diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index 2af4032..5e7c860 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -348,6 +348,9 @@
  * with the key in volatile memory. The key slot in persistent storage is
  * not affected and can be opened again later with psa_open_key().
  *
+ * If the key is currently in use in a multipart operation,
+ * the multipart operation is aborted.
+ *
  * \param handle        The key handle to close.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -430,6 +433,9 @@
  * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees all
  * resources associated with the key.
  *
+ * If the key is currently in use in a multipart operation,
+ * the multipart operation is aborted.
+ *
  * \param handle        Handle to the key slot to erase.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
@@ -485,6 +491,106 @@
                                      size_t *bits);
 
 /**
+ * \brief Set domain parameters for a key.
+ *
+ * Some key types require additional domain parameters to be set before import
+ * or generation of the key. The domain parameters can be set with this
+ * function or, for key generation, through the \c extra parameter of
+ * psa_generate_key().
+ *
+ * The format for the required domain parameters varies by the key type.
+ * - For DSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY),
+ *   the `Dss-Parms` format as defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.2.
+ *   ```
+ *   Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE  {
+ *      p       INTEGER,
+ *      q       INTEGER,
+ *      g       INTEGER
+ *   }
+ *   ```
+ * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY), the
+ *   `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.3.
+ *   ```
+ *   DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      p               INTEGER,                    -- odd prime, p=jq +1
+ *      g               INTEGER,                    -- generator, g
+ *      q               INTEGER,                    -- factor of p-1
+ *      j               INTEGER OPTIONAL,           -- subgroup factor
+ *      validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL
+ *   }
+ *   ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      seed            BIT STRING,
+ *      pgenCounter     INTEGER
+ *   }
+ *   ```
+ *
+ * \param handle      Handle to the slot where the key will be stored.
+ *                    This must be a valid slot for a key of the chosen
+ *                    type: it must have been obtained by calling
+ *                    psa_allocate_key() or psa_create_key() with the
+ *                    correct \p type and with a maximum size that is
+ *                    compatible with \p data. It must not contain
+ *                    key material yet.
+ * \param type        Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). When
+ *                    subsequently creating key material into \p handle,
+ *                    the type must be compatible.
+ * \param[in] data    Buffer containing the key domain parameters. The content
+ *                    of this buffer is interpreted according to \p type. of
+ *                    psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for the
+ *                    chosen type.
+ * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
+ *         There is already a key in the specified slot.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                           psa_key_type_t type,
+                                           const uint8_t *data,
+                                           size_t data_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get domain parameters for a key.
+ *
+ * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format
+ * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the
+ * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters().
+ *
+ * \param handle            Handle to the key to get domain parameters from.
+ * \param[out] data         On success, the key domain parameters.
+ * \param data_size         Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] data_length  On success, the number of bytes
+ *                          that make up the key domain parameters data.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ *         There is no key in the specified slot.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                           uint8_t *data,
+                                           size_t data_size,
+                                           size_t *data_length);
+
+/**
  * \brief Export a key in binary format.
  *
  * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
@@ -519,19 +625,10 @@
  *       coefficient         INTEGER,  -- (inverse of q) mod p
  *   }
  *   ```
- * - For DSA private keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR), the format
- *   is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation used by
- *   OpenSSL and OpenSSH, whose structure is described in ASN.1 as follows:
- *   ```
- *   DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- *       version             INTEGER,  -- must be 0
- *       prime               INTEGER,  -- p
- *       subprime            INTEGER,  -- q
- *       generator           INTEGER,  -- g
- *       public              INTEGER,  -- y
- *       private             INTEGER,  -- x
- *   }
- *   ```
+ * - For DSA private keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR), the format is the
+ *   representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The
+ *   length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes
+ *   are not stripped).
  * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which
  *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR is true), the format is
  *   a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string
@@ -543,6 +640,10 @@
  *   and `PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`).
  *   This is the content of the `privateKey` field of the `ECPrivateKey`
  *   format defined by RFC 5915.
+ * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEYPAIR), the
+ *   format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte
+ *   string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes
+ *   (leading zeroes are not stripped).
  * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is
  *   true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key().
  *
@@ -582,71 +683,37 @@
  * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
  * create an object that is equivalent to the public key.
  *
- * The format is the DER representation defined by RFC 5280 as
- * `SubjectPublicKeyInfo`, with the `subjectPublicKey` format
- * specified below.
- * ```
- * SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *      algorithm          AlgorithmIdentifier,
- *      subjectPublicKey   BIT STRING  }
- * AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *      algorithm          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- *      parameters         ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL  }
- * ```
+ * This specification supports a single format for each key type.
+ * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard
+ * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats
+ * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to
+ * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted
+ * according to a different format.
  *
- * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY),
- *   the `subjectPublicKey` format is defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.1 as
- *   `RSAPublicKey`,
- *   with the OID `rsaEncryption`,
- *   and with the parameters `NULL`.
+ * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
+ * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of
+ *   the representation defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`.
  *   ```
- *   pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
- *                                  rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
- *   rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1 }
- *
  *   RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
  *      modulus            INTEGER,    -- n
  *      publicExponent     INTEGER  }  -- e
  *   ```
- * - For DSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY),
- *   the `subjectPublicKey` format is defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.2 as
- *   `DSAPublicKey`,
- *   with the OID `id-dsa`,
- *   and with the parameters `DSS-Parms`.
- *   ```
- *   id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
- *      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }
- *
- *   Dss-Parms  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *      p                  INTEGER,
- *      q                  INTEGER,
- *      g                  INTEGER  }
- *   DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y
- *   ```
  * - For elliptic curve public keys (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true),
- *   the `subjectPublicKey` format is defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.5 as
- *   `ECPoint`, which contains the uncompressed
- *   representation defined by SEC1 &sect;2.3.3.
- *   The OID is `id-ecPublicKey`,
- *   and the parameters must be given as a `namedCurve` OID as specified in
- *   RFC 5480 &sect;2.1.1.1 or other applicable standards.
- *   ```
- *   ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
- *                           { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
- *   id-public-key-type OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { ansi-X9.62 2 }
- *   id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-publicKeyType 1 }
- *
- *   ECPoint ::= ...
- *      -- first 8 bits: 0x04;
- *      -- then x_P as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big endian;
- *      -- then y_P as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big endian;
- *      -- where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve,
- *      --       i.e. the bit size of `q` for a curve over `F_q`.
- *
- *   EcpkParameters ::= CHOICE { -- other choices are not allowed
- *      namedCurve    OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
- *   ```
+ *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed
+ *   representation defined by SEC1 &sect;2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint.
+ *   Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of
+ *   `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of:
+ *      - The byte 0x04;
+ *      - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ *      - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian.
+ * - For DSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the format is the
+ *   representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte
+ *   string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p`
+ *   in bytes.
+ * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY),
+ *   the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a
+ *   big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the
+ *   base prime `p` in bytes.
  *
  * \param handle            Handle to the key to export.
  * \param[out] data         Buffer where the key data is to be written.
@@ -750,6 +817,66 @@
  * @{
  */
 
+/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message.
+ *
+ * \note To verify the hash of a message against an
+ *       expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead.
+ *
+ * \param alg               The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message to hash.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash         Buffer where the hash is to be written.
+ * \param hash_size         Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash_length  On success, the number of bytes
+ *                          that make up the hash value. This is always
+ *                          #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where \c alg is the
+ *                          hash algorithm that is calculated.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                              const uint8_t *input,
+                              size_t input_length,
+                              uint8_t *hash,
+                              size_t hash_size,
+                              size_t *hash_length);
+
+/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a
+ * reference value.
+ *
+ * \param alg               The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message to hash.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash         Buffer containing the expected hash value.
+ * \param hash_length       Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ *         differs from the expected hash.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                              const uint8_t *input,
+                              size_t input_length,
+                              const uint8_t *hash,
+                              const size_t hash_length);
+
 /** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations.
  *
  * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must
@@ -796,7 +923,7 @@
  */
 static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
 
-/** Start a multipart hash operation.
+/** Set up a multipart hash operation.
  *
  * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest)
  * is as follows:
@@ -851,7 +978,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -888,7 +1015,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg)
@@ -928,7 +1055,7 @@
  *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected hash.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -967,12 +1094,112 @@
  */
 psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
 
+/** Clone a hash operation.
+ *
+ * \param[in] source_operation      The active hash operation to clone.
+ * \param[in,out] target_operation  The operation object to set up.
+ *                                  It must be initialized but not active.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         \p source_operation is not an active hash operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         \p source_operation is active.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
+                            psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation);
+
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes
  * @{
  */
 
+/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message.
+ *
+ * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an
+ *       expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead.
+ *       Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ *       MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ *       because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ *       about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
+ *       a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param handle            Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac          Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size          Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length   On success, the number of bytes
+ *                          that make up the mac value. This is always
+ *                          #PSA_HASH_SIZE(\c alg) where \c alg is the
+ *                          hash algorithm that is calculated.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                             const uint8_t *input,
+                             size_t input_length,
+                             uint8_t *mac,
+                             size_t mac_size,
+                             size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.
+ *
+ * \param handle            Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac          Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length        Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ *         differs from the expected value.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                            psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                            const uint8_t *input,
+                            size_t input_length,
+                            const uint8_t *mac,
+                            const size_t mac_length);
+
 /** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations.
  *
  * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must
@@ -1019,7 +1246,7 @@
  */
 static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
 
-/** Start a multipart MAC calculation operation.
+/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation.
  *
  * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
  * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
@@ -1032,8 +1259,6 @@
  * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
  *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
  * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- *    The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
- *    of the key slot changes.
  * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
  *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
  *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
@@ -1052,6 +1277,8 @@
  *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
  *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
  * \param handle            Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                          It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                          terminates.
  * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
  *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
  *
@@ -1077,7 +1304,7 @@
                                 psa_key_handle_t handle,
                                 psa_algorithm_t alg);
 
-/** Start a multipart MAC verification operation.
+/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation.
  *
  * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
  * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
@@ -1088,8 +1315,6 @@
  * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
  *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
  * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- *    The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
- *    of the key slot changes.
  * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
  *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
  *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
@@ -1109,6 +1334,8 @@
  *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
  *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
  * \param handle            Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                          It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                          terminates.
  * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
  *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
  *
@@ -1149,7 +1376,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -1188,7 +1415,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
  *         sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE().
@@ -1227,7 +1454,7 @@
  *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
  *         differs from the expected MAC.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or already completed).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
@@ -1273,6 +1500,91 @@
  * @{
  */
 
+/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization
+ * vector).
+ *
+ * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
+ * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message to encrypt.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ *                              The output contains the IV followed by
+ *                              the ciphertext proper.
+ * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                const uint8_t *input,
+                                size_t input_length,
+                                uint8_t *output,
+                                size_t output_size,
+                                size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
+ * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message to decrypt.
+ *                              This consists of the IV followed by the
+ *                              ciphertext proper.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output           Buffer where the plaintext is to be written.
+ * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                const uint8_t *input,
+                                size_t input_length,
+                                uint8_t *output,
+                                size_t output_size,
+                                size_t *output_length);
+
 /** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
  *
  * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application
@@ -1329,8 +1641,6 @@
  *    documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
  *    PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
  * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- *    The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
- *    of the key slot changes.
  * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to
  *    generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use
  *    psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing
@@ -1345,14 +1655,15 @@
  * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must
  * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
  * operation:
- * - A failed call to psa_cipher_generate_iv(), psa_cipher_set_iv()
- *   or psa_cipher_update().
+ * - A failed call to any of the \c psa_cipher_xxx functions.
  * - A call to psa_cipher_finish() or psa_cipher_abort().
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
  *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
  *                              #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
  * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
  * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
  *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
@@ -1389,9 +1700,7 @@
  *    documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
  *    PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
  * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- *    The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
- *    of the key slot changes.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_update() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
  *    decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call
  *    psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the
  *    beginning of the message.
@@ -1405,13 +1714,15 @@
  * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must
  * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
  * operation:
- * - A failed call to psa_cipher_update().
+ * - A failed call to any of the \c psa_cipher_xxx functions.
  * - A call to psa_cipher_finish() or psa_cipher_abort().
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
  *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
  *                              #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
  * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
  * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
  *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
@@ -1458,7 +1769,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or IV already set).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
@@ -1473,7 +1784,7 @@
 
 /** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.
  *
- * This function sets the random IV (initialization vector), nonce
+ * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce
  * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation.
  *
  * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
@@ -1492,7 +1803,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, or IV already set).
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or IV already set).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
  *         or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
@@ -1528,7 +1839,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, IV required but
  *         not set, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
@@ -1566,7 +1877,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (not started, IV required but
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, IV required but
  *         not set, or already completed).
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
@@ -1732,6 +2043,515 @@
                               size_t plaintext_size,
                               size_t *plaintext_length);
 
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application
+ * must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_aead_operation_t operation;
+ *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0};
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT,
+ *   for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init()
+ *   to the structure, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_aead_operation_t operation;
+ *   operation = psa_aead_operation_init();
+ *   \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except
+ * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
+typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of
+ * type #psa_aead_operation_t.
+ */
+#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
+/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes.
+ * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0}
+#endif
+
+/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object.
+ */
+static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ *    listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ *    documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
+ *    PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
+ *    inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
+ *    psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
+ *    for details.
+ * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to
+ *    generate or set the nonce. You should use
+ *    psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing
+ *    requires a specific nonce value.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the message to encrypt each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_finish().
+ *
+ * The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A failed call to any of the \c psa_aead_xxx functions.
+ * - A call to psa_aead_finish(), psa_aead_verify() or psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                              #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
+ * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                    psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ *    listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ *    documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
+ *    PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
+ *    inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
+ *    psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
+ *    for details.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the ciphertext to decrypt each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_verify().
+ *
+ * The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A failed call to any of the \c psa_aead_xxx functions.
+ * - A call to psa_aead_finish(), psa_aead_verify() or psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                              #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param handle                Handle to the key to use for the operation.
+ *                              It must remain valid until the operation
+ *                              terminates.
+ * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                    psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption
+ * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type
+ * and key size.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before
+ * calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] nonce            Buffer where the generated nonce is to be
+ *                              written.
+ * \param nonce_size            Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] nonce_length     On success, the number of bytes of the
+ *                              generated nonce.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or nonce already set).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                     unsigned char *nonce,
+                                     size_t nonce_size,
+                                     size_t *nonce_length);
+
+/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before
+ * calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce()
+ * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
+ * a non-random IV.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] nonce             Buffer containing the nonce to use.
+ * \param nonce_length          Size of the nonce in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, or nonce already set).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                const unsigned char *nonce,
+                                size_t nonce_length);
+
+/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.
+ *
+ * The application must call this function before calling
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for
+ * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it,
+ * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called
+ * then the implementation must enforce the lengths.
+ *
+ * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with
+ * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
+ * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling
+ *   this function is not required.
+ * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param ad_length             Size of the non-encrypted additional
+ *                              authenticated data in bytes.
+ * \param plaintext_length      Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, already completed,
+ *         or psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() already called).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen
+ *         algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                  size_t ad_length,
+                                  size_t plaintext_length);
+
+/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted.
+ *
+ * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments
+ * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing
+ * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, you must:
+ * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ *          there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
+ *          you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ *          treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that
+ *          depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the fragment of
+ *                              additional data.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, nonce not set,
+ *         psa_aead_update() already called, or operation already completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total input length overflows the additional data length that
+ *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                                const uint8_t *input,
+                                size_t input_length);
+
+/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, you must:
+ * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ *    The choice of setup function determines whether this function
+ *    encrypts or decrypts its input.
+ * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ *          there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
+ *          you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS:
+ *          - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a
+ *            confidential location. If you take any action that depends
+ *            on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be
+ *            undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore,
+ *            if an adversary can observe that this action took place
+ *            (for example through timing), they may be able to use this
+ *            fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the
+ *            same key.
+ *          - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a
+ *            memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message fragment to
+ *                              encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, nonce not set
+ *         or already completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ *         less than the additional data length that was previously
+ *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total input length overflows the plaintext length that
+ *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                             const uint8_t *input,
+                             size_t input_length,
+                             unsigned char *output,
+                             size_t output_size,
+                             size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
+ *
+ * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data
+ * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the
+ * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * This function has two output buffers:
+ * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from
+ *   preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). For all standard AEAD algorithms,
+ *   psa_aead_update() does not buffer any output and therefore \p ciphertext
+ *   will not contain any output and can be a 0-sized buffer.
+ * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. Its length is always
+ *   #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p alg) where \p alg is the AEAD algorithm
+ *   that the operation performs.
+ *
+ * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext       Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext
+ *                              is to be written.
+ * \param ciphertext_size       Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of
+ *                              returned ciphertext.
+ * \param[out] tag              Buffer where the authentication tag is
+ *                              to be written.
+ * \param tag_size              Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] tag_length       On success, the number of bytes
+ *                              that make up the returned tag.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, nonce not set,
+ *         decryption, or already completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ *         less than the additional data length that was previously
+ *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
+ *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
+ *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                             uint8_t *ciphertext,
+                             size_t ciphertext_size,
+                             size_t *ciphertext_length,
+                             uint8_t *tag,
+                             size_t tag_size,
+                             size_t *tag_length);
+
+/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ *
+ * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data
+ * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() with the ciphertext formed by concatenating the
+ * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * When this function returns, the operation becomes inactive.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] tag               Buffer containing the authentication tag.
+ * \param tag_length            Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (not set up, nonce not set,
+ *         encryption, or already completed).
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ *         less than the additional data length that was previously
+ *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
+ *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
+ *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+                             const uint8_t *tag,
+                             size_t tag_length);
+
+/** Abort an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized by any of the following methods:
+ * - A call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(),
+ *   whether it succeeds or not.
+ * - Initializing the \c struct to all-bits-zero.
+ * - Initializing the \c struct to logical zeros, e.g.
+ *   `psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}`.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort() or psa_aead_finish()
+ * is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         \p operation is not an active AEAD operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation);
+
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography
@@ -2009,6 +2829,22 @@
 psa_status_t psa_get_generator_capacity(const psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
                                         size_t *capacity);
 
+/** Set the maximum capacity of a generator.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] generator The generator object to modify.
+ * \param capacity          The new capacity of the generator.
+ *                          It must be less or equal to the generator's
+ *                          current capacity.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p capacity is larger than the generator's current capacity.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_set_generator_capacity(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                        size_t capacity);
+
 /** Read some data from a generator.
  *
  * This function reads and returns a sequence of bytes from a generator.
@@ -2133,37 +2969,36 @@
 
 /** Set up a key derivation operation.
  *
- * A key derivation algorithm takes three inputs: a secret input \p key and
- * two non-secret inputs \p label and p salt.
- * The result of this function is a byte generator which can
- * be used to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
+ * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to create
+ * a byte generator which can be used to produce keys and other
+ * cryptographic material.
  *
- * The role of \p label and \p salt is as follows:
- * - For HKDF (#PSA_ALG_HKDF), \p salt is the salt used in the "extract" step
- *   and \p label is the info string used in the "expand" step.
+ * To use a generator for key derivation:
+ * - Start with an initialized object of type #psa_crypto_generator_t.
+ * - Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm.
+ * - Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling
+ *   psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key()
+ *   as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether
+ *   they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm.
+ * - Optionally set the generator's maximum capacity with
+ *   psa_set_generator_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle of
+ *   or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory
+ *   because the output depends on the maximum capacity.
+ * - Generate output with psa_generator_read() or
+ *   psa_generator_import_key(). Successive calls to these functions
+ *   use successive output bytes from the generator.
+ * - Clean up the generator object with psa_generator_abort().
  *
- * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to set up. It must have
- *                                been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                                #psa_crypto_generator_t and not yet in use.
- * \param handle                  Handle to the secret key.
+ * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to set up. It must
+ *                                have been initialized but not set up yet.
  * \param alg                     The key derivation algorithm to compute
  *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] salt                Salt to use.
- * \param salt_length             Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] label               Label to use.
- * \param label_length            Size of the \p label buffer in bytes.
- * \param capacity                The maximum number of bytes that the
- *                                generator will be able to provide.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c key is not compatible with \c alg,
- *         or \p capacity is too large for the specified algorithm and key.
+ *         \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
@@ -2171,42 +3006,130 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function passes direct inputs. Some inputs must be passed as keys
+ * using psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. Refer to
+ * the documentation of individual step types for information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to use. It must
+ *                                have been set up with
+ *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ *                                have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param[in] data                Input data to use.
+ * \param data_length             Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c step is not compatible with the generator's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c step does not allow direct inputs.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The value of \p step is not valid given the state of \p generator.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
-                                psa_key_handle_t handle,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                const uint8_t *salt,
-                                size_t salt_length,
-                                const uint8_t *label,
-                                size_t label_length,
-                                size_t capacity);
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                            psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+                                            const uint8_t *data,
+                                            size_t data_length);
 
-/** Set up a key agreement operation.
+/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function passes key inputs. Some inputs must be passed as keys
+ * of the appropriate type using this function, while others must be
+ * passed as direct inputs using psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(). Refer to
+ * the documentation of individual step types for information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to use. It must
+ *                                have been set up with
+ *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ *                                have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param handle                  Handle to the key. It must have an
+ *                                appropriate type for \p step and must
+ *                                allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c step is not compatible with the generator's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c step does not allow key inputs.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The value of \p step is not valid given the state of \p generator.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                          psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+                                          psa_key_handle_t handle);
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key
+ * derivation.
  *
  * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key
  * a public key \p peer_key.
- * The result of this function is a byte generator which can
- * be used to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
+ * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation.
+ * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the
+ * resulting generator to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
  *
- * The resulting generator always has the maximum capacity permitted by
- * the algorithm.
- *
- * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to set up. It must have
- *                                been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                                #psa_crypto_generator_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to use. It must
+ *                                have been set up with
+ *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() with a
+ *                                key agreement and derivation algorithm
+ *                                \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) is true
+ *                                and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg)
+ *                                is false).
+ *                                The generator must be ready for an
+ *                                input of the type given by \p step.
+ * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
  * \param private_key             Handle to the private key to use.
- * \param[in] peer_key            Public key of the peer. It must be
- *                                in the same format that psa_import_key()
- *                                accepts. The standard formats for public
- *                                keys are documented in the documentation
- *                                of psa_export_public_key().
+ * \param[in] peer_key      Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the
+ *                          same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the
+ *                          public key type corresponding to the type of
+ *                          private_key. That is, this function performs the
+ *                          equivalent of
+ *                          `psa_import_key(internal_public_key_handle,
+ *                          PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(private_key_type),
+ *                          peer_key, peer_key_length)` where
+ *                          `private_key_type` is the type of `private_key`.
+ *                          For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key
+ *                          is interpreted as a point on the curve that the
+ *                          private key is on. The standard formats for public
+ *                          keys are documented in the documentation of
+ *                          psa_export_public_key().
  * \param peer_key_length         Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
- * \param alg                     The key agreement algorithm to compute
- *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) is true).
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
@@ -2225,10 +3148,62 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
  */
 psa_status_t psa_key_agreement(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                               psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                psa_key_handle_t private_key,
                                const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                               size_t peer_key_length,
-                               psa_algorithm_t alg);
+                               size_t peer_key_length);
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key
+ * derivation.
+ *
+ * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key
+ * a public key \p peer_key.
+ *
+ * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field
+ * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should
+ * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as
+ * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with
+ * a key derivation, use psa_key_agreement() and other functions from
+ * the key derivation and generator interface.
+ *
+ * \param private_key             Handle to the private key to use.
+ * \param[in] peer_key            Public key of the peer. It must be
+ *                                in the same format that psa_import_key()
+ *                                accepts. The standard formats for public
+ *                                keys are documented in the documentation
+ *                                of psa_export_public_key().
+ * \param peer_key_length         Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output             Buffer where the decrypted message is to
+ *                                be written.
+ * \param output_size             Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length      On success, the number of bytes
+ *                                that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
+ *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with
+ *         \p private_key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_shared_secret(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                                 psa_key_handle_t private_key,
+                                                 const uint8_t *peer_key,
+                                                 size_t peer_key_length,
+                                                 uint8_t *output,
+                                                 size_t output_size,
+                                                 size_t *output_length);
 
 /**@}*/
 
@@ -2301,6 +3276,18 @@
  *                            specifying the public exponent. The
  *                            default public exponent used when \p extra
  *                            is \c NULL is 65537.
+ *                          - For an DSA key (\p type is
+ *                            #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR), \p extra is an
+ *                            optional structure specifying the key domain
+ *                            parameters. The key domain parameters can also be
+ *                            provided by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(),
+ *                            which documents the format of the structure.
+ *                          - For a DH key (\p type is
+ *                            #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEYPAIR), the \p extra is an
+ *                            optional structure specifying the key domain
+ *                            parameters. The key domain parameters can also be
+ *                            provided by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(),
+ *                            which documents the format of the structure.
  * \param extra_size        Size of the buffer that \p extra
  *                          points to, in bytes. Note that if \p extra is
  *                          \c NULL then \p extra_size must be zero.
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index 7f08857..a0eac4d 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -120,6 +120,64 @@
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed,
                                         size_t seed_size);
 
+/** Set up a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * FIMXE This function is no longer part of the official API. Its prototype
+ * is only kept around for the sake of tests that haven't been updated yet.
+ *
+ * A key derivation algorithm takes three inputs: a secret input \p key and
+ * two non-secret inputs \p label and p salt.
+ * The result of this function is a byte generator which can
+ * be used to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
+ *
+ * The role of \p label and \p salt is as follows:
+ * - For HKDF (#PSA_ALG_HKDF), \p salt is the salt used in the "extract" step
+ *   and \p label is the info string used in the "expand" step.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] generator       The generator object to set up. It must have
+ *                                been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                                #psa_crypto_generator_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param handle                  Handle to the secret key.
+ * \param alg                     The key derivation algorithm to compute
+ *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] salt                Salt to use.
+ * \param salt_length             Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] label               Label to use.
+ * \param label_length            Size of the \p label buffer in bytes.
+ * \param capacity                The maximum number of bytes that the
+ *                                generator will be able to provide.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c key is not compatible with \c alg,
+ *         or \p capacity is too large for the specified algorithm and key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation(psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                psa_key_handle_t handle,
+                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                const uint8_t *salt,
+                                size_t salt_length,
+                                const uint8_t *label,
+                                size_t label_length,
+                                size_t capacity);
+
+/* FIXME Deprecated. Remove this as soon as all the tests are updated. */
+#define PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW                      ((psa_algorithm_t)0x31000001)
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
index 5ad695a..d4182f5 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
@@ -268,6 +268,27 @@
      (plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) :              \
      0)
 
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_finish(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
+ * the ciphertext may be smaller.
+ *
+ * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
+ *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return                    The maximum trailing ciphertext size for the
+ *                            specified algorithm.
+ *                            If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
+ *                            An implementation may return either 0 or a
+ *                            correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
+ *                            recognizes, but does not support.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, plaintext_length)      \
+    ((size_t)0)
+
 /** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.
  *
  * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
index ee3ecd7..2414ad5 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@@ -152,6 +152,27 @@
     return( v );
 }
 
+struct psa_aead_operation_s
+{
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+    unsigned int key_set : 1;
+    unsigned int iv_set : 1;
+    uint8_t iv_size;
+    uint8_t block_size;
+    union
+    {
+        unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */
+        mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher;
+    } ctx;
+};
+
+#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}}
+static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void )
+{
+    const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+    return( v );
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
 typedef struct
 {
@@ -165,6 +186,8 @@
 #endif
     uint8_t offset_in_block;
     uint8_t block_number;
+    uint8_t state : 2;
+    uint8_t info_set : 1;
 } psa_hkdf_generator_t;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
 
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
index 9b44d6a..637e07c 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_types.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
@@ -98,4 +98,13 @@
 
 /**@}*/
 
+/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. */
+typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
index f072487..e6909af 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -497,6 +497,15 @@
 #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519        ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001d)
 #define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448          ((psa_ecc_curve_t) 0x001e)
 
+/** Diffie-Hellman key exchange public key. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY             ((psa_key_type_t)0x60040000)
+/** Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pair (private and public key). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEYPAIR                ((psa_key_type_t)0x70040000)
+/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange key (pair or
+ * public-only). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)                                       \
+    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
+
 /** The block size of a block cipher.
  *
  * \param type  A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
@@ -531,9 +540,8 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD                   ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN                   ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION  ((psa_algorithm_t)0x12000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT          ((psa_algorithm_t)0x22000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION         ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_SELECTION          ((psa_algorithm_t)0x31000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION         ((psa_algorithm_t)0x20000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT          ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000000)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg)                                  \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
@@ -1161,11 +1169,20 @@
      ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :      \
      0)
 
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000100)
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x20000100)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - #PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
+ *   It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
+ * - #PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
+ * - #PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
+ * You must pass #PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT before #PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET.
+ * You may pass #PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO at any time after steup and before
+ * starting to generate output.
+ *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
@@ -1191,7 +1208,7 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE                     ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000200)
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE                  ((psa_algorithm_t)0x20000200)
 /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
  *
  * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
@@ -1230,7 +1247,7 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30000300)
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE            ((psa_algorithm_t)0x20000300)
 /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
  *
  * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
@@ -1270,51 +1287,48 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t)0x010fffff)
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t)0x080fffff)
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK              ((psa_algorithm_t)0x10f00000)
 
-/** Use a shared secret as is.
+/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
+ * a key derivation.
  *
- * Specify this algorithm as the selection component of a key agreement
- * to use the raw result of the key agreement as key material.
+ * \param ka_alg        A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
+ *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
+ * \param kdf_alg       A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
+ *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
  *
- * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field
- * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should
- * not be used directly as key material. It can however be used as the secret
- * input in a key derivation algorithm.
+ * \return              The corresponding key agreement and derivation
+ *                      algorithm.
+ * \return              Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
+ *                      key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
+ *                      supported key derivation algorithm.
  */
-#define PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW                      ((psa_algorithm_t)0x31000001)
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg)  \
+    ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg)                              \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
 
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)                              \
-    ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK)
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)                             \
+    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
 
-#define PSA_ALG_FFDH_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x22100000)
-/** The Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm.
- *
- * This algorithm combines the finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
- * agreement, also known as Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key agreement,
- * to produce a shared secret from a private key and the peer's
- * public key, with a key selection or key derivation algorithm to produce
- * one or more shared keys and other shared cryptographic material.
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)                               \
+    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg)     \
+    ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
+
+/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
  *
  * The shared secret produced by key agreement and passed as input to the
  * derivation or selection algorithm \p kdf_alg is the shared secret
  * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
  * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
  * in bits.
- *
- * \param kdf_alg       A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p hash_alg) is true)
- *                      or a key selection algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The Diffie-Hellman algorithm with the specified
- *                      selection or derivation algorithm.
  */
-#define PSA_ALG_FFDH(kdf_alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_FFDH_BASE | ((kdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_FFDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30100000)
+
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
  *
  * This includes every supported key selection or key agreement algorithm
@@ -1327,18 +1341,11 @@
  *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH_BASE)
+    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH)
 
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDH_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x22200000)
 /** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
  *
- * This algorithm combines the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
- * agreement to produce a shared secret from a private key and the peer's
- * public key, with a key selection or key derivation algorithm to produce
- * one or more shared keys and other shared cryptographic material.
- *
- * The shared secret produced by key agreement and passed as input to the
- * derivation or selection algorithm \p kdf_alg is the x-coordinate of
+ * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
  * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
  * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
  * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
@@ -1360,17 +1367,9 @@
  *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
  *   in big-endian byte order.
  *   The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
- *
- * \param kdf_alg       A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p hash_alg) is true)
- *                      or a selection algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The Diffie-Hellman algorithm with the specified
- *                      selection or derivation algorithm.
  */
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDH(kdf_alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_ECDH_BASE | ((kdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t)0x30200000)
+
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
  * algorithm.
  *
@@ -1385,7 +1384,25 @@
  *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH_BASE)
+    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
+ *
+ * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
+ * a policy, not to perform an operation.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
+ * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
+ *         an operation).
+ * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ *         algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)                        \
+    (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                    \
+     PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH :   \
+     (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
  *
@@ -1497,4 +1514,34 @@
 
 /**@}*/
 
+/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** A secret input for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This must be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE.
+ */
+#define PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET              ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101)
+
+/** A label for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This must be a direct input.
+ */
+#define PSA_KDF_STEP_LABEL               ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201)
+
+/** A salt for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This must be a direct input.
+ */
+#define PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT                ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202)
+
+/** An information string for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This must be a direct input.
+ */
+#define PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO                ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203)
+
+/**@}*/
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index eb4d433..f3eedde 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/arc4.h"
 #include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
 #include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
 #include "mbedtls/blowfish.h"
 #include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
@@ -511,50 +512,112 @@
     return( status );
 }
 
-static psa_status_t psa_import_rsa_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+static psa_status_t psa_import_rsa_key( psa_key_type_t type,
+                                        const uint8_t *data,
+                                        size_t data_length,
                                         mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa )
 {
-    if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    psa_status_t status;
+    mbedtls_pk_context pk;
+    mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa;
+    size_t bits;
+
+    mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
+
+    /* Parse the data. */
+    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR( type ) )
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) );
     else
+        status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+            mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, data, data_length ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a
+     * valid RSA key, store it. */
+    if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
     {
-        mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk );
-        /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8.
-         * Mbed TLS supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well.
-         * For example, mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in
-         * bytes, not in bits. */
-        size_t bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
-        psa_status_t status;
-        if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-        status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( rsa );
-        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-            return( status );
-        *p_rsa = rsa;
-        return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto exit;
     }
+
+    rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( pk );
+    /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS
+     * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example,
+     * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */
+    bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) );
+    if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS )
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+    status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( rsa );
+
+exit:
+    /* Free the content of the pk object only on error. */
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
+        return( status );
+    }
+
+    /* On success, store the content of the object in the RSA context. */
+    *p_rsa = rsa;
+
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
-/* Import an elliptic curve parsed by the mbedtls pk module. */
-static psa_status_t psa_import_ecp_key( psa_ecc_curve_t expected_curve,
-                                        mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
-                                        mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+
+/* Import a public key given as the uncompressed representation defined by SEC1
+ * 2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. */
+static psa_status_t psa_import_ec_public_key( psa_ecc_curve_t curve,
+                                              const uint8_t *data,
+                                              size_t data_length,
+                                              mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp )
 {
-    if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-    else
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve );
+
+    *p_ecp = NULL;
+    ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ecp ) );
+    if( ecp == NULL )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp );
+
+    /* Load the group. */
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+    /* Load the public value. */
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q,
+                                       data, data_length ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    /* Check that the point is on the curve. */
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    *p_ecp = ecp;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+exit:
+    if( ecp != NULL )
     {
-        mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk );
-        psa_ecc_curve_t actual_curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ecp->grp.id );
-        if( actual_curve != expected_curve )
-            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-        *p_ecp = ecp;
-        return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+        mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+        mbedtls_free( ecp );
     }
+    return( status );
 }
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
 /* Import a private key given as a byte string which is the private value
@@ -572,6 +635,7 @@
     ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) );
     if( ecp == NULL )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp );
 
     /* Load the group. */
     status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
@@ -637,63 +701,33 @@
         status = psa_import_ec_private_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( slot->type ),
                                             data, data_length,
                                             &slot->data.ecp );
-        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-            return( status );
     }
-    else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
-    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->type ) ||
-        PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->type ) )
+    else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->type ) )
     {
-        int ret;
-        mbedtls_pk_context pk;
-        mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
-
-        /* Parse the data. */
-        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR( slot->type ) )
-            ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pk, data, data_length, NULL, 0 );
-        else
-            ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, data, data_length );
-        if( ret != 0 )
-            return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
-
-        /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes.
-         * If it has the expected type and passes any type-specific
-         * checks, store it. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->type ) )
-            status = psa_import_rsa_key( &pk, &slot->data.rsa );
-        else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-        if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( slot->type ) )
-            status = psa_import_ecp_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( slot->type ),
-                                         &pk, &slot->data.ecp );
-        else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
-        {
-            status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-        }
-
-        /* Free the content of the pk object only on error. On success,
-         * the content of the object has been stored in the slot. */
-        if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        {
-            mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
-            return( status );
-        }
+        status = psa_import_ec_public_key(
+            PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( slot->type ),
+            data, data_length,
+            &slot->data.ecp );
     }
     else
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+    if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->type ) )
+    {
+        status = psa_import_rsa_key( slot->type,
+            data, data_length,
+            &slot->data.rsa );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) */
     {
         return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
     }
-    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+    return( status );
 }
 
 /* Retrieve an empty key slot (slot with no key data, but possibly
- * with some metadata such as a policy). */
+ * with some metadata such as a policy or domain parameters). */
 static psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_handle_t handle,
                                             psa_key_slot_t **p_slot )
 {
@@ -847,11 +881,18 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 
+static void psa_abort_operations_using_key( psa_key_slot_t *slot )
+{
+    /*TODO*/
+    (void) slot;
+}
+
 /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
  * Persistent storage is not affected. */
 psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot )
 {
     psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot );
+    psa_abort_operations_using_key( slot );
     /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has
      * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not
      * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */
@@ -961,6 +1002,22 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+static int pk_write_pubkey_simple( mbedtls_pk_context *key,
+                                   unsigned char *buf, size_t size )
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *c;
+    size_t len = 0;
+
+    c = buf + size;
+
+    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) );
+
+    return( (int) len );
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) */
+
 static psa_status_t psa_internal_export_key( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
                                              uint8_t *data,
                                              size_t data_size,
@@ -1031,9 +1088,13 @@
 #endif
             }
             if( export_public_key || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->type ) )
-                ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &pk, data, data_size );
+            {
+                ret = pk_write_pubkey_simple( &pk, data, data_size );
+            }
             else
+            {
                 ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size );
+            }
             if( ret < 0 )
             {
                 /* If data_size is 0 then data may be NULL and then the
@@ -1543,6 +1604,67 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 
+psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
+                            psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation)
+{
+    if( target_operation->alg != 0 )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    switch( source_operation->alg )
+    {
+        case 0:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_MD2:
+            mbedtls_md2_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md2,
+                               &source_operation->ctx.md2 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_MD4:
+            mbedtls_md4_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md4,
+                               &source_operation->ctx.md4 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_MD5:
+            mbedtls_md5_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md5,
+                               &source_operation->ctx.md5 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
+            mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( &target_operation->ctx.ripemd160,
+                                     &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
+            mbedtls_sha1_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha1,
+                                &source_operation->ctx.sha1 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
+        case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
+            mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256,
+                                  &source_operation->ctx.sha256 );
+            break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+        case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
+        case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
+            mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512,
+                                  &source_operation->ctx.sha512 );
+            break;
+#endif
+        default:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+
+    target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
 
 
 /****************************************************************/
@@ -3168,7 +3290,7 @@
     uint8_t tag_length;
 } aead_operation_t;
 
-static void psa_aead_abort( aead_operation_t *operation )
+static void psa_aead_abort_internal( aead_operation_t *operation )
 {
     switch( operation->core_alg )
     {
@@ -3255,7 +3377,7 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 
 cleanup:
-    psa_aead_abort( operation );
+    psa_aead_abort_internal( operation );
     return( status );
 }
 
@@ -3326,7 +3448,7 @@
         memset( ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size );
 
 exit:
-    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation );
     if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
         *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length;
     return( status );
@@ -3423,7 +3545,7 @@
         memset( plaintext, 0, plaintext_size );
 
 exit:
-    psa_aead_abort( &operation );
+    psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation );
     if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
         *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length;
     return( status );
@@ -3435,17 +3557,33 @@
 /* Generators */
 /****************************************************************/
 
+#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */
+#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */
+#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */
+#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */
+
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_generator_get_kdf_alg(
+    const psa_crypto_generator_t *generator )
+{
+    if ( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( generator->alg ) )
+        return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( generator->alg ) );
+    else
+        return( generator->alg );
+}
+
+
 psa_status_t psa_generator_abort( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator )
 {
     psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
-    if( generator->alg == 0 )
+    psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_generator_get_kdf_alg( generator );
+    if( kdf_alg == 0 )
     {
         /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not
          * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
          * nothing to do. */
     }
     else
-    if( generator->alg == PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW )
+    if( kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW )
     {
         if( generator->ctx.buffer.data != NULL )
         {
@@ -3456,14 +3594,14 @@
     }
     else
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( generator->alg ) )
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
     {
         mbedtls_free( generator->ctx.hkdf.info );
         status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &generator->ctx.hkdf.hmac );
     }
-    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( generator->alg ) ||
+    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
              /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same generator as TLS-1.2 PRF */
-             PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( generator->alg ) )
+             PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
     {
         if( generator->ctx.tls12_prf.key != NULL )
         {
@@ -3488,7 +3626,6 @@
     return( status );
 }
 
-
 psa_status_t psa_get_generator_capacity(const psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
                                         size_t *capacity)
 {
@@ -3496,6 +3633,17 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 
+psa_status_t psa_set_generator_capacity( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                         size_t capacity )
+{
+    if( generator->alg == 0 )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    if( capacity > generator->capacity )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    generator->capacity = capacity;
+    return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+}
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
 /* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based generator. This performs a chunk
  * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */
@@ -3507,6 +3655,10 @@
     uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
     psa_status_t status;
 
+    if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT;
+
     while( output_length != 0 )
     {
         /* Copy what remains of the current block */
@@ -3720,6 +3872,7 @@
                                  size_t output_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status;
+    psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_generator_get_kdf_alg( generator );
 
     if( output_length > generator->capacity )
     {
@@ -3730,7 +3883,7 @@
         goto exit;
     }
     if( output_length == 0 &&
-        generator->capacity == 0 && generator->alg == 0 )
+        generator->capacity == 0 && kdf_alg == 0 )
     {
         /* Edge case: this is a blank or finished generator, and 0
          * bytes were requested. The right error in this case could
@@ -3742,7 +3895,7 @@
     }
     generator->capacity -= output_length;
 
-    if( generator->alg == PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW )
+    if( kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW )
     {
         /* Initially, the capacity of a selection generator is always
          * the size of the buffer, i.e. `generator->ctx.buffer.size`,
@@ -3760,17 +3913,17 @@
     }
     else
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
-    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( generator->alg ) )
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
     {
-        psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( generator->alg );
+        psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
         status = psa_generator_hkdf_read( &generator->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg,
                                           output, output_length );
     }
-    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( generator->alg ) ||
-             PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( generator->alg ) )
+    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
+             PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
     {
         status = psa_generator_tls12_prf_read( &generator->ctx.tls12_prf,
-                                               generator->alg, output,
+                                               kdf_alg, output,
                                                output_length );
     }
     else
@@ -3877,6 +4030,8 @@
             return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
         memcpy( hkdf->info, label, label_length );
     }
+    hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
+    hkdf->info_set = 1;
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
@@ -4120,6 +4275,232 @@
     return( status );
 }
 
+static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(
+    psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+    psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg )
+{
+    /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ||
+        PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
+        PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
+    {
+        psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg );
+        size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
+        if( hash_size == 0 )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        if( ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
+              PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) &&
+            ! ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 && hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) )
+        {
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        }
+        generator->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
+        return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+    else
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                       psa_algorithm_t alg )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+
+    if( generator->alg != 0 )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) )
+    {
+        psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg );
+        status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( generator, kdf_alg );
+    }
+    else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) )
+    {
+        status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( generator, alg );
+    }
+    else
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+
+    if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        generator->alg = alg;
+    return( status );
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
+                                    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+                                    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+                                    const uint8_t *data,
+                                    size_t data_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+    switch( step )
+    {
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT:
+            if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+            {
+                status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
+                                                  data, data_length,
+                                                  hash_alg );
+                if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                    return( status );
+                hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+            }
+            else
+                return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            break;
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET:
+            /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */
+            if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
+            {
+                status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
+                                                  NULL, 0,
+                                                  PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) );
+                if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                    return( status );
+                hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
+            }
+            if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_STARTED )
+            {
+                status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx,
+                                          data, data_length );
+                if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                    return( status );
+                status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
+                                                   hkdf->prk,
+                                                   sizeof( hkdf->prk ) );
+                if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                    return( status );
+                hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
+                hkdf->block_number = 0;
+                hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
+                return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+            }
+            else
+                return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            break;
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO:
+            if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT )
+                return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            if( hkdf->info_set )
+                return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            hkdf->info_length = data_length;
+            if( data_length != 0 )
+            {
+                hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
+                if( hkdf->info == NULL )
+                    return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+                memcpy( hkdf->info, data, data_length );
+            }
+            hkdf->info_set = 1;
+            return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+        default:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+
+static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_raw(
+    psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+    const uint8_t *data,
+    size_t data_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+    psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_generator_get_kdf_alg( generator );
+
+    if( kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW )
+    {
+        if( generator->capacity != 0 )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        generator->ctx.buffer.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
+        if( generator->ctx.buffer.data == NULL )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+        memcpy( generator->ctx.buffer.data, data, data_length );
+        generator->ctx.buffer.size = data_length;
+        generator->capacity = data_length;
+        status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+    }
+    else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) )
+    {
+        status = psa_hkdf_input( &generator->ctx.hkdf,
+                                 PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
+                                 step, data, data_length );
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+    /* TLS-1.2 PRF and TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS are very similar, so share code. */
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ||
+             PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
+    {
+        // TODO
+        status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+    else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+    {
+        /* This can't happen unless the generator object was not initialized */
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    }
+
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        psa_generator_abort( generator );
+    return( status );
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                             psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+                                             const uint8_t *data,
+                                             size_t data_length )
+{
+    switch( step )
+    {
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_LABEL:
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT:
+        case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO:
+            return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, step,
+                                                  data, data_length ) );
+        default:
+            return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+}
+
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                           psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+                                           psa_key_handle_t handle )
+{
+    psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_status_t status;
+    status = psa_get_key_from_slot( handle, &slot,
+                                    PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE,
+                                    generator->alg );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( status );
+    // TODO: for a key agreement algorithm, allow the corresponding key type and step
+    if( slot->type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    /* Don't allow a key to be used as an input that is usually public.
+     * This is debatable. It's ok from a cryptographic perspective to
+     * use secret material as an input that is usually public. However
+     * the material should be dedicated to a particular input step,
+     * otherwise this may allow the key to be used in an unintended way
+     * and leak values derived from the key. So be conservative. */
+    if( step != PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator,
+                                          step,
+                                          slot->data.raw.data,
+                                          slot->data.raw.bytes ) );
+}
+
 
 
 /****************************************************************/
@@ -4134,49 +4515,39 @@
                                             size_t shared_secret_size,
                                             size_t *shared_secret_length )
 {
-    mbedtls_pk_context pk;
     mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL;
     mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh;
-    int ret;
+    psa_status_t status;
     mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh );
-    mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, peer_key, peer_key_length );
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        goto exit;
-    switch( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) )
-    {
-        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
-        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
-            break;
-        default:
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
-            goto exit;
-    }
-    their_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( pk );
-    if( their_key->grp.id != our_key->grp.id )
-    {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS );
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        goto exit;
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS );
-    if( ret != 0 )
+    status = psa_import_ec_public_key(
+        mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id ),
+        peer_key, peer_key_length,
+        &their_key );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh,
-                                    shared_secret_length,
-                                    shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
-                                    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
-                                    &global_data.ctr_drbg );
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh,
+                                  shared_secret_length,
+                                  shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                                  mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random,
+                                  &global_data.ctr_drbg ) );
 
 exit:
-    mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
     mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh );
-    return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key );
+    mbedtls_free( their_key );
+    return( status );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
 
@@ -4186,10 +4557,10 @@
  * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
  */
 static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                                psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                                 psa_key_slot_t *private_key,
                                                 const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                                                size_t peer_key_length,
-                                                psa_algorithm_t alg )
+                                                size_t peer_key_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status;
     uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE];
@@ -4197,10 +4568,10 @@
 
     /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared
      * secret. */
-    switch( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( alg ) )
+    switch( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( generator->alg ) )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
-        case PSA_ALG_ECDH_BASE:
+        case PSA_ALG_ECDH:
             if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR( private_key->type ) )
                 return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
             status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length,
@@ -4221,34 +4592,31 @@
 
     /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from
      * the shared secret. */
-    status = psa_key_derivation_internal( generator,
-                                          shared_secret, shared_secret_length,
-                                          PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ),
-                                          NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-                                          PSA_GENERATOR_UNBRIDLED_CAPACITY );
+    status = psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, step,
+                                           shared_secret, shared_secret_length );
+
 exit:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_length );
     return( status );
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_key_agreement( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
+                                psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                 psa_key_handle_t private_key,
                                 const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                                size_t peer_key_length,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg )
+                                size_t peer_key_length )
 {
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
     psa_status_t status;
-    if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) )
+    if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( generator->alg ) )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
     status = psa_get_key_from_slot( private_key, &slot,
-                                    PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg );
+                                    PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, generator->alg );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         return( status );
-    status = psa_key_agreement_internal( generator,
+    status = psa_key_agreement_internal( generator, step,
                                          slot,
-                                         peer_key, peer_key_length,
-                                         alg );
+                                         peer_key, peer_key_length );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         psa_generator_abort( generator );
     return( status );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index ce13f9e..f660809 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 
 PSA export a slot after a failed import of a RSA key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
-export_after_import_failure:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+export_after_import_failure:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA export a slot after a failed import of an EC keypair
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
 
 PSA export RSA public key from a slot where there was an import followed by destroy.
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-export_after_destroy_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY
+export_after_destroy_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY
 
 PSA export AES key from a slot where there was an import followed by destroy.
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
@@ -78,27 +78,27 @@
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (+1 byte)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:1:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2-1)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:161:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:162:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: good, larger buffer (*2+1)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:163:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: export buffer too small
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
+import_export:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1024:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
 
 PSA import RSA keypair: public key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+import:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA import RSA public key: key pair
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -146,23 +146,23 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_public_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA public key: buffer too small
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_public_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export-public RSA keypair: buffer too small
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
+import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:-1:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001"
 
 PSA import/export RSA public key: 1016-bit (good)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export:"30819e300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818c0030818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"30818802818000cde684f1aee96917b89c8a0a72523cfce4686ed5a5fbd32abab12038fc75148e45314b7e31fe60d8258e7e78234a23df0f00cc20fd008b64cb5b0f4ced8c47aa048f767f859961adc22b3df14e63bd9e08c9707bbf4e0eba32b1cc35a020e7e815ca47e0d39601a80d683ab4a07f4d3a7acebaba6c87d25bce2d091ee115c50203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:1016:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export RSA keypair: 1016-bit (good)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 
 PSA import RSA public key: 1022-bit (not supported)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import:"30819e300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818c0030818802818036e4b95f847dcd7a91b0972b7ba096e040ec04e42d59f733029fb2600b8ae9e4fd8ea76f3d7ec576288102285b612db7abc53770006046fef321172a6ad84053710d48528a8d51b6481db53c09e1524d6704b58bd30313016535eefe9bcff89eb599608daaa0a72ab7720af31486b51020421fdd3c6974cc445a78dd134450230203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+import:"30818802818036e4b95f847dcd7a91b0972b7ba096e040ec04e42d59f733029fb2600b8ae9e4fd8ea76f3d7ec576288102285b612db7abc53770006046fef321172a6ad84053710d48528a8d51b6481db53c09e1524d6704b58bd30313016535eefe9bcff89eb599608daaa0a72ab7720af31486b51020421fdd3c6974cc445a78dd134450230203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
 PSA import RSA keypair: 1022-bit (not supported)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
 
 PSA import RSA public key: 1023-bit (not supported)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import:"30819e300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818c003081880281806c49704e91f3df44fc99e9b3c0fee5025cc04d09529a1dd05754f2da2751d7a9aa5a79f7070132f2c47b31963e37cd74675f9c93ee7c85a143fefe303e94d1ee0e4d30898d17ab3a229e8457ef21fd179039f748305babe7f134f6d58ce5d721a1a5da98f63503d2466c6a515e53494a41180a91e535bd5b55d4dce2c17419870203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+import:"3081880281806c49704e91f3df44fc99e9b3c0fee5025cc04d09529a1dd05754f2da2751d7a9aa5a79f7070132f2c47b31963e37cd74675f9c93ee7c85a143fefe303e94d1ee0e4d30898d17ab3a229e8457ef21fd179039f748305babe7f134f6d58ce5d721a1a5da98f63503d2466c6a515e53494a41180a91e535bd5b55d4dce2c17419870203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
 PSA import RSA keypair: 1023-bit (not supported)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp224r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"304e301006072a8648ce3d020106052b81040021033a00041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7"
+import_export_public_key:"6849f97d1066f6997759637c7e3899464cee3ec7ac970653a0be0742":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"041693a290f7f0b571fe2b41d5d84b01327631f4a860f995fa332c097f54192bb10f00113f2affb13c1a24ce44914571a95440ae014a00cbf7"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp256r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp256r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"
+import_export_public_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp384r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp384r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"3076301006072a8648ce3d020106052b8104002203620004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"
+import_export_public_key:"3f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"
 
 PSA import/export EC secp521r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC secp521r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30819b301006072a8648ce3d020106052b810400230381860004001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"
+import_export_public_key:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04001de142d54f69eb038ee4b7af9d3ca07736fd9cf719eb354d69879ee7f3c136fb0fbf9f08f86be5fa128ec1a051d3e6c643e85ada8ffacf3663c260bd2c844b6f5600cee8e48a9e65d09cadd89f235dee05f3b8a646be715f1f67d5b434e0ff23a1fc07ef7740193e40eeff6f3bcdfd765aa9155033524fe4f205f5444e292c4c2f6ac1"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool256r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool256r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"305a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010703420004768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"
+import_export_public_key:"2161d6f2db76526fa62c16f356a80f01f32f776784b36aa99799a8b7662080ff":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04768c8cae4abca6306db0ed81b0c4a6215c378066ec6d616c146e13f1c7df809b96ab6911c27d8a02339f0926840e55236d3d1efbe2669d090e4c4c660fada91d"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool384r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool384r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"307a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010b03620004719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"
+import_export_public_key:"3dd92e750d90d7d39fc1885cd8ad12ea9441f22b9334b4d965202adb1448ce24c5808a85dd9afc229af0a3124f755bcb":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"04719f9d093a627e0d350385c661cebf00c61923566fe9006a3107af1d871bc6bb68985fd722ea32be316f8e783b7cd1957785f66cfc0cb195dd5c99a8e7abaa848553a584dfd2b48e76d445fe00dd8be59096d877d4696d23b4bc8db14724e66a"
 
 PSA import/export EC brainpool512r1 key pair: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export-public EC brainpool512r1: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
-import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"30819b301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010d038182000438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"
+import_export_public_key:"372c9778f69f726cbca3f4a268f16b4d617d10280d79a6a029cd51879fe1012934dfe5395455337df6906dc7d6d2eea4dbb2065c0228f73b3ed716480e7d71d2":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"0438b7ec92b61c5c6c7fbc28a4ec759d48fcd4e2e374defd5c4968a54dbef7510e517886fbfc38ea39aa529359d70a7156c35d3cbac7ce776bdb251dd64bce71234424ee7049eed072f0dbc4d79996e175d557e263763ae97095c081e73e7db2e38adc3d4c9a0487b1ede876dc1fca61c902e9a1d8722b8612928f18a24845591a"
 
 PSA import/export-public: cannot export-public a symmetric key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
 
 PSA import/export EC secp256r1 public key: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-import_export:"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
+import_export:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:256:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1
 
 PSA import/export AES key: policy forbids export
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
 
 PSA import EC keypair: public key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-import:"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+import:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, all-bits-zero (bad)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
@@ -306,20 +306,13 @@
 # it's looking for an OID where there is no OID.
 import:"3078020101042100ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3aa00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
-# A key with the OID id-ECDH is only valid for ECDH, not for ECDSA.
-# Such keys are currently not allowed by psa_import_key, only by
-# psa_key_agreement.
-PSA import EC public key: ECDH-only
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-import:"3057301106052b8104010c06082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-
 PSA import EC keypair: valid key but RSA
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
 import:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA import failure preserves policy
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-import_twice:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_SUCCESS
+import_twice:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA import RSA key pair: maximum size exceeded
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -481,15 +474,15 @@
 
 PSA key policy: agreement, permitted
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW)
+agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 PSA key policy: agreement, not permitted
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-agreement_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW)
+agreement_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 PSA key policy: agreement, wrong algorithm
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_FFDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW)
+agreement_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_FFDH
 
 Hash operation object initializers zero properly
 hash_operation_init:
@@ -551,6 +544,12 @@
 PSA hash finish: bad arguments
 hash_finish_bad_args:
 
+PSA hash clone: source state
+hash_clone_source_state:
+
+PSA hash clone: target state
+hash_clone_target_state:
+
 MAC operation object initializers zero properly
 mac_operation_init:
 
@@ -1140,11 +1139,11 @@
 
 PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-import_and_exercise_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
+import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
 
 PSA import/exercise RSA public key, PSS-SHA-256
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-import_and_exercise_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
+import_and_exercise_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)
 
 PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, ECDSA
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
@@ -1156,7 +1155,7 @@
 
 PSA import/exercise: ECP SECP256R1 keypair, ECDH
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW)
+import_and_exercise_key:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):256:PSA_ALG_ECDH
 
 PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, raw
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
@@ -1202,7 +1201,7 @@
 
 PSA sign: invalid key type, signing with a public key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":72:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA sign: invalid algorithm for ECC key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
@@ -1238,7 +1237,7 @@
 
 PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
+asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311"
 
 PSA verify with keypair: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, good signature
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
@@ -1246,27 +1245,27 @@
 
 PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong hash
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"a73664d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA verify: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256, wrong signature
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"111164d55b39c7ea6c1e5b5011724a11e1d7073d3a68f48c836fad153a1d91b6abdbc8f69da13b206cc96af6363b114458b026af14b24fab8929ed634c6a2acace0bcc62d9bb6a984afbcbfcd3a0608d32a2bae535b9cd1ecdf9dd281db1e0025c3bfb5512963ec3b98ddaa69e38bc3c84b1b61a04e5648640856aacc6fc7311":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
 
 PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 0 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d"
+asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"":"34c011b625c32d992f4ab8fcfa52b616ea66270b5b75a4fc71af712f9b8806bcdd374ce50eafcbb489562b93347885f93c2de1d404c45cacccefceb112ff6ffdfe4264f91d66320bbbe09304b851b8ad6280bbccc571eebcd49c7db5dfa399a6289e1978407904598751613d9870770cdd8507e3dc7b46851dbf05ae1df2988d"
 
 PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 32 bytes (hash size)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"1967ae568cc071dfebeeca76b11d40bd1ec5af241c50b3dcceff21f4536c0693a7179a8d5d163a7625fefd37c161127800edeebc24fa73ca772096827bd3f75e8ccf2c64f07b7171b5c99022a4d73b760f34a385ccff0bd5ed7997d2a29d2847acb0767f93a2a404bc046c97de66d95dc9f7646fdb216b627b2ea0de8afcefb7"
+asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"1967ae568cc071dfebeeca76b11d40bd1ec5af241c50b3dcceff21f4536c0693a7179a8d5d163a7625fefd37c161127800edeebc24fa73ca772096827bd3f75e8ccf2c64f07b7171b5c99022a4d73b760f34a385ccff0bd5ed7997d2a29d2847acb0767f93a2a404bc046c97de66d95dc9f7646fdb216b627b2ea0de8afcefb7"
 
 PSA verify: RSA PSS SHA-256, good signature, 129 bytes
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308"
+asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":"1491cead330b4ad5b092f8351518141ac11d0888591572669c1e79d6e932c488acd62d44479b0e14cd91a048778bc02398a772ad6bdb4f7764780cf0afe70293d0cac86f2695a1dcb54568bb37d7086f9e86f95a6802d2ee5a4facaa762beff5261bb2816b62cb5af86404974c3f6b67985ac1fbfdf46d6de54f6e29d9274308"
 
 PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
+asymmetric_verify:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
 
 PSA verify with keypair: ECDSA SECP256R1, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
@@ -1274,11 +1273,11 @@
 
 PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature size (correct but ASN1-encoded)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"304502206a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151022100ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"304502206a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151022100ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
 
 PSA verify: ECDSA SECP256R1, wrong signature of correct size
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
-asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+asymmetric_verify_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba012042087097496efc583fed8b24a5b9be9a51de063f5a00a8b698a16fd7f29b5485f320":PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50e":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
 
 PSA verify: invalid algorithm for ECC key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
@@ -1286,23 +1285,23 @@
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-256, good, with label
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":128:PSA_SUCCESS
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"746869730069730061006c6162656c00":128:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":"":128:PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, key pair
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
@@ -1314,19 +1313,19 @@
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, input too large
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: salt not allowed
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA OAEP-SHA-384, input too large
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA encrypt: invalid algorithm
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_encrypt:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad":"":0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA encrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: invalid key type
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
@@ -1410,11 +1409,11 @@
 
 PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid key type (RSA public key)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
-asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA decrypt: RSA OAEP, invalid key type (RSA public key)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+asymmetric_decrypt_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"adeecba2db7f867a733853f0136c554e5e01c7a2015721a9bfe30c3ad163b93a9c7589170311209f91420ad8a1a8280c7e890a6d7bca3c500b4da4f53a17bd84a21d58f979a9b4b8f2246b482d930804f12b3aeb2ac8b5ac7938d452ca13be8eb8e973c4e2b19fd454058cbae037bcef7ef68a5fbabf050de5f283cf1998c695":"":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5: invalid key type (AES)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
@@ -1681,91 +1680,91 @@
 
 PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, raw: good
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_SUCCESS
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_SUCCESS
 
 PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, raw: public key on different curve
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3076301006072a8648ce3d020106052b8104002203620004e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, raw: public key instead of private key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, unknown KDF
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_ECDH(0):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, 0):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
 
 PSA key agreement setup: not a key agreement algorithm
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903), raw: capacity=32
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":32
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":32
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read 32 (full)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 with ECDH-only public key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3057301106052b8104010c06082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3057301106052b8104010c06082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read 0+32
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de"
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de"
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read 20+12
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9e":"ce7dce03812464d04b9442de"
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9e":"ce7dce03812464d04b9442de"
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read 7+15
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6ed":"afd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7d"
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6ed":"afd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7d"
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP384R1 (RFC 5903), raw: capacity=48
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):"099f3c7034d4a2c699884d73a375a67f7624ef7c6b3c0f160647b67414dce655e35b538041e649ee3faef896783ab194":"3076301006072a8648ce3d020106052b8104002203620004e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":48
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):"099f3c7034d4a2c699884d73a375a67f7624ef7c6b3c0f160647b67414dce655e35b538041e649ee3faef896783ab194":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":48
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP384R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):"099f3c7034d4a2c699884d73a375a67f7624ef7c6b3c0f160647b67414dce655e35b538041e649ee3faef896783ab194":"3076301006072a8648ce3d020106052b8104002203620004e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":"11187331c279962d93d604243fd592cb9d0a926f422e47187521287e7156c5c4d603135569b9e9d09cf5d4a270f59746":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1):"099f3c7034d4a2c699884d73a375a67f7624ef7c6b3c0f160647b67414dce655e35b538041e649ee3faef896783ab194":"04e558dbef53eecde3d3fccfc1aea08a89a987475d12fd950d83cfa41732bc509d0d1ac43a0336def96fda41d0774a3571dcfbec7aacf3196472169e838430367f66eebe3c6e70c416dd5f0c68759dd1fff83fa40142209dff5eaad96db9e6386c":"11187331c279962d93d604243fd592cb9d0a926f422e47187521287e7156c5c4d603135569b9e9d09cf5d4a270f59746":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP521R1 (RFC 5903), raw: capacity=66
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):"0037ade9319a89f4dabdb3ef411aaccca5123c61acab57b5393dce47608172a095aa85a30fe1c2952c6771d937ba9777f5957b2639bab072462f68c27a57382d4a52":"30819b301006072a8648ce3d020106052b81040023038186000400d0b3975ac4b799f5bea16d5e13e9af971d5e9b984c9f39728b5e5739735a219b97c356436adc6e95bb0352f6be64a6c2912d4ef2d0433ced2b6171640012d9460f015c68226383956e3bd066e797b623c27ce0eac2f551a10c2c724d9852077b87220b6536c5c408a1d2aebb8e86d678ae49cb57091f4732296579ab44fcd17f0fc56a":66
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):"0037ade9319a89f4dabdb3ef411aaccca5123c61acab57b5393dce47608172a095aa85a30fe1c2952c6771d937ba9777f5957b2639bab072462f68c27a57382d4a52":"30819b301006072a8648ce3d020106052b81040023038186000400d0b3975ac4b799f5bea16d5e13e9af971d5e9b984c9f39728b5e5739735a219b97c356436adc6e95bb0352f6be64a6c2912d4ef2d0433ced2b6171640012d9460f015c68226383956e3bd066e797b623c27ce0eac2f551a10c2c724d9852077b87220b6536c5c408a1d2aebb8e86d678ae49cb57091f4732296579ab44fcd17f0fc56a":66
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP521R1 (RFC 5903), raw: read
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):"0037ade9319a89f4dabdb3ef411aaccca5123c61acab57b5393dce47608172a095aa85a30fe1c2952c6771d937ba9777f5957b2639bab072462f68c27a57382d4a52":"30819b301006072a8648ce3d020106052b81040023038186000400d0b3975ac4b799f5bea16d5e13e9af971d5e9b984c9f39728b5e5739735a219b97c356436adc6e95bb0352f6be64a6c2912d4ef2d0433ced2b6171640012d9460f015c68226383956e3bd066e797b623c27ce0eac2f551a10c2c724d9852077b87220b6536c5c408a1d2aebb8e86d678ae49cb57091f4732296579ab44fcd17f0fc56a":"01144c7d79ae6956bc8edb8e7c787c4521cb086fa64407f97894e5e6b2d79b04d1427e73ca4baa240a34786859810c06b3c715a3a8cc3151f2bee417996d19f3ddea":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1):"0037ade9319a89f4dabdb3ef411aaccca5123c61acab57b5393dce47608172a095aa85a30fe1c2952c6771d937ba9777f5957b2639bab072462f68c27a57382d4a52":"30819b301006072a8648ce3d020106052b81040023038186000400d0b3975ac4b799f5bea16d5e13e9af971d5e9b984c9f39728b5e5739735a219b97c356436adc6e95bb0352f6be64a6c2912d4ef2d0433ced2b6171640012d9460f015c68226383956e3bd066e797b623c27ce0eac2f551a10c2c724d9852077b87220b6536c5c408a1d2aebb8e86d678ae49cb57091f4732296579ab44fcd17f0fc56a":"01144c7d79ae6956bc8edb8e7c787c4521cb086fa64407f97894e5e6b2d79b04d1427e73ca4baa240a34786859810c06b3c715a3a8cc3151f2bee417996d19f3ddea":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 7027), raw: capacity=32
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):"81db1ee100150ff2ea338d708271be38300cb54241d79950f77b063039804f1d":"305a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b2403030208010107034200048d2d688c6cf93e1160ad04cc4429117dc2c41825e1e9fca0addd34e6f1b39f7b990c57520812be512641e47034832106bc7d3e8dd0e4c7f1136d7006547cec6a":32
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):"81db1ee100150ff2ea338d708271be38300cb54241d79950f77b063039804f1d":"305a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b2403030208010107034200048d2d688c6cf93e1160ad04cc4429117dc2c41825e1e9fca0addd34e6f1b39f7b990c57520812be512641e47034832106bc7d3e8dd0e4c7f1136d7006547cec6a":32
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 7027), raw: read
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):"81db1ee100150ff2ea338d708271be38300cb54241d79950f77b063039804f1d":"305a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b2403030208010107034200048d2d688c6cf93e1160ad04cc4429117dc2c41825e1e9fca0addd34e6f1b39f7b990c57520812be512641e47034832106bc7d3e8dd0e4c7f1136d7006547cec6a":"89afc39d41d3b327814b80940b042590f96556ec91e6ae7939bce31f3a18bf2b":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1):"81db1ee100150ff2ea338d708271be38300cb54241d79950f77b063039804f1d":"305a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b2403030208010107034200048d2d688c6cf93e1160ad04cc4429117dc2c41825e1e9fca0addd34e6f1b39f7b990c57520812be512641e47034832106bc7d3e8dd0e4c7f1136d7006547cec6a":"89afc39d41d3b327814b80940b042590f96556ec91e6ae7939bce31f3a18bf2b":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 7027), raw: capacity=48
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):"1e20f5e048a5886f1f157c74e91bde2b98c8b52d58e5003d57053fc4b0bd65d6f15eb5d1ee1610df870795143627d042":"307a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010b036200044d44326f269a597a5b58bba565da5556ed7fd9a8a9eb76c25f46db69d19dc8ce6ad18e404b15738b2086df37e71d1eb462d692136de56cbe93bf5fa3188ef58bc8a3a0ec6c1e151a21038a42e9185329b5b275903d192f8d4e1f32fe9cc78c48":48
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):"1e20f5e048a5886f1f157c74e91bde2b98c8b52d58e5003d57053fc4b0bd65d6f15eb5d1ee1610df870795143627d042":"307a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010b036200044d44326f269a597a5b58bba565da5556ed7fd9a8a9eb76c25f46db69d19dc8ce6ad18e404b15738b2086df37e71d1eb462d692136de56cbe93bf5fa3188ef58bc8a3a0ec6c1e151a21038a42e9185329b5b275903d192f8d4e1f32fe9cc78c48":48
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 7027), raw: read
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):"1e20f5e048a5886f1f157c74e91bde2b98c8b52d58e5003d57053fc4b0bd65d6f15eb5d1ee1610df870795143627d042":"307a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010b036200044d44326f269a597a5b58bba565da5556ed7fd9a8a9eb76c25f46db69d19dc8ce6ad18e404b15738b2086df37e71d1eb462d692136de56cbe93bf5fa3188ef58bc8a3a0ec6c1e151a21038a42e9185329b5b275903d192f8d4e1f32fe9cc78c48":"0bd9d3a7ea0b3d519d09d8e48d0785fb744a6b355e6304bc51c229fbbce239bbadf6403715c35d4fb2a5444f575d4f42":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1):"1e20f5e048a5886f1f157c74e91bde2b98c8b52d58e5003d57053fc4b0bd65d6f15eb5d1ee1610df870795143627d042":"307a301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010b036200044d44326f269a597a5b58bba565da5556ed7fd9a8a9eb76c25f46db69d19dc8ce6ad18e404b15738b2086df37e71d1eb462d692136de56cbe93bf5fa3188ef58bc8a3a0ec6c1e151a21038a42e9185329b5b275903d192f8d4e1f32fe9cc78c48":"0bd9d3a7ea0b3d519d09d8e48d0785fb744a6b355e6304bc51c229fbbce239bbadf6403715c35d4fb2a5444f575d4f42":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 7027), raw: capacity=64
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):"16302ff0dbbb5a8d733dab7141c1b45acbc8715939677f6a56850a38bd87bd59b09e80279609ff333eb9d4c061231fb26f92eeb04982a5f1d1764cad57665422":"30819b301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010d03818200049d45f66de5d67e2e6db6e93a59ce0bb48106097ff78a081de781cdb31fce8ccbaaea8dd4320c4119f1e9cd437a2eab3731fa9668ab268d871deda55a5473199f2fdc313095bcdd5fb3a91636f07a959c8e86b5636a1e930e8396049cb481961d365cc11453a06c719835475b12cb52fc3c383bce35e27ef194512b71876285fa":64
+key_agreement_capacity:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):"16302ff0dbbb5a8d733dab7141c1b45acbc8715939677f6a56850a38bd87bd59b09e80279609ff333eb9d4c061231fb26f92eeb04982a5f1d1764cad57665422":"30819b301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010d03818200049d45f66de5d67e2e6db6e93a59ce0bb48106097ff78a081de781cdb31fce8ccbaaea8dd4320c4119f1e9cd437a2eab3731fa9668ab268d871deda55a5473199f2fdc313095bcdd5fb3a91636f07a959c8e86b5636a1e930e8396049cb481961d365cc11453a06c719835475b12cb52fc3c383bce35e27ef194512b71876285fa":64
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 7027), raw: read
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):"16302ff0dbbb5a8d733dab7141c1b45acbc8715939677f6a56850a38bd87bd59b09e80279609ff333eb9d4c061231fb26f92eeb04982a5f1d1764cad57665422":"30819b301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010d03818200049d45f66de5d67e2e6db6e93a59ce0bb48106097ff78a081de781cdb31fce8ccbaaea8dd4320c4119f1e9cd437a2eab3731fa9668ab268d871deda55a5473199f2fdc313095bcdd5fb3a91636f07a959c8e86b5636a1e930e8396049cb481961d365cc11453a06c719835475b12cb52fc3c383bce35e27ef194512b71876285fa":"a7927098655f1f9976fa50a9d566865dc530331846381c87256baf3226244b76d36403c024d7bbf0aa0803eaff405d3d24f11a9b5c0bef679fe1454b21c4cd1f":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1):"16302ff0dbbb5a8d733dab7141c1b45acbc8715939677f6a56850a38bd87bd59b09e80279609ff333eb9d4c061231fb26f92eeb04982a5f1d1764cad57665422":"30819b301406072a8648ce3d020106092b240303020801010d03818200049d45f66de5d67e2e6db6e93a59ce0bb48106097ff78a081de781cdb31fce8ccbaaea8dd4320c4119f1e9cd437a2eab3731fa9668ab268d871deda55a5473199f2fdc313095bcdd5fb3a91636f07a959c8e86b5636a1e930e8396049cb481961d365cc11453a06c719835475b12cb52fc3c383bce35e27ef194512b71876285fa":"a7927098655f1f9976fa50a9d566865dc530331846381c87256baf3226244b76d36403c024d7bbf0aa0803eaff405d3d24f11a9b5c0bef679fe1454b21c4cd1f":""
 
 PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: read 32
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C
-key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_ECDH(PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441":""
+key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c441":""
 
 PSA generate random: 0 bytes
 generate_random:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index bc3d788..28761bd 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -366,11 +366,30 @@
 
     if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE )
     {
-        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator,
-                                        handle, alg,
-                                        label, label_length,
-                                        seed, seed_length,
-                                        sizeof( output ) ) );
+        if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) )
+        {
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                        PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT,
+                                                        label,
+                                                        label_length ) );
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
+                                                      PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
+                                                      handle ) );
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                        PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO,
+                                                        seed,
+                                                        seed_length ) );
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            // legacy
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator,
+                                            handle, alg,
+                                            label, label_length,
+                                            seed, seed_length,
+                                            sizeof( output ) ) );
+        }
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_generator_read( &generator,
                                         output,
                                         sizeof( output ) ) );
@@ -386,8 +405,7 @@
 /* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the
  * private key against its own public key. */
 static psa_status_t key_agreement_with_self( psa_crypto_generator_t *generator,
-                                             psa_key_handle_t handle,
-                                             psa_algorithm_t alg )
+                                             psa_key_handle_t handle )
 {
     psa_key_type_t private_key_type;
     psa_key_type_t public_key_type;
@@ -409,9 +427,8 @@
                                        public_key, public_key_length,
                                        &public_key_length ) );
 
-    status = psa_key_agreement( generator, handle,
-                                public_key, public_key_length,
-                                alg );
+    status = psa_key_agreement( generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, handle,
+                                public_key, public_key_length );
 exit:
     mbedtls_free( public_key );
     return( status );
@@ -429,7 +446,8 @@
     {
         /* We need two keys to exercise key agreement. Exercise the
          * private key against its own public key. */
-        PSA_ASSERT( key_agreement_with_self( &generator, handle, alg ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( key_agreement_with_self( &generator, handle ) );
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_generator_read( &generator,
                                         output,
                                         sizeof( output ) ) );
@@ -625,27 +643,6 @@
         uint8_t *p = exported;
         uint8_t *end = exported + exported_length;
         size_t len;
-        mbedtls_asn1_buf alg;
-        mbedtls_asn1_buf params;
-        mbedtls_asn1_bitstring bitstring;
-        /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
-         *      algorithm          AlgorithmIdentifier,
-         *      subjectPublicKey   BIT STRING  }
-         * AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
-         *      algorithm          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-         *      parameters         ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL  }
-         */
-        TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
-                                          MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE |
-                                          MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ),
-                    0 );
-        TEST_EQUAL( p + len, end );
-        TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &alg, &params ), 0 );
-        if( ! is_oid_of_key_type( type, alg.p, alg.len ) )
-            goto exit;
-        TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( &p, end, &bitstring ), 0 );
-        TEST_EQUAL( p, end );
-        p = bitstring.p;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
         if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY )
         {
@@ -653,7 +650,6 @@
              *      modulus            INTEGER,    -- n
              *      publicExponent     INTEGER  }  -- e
              */
-            TEST_EQUAL( bitstring.unused_bits, 0 );
             TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
                                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE |
                                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ),
@@ -670,13 +666,12 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
         if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) )
         {
-            /*   ECPoint ::= ...
-             *      -- first 8 bits: 0x04 (uncompressed representation);
-             *      -- then x_P as an n-bit string, big endian;
-             *      -- then y_P as a n-bit string, big endian,
-             *      -- where n is the order of the curve.
+            /* The representation of an ECC public key is:
+             *      - The byte 0x04;
+             *      - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+             *      - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+             *      - where m is the bit size associated with the curve.
              */
-            TEST_EQUAL( bitstring.unused_bits, 0 );
             TEST_EQUAL( p + 1 + 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ), end );
             TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 4 );
         }
@@ -1749,7 +1744,8 @@
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( handle, key_type,
                                 key_data->x, key_data->len ) );
 
-    status = key_agreement_with_self( &generator, handle, exercise_alg );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, exercise_alg ) );
+    status = key_agreement_with_self( &generator, handle );
 
     if( policy_alg == exercise_alg &&
         ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) != 0 )
@@ -1901,6 +1897,92 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void hash_clone_source_state( )
+{
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+    unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_source = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_setup = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_finished = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_aborted = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    size_t hash_len;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_source, alg ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_setup, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_finished, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_aborted, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_setup ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_init ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_init,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_finished ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_source, &op_aborted ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_aborted,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+
+exit:
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_source );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_init );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_setup );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_finished );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted );
+    mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+void hash_clone_target_state( )
+{
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+    unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_init = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_setup = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_finished = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_aborted = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t op_target = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    size_t hash_len;
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_setup, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_finished, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_finished,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &op_aborted, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &op_setup, &op_target ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &op_target,
+                                 hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_init, &op_target ), PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_finished, &op_target ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_hash_clone( &op_aborted, &op_target ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+exit:
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_target );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_init );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_setup );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_finished );
+    psa_hash_abort( &op_aborted );
+    mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void mac_operation_init( )
 {
@@ -3436,10 +3518,29 @@
                                 key_data->len ) );
 
     /* Extraction phase. */
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator, handle, alg,
-                                    salt->x, salt->len,
-                                    label->x, label->len,
-                                    requested_capacity ) );
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) )
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_set_generator_capacity( &generator,
+                                                requested_capacity ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                    PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT,
+                                                    salt->x, salt->len ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
+                                                  PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
+                                                  handle ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                    PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO,
+                                                    label->x, label->len ) );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        // legacy
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator, handle, alg,
+                                        salt->x, salt->len,
+                                        label->x, label->len,
+                                        requested_capacity ) );
+    }
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &generator,
                                             &current_capacity ) );
     TEST_EQUAL( current_capacity, requested_capacity );
@@ -3514,10 +3615,29 @@
                                 key_data->len ) );
 
     /* Extraction phase. */
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator, handle, alg,
-                                    salt->x, salt->len,
-                                    label->x, label->len,
-                                    requested_capacity ) );
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) )
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_set_generator_capacity( &generator,
+                                                requested_capacity ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                    PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT,
+                                                    salt->x, salt->len ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
+                                                  PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
+                                                  handle ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
+                                                    PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO,
+                                                    label->x, label->len ) );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        // legacy
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation( &generator, handle, alg,
+                                        salt->x, salt->len,
+                                        label->x, label->len,
+                                        requested_capacity ) );
+    }
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity( &generator,
                                             &current_capacity ) );
     TEST_EQUAL( current_capacity, expected_capacity );
@@ -3719,10 +3839,10 @@
                                 our_key_data->x,
                                 our_key_data->len ) );
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_agreement( &generator,
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
                                    our_key,
-                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len,
-                                   alg ),
+                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ),
                 expected_status_arg );
 
 exit:
@@ -3755,10 +3875,10 @@
                                 our_key_data->x,
                                 our_key_data->len ) );
 
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_agreement( &generator,
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
                                    our_key,
-                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len,
-                                   alg ) );
+                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) );
 
     /* Test the advertized capacity. */
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_generator_capacity(
@@ -3809,10 +3929,10 @@
                                 our_key_data->x,
                                 our_key_data->len ) );
 
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_agreement( &generator,
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET,
                                    our_key,
-                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len,
-                                   alg ) );
+                                   peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) );
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_generator_read( &generator,
                                     actual_output,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function
index bdb2f98..8abd4e2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
     unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t actual_hash_length;
     psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_hash_operation_t operation2 = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
     uint32_t len = 0;
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -78,16 +79,23 @@
 
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
                                      input->x, len ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_clone( &operation, &operation2 ) );
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
                                      input->x + len, input->len - len ) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation2,
+                                     input->x + len, input->len - len ) );
 
         PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation,
                                      actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ),
                                      &actual_hash_length ) );
-
         ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len,
                         actual_hash, actual_hash_length );
 
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation2,
+                                     actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ),
+                                     &actual_hash_length ) );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len,
+                        actual_hash, actual_hash_length );
     } while( len++ != input->len );
 
 exit:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
index 1e7a996..edb09a8 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data
@@ -266,24 +266,21 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_HKDF
 
-Key selection: raw
-key_selection_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW:0
-
 Key agreement: FFDH, raw output
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C
-key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW
+key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH:ALG_IS_FFDH | ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION
 
 Key agreement: FFDH, HKDF using SHA-256
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C
-key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH( PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
+key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
 
 Key agreement: ECDH, raw output
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW
+key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH:ALG_IS_ECDH | ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION
 
 Key agreement: ECDH, HKDF using SHA-256
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
-key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
+key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
 
 Key type: raw data
 key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
index 01c8628..1bc8d64 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #define ALG_IS_FFDH                     ( 1u << 17 )
 #define ALG_IS_ECDH                     ( 1u << 18 )
 #define ALG_IS_WILDCARD                 ( 1u << 19 )
+#define ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT        ( 1u << 20 )
 
 /* Flags for key type classification macros. There is a flag for every
  * key type classification macro PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx except for some that
@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@
     TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags );
     TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags );
     TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_WILDCARD, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_ECDH, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_FFDH, alg, flags );
+    TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT, alg, flags );
 exit: ;
 }
 
@@ -113,7 +117,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 
     /* Length */
@@ -134,7 +137,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 
     /* Tag length */
@@ -174,7 +176,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, 0 );
 
     /* Dependent algorithms */
@@ -271,7 +272,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
@@ -320,7 +320,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
@@ -350,7 +349,6 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
@@ -359,6 +357,8 @@
 void key_derivation_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
 {
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t ecdh_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH, alg );
+    psa_algorithm_t ffdh_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH, alg );
 
     /* Algorithm classification */
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
@@ -369,49 +369,25 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 
     /* Check combinations with key agreements */
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ), alg );
-    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ), alg );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE */
-void key_selection_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
-{
-    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
-
-    /* Algorithm classification */
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
-    algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
-
-    /* Check combinations with key agreements */
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ), alg );
-    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ), alg );
+    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( ecdh_alg ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( ffdh_alg ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( ecdh_alg ), alg );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( ffdh_alg ), alg );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void key_agreement_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags,
-                              int post_alg_arg )
+                              int ka_alg_arg, int kdf_alg_arg )
 {
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
-    psa_algorithm_t actual_post_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg );
-    psa_algorithm_t expected_post_alg = post_alg_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t actual_ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( alg );
+    psa_algorithm_t expected_ka_alg = ka_alg_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t actual_kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg );
+    psa_algorithm_t expected_kdf_alg = kdf_alg_arg;
 
     /* Algorithm classification */
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
@@ -422,13 +398,11 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
     algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
 
     /* Shared secret derivation properties */
-    TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( actual_post_alg ) ||
-                 PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( actual_post_alg ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( actual_post_alg, expected_post_alg );
+    TEST_EQUAL( actual_ka_alg, expected_ka_alg );
+    TEST_EQUAL( actual_kdf_alg, expected_kdf_alg );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
index c9eb8e1..613968d 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
 
 import/export persistent key RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_persistent_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:0
+import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:0
 
 import/export persistent key RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 
 import/export persistent key RSA public key file not exist: 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
-import_export_persistent_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:1
+import_export_persistent_key:"30818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:1
 
 import/export persistent key RSA keypair file not exist: 1024-bit
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C