >= 224 ? 5 :
-        4;
+                            4;
 
     /*
      * Make sure w is within the limits.
      * The last test ensures that none of the precomputed points is zero,
      * which wouldn't be handled correctly by ecp_normalize_many().
-     * It is only useful for small curves, as used in the test suite.
+     * It is only useful for very small curves, as used in the test suite.
      */
     if( w > POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE )
         w = POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE;
@@ -1348,7 +1352,7 @@
     }
     while( mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 );
 
-    return( ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, &grp->G ) );
+    return( ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
 }
 
 #if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST)
@@ -1402,12 +1406,12 @@
 #endif /* POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
 
     if( verbose != 0 )
-        printf( "  ECP test #1 (SPA resistance): " );
+        printf( "  ECP test #1 (resistance to simple timing attacks): " );
 
     add_count = 0;
     dbl_count = 0;
     MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[0] ) );
-    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G ) );
+    MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
 
     for( i = 1; i < sizeof( exponents ) / sizeof( exponents[0] ); i++ )
     {
@@ -1417,7 +1421,7 @@
         dbl_count = 0;
 
         MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &m, 16, exponents[i] ) );
-        MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G ) );
+        MPI_CHK( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) );
 
         if( add_count != add_c_prev || dbl_count != dbl_c_prev )
         {
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 0fccf34..3b9d142 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -1748,7 +1748,8 @@
         if( ( ret = ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                                       &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
                                        ssl->handshake->premaster,
-                                       POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) ) != 0 )
+                                       POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
+                                       ssl->f_rng, ssl->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
         {
             SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
             return( ret );
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 5bedcad..adf5a62 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -2410,7 +2410,8 @@
         if( ( ret = ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
                                       &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
                                        ssl->handshake->premaster,
-                                       POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) ) != 0 )
+                                       POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
+                                       ssl->f_rng, ssl->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
         {
             SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
             return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
index 5bfd63d..ba35c76 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function
@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@
                  == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_gen_public( &grp, &dB, &qB, &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info )
                  == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA,
+                                      &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB,
+                                      NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &zB ) == 0 );
 
@@ -70,9 +72,9 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &qB.Y, &check ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &check, 16, z_str ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zA, &qB, &dA, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &zA, &check ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_compute_shared( &grp, &zB, &qA, &dB, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &zB, &check ) == 0 );
 
     ecp_group_free( &grp );
@@ -107,8 +109,9 @@
                                    &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_read_public( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, 1000 ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, 1000 ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, 1000,
+                                   &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, 1000, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &srv.z, &cli.z ) == 0 );
 
     ecdh_free( &srv );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
index ce92633..55a3453 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 ecp_small_sub:0:"14":"11":0:"14":"36":0:27:30
 
 ECP small multiplication negative
-ecp_small_mul:-1:0:0:0:POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_GENERIC
+ecp_small_mul:-1:0:0:0:POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 ECP small multiplication #0
 ecp_small_mul:0:1:0:0:0
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
 ecp_small_mul:2:0:20:01:0
 
 ECP small multiplication too big
-ecp_small_mul:-1:0:0:0:POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_GENERIC
+ecp_small_mul:-1:0:0:0:POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 ECP small check pubkey #1
 ecp_small_check_pub:1:1:0:POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_GENERIC
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
index 62c5de2..5b1ab60 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function
@@ -101,17 +101,33 @@
     ecp_group grp;
     ecp_point R;
     mpi m;
+    rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
 
     ecp_group_init( &grp );
     ecp_point_init( &R );
     mpi_init( &m );
+    memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( rnd_pseudo_info ) );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_group_read_string( &grp, 10,
                 "47", "4", "17", "42", "13" ) == 0 );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_lset( &m, m_str ) == 0 );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G ) == ret );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == ret );
+
+    if( r_zero )
+        TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_int( &R.Z, 0 ) == 0 );
+    else
+    {
+        TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_int( &R.X, x_r ) == 0 );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_int( &R.Y, y_r ) == 0 );
+    }
+
+    /* try again with randomization */
+    ecp_point_free( &R );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
+                          &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == ret );
 
     if( r_zero )
         TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_int( &R.Z, 0 ) == 0 );
@@ -158,10 +174,12 @@
     ecp_group grp;
     ecp_point R;
     mpi dA, xA, yA, dB, xB, yB, xZ, yZ;
+    rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
 
     ecp_group_init( &grp ); ecp_point_init( &R );
     mpi_init( &dA ); mpi_init( &xA ); mpi_init( &yA ); mpi_init( &dB );
     mpi_init( &xB ); mpi_init( &yB ); mpi_init( &xZ ); mpi_init( &yZ );
+    memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( rnd_pseudo_info ) );
 
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_use_known_dp( &grp, id ) == 0 );
 
@@ -176,20 +194,22 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &xZ, 16, xZ_str ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &yZ, 16, yZ_str ) == 0 );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &grp.G,
+                          &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xA ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yA ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &R, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
 
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dB, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xB ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yB ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &dA, &R,
+                          &rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, &xZ ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.Y, &yZ ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( ecp_check_pubkey( &grp, &R ) == 0 );