diff --git a/.github/pull_request_template.md b/.github/pull_request_template.md
index 94fb020..50a4901 100644
--- a/.github/pull_request_template.md
+++ b/.github/pull_request_template.md
@@ -14,6 +14,6 @@
 
 ## Notes for the submitter
 
-Please refer to the [contributing guidelines](../CONTRIBUTING.md), especially the
+Please refer to the [contributing guidelines](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/CONTRIBUTING.md), especially the
 checklist for PR contributors.
 
diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index 67cb3ca..eaf817a 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -25,8 +25,40 @@
         - tests/scripts/all.sh -k build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_m0plus
 
     - name: full configuration
+      os: linux
+      dist: focal
+      addons:
+        apt:
+          packages:
+          - clang-10
+          - gnutls-bin
       script:
-        - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_full_cmake_gcc_asan
+        # Do a manual build+test sequence rather than using all.sh,
+        # because there's no all.sh component that does what we want,
+        # which is a build with Clang >= 10 and ASan, running all the SSL
+        # testing.
+        #   - The clang executable in the default PATH is Clang 7 on
+        #     Travis's focal instances, but we want Clang >= 10.
+        #   - Running all the SSL testing requires a specific set of
+        #     OpenSSL and GnuTLS versions and we don't want to bother
+        #     with those on Travis.
+        # So we explicitly select clang-10 as the compiler, and we
+        # have ad hoc restrictions on SSL testing based on what is
+        # passing at the time of writing. We will remove these limitations
+        # gradually.
+        - make generated_files
+        - make CC=clang-10 CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O2' LDFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all'
+        - make test
+        - programs/test/selftest
+        - tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py
+        - tests/ssl-opt.sh
+        # Modern OpenSSL does not support fixed ECDH or null ciphers.
+        - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH-'
+        - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
+        # GnuTLS supports CAMELLIA but compat.sh doesn't properly enable it.
+        - tests/compat.sh -p GnuTLS -e 'CAMELLIA'
+        - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh
+        - tests/context-info.sh
 
     - name: Windows
       os: windows
diff --git a/.uncrustify.cfg b/.uncrustify.cfg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac9173e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.uncrustify.cfg
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+# Configuration options for Uncrustify specifying the Mbed TLS code style.
+#
+# Note: The code style represented by this file has not yet been introduced
+# to Mbed TLS.
+#
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+
+# Line length options
+
+# Wrap lines at 100 characters
+code_width = 100
+
+# Allow splitting long for statements between the condition statements
+ls_for_split_full = true
+
+# Allow splitting function calls between arguments
+ls_func_split_full = true
+
+input_tab_size = 4
+
+# Spaces-only indentation
+indent_with_tabs = 0
+
+indent_columns = 4
+
+# Indent 'case' 1 level from 'switch'
+indent_switch_case = indent_columns
+
+# Line-up strings broken by '\'
+indent_align_string = true
+
+# Braces on the same line (Egyptian-style braces)
+nl_enum_brace = remove
+nl_union_brace = remove
+nl_struct_brace = remove
+nl_do_brace = remove
+nl_if_brace = remove
+nl_for_brace = remove
+nl_else_brace = remove
+nl_while_brace = remove
+nl_switch_brace = remove
+
+# Braces on same line as keywords that follow them - 'else' and the 'while' in 'do {} while ()';
+nl_brace_else = remove
+nl_brace_while = remove
+# Space before else on the same line
+sp_brace_else = add
+# If else is on the same line as '{', force exactly 1 space between them
+sp_else_brace = force
+
+# Functions are the exception and have braces on the next line
+nl_fcall_brace = add
+nl_fdef_brace = add
+
+# Force exactly one space between ')' and '{' in statements
+sp_sparen_brace = force
+
+# At least 1 space around assignment
+sp_assign = add
+
+# Remove spaces around the preprocessor '##' token-concatenate
+sp_pp_concat = ignore
+
+# At least 1 space around '||' and '&&'
+sp_bool = add
+
+# But no space after the '!' operator
+sp_not = remove
+
+# No space after the bitwise-not '~' operator
+sp_inv = remove
+
+# No space after the addressof '&' operator
+sp_addr = remove
+
+# No space around the member '.' and '->' operators
+sp_member = remove
+
+# No space after the dereference '*' operator
+sp_deref = remove
+
+# No space after a unary negation '-'
+sp_sign = remove
+
+# No space between the '++'/'--' operator and its operand
+sp_incdec = remove
+
+# At least 1 space around comparison operators
+sp_compare = add
+
+# Remove spaces inside all kinds of parentheses:
+
+# Remove spaces inside parentheses
+sp_inside_paren = remove
+
+# No spaces inside statement parentheses
+sp_inside_sparen = remove
+
+# No spaces inside cast parentheses '( char )x' -> '(char)x'
+sp_inside_paren_cast = remove
+
+# No spaces inside function parentheses
+sp_inside_fparen = remove
+# (The case where the function has no parameters/arguments)
+sp_inside_fparens = remove
+
+# No spaces inside the first parentheses in a function type
+sp_inside_tparen = remove
+
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.74.0) No spaces inside parens in for statements
+sp_inside_for = remove
+
+# Remove spaces between nested parentheses '( (' -> '(('
+sp_paren_paren = remove
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.74.0)
+sp_sparen_paren = remove
+
+# Remove spaces between ')' and adjacent '('
+sp_cparen_oparen = remove
+
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) space between 'do' and '{'
+sp_do_brace_open = force
+
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) space between '}' and 'while'
+sp_brace_close_while = force
+
+# At least 1 space before a '*' pointer star
+sp_before_ptr_star = add
+
+# Remove spaces between pointer stars
+sp_between_ptr_star = remove
+
+# No space after a pointer star
+sp_after_ptr_star = remove
+
+# But allow a space in the case of e.g. char * const x;
+sp_after_ptr_star_qualifier = ignore
+
+# Remove space after star in a function return type
+sp_after_ptr_star_func = remove
+
+# At least 1 space after a type in variable definition etc
+sp_after_type = add
+
+# Force exactly 1 space between a statement keyword (e.g. 'if') and an opening parenthesis
+sp_before_sparen = force
+
+# Remove a space before a ';'
+sp_before_semi = remove
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) Remove space before a semi in a non-empty for
+sp_before_semi_for = remove
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) Remove space in empty first statement of a for
+sp_before_semi_for_empty = remove
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.74.0) Remove space in empty middle statement of a for
+sp_between_semi_for_empty = remove
+
+# Add a space after a ';' (unless a comment follows)
+sp_after_semi = add
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) Add a space after a semi in non-empty for statements
+sp_after_semi_for = add
+# (Uncrustify >= 0.73.0) No space after final semi in empty for statements
+sp_after_semi_for_empty = remove
+
+# Remove spaces on the inside of square brackets '[]'
+sp_inside_square = remove
+
+# Must have at least 1 space after a comma
+sp_after_comma = add
+
+# Must not have a space before a comma
+sp_before_comma = remove
+
+# No space before the ':' in a case statement
+sp_before_case_colon = remove
+
+# No space after a cast - '(char) x' -> '(char)x'
+sp_after_cast = remove
+
+# No space between 'sizeof' and '('
+sp_sizeof_paren = remove
+
+# At least 1 space inside '{ }'
+sp_inside_braces = add
+
+# At least 1 space inside '{ }' in an enum
+sp_inside_braces_enum = add
+
+# At least 1 space inside '{ }' in a struct
+sp_inside_braces_struct = add
+
+# At least 1 space between a function return type and the function name
+sp_type_func = add
+
+# No space between a function name and its arguments/parameters
+sp_func_proto_paren = remove
+sp_func_def_paren = remove
+sp_func_call_paren = remove
+
+# No space between '__attribute__' and '('
+sp_attribute_paren = remove
+
+# No space between 'defined' and '(' in preprocessor conditions
+sp_defined_paren = remove
+
+# At least 1 space between a macro's name and its definition
+sp_macro = add
+sp_macro_func = add
+
+# Force exactly 1 space between a '}' and the name of a typedef if on the same line
+sp_brace_typedef = force
+
+# At least 1 space before a '\' line continuation
+sp_before_nl_cont = add
+
+# At least 1 space around '?' and ':' in ternary statements
+sp_cond_colon = add
+sp_cond_question = add
+
+# Space between #else/#endif and comment afterwards
+sp_endif_cmt = add
+
+# Remove newlines at the start of a file
+nl_start_of_file = remove
+
+# At least 1 newline at the end of a file
+nl_end_of_file = add
+nl_end_of_file_min = 1
+
+# Add braces in single-line statements
+mod_full_brace_do = add
+mod_full_brace_for = add
+mod_full_brace_if = add
+mod_full_brace_while = add
+
+# Remove parentheses from return statements
+mod_paren_on_return = remove
+
+# Disable removal of leading spaces in a multi-line comment if the first and
+# last lines are the same length
+cmt_multi_check_last = false
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 80b8617..cb277dc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 = Mbed TLS 3.2.1 branch released 2022-07-12
 
 Bugfix
-   *  Re-add missing generated file library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
+   *  Re-add missing generated file library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c
 
 = Mbed TLS 3.2.0 branch released 2022-07-11
 
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/LMS.txt b/ChangeLog.d/LMS.txt
index 6de374f..785bfcf 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/LMS.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/LMS.txt
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@
       Signature verification is production-ready, but generation is for testing
       purposes only. This currently only supports one parameter set
       (LMS_SHA256_M32_H10), meaning that each private key can be used to sign
-      1024 messages. As such, it is not intended for use in TLS, but instead for
-      verification of assets transmitted over an insecure channel, particularly
-      firmware images.
+      1024 messages. As such, it is not intended for use in TLS, but instead
+      for verification of assets transmitted over an insecure channel,
+      particularly firmware images.
     * Add the LM-OTS post-quantum-safe one-time signature scheme, which is
-      required for LMS. This can be used independently, but each key can only be
-      used to sign one message so is impractical for most circumstances.
+      required for LMS. This can be used independently, but each key can only
+      be used to sign one message so is impractical for most circumstances.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-rsa-pss-rsae-support-for-tls12.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-rsa-pss-rsae-support-for-tls12.txt
index f88eb9e..0d40968 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/add-rsa-pss-rsae-support-for-tls12.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-rsa-pss-rsae-support-for-tls12.txt
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Features
-   * When GnuTLS/Openssl server is configured in TLS 1.2 mode with a certificate
-     declaring an RSA public key and Mbed TLS is configured in hybrid mode, if
-     `rsa_pss_rsae_*` algorithms are before `rsa_pkcs1_*` ones in this list then
-     the GnuTLS/Openssl server chooses an `rsa_pss_rsae_*` signature algorithm
-     for its signature in the key exchange message. As Mbed TLS 1.2 does not
-     support them, the handshake fails. Add `rsa_pss_rsae_*` support for TLS 1.2
-     to resolve the compitablity issue.
+   * Support rsa_pss_rsae_* signature algorithms in TLS 1.2.
+Bugfix
+   * Fix an interoperability failure between an Mbed TLS client with both
+     TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 support, and a TLS 1.2 server that supports
+     rsa_pss_rsae_* signature algorithms. This failed because Mbed TLS
+     advertised support for PSS in both TLS 1.2 and 1.3, but only
+     actually supported PSS in TLS 1.3.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/alignment-perf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/alignment-perf.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a8e6fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/alignment-perf.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Features
+   * General performance improvements by accessing multiple bytes at a time.
+     Fixes #1666.
+   * Improvements to use of unaligned and byte-swapped memory, reducing code
+     size and improving performance (depending on compiler and target
+     architecture).
+Changes
+   * Mixed-endian systems are explicitly not supported any more.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt b/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt
index 2062bcb..6ccd199 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/driver-only-hashes.txt
@@ -1,20 +1,19 @@
 Features
-   * Some crypto modules that previously depended on MD or a low-level hash
-     module, either unconditionally (RSA, PK, PKCS5, PKCS12, EC J-PAKE), or
-     for some features (PEM for encrypted files), are now able to use PSA
-     Crypto instead when the legacy API is not available. This means it is
-     now possible to use all features from those modules in configurations
-     where the built-in implementations of hashes are excluded and the hashes
-     are only provided by PSA drivers. In these configurations, you need to
-     call `psa_crypto_init()` before you call any function from those
-     modules; this is not required in configurations where the built-in
-     implementation is still available. Note that some crypto modules and
-     features still depend on the built-in implementation of hashes:
-     MBEDTLS_HKDF_C (but the PSA HKDF function do not depend on it),
-     MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC.
-     In particular, for now, compiling without built-in hashes requires use
-     of MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG.
-   * When MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, X.509, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 no
-     longer depend on MD. This means it is now possible to use them in
-     configurations where the built-in implementations of hashes are excluded
-     and the hashes are only provided by PSA drivers.
+   * Some modules can now use PSA drivers for hashes, including with no
+     built-in implementation present, but only in some configurations.
+     - RSA OAEP and PSS (PKCS#1 v2.1), PKCS5, PKCS12 and EC J-PAKE now use
+       hashes from PSA when (and only when) MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled.
+     - PEM parsing of encrypted files now uses MD-5 from PSA when (and only
+       when) MBEDTLS_MD5_C is disabled.
+     See the documentation of the corresponding macros in mbedtls_config.h for
+     details.
+     Note that some modules are not able to use hashes from PSA yet, including
+     the entropy module. As a consequence, for now the only way to build with
+     all hashes only provided by drivers (no built-in hash) is to use
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG.
+   * When MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, X.509, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 now
+     properly negotiate/accept hashes based on their availability in PSA.
+     As a consequence, they now work in configurations where the built-in
+     implementations of (some) hashes are excluded and those hashes are only
+     provided by PSA drivers. (See previous entry for limitation on RSA-PSS
+     though: that module only use hashes from PSA when MBEDTLS_MD_C is off).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/dtls-connection-id.txt b/ChangeLog.d/dtls-connection-id.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..840f837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/dtls-connection-id.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Features
+   * Add support for DTLS Connection ID as defined by RFC 9146, controlled by
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (enabled by default) and configured with
+     mbedtls_ssl_set_cid().
+
+Default behavior changes
+   * Previously the macro MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID implemented version 05
+     of the IETF draft, and was marked experimental and disabled by default.
+     It is now no longer experimental, and implements the final version from
+     RFC 9146, which is not interoperable with the draft-05 version.
+     If you need to communicate with peers that use earlier versions of
+     Mbed TLS, then you need to define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
+     to 1, but then you won't be able to communicate with peers that use the
+     standard (non-draft) version.
+     If you need to interoperate with both classes of peers with the
+     same build of Mbed TLS, please let us know about your situation on the
+     mailing list or GitHub.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ecjpake-in-tls.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ecjpake-in-tls.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b84caab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/ecjpake-in-tls.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Features
+   * The TLS 1.2 EC J-PAKE key exchange can now use the PSA Crypto API.
+     Additional PSA key slots will be allocated in the process of such key
+     exchange for builds that enable MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED and
+     MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/extend-query_compile_time_config-to-psa_want.txt b/ChangeLog.d/extend-query_compile_time_config-to-psa_want.txt
index b268fd4..99b2ec4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/extend-query_compile_time_config-to-psa_want.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/extend-query_compile_time_config-to-psa_want.txt
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 Changes
-   * Add the ability to query PSA_WANT_xxx macros to query_compile_time_config
+   * Add the ability to query PSA_WANT_xxx macros to query_compile_time_config.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-possible-false-success-in-mbedtls_cipher_check_tag.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-possible-false-success-in-mbedtls_cipher_check_tag.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f9e0aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-possible-false-success-in-mbedtls_cipher_check_tag.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Changes
+   * Calling AEAD tag-specific functions for non-AEAD algorithms (which
+     should not be done - they are documented for use only by AES-GCM and
+     ChaCha20+Poly1305) now returns MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
+     instead of success (0).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls12server-sent-sigalgs.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls12server-sent-sigalgs.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b74c6ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls12server-sent-sigalgs.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Bugfix
+    * Fix a bug whereby the list of signature algorithms sent as part of
+      the TLS 1.2 server certificate request would get corrupted, meaning the
+      first algorithm would not get sent and an entry consisting of two random
+      bytes would be sent instead. Found by Serban Bejan and Dudek Sebastian.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_arm_compile_erorr.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_arm_compile_erorr.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28c1d45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_arm_compile_erorr.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+    * Fix a build error when compiling the bignum module for some Arm platforms.
+      Fixes #6089, #6124, #6217.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_error_for_mbedtls_deprecated_removed.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_error_for_mbedtls_deprecated_removed.txt
index a70521a..f0fa000 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_error_for_mbedtls_deprecated_removed.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_error_for_mbedtls_deprecated_removed.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 Bugfix
-    * Fix build error due to missing prototype
-      warning when MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is enabled
+    * Fix a build error due to a missing prototype warning when
+      MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is enabled.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_tls1_2_with_single_encryption_type.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_tls1_2_with_single_encryption_type.txt
index bac4910..c7d2691 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_tls1_2_with_single_encryption_type.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_build_tls1_2_with_single_encryption_type.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 Bugfix
-    * Fix bugs and missing dependencies when
-      building and testing configurations with
-      only one encryption type enabled in TLS 1.2.
+    * Fix bugs and missing dependencies when building and testing
+      configurations with only one encryption type enabled in TLS 1.2.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files b/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b2c099..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix an issue in releases with GEN_FILES turned off whereby missing
-     generated files could be turned into symlinks to themselves.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdec6e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_gen_files.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix an issue with in-tree CMake builds in releases with GEN_FILES
+     turned off: if a shipped file was missing from the working directory,
+     it could be turned into a symbolic link to itself.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_using_iar_toolchain.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_using_iar_toolchain.txt
index ecc09c2..9ec6e0d 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_using_iar_toolchain.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_cmake_using_iar_toolchain.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 Bugfix
-   * Fixed an issue that cause compile error using CMake IAR toolchain.
+   * Fix a compilation error when using CMake with an IAR toolchain.
      Fixes #5964.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives b/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c55c30..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a build issue on Windows where the source and build directory could not be on
-     different drives (#5751).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46d05c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_hard_link_across_drives.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix a build issue on Windows using CMake where the source and build
+     directories could not be on different drives. Fixes #5751.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_tls13_session_resumption_fail_when_hostname_is_not_localhost.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_tls13_session_resumption_fail_when_hostname_is_not_localhost.txt
index 5797f48..9f5c649 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_tls13_session_resumption_fail_when_hostname_is_not_localhost.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_tls13_session_resumption_fail_when_hostname_is_not_localhost.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 Bugfix
-    * Fix TLS 1.3 session resumption fail. Fixes #6488.
-    * Add configuration check to exclude TLS 1.3 optional authentication of
-      client.
+    * Fix TLS 1.3 session resumption. Fixes #6488.
+    * Add a configuration check to exclude optional client authentication
+      in TLS 1.3 (where it is forbidden).
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_zeroization.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_zeroization.txt
index ad74d9c..8b00dcc 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_zeroization.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_zeroization.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 Bugfix
-   * Fix possible crash in TLS PRF code, if a failure to allocate memory occurs.
-     Reported by Michael Madsen in #6516.
+   * Fix a possible null pointer dereference if a memory allocation fails
+     in TLS PRF code. Reported by Michael Madsen in #6516.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_asn1_type_free.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_asn1_type_free.txt
index 81f3a20..3459bbe 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_asn1_type_free.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_asn1_type_free.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 Features
-   * Shared code to free x509 structs like mbedtls_x509_named_data
+   * The new functions mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list() and
+     mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow() simplify the management
+     of memory in named data lists in X.509 structures.
 New deprecations
    * Deprecate mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data().
      Use mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list()
-     or mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow()
+     or mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow().
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/move-ssl-modules.txt b/ChangeLog.d/move-ssl-modules.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f00e5ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/move-ssl-modules.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Move some SSL-specific code out of libmbedcrypto where it had been placed
+     accidentally.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mpi-add-0-ub.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-add-0-ub.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f131a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-add-0-ub.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) of
+     mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(), mbedtls_mpi_add_abs() and mbedtls_mpi_add_int()
+     when both operands are 0 and the left operand is represented with 0 limbs.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/mpi-most-negative-sint.txt b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-most-negative-sint.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e775c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/mpi-most-negative-sint.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) when some bignum
+     functions receive the most negative value of mbedtls_mpi_sint. Credit
+     to OSS-Fuzz. Fixes #6597.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa-ecb-ub.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa-ecb-ub.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d725ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa-ecb-ub.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) in PSA ECB
+     encryption and decryption.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_code_gen_1_1.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_code_gen_1_1.txt
index 2c18e6f..e10a81c 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_code_gen_1_1.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_crypto_code_gen_1_1.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 Features
-    * Brought in PSA code geneneration JSON driver list.
-      Added auto generated templating support for key management.
-      Added Support for transparent and opaque keys (import/export/copy).
-      Included some general JSON validation for the given entry points.
-      Addresses version 1.1 of #5137.
+    * The PSA driver wrapper generator generate_driver_wrappers.py now
+      supports a subset of the driver description language, including
+      the following entry points: import_key, export_key, export_public_key,
+      get_builtin_key, copy_key.
+
+Requirement changes
+   * When building with PSA drivers using generate_driver_wrappers.py, or
+     when building the library from the development branch rather than
+     from a release, the Python module jsonschema is now necessary, in
+     addition to jinja2. The official list of required Python modules is
+     maintained in scripts/basic.requirements.txt and may change again
+     in the future.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa_driver_wrapper_for_raw_key_agreement.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa_driver_wrapper_for_raw_key_agreement.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9c78a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa_driver_wrapper_for_raw_key_agreement.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Features
+   * Add a driver dispatch layer for raw key agreement, enabling alternative
+     implementations of raw key agreement through the key_agreement driver
+     entry point. This entry point is specified in the proposed PSA driver
+     interface, but had not yet been implemented.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/remove_ssl_session_compression.txt b/ChangeLog.d/remove_ssl_session_compression.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index dc59f1c..0000000
--- a/ChangeLog.d/remove_ssl_session_compression.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Removals
-   * Remove compression property from SSL session struct.
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is now the only supported
-     compression option and can be used for compatibility
-     reasons. Changes requested in #4223.
diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc.txt b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc.txt
index 497ed38..6733173 100644
--- a/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc.txt
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/tls13-misc.txt
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 Features
-   * Mbed TLS supports TLS 1.3 key establishment via pre-shared keys,
-     pre-shared keys provisioned externally or via the ticket mechanism
-     (session resumption).
-     The MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option controls the support
-     for the ticket mechanism.
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_xxx_ENABLED configuration options
-     have been introduced to control the support for the three possible
-     TLS 1.3 key exchange modes.
+   * Mbed TLS now supports TLS 1.3 key establishment via pre-shared keys.
+     The pre-shared keys can be provisioned externally or via the ticket
+     mechanism (session resumption).
+     The ticket mechanism is supported when the configuration option
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS is enabled.
+     New options MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_xxx_ENABLED
+     control the support for the three possible TLS 1.3 key exchange modes.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1a4edb0..8a23bd2 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@
 - Signed integers must be represented using two's complement.
 - `int` and `size_t` must be at least 32 bits wide.
 - The types `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t` and their signed equivalents must be available.
+- Mixed-endian platforms are not supported.
 
 PSA cryptography API
 --------------------
diff --git a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
index f30590b..85482ba 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
@@ -478,3 +478,175 @@
 
 * state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease
 the navigation of the state machine transitions.
+
+
+Writing and reading early or 0-RTT data
+---------------------------------------
+
+An application function to write and send a buffer of data to a server through
+TLS may plausibly look like:
+
+```
+int write_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                const unsigned char *data_to_write,
+                size_t data_to_write_len,
+                size_t *data_written )
+{
+    *data_written = 0;
+
+    while( *data_written < data_to_write_len )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, data_to_write + *data_written,
+                                 data_to_write_len - *data_written );
+
+        if( ret < 0 &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+        {
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        *data_written += ret;
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+```
+where ssl is the SSL context to use, data_to_write the address of the data
+buffer and data_to_write_len the number of data bytes. The handshake may
+not be completed, not even started for the SSL context ssl when the function is
+called and in that case the mbedtls_ssl_write() API takes care transparently of
+completing the handshake before to write and send data to the server. The
+mbedtls_ssl_write() may not been able to write and send all data in one go thus
+the need for a loop calling it as long as there are still data to write and
+send.
+
+An application function to write and send early data and only early data,
+data sent during the first flight of client messages while the handshake is in
+its initial phase, would look completely similar but the call to
+mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() instead of mbedtls_ssl_write().
+```
+int write_early_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                      const unsigned char *data_to_write,
+                      size_t data_to_write_len,
+                      size_t *data_written )
+{
+    *data_written = 0;
+
+    while( *data_written < data_to_write_len )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data( ssl, data_to_write + *data_written,
+                                            data_to_write_len - *data_written );
+
+        if( ret < 0 &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+        {
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        *data_written += ret;
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+```
+Note that compared to write_data(), write_early_data() can also return
+MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA and that should be handled
+specifically by the user of write_early_data(). A fresh SSL context (typically
+just after a call to mbedtls_ssl_setup() or mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()) would
+be expected when calling `write_early_data`.
+
+All together, code to write and send a buffer of data as long as possible as
+early data and then as standard post-handshake application data could
+plausibly look like:
+
+```
+ret = write_early_data( ssl, data_to_write, data_to_write_len,
+                        &early_data_written );
+if( ret < 0 &&
+    ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA )
+{
+    goto error;
+}
+
+ret = write_data( ssl, data_to_write + early_data_written,
+                  data_to_write_len - early_data_written, &data_written );
+if( ret < 0 )
+    goto error;
+
+data_written += early_data_written;
+```
+
+Finally, taking into account that the server may reject early data, application
+code to write and send a buffer of data could plausibly look like:
+```
+ret = write_early_data( ssl, data_to_write, data_to_write_len,
+                        &early_data_written );
+if( ret < 0 &&
+    ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA )
+{
+    goto error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure the handshake is completed as it is a requisite to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status().
+ */
+while( !mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) )
+{
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
+    if( ret < 0 &&
+        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+    {
+        goto error;
+    }
+}
+
+ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status( ssl );
+if( ret < 0 )
+    goto error;
+
+if( ret == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED )
+   early_data_written = 0;
+
+ret = write_data( ssl, data_to_write + early_data_written,
+                  data_to_write_len - early_data_written, &data_written );
+if( ret < 0 )
+    goto error;
+
+data_written += early_data_written;
+```
+
+Basically, the same holds for reading early data on the server side without the
+complication of possible rejection. An application function to read early data
+into a given buffer could plausibly look like:
+```
+int read_early_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                     unsigned char *buffer,
+                     size_t buffer_size,
+                     size_t *data_len )
+{
+    *data_len = 0;
+
+    while( *data_len < buffer_size )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data( ssl, buffer + *data_len,
+                                           buffer_size - *data_len );
+
+        if( ret < 0 &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+            ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
+        {
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        *data_len += ret;
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+```
+with again calls to read_early_data() expected to be done with a fresh SSL
+context.
diff --git a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
index b22d37f..11442ed 100644
--- a/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
+++ b/docs/use-psa-crypto.md
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@
 
 Current exceptions:
 
-- EC J-PAKE (when `MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED` is defined)
 - finite-field (non-EC) Diffie-Hellman (used in key exchanges: DHE-RSA,
   DHE-PSK)
 
diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h b/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h
index 96734bd..ec149ae 100644
--- a/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h
+++ b/doxygen/input/doc_encdec.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  * All symmetric encryption algorithms are accessible via the generic cipher layer
  * (see \c mbedtls_cipher_setup()).
  *
- * The asymmetric encryptrion algorithms are accessible via the generic public
+ * The asymmetric encryption algorithms are accessible via the generic public
  * key layer (see \c mbedtls_pk_init()).
  *
  * The following algorithms are provided:
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
index c359011..1cd20fe 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/aes.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/aes.h
@@ -61,11 +61,6 @@
 /** Invalid input data. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA                    -0x0021
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
index 8b66ee2..5e3f387 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@
 
 /**
  * \name ASN1 Error codes
- * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for
+ * These error codes are combined with other error codes for
  * higher error granularity.
+ * e.g. X.509 and PKCS #7 error codes
  * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures.
  * \{
  */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
index 5554720..e6f0479 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
  *                  the existing buffer to fit \p val_len.
  *
  * \return          A pointer to the new / existing entry on success.
- * \return          \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error.
+ * \return          \c NULL if there was a memory allocation error.
  */
 mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list,
                                         const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
index 3bd1ca0..877fbc7 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -179,6 +179,20 @@
     #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
 
+/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_uint
+ * \brief The type of machine digits in a bignum, called _limbs_.
+ *
+ * This is always an unsigned integer type with no padding bits. The size
+ * is platform-dependent.
+ */
+
+/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_sint
+ * \brief The signed type corresponding to #mbedtls_mpi_uint.
+ *
+ * This is always an signed integer type with no padding bits. The size
+ * is platform-dependent.
+ */
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
index 170cbeb..362ce2f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@
 #define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
 #endif
 
+/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */
+#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
+    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
+#define inline __inline
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
 #include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
 #else
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 3918639..b791344 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H
 #define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H
 
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
 /*
  * We assume CHAR_BIT is 8 in many places. In practice, this is true on our
  * target platforms, so not an issue, but let's just be extra sure.
@@ -32,6 +33,8 @@
 #error "mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars"
 #endif
 
+#include <stdint.h>
+
 #if defined(_WIN32)
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
 #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows"
@@ -327,7 +330,7 @@
 
 /* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256.
  * This will be taken from MD if it is present, or from PSA if MD is absent.
- * Note: ECJPAKE_C depends on MD_C || PSA_CRYPTO_C. */
+ * Note: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C depends on MBEDTLS_MD_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) &&                    \
     !( defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) ) &&          \
     !( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) )
@@ -849,6 +852,13 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA  defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
+    ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE)     || \
+      ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE < 0 )       || \
+      ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE > UINT32_MAX ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE MUST be defined and in range(0..UINT32_MAX)"
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)     && \
     !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites"
@@ -903,6 +913,19 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT)     &&                 \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&   \
     !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites"
@@ -1062,6 +1085,14 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4341"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) && ( ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) ) || \
+    ( !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) || \
+    ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) ||\
+    ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) ) || \
+    ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) )
+#error  "MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C is defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this
  * workaround since this is included by every single file before the
@@ -1069,4 +1100,5 @@
  */
 typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units;
 
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
index a3f52ea..151da1d 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -46,11 +46,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM
 #endif
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /** The selected feature is not available. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE  -0x6080
 /** Bad input parameters. */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
index 5b27dda..5727c5e 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  *  those definitions to define symbols used in the library code.
  *
  *  Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit
- *  include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBETLS_XXX settings or
+ *  include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or
  *  include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings.
  */
 /*
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
index e7ca1b2..3dd3361 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
  * \param curve     The identifier of the elliptic curve to use,
  *                  for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1.
  * \param secret    The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be
- *                  a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need
+ *                  a readable not empty buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need
  *                  only be valid for the duration of this call.
  * \param len       The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret.
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/error.h b/include/mbedtls/error.h
index eb83913..4a97d65 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/error.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -26,11 +26,6 @@
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /**
  * Error code layout.
  *
@@ -96,6 +91,7 @@
  * ECP       4   10 (Started from top)
  * MD        5   5
  * HKDF      5   1 (Started from top)
+ * PKCS7     5   12 (Started from 0x5300)
  * SSL       5   2 (Started from 0x5F00)
  * CIPHER    6   8 (Started from 0x6080)
  * SSL       6   22 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h
index f872dda..35798a5 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
  * The naming scheme for these macros is:
  *      MBEDTLS_HAS_feature_VIA_legacy_OR_PSA(_condition)
  * where:
- * - feature is expressed the same way as in PSA_WANT macros, for example:
+ * - feature is expressed the same way as in PSA_WANT_xxx macros, for example:
  *   KEY_TYPE_AES, ALG_SHA_256, ECC_SECP_R1_256;
  * - legacy is either LOWLEVEL or the name of the layer: MD, CIPHER;
  * - condition is omitted if it's based on availability, else it's
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/lms.h b/include/mbedtls/lms.h
index fe87d40..1179cd1 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/lms.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/lms.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN            (4)
 #define MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 10u : 0)
 
-/* The length of a hash output, Currently only imlemented for SHA256.
+/* The length of a hash output, Currently only implemented for SHA256.
  * Max is 32 bytes.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 32 : 0)
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
 
 /** The Identifier of the LMS parameter set, as per
  * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml
- * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly H10, for the sake of simplicty.
+ * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly H10, for the sake of simplicity.
  */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 = 0x6,
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
 
 /** The Identifier of the LMOTS parameter set, as per
  *  https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml.
- *  We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly N32_W8, for the sake of simplicty.
+ *  We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly N32_W8, for the sake of simplicity.
  */
 typedef enum {
     MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 = 4
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
index 3f869b9..78c3635 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -1146,6 +1146,11 @@
  * \warning If building without MBEDTLS_MD_C, you must call psa_crypto_init()
  * before doing any PKCS#1 v2.1 operation.
  *
+ * \warning When building with MBEDTLS_MD_C, all hashes used with this
+ * need to be available as built-ins (that is, for SHA-256, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C,
+ * etc.) as opposed to just PSA drivers. So far, PSA drivers are only used by
+ * this module in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled.
+ *
  * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
@@ -1320,21 +1325,16 @@
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
  *
- * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension
- * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05)
+ * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID (CID) extension,
  * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes
- * in the underlying transport.
+ * in the underlying transport. The CID functionality is described
+ * in RFC 9146.
  *
  * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`,
  * mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid()`, `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and
  * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. See the corresponding documentation for
  * more information.
  *
- * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state.
- *          We make no stability promises for the availability
- *          or the shape of the API controlled by this option.
- *
  * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured
  * through the options
  * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
@@ -1344,7 +1344,30 @@
  *
  * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension.
  */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
+ *
+ * Defines whether RFC 9146 (default) or the legacy version
+ * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05)
+ * is used.
+ *
+ * Set the value to 0 for the standard version, and
+ * 1 for the legacy draft version.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Support for the legacy version of the DTLS
+ *             Connection ID feature is deprecated. Please
+ *             switch to the standardized version defined
+ *             in RFC 9146 enabled by utilizing
+ *             MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID without use
+ *             of MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
 
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
@@ -1520,7 +1543,7 @@
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
  * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
  *
- * Note: even though TLS 1.3 depends on PSA Crypto, and uses it unconditonally
+ * Note: even though TLS 1.3 depends on PSA Crypto, and uses it unconditionally
  * for most operations, if you want it to only use PSA for all crypto
  * operations, you need to also enable MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO; otherwise X.509
  * operations, and functions that are common with TLS 1.2 (record protection,
@@ -1648,7 +1671,24 @@
 * production.
 *
 */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
+ *
+ * The default maximum amount of 0-RTT data. See the documentation of
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_max_early_data_size() for more information.
+ *
+ * It must be positive and smaller than UINT32_MAX.
+ *
+ * If MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA is not defined, this default value does not
+ * have any impact on the build.
+ *
+ * This feature is experimental, not completed and thus not ready for
+ * production.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE        1024
 
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
@@ -2433,6 +2473,11 @@
  *
  * \warning If building without MBEDTLS_MD_C, you must call psa_crypto_init()
  * before doing any EC J-PAKE operations.
+ *
+ * \warning When building with MBEDTLS_MD_C, all hashes used with this
+ * need to be available as built-ins (that is, for SHA-256, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C,
+ * etc.) as opposed to just PSA drivers. So far, PSA drivers are only used by
+ * this module in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
 
@@ -2777,11 +2822,36 @@
  * \warning If building without MBEDTLS_MD_C, you must call psa_crypto_init()
  * before doing any PKCS5 operation.
  *
+ * \warning When building with MBEDTLS_MD_C, all hashes used with this
+ * need to be available as built-ins (that is, for SHA-256, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C,
+ * etc.) as opposed to just PSA drivers. So far, PSA drivers are only used by
+ * this module in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled.
+ *
  * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
 
 /**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+ *
+ * This feature is a work in progress and not ready for production. Testing and
+ * validation is incomplete, and handling of malformed inputs may not be robust.
+ * The API may change.
+ *
+ * Enable PKCS7 core for using PKCS7 formatted signatures.
+ * RFC Link - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
+ *
+ * Module:  library/pkcs7.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C,
+ *           MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C,
+ *           MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for the PKCS7 parsing modules.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+
+/**
  * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
  *
  * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions.
@@ -2796,6 +2866,11 @@
  * \warning If building without MBEDTLS_MD_C, you must call psa_crypto_init()
  * before doing any PKCS12 operation.
  *
+ * \warning When building with MBEDTLS_MD_C, all hashes used with this
+ * need to be available as built-ins (that is, for SHA-256, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C,
+ * etc.) as opposed to just PSA drivers. So far, PSA drivers are only used by
+ * this module in builds where MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled.
+ *
  * This module enables PKCS#12 functions.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
@@ -3661,17 +3736,6 @@
 //#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN               32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */
 //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT        60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */
 
-/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID
- *
- * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its
- * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a
- * different value.
- *
- * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of
- * this option to match evolving standards and usage.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID                        254
-
 /**
  * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference.
  *
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/include/mbedtls/oid.h
index 4ee3f93..e5c4b92 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/oid.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/oid.h
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS                MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1               MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5               MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7               MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x07" /**< pkcs-7 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 7 } */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9               MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12              MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */
 
@@ -301,6 +302,16 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC      MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */
 
 /*
+ * PKCS#7 OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA                        MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x01" /**< Content type is Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 1} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA                 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x02" /**< Content type is Signed Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 2} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA              MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x03" /**< Content type is Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 3} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA   MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x04" /**< Content type is Signed and Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 4} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA               MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x05" /**< Content type is Digested Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 5} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA              MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x06" /**< Content type is Encrypted Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 6} */
+
+/*
  * PKCS#8 OIDs
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ           MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x0e" /**< extensionRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 14} */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/include/mbedtls/pem.h
index c75a124..a4c6fb8 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pem.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pem.h
@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /**
  * \name PEM Error codes
  * These error codes are returned in case of errors reading the
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
index 867961d..db0bfac 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -44,11 +44,6 @@
 #include "psa/crypto.h"
 #endif
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /** Memory allocation failed. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED        -0x3F80
 /** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
index 1b87aea..327996a 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
  *                   no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the
  *                   last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00).
  * \param pwdlen     length of the password (may be 0).
- * \param salt       Salt buffer to use This may only be \c NULL when
+ * \param salt       Salt buffer to use. This may only be \c NULL when
  *                   \p saltlen is 0.
  * \param saltlen    length of the salt (may be zero)
  * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf61a63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/**
+ * \file pkcs7.h
+ *
+ * \brief PKCS7 generic defines and structures
+ *  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * This feature is a work in progress and not ready for production. The API may
+ * change. Furthermore, please note that the implementation has only been
+ * validated with well-formed inputs, not yet with untrusted inputs (which is
+ * almost always the case in practice).
+ *
+ * Note: For the time being, this implementation of the PKCS7 cryptographic
+ * message syntax is a partial implementation of RFC 2315.
+ * Differences include:
+ *  - The RFC specifies 6 different content types. The only type currently
+ *    supported in Mbed TLS is the signed data content type.
+ *  - The only supported PKCS7 Signed Data syntax version is version 1
+ *  - The RFC specifies support for BER. This implementation is limited to
+ *    DER only.
+ *  - The RFC specifies that multiple digest algorithms can be specified
+ *    in the Signed Data type. Only one digest algorithm is supported in Mbed TLS.
+ *  - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain multiple X509 or PKCS6
+ *    certificates. In Mbed TLS, this list can only contain 0 or 1 certificates
+ *    and they must be in X509 format.
+ *  - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain
+ *    certificate-revocation lists (crls). This implementation has no support
+ *    for crls so it is assumed to be an empty list.
+ *  - The RFC allows for SignerInfo structure to optionally contain
+ *    unauthenticatedAttributes and authenticatedAttributes. In Mbed TLS it is
+ *    assumed these fields are empty.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+
+/**
+ * \name PKCS7 Module Error codes
+ * \{
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT                   -0x5300  /**< The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE              -0x5380  /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION                  -0x5400  /**< The PKCS7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO             -0x5480  /**< The PKCS7 content info invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG                      -0x5500  /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT                     -0x5580  /**< The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE                -0x5600  /**< Error parsing the signature */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO              -0x5680  /**< Error parsing the signer's info */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA                   -0x5700  /**< Input invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED                     -0x5780  /**< Allocation of memory failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL                      -0x5800  /**< Verification Failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID                -0x5880  /**< The PKCS7 date issued/expired dates are invalid */
+/* \} name */
+
+/**
+ * \name PKCS7 Supported Version
+ * \{
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION                           0x01
+/* \} name */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER.
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_pkcs7_buf;
+
+/**
+ * Container for ASN1 named information objects.
+ * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.).
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_pkcs7_name;
+
+/**
+ * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_pkcs7_sequence;
+
+/**
+ * PKCS7 types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_NONE=0,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DATA,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA,
+    MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA,
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_type;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding PKCS7 signer info
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info
+{
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial);
+    mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg_identifier);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_alg_identifier);
+    mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
+    struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding attached data as part of PKCS7 signed data format
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_data
+{
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(oid);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_data;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding the signed data section
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data
+{
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(digest_alg_identifiers);
+    struct mbedtls_pkcs7_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(content);
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_certs);
+    mbedtls_x509_crt MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certs);
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_crls);
+    mbedtls_x509_crl MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl);
+    int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_signers);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signers);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding PKCS7 structure, only signed data for now
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7
+{
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(content_type_oid);
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signed_data);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7;
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Initialize pkcs7 structure.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7    pkcs7 structure.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_init( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7 );
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Parse a single DER formatted pkcs7 content.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7    The pkcs7 structure to be filled by parser for the output.
+ * \param buf      The buffer holding the DER encoded pkcs7.
+ * \param buflen   The size in bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note           This function makes an internal copy of the PKCS7 buffer
+ *                 \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
+ *                 after this call returns.
+ *
+ * \return         The \c mbedtls_pkcs7_type of \p buf, if successful.
+ * \return         A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf,
+                             const size_t buflen );
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Verification of PKCS7 signature against a caller-supplied
+ *                 certificate.
+ *
+ *                 For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes
+ *                 a signature over the supplied data, using the supplied
+ *                 certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the
+ *                 signer. It then compares this signature against the
+ *                 signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison
+ *                 matches.
+ *
+ *                 This function does not use the certificates held within the
+ *                 PKCS7 structure itself.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7    PKCS7 structure containing signature.
+ * \param cert     Certificate containing key to verify signature.
+ * \param data     Plain data on which signature has to be verified.
+ * \param datalen  Length of the data.
+ *
+ * \note           This function internally calculates the hash on the supplied
+ *                 plain data for signature verification.
+ *
+ * \return         0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+                                      const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                      const unsigned char *data,
+                                      size_t datalen );
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Verification of PKCS7 signature against a caller-supplied
+ *                 certificate.
+ *
+ *                 For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes
+ *                 a signature over the supplied hash, using the supplied
+ *                 certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the
+ *                 signer. It then compares this signature against the
+ *                 signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison
+ *                 matches.
+ *
+ *                 This function does not use the certificates held within the
+ *                 PKCS7 structure itself.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7    PKCS7 structure containing signature.
+ * \param cert     Certificate containing key to verify signature.
+ * \param hash     Hash of the plain data on which signature has to be verified.
+ * \param hashlen  Length of the hash.
+ *
+ * \note           This function is different from mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify()
+ *                 in a way that it directly receives the hash of the data.
+ *
+ * \return         0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+                                      const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                      const unsigned char *hash, size_t hashlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief          Unallocate all PKCS7 data and zeroize the memory.
+ *                 It doesn't free pkcs7 itself. It should be done by the caller.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7    PKCS7 structure to free.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_free( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7 );
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* pkcs7.h */
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
index 002551f..2bfaf8f 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
  * \param N        The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL.
  * \param N_len    The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL.
  * \param P        The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
- * \param P_len    The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL.
+ * \param P_len    The Byte length of \p P; it is ignored if \p P == NULL.
  * \param Q        The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
  * \param Q_len    The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL.
  * \param D        The private exponent. This may be \c NULL.
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
index d055851..3f48377 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -96,12 +96,16 @@
 /* Error space gap */
 /** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE                   -0x7A00
-/** Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message */
+/* Error space gap */
+/**
+ * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message.
+ * This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice.
+ */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET       -0x7B00
-/* Error space gap */
-/* Error space gap */
-/* Error space gap */
-/* Error space gap */
+/** Not possible to read early data */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA            -0x7B80
+/** Not possible to write early data */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA           -0x7C00
 /* Error space gap */
 /* Error space gap */
 /* Error space gap */
@@ -405,6 +409,14 @@
 /** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
 
 /*
+ * Default to standard CID mode
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
+#endif
+
+/*
  * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12
@@ -572,15 +584,10 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT                50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE                   51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
 
-/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of
- * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
- * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05).
- *
- * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of
- * this option to match evolving standards and usage.
- */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID)
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID                        254 /* TBD */
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID                         54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID                        254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
 #endif
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP               256 /* experimental */
@@ -661,7 +668,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP,
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
+
     MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
@@ -671,7 +678,9 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
     MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH,
 }
 mbedtls_ssl_states;
 
@@ -801,14 +810,6 @@
 typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN           0
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT          1
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_INDICATION_SENT   2
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED          3
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED          4
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
 typedef uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_ticket_flags;
 
@@ -1526,6 +1527,12 @@
     int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled);     /*!< Early data enablement:
                                                   *   - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED,
                                                   *   - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+    /* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */
+    uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
@@ -1963,6 +1970,35 @@
 */
 void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_early_data( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                         int early_data_enabled );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes
+ *        Default:  #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
+ *
+ *        This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size
+ *        field of the early data indication extension included in
+ *        the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send.
+ *
+ *        The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data
+ *        in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using
+ *        one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages.
+ *
+ * \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more
+ *       early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection.
+ *       The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough
+ *       to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged.
+ *
+ * \param[in] conf                  The SSL configuration to use.
+ * \param[in] max_early_data_size   The maximum amount of 0-RTT data.
+ *
+ * \warning This interface is experimental and may change without notice.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_max_early_data_size(
+         mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
@@ -2076,8 +2112,9 @@
  * \brief             Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID)
  *                    extension in the next handshake.
  *
- *                    Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ *                    Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
  *                    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ *                    for legacy version)
  *
  *                    The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of
  *                    DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the
@@ -2134,7 +2171,7 @@
  *                      the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too,
  *                      the CID extension will actually be put to use.
  *                    - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through
- *                      this call implies that that the server will look for
+ *                      this call implies that the server will look for
  *                      the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client,
  *                      and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its
  *                      `ServerHello`.
@@ -2580,7 +2617,7 @@
  * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
  *       of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
  *
- * \param ssl            The SSL context context to modify.
+ * \param ssl            The SSL context to modify.
  * \param p              The new value of the user data.
  */
 static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(
@@ -2594,7 +2631,7 @@
  *
  * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n().
  *
- * \param ssl            The SSL context context to modify.
+ * \param ssl            The SSL context to modify.
  * \param n              The new value of the user data.
  */
 static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(
@@ -2611,7 +2648,7 @@
  * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has
  * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p().
  *
- * \param ssl            The SSL context context to modify.
+ * \param ssl            The SSL context to modify.
  * \return               The current value of the user data.
  */
 static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(
@@ -2627,7 +2664,7 @@
  * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has
  * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n().
  *
- * \param ssl            The SSL context context to modify.
+ * \param ssl            The SSL context to modify.
  * \return               The current value of the user data.
  */
 static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(
@@ -3851,9 +3888,10 @@
  * \note           The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
  *                 to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
  *                 \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ *                 Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236).
  *
  * \param ssl      SSL context
- * \param pw       EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret)
+ * \param pw       EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty
  * \param pw_len   length of pw in bytes
  *
  * \return         0 on success, or a negative error code.
@@ -4651,7 +4689,7 @@
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
-    return( ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE( state ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER );
+    return( ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE( state ) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER );
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4891,6 +4929,151 @@
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief          Read at most 'len' application data bytes while performing
+ *                 the handshake (early data).
+ *
+ * \note           This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_read(). The
+ *                 specification of mbedtls_ssl_read() relevant to TLS 1.3
+ *                 (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS 1.2) applies to this
+ *                 function and the present documentation is restricted to the
+ *                 differences with mbedtls_ssl_read().
+ *
+ * \param ssl      SSL context
+ * \param buf      buffer that will hold the data
+ * \param len      maximum number of bytes to read
+ *
+ * \return         One additional specific return value:
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA.
+ *
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
+ *                 is not possible to read early data for the SSL context
+ *                 \p ssl.
+ *
+ *                 It may have been possible and it is not possible
+ *                 anymore because the server received the End of Early Data
+ *                 message or the maximum number of allowed early data for the
+ *                 PSK in use has been reached.
+ *
+ *                 It may never have been possible and will never be possible
+ *                 for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
+ *                 is disabled for that context or more generally the context
+ *                 is not suitably configured to enable early data or the
+ *                 client does not use early data or the first call to the
+ *                 function was done while the handshake was already too
+ *                 advanced to gather and accept early data.
+ *
+ *                 It is not possible to read early data for the SSL context
+ *                 \p ssl but this does not preclude for using it with
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ *
+ * \note           When a server wants to retrieve early data, it is expected
+ *                 that this function starts the handshake for the SSL context
+ *                 \p ssl. But this is not mandatory.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                 unsigned char *buf, size_t len );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief          Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while
+ *                 performing the handshake (early data).
+ *
+ * \note           This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The
+ *                 specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3
+ *                 (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this
+ *                 function and the present documentation is restricted to the
+ *                 differences with mbedtls_ssl_write().
+ *
+ * \param ssl      SSL context
+ * \param buf      buffer holding the data
+ * \param len      how many bytes must be written
+ *
+ * \return         One additional specific return value:
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA.
+ *
+ *                 #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
+ *                 is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
+ *                 \p ssl.
+ *
+ *                 It may have been possible and it is not possible
+ *                 anymore because the client received the server Finished
+ *                 message, the server rejected early data or the maximum
+ *                 number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been
+ *                 reached.
+ *
+ *                 It may never have been possible and will never be possible
+ *                 for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
+ *                 is disabled for that context or more generally the context
+ *                 is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first
+ *                 call to the function was done while the handshake was
+ *                 already completed.
+ *
+ *                 It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
+ *                 \p ssl but this does not preclude for using it with
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ *
+ * \note           This function may write early data only if the SSL context
+ *                 has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which
+ *                 early data is allowed.
+ *
+ * \note           To maximize the number of early data that can be written in
+ *                 the course of the handshake, it is expected that this
+ *                 function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
+ *                 But this is not mandatory.
+ *
+ * \note           This function does not provide any information on whether
+ *                 the server has accepted or will accept early data or not.
+ *                 When it returns a positive value, it just means that it
+ *                 has written early data to the server. To know whether the
+ *                 server has accepted early data or not, you should call
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake
+ *                 completed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *buf, size_t len );
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT  0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED  1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED  2
+/**
+ * \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data.
+ *
+ * \param ssl      The SSL context to query
+ *
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
+ *                 from the server-side.
+ *
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
+ *                 prior to completion of the handshake.
+ *
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT if the client has
+ *                 not indicated the use of early data to the server.
+ *
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has
+ *                 indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted
+ *                 it.
+ *
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has
+ *                 indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected
+ *                 it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the
+ *                 early data it may have tried to send by calling
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake
+ *                 application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write().
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 /**
  * \brief          Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory
  *
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h
index a71ca3f..03181ed 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@
  *
  * This function destroys a key from both volatile
  * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall
- * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered.
+ * make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered.
  *
  * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees
  * resources associated with the key.
@@ -3823,7 +3823,7 @@
  * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type
  * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
  * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
- * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding the the
+ * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the
  * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them.
  * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
  *
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
index 4f65398..33e2e77 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@
  */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, 0,              \
-                                 MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT,               \
+                                 NULL, 0                ,               \
                                  PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE, {0}, 0, 0,         \
                                  {.dummy = 0}}
 #else
@@ -1920,7 +1920,8 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
     unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_step);
     unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_step);
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+    uint8_t* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+    size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
     psa_pake_role_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role);
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]);
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length);
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
index 47ab1cf..573b33c 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
@@ -45,11 +45,6 @@
 /* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */
 #include <stdint.h>
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
 
 /* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
index f0252c8..225fb17 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
  * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value
  *
  * \param[in,out] op_context    A hardware-specific structure for the previously
- *                              started MAC operation to be fiinished
+ *                              started MAC operation to be finished
  * \param[in] p_mac             The MAC value against which the resulting MAC
  *                              will be compared against
  * \param[in] mac_length        The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac`
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@
     /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check
      */
     psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t  MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish_verify);
-    /** Function that aborts a previoustly started MAC operation
+    /** Function that aborts a previously started MAC operation
      */
     psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t          MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort);
     /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@
                                                   size_t ciphertext_size,
                                                   size_t *p_ciphertext_length);
 
-/** A function that peforms a secure element authenticated decryption operation
+/** A function that performs a secure element authenticated decryption operation
  *
  * \param[in,out] drv_context           The driver context structure.
  * \param[in] key_slot                  Slot containing the key to use
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@
  *
  * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs.
  * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which
- * can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed
+ * can be problematic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed
  * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that
  * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key
  * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@
     psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_collateral);
     /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */
     psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t     MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_derive);
-    /** Function that perforsm a final key derivation or agreement and
+    /** Function that performs a final key derivation or agreement and
      * exports the key */
     psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t     MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export);
 } psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t;
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
index 231ea62..b42b2df 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@
     (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11)
 
 /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair.
- * Assumes thatthe public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size
+ * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size
  * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit.
  *
  * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
index 739062d..af61aea 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_types.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_types.h
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
 
 #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
 /* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as
- * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptograpy API in each
+ * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptography API in each
  * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of
  * functions such as psa_open_key().
  */
diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
index b465ddb..cf8a7b2 100644
--- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -1760,7 +1760,7 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000100)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
  *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000400)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
  *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
  * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
@@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000500)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
  *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
  * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
@@ -1925,7 +1925,7 @@
  * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
  * and the label is "key expansion".
  *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
  * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
@@ -1995,7 +1995,7 @@
  *   PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation
  *   with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
  *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
  * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
@@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@
  * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
  * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
  * HMAC with the specified hash.
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` specifies PBKDF2
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2
  * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
@@ -2577,7 +2577,7 @@
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
  * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
- * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy.
+ * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
  */
@@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@
  * hash.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for
- * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and
+ * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and
  * policy.
  *
  * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
@@ -2603,7 +2603,7 @@
  * This flag allows the key to be used:
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if
- * otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy.
+ * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
  * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt
index 7c325f7..8106dab 100644
--- a/library/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -49,8 +49,6 @@
     md.c
     md5.c
     memory_buffer_alloc.c
-    mps_reader.c
-    mps_trace.c
     nist_kw.c
     oid.c
     padlock.c
@@ -84,7 +82,6 @@
     sha1.c
     sha256.c
     sha512.c
-    ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
     threading.c
     timing.c
     version.c
@@ -92,6 +89,7 @@
 )
 
 set(src_x509
+    pkcs7.c
     x509.c
     x509_create.c
     x509_crl.c
@@ -103,11 +101,14 @@
 
 set(src_tls
     debug.c
+    mps_reader.c
+    mps_trace.c
     net_sockets.c
     ssl_cache.c
     ssl_ciphersuites.c
     ssl_client.c
     ssl_cookie.c
+    ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
     ssl_msg.c
     ssl_ticket.c
     ssl_tls.c
diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile
index b1cdc7f..5073517 100644
--- a/library/Makefile
+++ b/library/Makefile
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@
 	     md.o \
 	     md5.o \
 	     memory_buffer_alloc.o \
-	     mps_reader.o \
-	     mps_trace.o \
 	     nist_kw.o \
 	     oid.o \
 	     padlock.o \
@@ -149,7 +147,6 @@
 	     sha1.o \
 	     sha256.o \
 	     sha512.o \
-	     ssl_debug_helpers_generated.o \
 	     threading.o \
 	     timing.o \
 	     version.o \
@@ -168,15 +165,19 @@
 	   x509_csr.o \
 	   x509write_crt.o \
 	   x509write_csr.o \
+	   pkcs7.o \
 	   # This line is intentionally left blank
 
 OBJS_TLS= \
 	  debug.o \
+	  mps_reader.o \
+	  mps_trace.o \
 	  net_sockets.o \
 	  ssl_cache.o \
 	  ssl_ciphersuites.o \
 	  ssl_client.o \
 	  ssl_cookie.o \
+	  ssl_debug_helpers_generated.o \
 	  ssl_msg.o \
 	  ssl_ticket.o \
 	  ssl_tls.o \
diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 7d03524..56dc5cf 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -978,7 +978,6 @@
                     const unsigned char *input,
                     unsigned char *output )
 {
-    int i;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[16];
 
@@ -1009,8 +1008,7 @@
             if( ret != 0 )
                 goto exit;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, output, iv, 16 );
 
             memcpy( iv, temp, 16 );
 
@@ -1023,8 +1021,7 @@
     {
         while( length > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, input, iv, 16 );
 
             ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output );
             if( ret != 0 )
@@ -1106,28 +1103,24 @@
 
     while( blocks-- )
     {
-        size_t i;
-
         if( leftover && ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) && blocks == 0 )
         {
             /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has
              * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block,
-             * and this tweak for the lefover bytes. Save the current tweak for
+             * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for
              * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this,
              * the last full block. */
             memcpy( prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof( tweak ) );
             mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak );
         }
 
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( tmp, input, tweak, 16 );
 
         ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp );
         if( ret != 0 )
             return( ret );
 
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( output, tmp, tweak, 16 );
 
         /* Update the tweak for the next block. */
         mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak );
@@ -1148,19 +1141,18 @@
         unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16;
 
         /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each
-         * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
-         * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds
-         * are the same). */
+         * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. */
         for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ )
         {
             output[i] = prev_output[i];
-            tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i];
         }
 
+        /* Copy the remainder of the input for this final round. */
+        mbedtls_xor( tmp, input, t, leftover );
+
         /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this
          * round. */
-        for( ; i < 16; i++ )
-            tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( tmp + i, prev_output + i, t + i, 16 - i );
 
         ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp );
         if( ret != 0 )
@@ -1168,8 +1160,7 @@
 
         /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous
          * output we copied. */
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( prev_output, tmp, t, 16 );
     }
 
     return( 0 );
diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c5fa23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/alignment.h
@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+/**
+ * \file alignment.h
+ *
+ * \brief Utility code for dealing with unaligned memory accesses
+ */
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H
+#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 2 bytes of data
+ * \return  Data at the given address
+ */
+inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16( const void *p )
+{
+    uint16_t r;
+    memcpy( &r, p, sizeof( r ) );
+    return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 16 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 2 bytes of data
+ * \param   x data to write
+ */
+inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16( void *p, uint16_t x )
+{
+    memcpy( p, &x, sizeof( x ) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 32 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 4 bytes of data
+ * \return  Data at the given address
+ */
+inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32( const void *p )
+{
+    uint32_t r;
+    memcpy( &r, p, sizeof( r ) );
+    return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 32 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 4 bytes of data
+ * \param   x data to write
+ */
+inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32( void *p, uint32_t x )
+{
+    memcpy( p, &x, sizeof( x ) );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 64 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 8 bytes of data
+ * \return  Data at the given address
+ */
+inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64( const void *p )
+{
+    uint64_t r;
+    memcpy( &r, p, sizeof( r ) );
+    return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 64 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param   p pointer to 8 bytes of data
+ * \param   x data to write
+ */
+inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64( void *p, uint64_t x )
+{
+    memcpy( p, &x, sizeof( x ) );
+}
+
+/** Byte Reading Macros
+ *
+ * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th
+ * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ) ( (uint8_t) (   ( x )         & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 8  ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 16 ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 24 ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 32 ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 40 ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 48 ) & 0xff ) )
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 56 ) & 0xff ) )
+
+/*
+ * Detect GCC built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ)
+#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16
+#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8) */
+#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64
+#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) */
+#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) */
+
+/*
+ * Detect Clang built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin)
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) */
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) */
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) */
+#endif /* defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) */
+
+/*
+ * Detect MSVC built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 _byteswap_ushort
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 _byteswap_ulong
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 _byteswap_uint64
+#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */
+
+/* Detect armcc built-in byteswap routine */
+#if defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && (__ARMCC_VERSION >= 410000)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the
+ * compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or
+ * similar instruction.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16)
+static inline uint16_t mbedtls_bswap16( uint16_t x ) {
+    return
+         ( x & 0x00ff ) << 8 |
+         ( x & 0xff00 ) >> 8;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 mbedtls_bswap16
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32)
+static inline uint32_t mbedtls_bswap32( uint32_t x ) {
+    return
+         ( x & 0x000000ff ) << 24 |
+         ( x & 0x0000ff00 ) <<  8 |
+         ( x & 0x00ff0000 ) >>  8 |
+         ( x & 0xff000000 ) >> 24;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 mbedtls_bswap32
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64)
+static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64( uint64_t x ) {
+    return
+         ( x & 0x00000000000000ff ) << 56 |
+         ( x & 0x000000000000ff00 ) << 40 |
+         ( x & 0x0000000000ff0000 ) << 24 |
+         ( x & 0x00000000ff000000 ) <<  8 |
+         ( x & 0x000000ff00000000 ) >>  8 |
+         ( x & 0x0000ff0000000000 ) >> 24 |
+         ( x & 0x00ff000000000000 ) >> 40 |
+         ( x & 0xff00000000000000 ) >> 56;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 mbedtls_bswap64
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */
+
+#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
+static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 };
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN ((__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__))
+#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))                  \
+        : MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), (uint32_t)(n));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \
+        : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))                  \
+    )
+
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), ((uint32_t)(n)));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \
+        : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))                  \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t)(n));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))                  \
+        : MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t)(n));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( data , offset )                  \
+    (                                                           \
+          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 16 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8  )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2]       )         \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( n, data, offset )                \
+{                                                               \
+    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE( data, offset )                   \
+    (                                                           \
+          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
+        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 )         \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE( n, data, offset )                \
+{                                                               \
+    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
+    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))                  \
+        : MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t)(n));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
+ *                  integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( data, offset )                              \
+    ( ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                            \
+        ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \
+        : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))                  \
+    )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
+ *                  bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( n, data, offset )                             \
+{                                                                            \
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )                                             \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t)(n))); \
+    }                                                                        \
+    else                                                                     \
+    {                                                                        \
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t)(n));      \
+    }                                                                        \
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H */
diff --git a/library/aria.c b/library/aria.c
index 924f952..517e10a 100644
--- a/library/aria.c
+++ b/library/aria.c
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /* Parameter validation macros */
 #define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond )                                       \
     MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA )
@@ -103,47 +98,8 @@
  * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness
  *
  * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1
- *
- * Some compilers fail to translate this to a single instruction,
- * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback.
  */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
-#if defined(__arm__) /* rev available from v6 up */
-/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && \
-    ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) && \
-    __ARM_ARCH >= 6
-static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x )
-{
-    uint32_t r;
-    __asm( "rev %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x) );
-    return( r );
-}
-#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3
-#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \
-    ( __TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3 )
-static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x )
-{
-    uint32_t r;
-    __asm( "rev r, x" );
-    return( r );
-}
-#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3
-#endif
-#endif /* arm */
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && \
-    defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__)
-static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x )
-{
-    __asm( "bswap %0" : "=r" (x) : "0" (x) );
-    return( x );
-}
-#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3
-#endif /* x86 gnuc */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */
-#if !defined(ARIA_P3)
-#define ARIA_P3(x) ARIA_P2( ARIA_P1 ( x ) )
-#endif
+#define ARIA_P3(x) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(x)
 
 /*
  * ARIA Affine Transform
@@ -588,7 +544,6 @@
                             const unsigned char *input,
                             unsigned char *output )
 {
-    int i;
     unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
 
     ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@@ -608,8 +563,7 @@
             memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
             mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output );
 
-            for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, output, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
 
             memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
 
@@ -622,8 +576,7 @@
     {
         while( length > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, input, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
 
             mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
             memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c
index 42be815..a68957a 100644
--- a/library/bignum.c
+++ b/library/bignum.c
@@ -252,6 +252,17 @@
     memcpy(  Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) );
 }
 
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs( mbedtls_mpi_sint z )
+{
+    if( z >= 0 )
+        return( z );
+    /* Take care to handle the most negative value (-2^(biL-1)) correctly.
+     * A naive -z would have undefined behavior.
+     * Write this in a way that makes popular compilers happy (GCC, Clang,
+     * MSVC). */
+    return( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z );
+}
+
 /*
  * Set value from integer
  */
@@ -263,7 +274,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) );
     memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL );
 
-    X->p[0] = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z;
+    X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( z );
     X->s    = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1;
 
 cleanup:
@@ -853,7 +864,7 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
 
-    *p  = ( z < 0 ) ? -z : z;
+    *p  = mpi_sint_abs( z );
     Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1;
     Y.n = 1;
     Y.p = p;
@@ -889,6 +900,11 @@
         if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 )
             break;
 
+    /* Exit early to avoid undefined behavior on NULL+0 when X->n == 0
+     * and B is 0 (of any size). */
+    if( j == 0 )
+        return( 0 );
+
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) );
 
     /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */
@@ -952,17 +968,15 @@
     carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub( X->p, A->p, B->p, n );
     if( carry != 0 )
     {
-        /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */
-        for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ )
-            --X->p[n];
-        /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result
-         * is negative. */
-        if( n == X->n )
+        /* Propagate the carry through the rest of X. */
+        carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( X->p + n, X->p + n, carry, X->n - n );
+
+        /* If we have further carry/borrow, the result is negative. */
+        if( carry != 0 )
         {
             ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
             goto cleanup;
         }
-        --X->p[n];
     }
 
     /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */
@@ -1040,7 +1054,7 @@
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL );
 
-    p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b;
+    p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b );
     B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1;
     B.n = 1;
     B.p = p;
@@ -1058,7 +1072,7 @@
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL );
 
-    p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b;
+    p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b );
     B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1;
     B.n = 1;
     B.p = p;
@@ -1396,7 +1410,7 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL );
 
-    p[0] = ( b < 0 ) ? -b : b;
+    p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b );
     B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1;
     B.n = 1;
     B.p = p;
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.c b/library/bignum_core.c
index 34aecda..1ce8457 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.c
+++ b/library/bignum_core.c
@@ -83,45 +83,25 @@
 
 static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint a )
 {
-#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
-
-/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */
-#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ )
-    return( a );
-#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */
-
-#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ )
-
-/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ)
-#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3)
-#define have_bswap
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin)
-#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32)  &&                 \
-    __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64)
-#define have_bswap
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(have_bswap)
-    /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */
-    switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) )
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )
     {
-        case 4:
-            return( __builtin_bswap32(a) );
-        case 8:
-            return( __builtin_bswap64(a) );
+        /* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */
+        return( a );
     }
-#endif
-#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */
-#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */
+    else
+    {
+        switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) )
+        {
+            case 4:
+                return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32( (uint32_t)a );
+            case 8:
+                return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP64( (uint64_t)a );
+        }
 
-    /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order
-     * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */
-    return( mpi_bigendian_to_host_c( a ) );
+        /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order
+        * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */
+        return( mpi_bigendian_to_host_c( a ) );
+    }
 }
 
 void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
@@ -540,6 +520,7 @@
     return( ret );
 }
 
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
 void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
                                             const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table,
                                             size_t limbs,
@@ -582,6 +563,161 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
+static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size( size_t Ebits )
+{
+    size_t wsize = ( Ebits > 671 ) ? 6 : ( Ebits > 239 ) ? 5 :
+                   ( Ebits >  79 ) ? 4 : 1;
+
+#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 )
+    if( wsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE )
+        wsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE;
+#endif
+
+    return( wsize );
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs( size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs )
+{
+    const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size( E_limbs * biL );
+    const size_t welem = ( (size_t) 1 ) << wsize;
+
+    /* How big does each part of the working memory pool need to be? */
+    const size_t table_limbs   = welem * AN_limbs;
+    const size_t select_limbs  = AN_limbs;
+    const size_t temp_limbs    = 2 * AN_limbs + 1;
+
+    return( table_limbs + select_limbs + temp_limbs );
+}
+
+static void exp_mod_precompute_window( const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                       const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+                                       size_t AN_limbs,
+                                       mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+                                       const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                       size_t welem,
+                                       mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable,
+                                       mbedtls_mpi_uint *temp )
+{
+    /* W[0] = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) */
+    memset( Wtable, 0, AN_limbs * ciL );
+    Wtable[0] = 1;
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul( Wtable, Wtable, RR, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp );
+
+    /* W[1] = A (already in Montgomery presentation) */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *W1 = Wtable + AN_limbs;
+    memcpy( W1, A, AN_limbs * ciL );
+
+    /* W[i+1] = W[i] * W[1], i >= 2 */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wprev = W1;
+    for( size_t i = 2; i < welem; i++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wcur = Wprev + AN_limbs;
+        mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul( Wcur, Wprev, W1, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp );
+        Wprev = Wcur;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N.
+ *
+ * A must already be in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero.
+ *
+ * RR must contain 2^{2*biL} mod N.
+ *
+ * The algorithm is a variant of Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation: HAC 14.82
+ * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead
+ * of a full window.)
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+                               size_t AN_limbs,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
+                               size_t E_limbs,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                               mbedtls_mpi_uint *T )
+{
+    const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size( E_limbs * biL );
+    const size_t welem = ( (size_t) 1 ) << wsize;
+
+    /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space
+     * for table_limbs, select_limbs and (2 * AN_limbs + 1) for montmul. */
+    const size_t table_limbs  = welem * AN_limbs;
+    const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs;
+
+    /* Pointers to specific parts of the temporary working memory pool */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wtable  = T;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wselect = Wtable  +  table_limbs;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *const temp    = Wselect + select_limbs;
+
+    /*
+     * Window precomputation
+     */
+
+    const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init( N );
+
+    /* Set Wtable[i] = A^(2^i) (in Montgomery representation) */
+    exp_mod_precompute_window( A, N, AN_limbs,
+                               mm, RR,
+                               welem, Wtable, temp );
+
+    /*
+     * Fixed window exponentiation
+     */
+
+    /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */
+    memcpy( X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL );
+
+    /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant
+     * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant
+     * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */
+    size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs;
+    size_t E_bit_index = 0;
+    /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E.
+     * window_bits can go up to wsize. */
+    size_t window_bits = 0;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint window = 0;
+
+    do
+    {
+        /* Square */
+        mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul( X, X, X, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp );
+
+        /* Move to the next bit of the exponent */
+        if( E_bit_index == 0 )
+        {
+            --E_limb_index;
+            E_bit_index = biL - 1;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            --E_bit_index;
+        }
+        /* Insert next exponent bit into window */
+        ++window_bits;
+        window <<= 1;
+        window |= ( E[E_limb_index] >> E_bit_index ) & 1;
+
+        /* Clear window if it's full. Also clear the window at the end,
+         * when we've finished processing the exponent. */
+        if( window_bits == wsize ||
+            ( E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0 ) )
+        {
+            /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through
+             * memory access patterns. */
+            mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup( Wselect, Wtable,
+                                                   AN_limbs, welem, window );
+            /* Multiply X by the selected element. */
+            mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul( X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm,
+                                      temp );
+            window = 0;
+            window_bits = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    while( ! ( E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0 ) );
+}
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
@@ -590,6 +726,22 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                           const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                           mbedtls_mpi_uint c, /* doubles as carry */
+                                           size_t limbs )
+{
+    for( size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_uint s = A[i];
+        mbedtls_mpi_uint t = s - c;
+        c = ( t > s );
+        X[i] = t;
+    }
+
+    return( c );
+}
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
diff --git a/library/bignum_core.h b/library/bignum_core.h
index ad04e08..b7af4d0 100644
--- a/library/bignum_core.h
+++ b/library/bignum_core.h
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe( mbedtls_mpi *X,
                                          const mbedtls_mpi *N );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
 /**
  * Copy an MPI from a table without leaking the index.
  *
@@ -469,6 +470,7 @@
                                             size_t limbs,
                                             size_t count,
                                             size_t index );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
 
 /**
  * \brief          Fill an integer with a number of random bytes.
@@ -496,6 +498,55 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
+/**
+ * \brief          Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
+ *                 a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ *
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N`
+ *                 (they must be the same size) that will be given to
+ *                 `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ * \param E_limbs  The number of limbs in the exponent `E` that will be given
+ *                 to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ *
+ * \return         The number of limbs of working memory required by
+ *                 `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs( size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs );
+
+/**
+ * \brief            Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent:
+ *                   X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs ==
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X     The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length
+ *                   \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A      The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ *                   Must be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] N      The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param AN_limbs   The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR.
+ * \param[in] E      The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs.
+ * \param E_limbs    The number of limbs in \p E.
+ * \param[in] RR     The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little
+ *                   endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T  Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ *                   by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`.
+ *                   Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ *                   indeterminate.
+ *                   It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ *                   parameters.
+ *                   It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ *                   longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ *                   allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+                               const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                               mbedtls_mpi_uint *T );
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
@@ -504,6 +555,23 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+/**
+ * \brief Subtract unsigned integer from known-size large unsigned integers.
+ *        Return the borrow.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X    The result of the subtraction.
+ * \param[in] A     The left operand.
+ * \param b         The unsigned scalar to subtract.
+ * \param limbs     Number of limbs of \p X and \p A.
+ *
+ * \return          1 if `A < b`.
+ *                  0 if `A >= b`.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                           const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                           mbedtls_mpi_uint b,
+                                           size_t limbs );
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod.c b/library/bignum_mod.c
index 13108c5..7cf2fb2 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod.c
+++ b/library/bignum_mod.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
                                    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
                                    size_t p_limbs )
 {
-    if( p_limbs < m->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct( m->p, p, p_limbs ) )
+    if( p_limbs != m->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct( p, m->p, m->limbs ) )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
     r->limbs = m->limbs;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 
 void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r )
 {
-    if ( r == NULL )
+    if( r == NULL )
         return;
 
     r->limbs = 0;
@@ -59,19 +59,18 @@
 
 void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m )
 {
-    if ( m == NULL )
+    if( m == NULL )
         return;
 
     m->p = NULL;
     m->limbs = 0;
     m->bits = 0;
-    m->ext_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
     m->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID;
 }
 
 void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m )
 {
-    if ( m == NULL )
+    if( m == NULL )
         return;
 
     switch( m->int_rep )
@@ -96,7 +95,6 @@
     m->p = NULL;
     m->limbs = 0;
     m->bits = 0;
-    m->ext_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
     m->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID;
 }
 
@@ -112,17 +110,17 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &N );
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR );
 
-    if ( A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= ( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2 ) - 2 )
+    if( A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= ( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2 ) - 2 )
         goto cleanup;
 
-    if ( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &N, limbs ) )
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &N, limbs ) )
         goto cleanup;
 
     memcpy( N.p, A, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * limbs );
 
     ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N);
 
-    if ( ret == 0 )
+    if( ret == 0 )
     {
         *X = RR.p;
         RR.p = NULL;
@@ -138,7 +136,6 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
                                    size_t p_limbs,
-                                   mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep,
                                    mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep )
 {
     int ret = 0;
@@ -147,17 +144,6 @@
     m->limbs = p_limbs;
     m->bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen( p, p_limbs );
 
-    switch( ext_rep )
-    {
-        case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
-        case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:
-            m->ext_rep = ext_rep;
-            break;
-        default:
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-            goto exit;
-    }
-
     switch( int_rep )
     {
         case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
@@ -193,7 +179,18 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N )
+{
+    if( X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X->p, A->p, B->p, N );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -209,7 +206,71 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 6 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 7 */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+                          const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                          size_t buflen,
+                          mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
 
+    /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */
+    if( r->limbs == 0 || m->limbs == 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+    if( r->limbs != m->limbs )
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read( r->p, m, buf, buflen, ext_rep );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    r->limbs = m->limbs;
+
+    if( m->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY )
+       ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep( r->p, m );
+
+cleanup:
+    return ( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+                           const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                           unsigned char *buf,
+                           size_t buflen,
+                           mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+    /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */
+    if( r->limbs == 0 || m->limbs == 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+    if( r->limbs != m->limbs )
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if( m->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep( r->p, m );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write( r->p, m, buf, buflen, ext_rep );
+
+    if( m->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY )
+    {
+        /* If this fails, the value of r is corrupted and we want to return
+         * this error (as opposed to the error code from the write above) to
+         * let the caller know. If it succeeds, we want to return the error
+         * code from write above. */
+        int conv_ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep( r->p, m );
+        if( ret == 0 )
+            ret = conv_ret;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return ( ret );
+}
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod.h b/library/bignum_mod.h
index 29c26f2..0a8f4d3 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod.h
+++ b/library/bignum_mod.h
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
     const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
     size_t limbs;                            // number of limbs
     size_t bits;                             // bitlen of p
-    mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep;         // signals external representation (eg. byte order)
     mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep;    // selector to signal the active member of the union
     union rep
     {
@@ -75,16 +74,27 @@
 
 /** Setup a residue structure.
  *
- * \param[out] r    The address of residue to setup. The size is determined by
- *                  \p m.
- *                  (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as the
- *                  modulus \p m.)
+ * The residue will be set up with the buffer \p p and modulus \p m.
+ *
+ * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by the resulting residue structure.
+ * The value at the pointed-to memory will be the initial value of \p r and must
+ * hold a value that is less than the modulus. This value will be used as-is
+ * and interpreted according to the value of the `m->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p m will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r
+ * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p m.
+ *
+ * \param[out] r    The address of the residue to setup.
  * \param[in] m     The address of the modulus related to \p r.
- * \param[in] p     The address of the limb array storing the value of \p r.
+ * \param[in] p     The address of the limb array containing the value of \p r.
  *                  The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p r and must
  *                  not be modified in any way until after
- *                  mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called.
- * \param p_limbs   The number of limbs of \p p.
+ *                  mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called. The data
+ *                  pointed to by \p p must be less than the modulus (the value
+ *                  pointed to by `m->p`) and already in the representation
+ *                  indicated by `m->int_rep`.
+ * \param p_limbs   The number of limbs of \p p. Must be the same as the number
+ *                  of limbs in the modulus \p m.
  *
  * \return      \c 0 if successful.
  * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p p_limbs is less than the
@@ -121,19 +131,15 @@
  *                  not be modified in any way until after
  *                  mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called.
  * \param p_limbs   The number of limbs of \p p.
- * \param ext_rep   The external representation to be used for residues
- *                  associated with \p m (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep).
  * \param int_rep   The internal representation to be used for residues
  *                  associated with \p m (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector).
  *
  * \return      \c 0 if successful.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep or \p int_rep is
- *              invalid.
+ * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p int_rep is invalid.
  */
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
                                    size_t p_limbs,
-                                   mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep,
                                    mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep );
 
 /** Free elements of a modulus structure.
@@ -157,7 +163,35 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
-
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular subtraction.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A - B modulo N`.
+ *
+ * \p A, \p B and \p X must all have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical
+ *       form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by
+ *       mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup().
+ *
+ * \param[out] X    The address of the result MPI. Must be initialized.
+ *                  Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N.
+ * \param[in]  A    The address of the first MPI.
+ * \param[in]  B    The address of the second MPI.
+ * \param[in]  N    The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ *                  operation on the result of the subtraction.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not
+ *                  have the correct number of limbs.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+                         const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N );
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -173,7 +207,72 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 6 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 7 */
+/** Read a residue from a byte buffer.
+ *
+ * The residue will be automatically converted to the internal representation
+ * based on the value of the `m->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p m will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r
+ * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p m or a modulus
+ * equivalent to \p m (in the sense that all their fields or memory pointed by
+ * their fields hold the same value).
+ *
+ * \param[out] r    The address of the residue. It must have exactly the same
+ *                  number of limbs as the modulus \p m.
+ * \param[in] m     The address of the modulus.
+ * \param[in] buf   The input buffer to import from.
+ * \param buflen    The length in bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param ext_rep   The endianness of the number in the input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return       \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p r isn't
+ *               large enough to hold the value in \p buf.
+ * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep
+ *               is invalid or the value in the buffer is not less than \p m.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+                          const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                          size_t buflen,
+                          mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep );
 
+/** Write a residue into a byte buffer.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p m must be the modulus associated with \p r (see
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() and mbedtls_mpi_mod_read()).
+ *
+ * The residue will be automatically converted from the internal representation
+ * based on the value of `m->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * \warning     If the buffer is smaller than `m->bits`, the number of
+ *              leading zeroes is leaked through timing. If \p r is
+ *              secret, the caller must ensure that \p buflen is at least
+ *              (`m->bits`+7)/8.
+ *
+ * \param[in] r     The address of the residue. It must have the same number of
+ *                  limbs as the modulus \p m. (\p r is an input parameter, but
+ *                  its value will be modified during execution and restored
+ *                  before the function returns.)
+ * \param[in] m     The address of the modulus associated with \r.
+ * \param[out] buf  The output buffer to export to.
+ * \param buflen    The length in bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param ext_rep   The endianness in which the number should be written into
+ *                  the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return       \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't
+ *               large enough to hold the value of \p r (without leading
+ *               zeroes).
+ * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep is invalid.
+ * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough
+ *               memory for conversion. Can occur only for moduli with
+ *               MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+                           const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                           unsigned char *buf,
+                           size_t buflen,
+                           mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep );
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
index b43add7..c98a1c1 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
+++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
@@ -52,11 +52,12 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
                               const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                               const unsigned char *input,
-                              size_t input_length )
+                              size_t input_length,
+                              mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
-    switch( m->ext_rep )
+    switch( ext_rep )
     {
         case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
             ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le( X, m->limbs,
@@ -87,9 +88,10 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write( const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
                                const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                                unsigned char *output,
-                               size_t output_length )
+                               size_t output_length,
+                               mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep )
 {
-    switch( m->ext_rep )
+    switch( ext_rep )
     {
         case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
             return( mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le( A, m->limbs,
@@ -108,10 +110,51 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub( X, A, B, N->limbs );
+
+    (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if( X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c );
+}
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs( size_t AN_limbs )
+{
+    /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime() needs a temporary for the exponent,
+     * which will be the same size as the modulus and input (AN_limbs),
+     * and additional space to pass to mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */
+    return( AN_limbs +
+            mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs( AN_limbs, AN_limbs ) );
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+                                    size_t AN_limbs,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                    mbedtls_mpi_uint *T )
+{
+    /* Inversion by power: g^|G| = 1 => g^(-1) = g^(|G|-1), and
+     *                       |G| = N - 1, so we want
+     *                 g^(|G|-1) = g^(N - 2)
+     */
+
+    /* Use the first AN_limbs of T to hold N - 2 */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *Nminus2 = T;
+    (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( Nminus2, N, 2, AN_limbs );
+
+    /* Rest of T is given to exp_mod for its working space */
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod( X,
+                              A, N, AN_limbs, Nminus2, AN_limbs,
+                              RR, T + AN_limbs );
+}
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -119,7 +162,16 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 4 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 5 */
-
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint carry, borrow;
+    carry  = mbedtls_mpi_core_add( X, A, B, N->limbs );
+    borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub( X, X, N->p, N->limbs );
+    (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if( X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) ( carry ^ borrow ) );
+}
 /* END MERGE SLOT 5 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 6 */
@@ -161,6 +213,18 @@
     mbedtls_free( T );
     return( 0 );
 }
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_sub( X, m->p, A, m->limbs );
+
+    /* If A=0 initially, then X=N now. Detect this by
+     * subtracting N and catching the carry. */
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub( X, X, m->p, m->limbs );
+    (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if( X, m->p, m->limbs, (unsigned) borrow  );
+}
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw.h b/library/bignum_mod_raw.h
index f738e91..f9968ba 100644
--- a/library/bignum_mod_raw.h
+++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
  * \param[in] m         The address of the modulus related to \p X.
  * \param[in] input     The input buffer to import from.
  * \param input_length  The length in bytes of \p input.
+ * \param ext_rep       The endianness of the number in the input buffer.
  *
  * \return       \c 0 if successful.
  * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't
@@ -116,7 +117,8 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
                               const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                               const unsigned char *input,
-                              size_t input_length );
+                              size_t input_length,
+                              mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep );
 
 /** Export A into unsigned binary data.
  *
@@ -126,6 +128,7 @@
  * \param[in] m         The address of the modulus related to \p A.
  * \param[out] output   The output buffer to export to.
  * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output.
+ * \param ext_rep       The endianness in which the number should be written into the output buffer.
  *
  * \return       \c 0 if successful.
  * \return       #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't
@@ -136,7 +139,8 @@
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write( const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
                                const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
                                unsigned char *output,
-                               size_t output_length );
+                               size_t output_length,
+                               mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep );
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
@@ -144,10 +148,77 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
+/** \brief  Subtract two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified
+ *          modulus.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A and \p B must have
+ * the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X        The address of the result MPI.
+ *                      This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to
+ *                      store the full value of the result.
+ * \param[in]  A        The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in]  B        The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in]  N        The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ *                      operation on the result of the subtraction.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N );
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+/**
+ * \brief          Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
+ *                 a call to `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ *
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N`
+ *                 (they must be the same size) that will be given to
+ *                 `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ *
+ * \return         The number of limbs of working memory required by
+ *                 `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs( size_t AN_limbs );
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform fixed-width modular inversion of a Montgomery-form MPI with
+ *        respect to a modulus \p N that must be prime.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p N or \p RR.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X     The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N.
+ *                   Will be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] A      The number to calculate the modular inverse of.
+ *                   Must be in Montgomery form. Must not be 0.
+ * \param[in] N      The modulus, as a little-endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ *                   Must be prime.
+ * \param AN_limbs   The number of limbs in \p A, \p N and \p RR.
+ * \param[in] RR     The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little-
+ *                   endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T  Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ *                   by `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()`.
+ *                   Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ *                   indeterminate.
+ *                   It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ *                   parameters.
+ *                   It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ *                   longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ *                   allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+                                    size_t AN_limbs,
+                                    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+                                    mbedtls_mpi_uint *T );
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -155,7 +226,28 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 4 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 5 */
-
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a known-size modular addition.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A + B modulo N`.
+ *
+ * The number of limbs in each operand, and the result, is given by the
+ * modulus \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X    The result of the modular addition.
+ * \param[in] A     Little-endian presentation of the left operand. This
+ *                  must be smaller than \p N.
+ * \param[in] B     Little-endian presentation of the right operand. This
+ *                  must be smaller than \p N.
+ * \param[in] N     The address of the modulus.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N );
 /* END MERGE SLOT 5 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 6 */
@@ -186,6 +278,23 @@
  */
 int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
                                        const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m );
+
+/** \brief  Perform fixed width modular negation.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p m. \p A must have
+ * the same number of limbs as \p m.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X        The result of the modular negation.
+ *                      This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] A         Little-endian presentation of the input operand. This
+ *                      must be less than or equal to \p m.
+ * \param[in] m         The modulus to use.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m);
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/library/camellia.c b/library/camellia.c
index 5dd6c56..6e781c7 100644
--- a/library/camellia.c
+++ b/library/camellia.c
@@ -526,7 +526,6 @@
                                 const unsigned char *input,
                                 unsigned char *output )
 {
-    int i;
     unsigned char temp[16];
     if( mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT )
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@@ -541,8 +540,7 @@
             memcpy( temp, input, 16 );
             mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output );
 
-            for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, output, iv, 16 );
 
             memcpy( iv, temp, 16 );
 
@@ -555,8 +553,7 @@
     {
         while( length > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, input, iv, 16 );
 
             mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output );
             memcpy( iv, output, 16 );
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index 3edfba3..065eb60 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -112,7 +112,6 @@
                               const unsigned char *input,
                               unsigned char *output )
 {
-    size_t i;
     size_t olen = 0;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = {0};
@@ -125,8 +124,7 @@
         return ret;
     }
 
-    for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-        output[i] = input[i] ^ tmp_buf[offset + i];
+    mbedtls_xor( output, input, tmp_buf + offset, use_len );
 
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
     return ret;
@@ -144,7 +142,7 @@
     unsigned char i;
     size_t len_left, olen;
 
-    /* length calulcation can be done only after both
+    /* length calculation can be done only after both
      * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed
      */
     if( !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET) )
@@ -269,7 +267,6 @@
                            size_t add_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char i;
     size_t olen, use_len, offset;
 
     if( ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR )
@@ -310,8 +307,7 @@
             if( use_len > add_len )
                 use_len = add_len;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= add[i];
+            mbedtls_xor( ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, add, use_len );
 
             ctx->processed += use_len;
             add_len -= use_len;
@@ -381,8 +377,7 @@
         if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
             ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= input[i];
+            mbedtls_xor( ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len );
 
             if( use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len )
             {
@@ -411,8 +406,7 @@
             if( ret != 0 )
                 goto exit;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-                ctx->y[i + offset] ^= local_output[i];
+            mbedtls_xor( ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, local_output, use_len );
 
             memcpy( output, local_output, use_len );
             mbedtls_platform_zeroize( local_output, 16 );
diff --git a/library/chacha20.c b/library/chacha20.c
index e53eb82..d17c58c 100644
--- a/library/chacha20.c
+++ b/library/chacha20.c
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT)
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #define ROTL32( value, amount ) \
     ( (uint32_t) ( (value) << (amount) ) | ( (value) >> ( 32 - (amount) ) ) )
 
@@ -222,7 +217,6 @@
                               unsigned char *output )
 {
     size_t offset = 0U;
-    size_t i;
 
     /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */
     while( size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES )
@@ -242,17 +236,7 @@
         chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 );
         ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++;
 
-        for( i = 0U; i < 64U; i += 8U )
-        {
-            output[offset + i  ] = input[offset + i  ] ^ ctx->keystream8[i  ];
-            output[offset + i+1] = input[offset + i+1] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+1];
-            output[offset + i+2] = input[offset + i+2] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+2];
-            output[offset + i+3] = input[offset + i+3] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+3];
-            output[offset + i+4] = input[offset + i+4] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+4];
-            output[offset + i+5] = input[offset + i+5] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+5];
-            output[offset + i+6] = input[offset + i+6] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+6];
-            output[offset + i+7] = input[offset + i+7] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+7];
-        }
+        mbedtls_xor( output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, 64U );
 
         offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
         size   -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
@@ -265,10 +249,7 @@
         chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 );
         ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++;
 
-        for( i = 0U; i < size; i++)
-        {
-            output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i];
-        }
+        mbedtls_xor( output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, size );
 
         ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size;
 
diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c
index dfb7329..dffe3ad 100644
--- a/library/cipher.c
+++ b/library/cipher.c
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    return( 0 );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
 
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    return( 0 );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
@@ -1156,11 +1156,8 @@
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
-    /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense
-     * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps
-     * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our
-     * unit tests assume 0. */
-    ret = 0;
+    /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. */
+    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
     if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
diff --git a/library/cmac.c b/library/cmac.c
index 3cc49d1..9870856 100644
--- a/library/cmac.c
+++ b/library/cmac.c
@@ -148,15 +148,6 @@
 #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT)
-static void cmac_xor_block( unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1,
-                            const unsigned char *input2,
-                            const size_t block_size )
-{
-    size_t idx;
-
-    for( idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++ )
-        output[ idx ] = input1[ idx ] ^ input2[ idx ];
-}
 
 /*
  * Create padded last block from (partial) last block.
@@ -247,7 +238,7 @@
                 input,
                 block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len );
 
-        cmac_xor_block( state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size );
+        mbedtls_xor( state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size );
 
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state,
                                            &olen ) ) != 0 )
@@ -267,7 +258,7 @@
      * final partial or complete block */
     for( j = 1; j < n; j++ )
     {
-        cmac_xor_block( state, input, state, block_size );
+        mbedtls_xor( state, input, state, block_size );
 
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state,
                                            &olen ) ) != 0 )
@@ -319,16 +310,16 @@
     if( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size )
     {
         cmac_pad( M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len );
-        cmac_xor_block( M_last, M_last, K2, block_size );
+        mbedtls_xor( M_last, M_last, K2, block_size );
     }
     else
     {
         /* Last block is complete block */
-        cmac_xor_block( M_last, last_block, K1, block_size );
+        mbedtls_xor( M_last, last_block, K1, block_size );
     }
 
 
-    cmac_xor_block( state, M_last, state, block_size );
+    mbedtls_xor( state, M_last, state, block_size );
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state,
                                        &olen ) ) != 0 )
     {
diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h
index a630fcc..9d3b8fe 100644
--- a/library/common.h
+++ b/library/common.h
@@ -24,8 +24,11 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H
 
 #include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "alignment.h"
 
+#include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
 
 /** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests.
  *
@@ -68,327 +71,68 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
 
-/** Byte Reading Macros
+/** Return an offset into a buffer.
  *
- * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th
- * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ) ( (uint8_t) (   ( x )         & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 8  ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 16 ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 24 ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 32 ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 40 ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 48 ) & 0xff ) )
-#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 56 ) & 0xff ) )
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
- * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this
+ * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null.
+ * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`.
+ * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example
+ * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.)
  *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
- *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
+ * \param p     Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes.
+ *              This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero.
+ * \param n     An offset in bytes.
+ * \return      Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p.
+ *              Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the
+ *              buffer is at least \p n + 1.
  */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data , offset )                  \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 24 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 16 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] <<  8 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3]       )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
- *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
+static inline unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset(
+    unsigned char *p, size_t n )
+{
+    return( p == NULL ? NULL : p + n );
 }
-#endif
 
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
- * little-endian order (LSB first).
+/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer.
  *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
- *                  byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers.
  *
- * \param   n       32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 32
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
- *                  byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ * \param p     Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes.
+ *              This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero.
+ * \param n     An offset in bytes.
+ * \return      Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p.
+ *              Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the
+ *              buffer is at least \p n + 1.
  */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n );             \
+static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
+    const unsigned char *p, size_t n )
+{
+    return( p == NULL ? NULL : p + n );
 }
-#endif
 
 /**
- * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
- * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
+ * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
  *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
- *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
+ * \param   r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r
+ *            may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when
+ *            it overlaps in other ways is undefined.
+ * \param   a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param   b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param   n Number of bytes to process.
  */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
-        | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
- *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
+inline void mbedtls_xor( unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n )
+{
+    size_t i;
+    for ( i = 0; ( i + 4 ) <= n; i += 4 )
+    {
+        uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32( a + i ) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32( b + i );
+        mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32( r + i, x );
+    }
+    for ( ; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
+    }
 }
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
- * big-endian order (MSB first).
- *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
- *                  byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 8 )          \
-        | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1]      )          \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 16
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
- *                  byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
- * big-endian order (MSB first).
- *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
- *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( data , offset )                  \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 16 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8  )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2]       )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
- *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
- * little-endian order (LSB first).
- *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
- *                  byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
-        | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 24
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
- *                  byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
- * big-endian order (MSB first).
- *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
- *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset )    ] << 56 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 48 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 40 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 32 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 24 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 16 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] <<  8 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7]       )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
- *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
- * little-endian order (LSB first).
- *
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
- *                  byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
- *                  integer from.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( data, offset )                   \
-    (                                                           \
-          ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] << 56 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 48 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 40 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 32 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] <<  8 )         \
-        | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset )    ]       )         \
-    )
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
- *
- * \param   n       64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
- * \param   data    Base address of the memory where to put the 64
- *                  bits unsigned integer in.
- * \param   offset  Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
- *                  byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
- */
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE
-#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( n, data, offset )                \
-{                                                               \
-    ( data )[( offset )    ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n );             \
-    ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n );             \
-}
-#endif
 
 /* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue
  *      MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 )
diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c
index 71c48af..f5c5e7b 100644
--- a/library/ctr_drbg.c
+++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -174,8 +174,7 @@
 
         while( use_len > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ )
-                chain[i] ^= p[i];
+            mbedtls_xor( chain, chain, p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
             p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
             use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ?
                        MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
diff --git a/library/debug.c b/library/debug.c
index bdbf6dd..78ce9ce 100644
--- a/library/debug.c
+++ b/library/debug.c
@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #define DEBUG_BUF_SIZE      512
 
 static int debug_threshold = 0;
@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@
     /*
      * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately,
      * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that.
-     * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since is is usually rare.
+     * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since it is usually rare.
      */
     if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ )
         return;
diff --git a/library/des.c b/library/des.c
index 65f5681..c56d4d4 100644
--- a/library/des.c
+++ b/library/des.c
@@ -635,7 +635,6 @@
                     const unsigned char *input,
                     unsigned char *output )
 {
-    int i;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[8];
 
@@ -646,8 +645,7 @@
     {
         while( length > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, input, iv, 8 );
 
             ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
             if( ret != 0 )
@@ -668,8 +666,7 @@
             if( ret != 0 )
                 goto exit;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, output, iv, 8 );
 
             memcpy( iv, temp, 8 );
 
@@ -741,7 +738,6 @@
                      const unsigned char *input,
                      unsigned char *output )
 {
-    int i;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char temp[8];
 
@@ -752,8 +748,7 @@
     {
         while( length > 0 )
         {
-            for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, input, iv, 8 );
 
             ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output );
             if( ret != 0 )
@@ -774,8 +769,7 @@
             if( ret != 0 )
                 goto exit;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
-                output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] );
+            mbedtls_xor( output, output, iv, 8 );
 
             memcpy( iv, temp, 8 );
 
diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c
index 37f6090..cd7d554 100644
--- a/library/ecp.c
+++ b/library/ecp.c
@@ -88,11 +88,6 @@
 
 #include "ecp_internal_alt.h"
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
 /*
  * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications.
diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c
index 7b14237..5cd2828 100644
--- a/library/ecp_curves.c
+++ b/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@
 #define ECP_VALIDATE( cond )        \
     MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)}
 
 #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x)   \
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index 1e0d9d3..545fd9d 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * A test to ensure hat the entropy sources are functioning correctly
+ * A test to ensure that the entropy sources are functioning correctly
  * and there is no obvious failure. The test performs the following checks:
  *  - The entropy source is not providing only 0s (all bits unset) or 1s (all
  *    bits set).
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index f004a73c..0178b5b 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -235,7 +235,6 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char work_buf[16];
-    size_t i;
     const unsigned char *p;
     size_t use_len, olen = 0;
     uint64_t iv_bits;
@@ -268,8 +267,7 @@
         {
             use_len = ( iv_len < 16 ) ? iv_len : 16;
 
-            for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-                ctx->y[i] ^= p[i];
+            mbedtls_xor( ctx->y, ctx->y, p, use_len );
 
             gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y );
 
@@ -277,8 +275,7 @@
             p += use_len;
         }
 
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->y, ctx->y, work_buf, 16);
 
         gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y );
     }
@@ -313,7 +310,7 @@
                            const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len )
 {
     const unsigned char *p;
-    size_t use_len, i, offset;
+    size_t use_len, offset;
 
     /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
     if( (uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0 )
@@ -328,8 +325,7 @@
         if( use_len > add_len )
             use_len = add_len;
 
-        for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-            ctx->buf[i+offset] ^= p[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, p, use_len );
 
         if( offset + use_len == 16 )
             gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
@@ -343,8 +339,7 @@
 
     while( add_len >= 16 )
     {
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, 16 );
 
         gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
 
@@ -354,8 +349,7 @@
 
     if( add_len > 0 )
     {
-        for( i = 0; i < add_len; i++ )
-            ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, add_len );
     }
 
     return( 0 );
@@ -378,7 +372,6 @@
                      const unsigned char *input,
                      unsigned char *output )
 {
-    size_t i;
     size_t olen = 0;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
@@ -389,14 +382,12 @@
         return( ret );
     }
 
-    for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ )
-    {
-        if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT )
-            ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= input[i];
-        output[i] = ectr[offset + i] ^ input[i];
-        if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT )
-            ctx->buf[offset + i] ^= output[i];
-    }
+    if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT )
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, input, use_len );
+    mbedtls_xor( output, ectr + offset, input, use_len );
+    if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT )
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, output, use_len );
+
     return( 0 );
 }
 
@@ -489,7 +480,6 @@
                         unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
 {
     unsigned char work_buf[16];
-    size_t i;
     uint64_t orig_len;
     uint64_t orig_add_len;
 
@@ -524,13 +514,11 @@
         MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len     >> 32 ), work_buf, 8  );
         MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len           ), work_buf, 12 );
 
-        for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
-            ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( ctx->buf, ctx->buf, work_buf, 16 );
 
         gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf );
 
-        for( i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ )
-            tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i];
+        mbedtls_xor( tag, tag, ctx->buf, tag_len );
     }
 
     return( 0 );
diff --git a/library/lmots.h b/library/lmots.h
index 39e8699..022dcf3 100644
--- a/library/lmots.h
+++ b/library/lmots.h
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
  *                           this public key.
  *
  * \param ctx                The initialized LMOTS context that contains the
- *                           publc key.
+ *                           public key.
  * \param key                The buffer into which the key will be output. Must
  *                           be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size.
  *
diff --git a/library/md.c b/library/md.c
index 8efcf10..9c161a5 100644
--- a/library/md.c
+++ b/library/md.c
@@ -633,7 +633,6 @@
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char *ipad, *opad;
-    size_t i;
 
     if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -657,11 +656,8 @@
     memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size );
     memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size );
 
-    for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ )
-    {
-        ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] );
-        opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] );
-    }
+    mbedtls_xor( ipad, ipad, key, keylen );
+    mbedtls_xor( opad, opad, key, keylen );
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 )
         goto cleanup;
diff --git a/library/mps_reader.c b/library/mps_reader.c
index 36958b4..df97b6c 100644
--- a/library/mps_reader.c
+++ b/library/mps_reader.c
@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@
 
 #include <string.h>
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE)
 static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */
@@ -535,7 +530,7 @@
          * of the accumulator. */
         memmove( acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len );
 
-        /* Copy uncmmitted parts of the current fragment to the
+        /* Copy uncommitted parts of the current fragment to the
          * accumulator. */
         memcpy( acc + acc_backup_len,
                 frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len );
diff --git a/library/pkcs5.c b/library/pkcs5.c
index ac5945a..1e3b17e 100644
--- a/library/pkcs5.c
+++ b/library/pkcs5.c
@@ -211,7 +211,6 @@
                               uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    int j;
     unsigned int i;
     unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -263,8 +262,7 @@
 
             // U1 xor U2
             //
-            for( j = 0; j < md_size; j++ )
-                work[j] ^= md1[j];
+            mbedtls_xor( work, work, md1, md_size );
         }
 
         use_len = ( key_length < md_size ) ? key_length : md_size;
@@ -324,7 +322,6 @@
     mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx );
     return( ret );
 #else
-    int j;
     unsigned int i;
     unsigned char md1[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char work[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -396,8 +393,7 @@
 
             // U1 xor U2
             //
-            for( j = 0; j < md_size; j++ )
-                work[j] ^= md1[j];
+            mbedtls_xor( work, work, md1, md_size );
         }
 
         use_len = ( key_length < md_size ) ? key_length : md_size;
diff --git a/library/pkcs7.c b/library/pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b22afa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,727 @@
+/*
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Initializes the pkcs7 structure.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_init( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7 )
+{
+    memset( pkcs7, 0, sizeof( *pkcs7 ) );
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_get_next_content_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                       size_t *len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+            | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret );
+    }
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/**
+ * version Version
+ * Version ::= INTEGER
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_version( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, int *ver )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION, ret );
+
+    /* If version != 1, return invalid version */
+    if( *ver != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION;
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/**
+ * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      contentType ContentType,
+ *      content
+ *              [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_content_info_type( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                        mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *pkcs7 )
+{
+    size_t len = 0;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *start = *p;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                                            | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( ret != 0 ) {
+        *p = start;
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID );
+    if( ret != 0 ) {
+        *p = start;
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    pkcs7->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+    pkcs7->len = len;
+    pkcs7->p = *p;
+    *p += len;
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/**
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
+ *
+ * This is from x509.h
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                       mbedtls_x509_buf *alg )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret );
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/**
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers :: SET of DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set( unsigned char **p,
+                                           unsigned char *end,
+                                           mbedtls_x509_buf *alg )
+{
+    size_t len = 0;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                                            | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    end = *p + len;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    /** For now, it assumes there is only one digest algorithm specified **/
+    if ( *p != end )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/**
+ * certificates :: SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate,
+ * ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+ *      certificate Certificate -- x509,
+ *      extendedCertificate[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate }
+ * Return number of certificates added to the signed data,
+ * 0 or higher is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_certificates( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt *certs )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len1 = 0;
+    size_t len2 = 0;
+    unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start;
+
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                    | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
+            return( 0 );
+        else
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
+    }
+    start = *p;
+    end_set = *p + len1;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_set, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+            | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    end_cert = *p + len2;
+
+    /*
+     * This is to verify that there is only one signer certificate. It seems it is
+     * not easy to differentiate between the chain vs different signer's certificate.
+     * So, we support only the root certificate and the single signer.
+     * The behaviour would be improved with addition of multiple signer support.
+     */
+    if ( end_cert != end_set )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+    }
+
+    *p = start;
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( certs, *p, len1 ) ) < 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT );
+    }
+
+    *p = *p + len1;
+
+    /*
+     * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching
+     * here implies we have parsed successfully, we return 1.
+     */
+    return( 1 );
+}
+
+/**
+ * EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signature( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *signature )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len = 0;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    signature->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    signature->len = len;
+    signature->p = *p;
+
+    *p = *p + len;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      version Version;
+ *      issuerAndSerialNumber   IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ *      digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *      authenticatedAttributes
+ *              [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ *      digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *      encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
+ *      unauthenticatedAttributes
+ *              [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ * Returns 0 if the signerInfo is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ * Structure must not contain vales for authenticatedAttributes
+ * and unauthenticatedAttributes.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signer_info( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                  mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer )
+{
+    unsigned char *end_signer;
+    int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len = 0;
+
+    asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                                | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( asn1_ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    end_signer = *p + len;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_version( p, end_signer, &signer->version );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_signer, &len,
+                MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( asn1_ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    /* Parsing IssuerAndSerialNumber */
+    signer->issuer_raw.p = *p;
+
+    asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_signer, &len,
+                MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( asn1_ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    ret  = mbedtls_x509_get_name( p, *p + len, &signer->issuer );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    signer->issuer_raw.len =  *p - signer->issuer_raw.p;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( p, end_signer, &signer->serial );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm( p, end_signer, &signer->alg_identifier );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm( p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signature( p, end_signer, &signer->sig );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    /* Do not permit any unauthenticated attributes */
+    if( *p != end_signer )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+
+out:
+    if( asn1_ret != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO,
+                                    asn1_ret );
+    else if( ret != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+static void pkcs7_free_signer_info( mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer )
+{
+    mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur;
+    mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv;
+
+    if( signer == NULL )
+        return;
+
+    name_cur = signer->issuer.next;
+    while( name_cur != NULL )
+    {
+        name_prv = name_cur;
+        name_cur = name_cur->next;
+        mbedtls_free( name_prv );
+    }
+    signer->issuer.next = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignerInfos ::= SET of SignerInfo
+ * Return number of signers added to the signed data,
+ * 0 or higher is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+                                       mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set )
+{
+    unsigned char *end_set;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    int count = 0;
+    size_t len = 0;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                                | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    /* Detect zero signers */
+    if( len == 0 )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+
+    end_set = *p + len;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info( p, end_set, signers_set );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+    count++;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *prev = signers_set;
+    while( *p != end_set )
+    {
+        mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer =
+            mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info ) );
+        if( !signer )
+        {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info( p, end_set, signer );
+        if( ret != 0 ) {
+            mbedtls_free( signer );
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+        prev->next = signer;
+        prev = signer;
+        count++;
+    }
+
+    return( count );
+
+cleanup:
+    pkcs7_free_signer_info( signers_set );
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = signers_set->next;
+    while( signer != NULL )
+    {
+        prev = signer;
+        signer = signer->next;
+        pkcs7_free_signer_info( prev );
+        mbedtls_free( prev );
+    }
+    signers_set->next = NULL;
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      version Version,
+ *      digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ *      contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ *      certificates
+ *              [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates
+ *                  OPTIONAL,
+ *      crls
+ *              [0] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,
+ *      signerInfos SignerInfos }
+ */
+static int pkcs7_get_signed_data( unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+                                  mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data *signed_data )
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *end = buf + buflen;
+    unsigned char *end_set;
+    size_t len = 0;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+                                | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) );
+    }
+
+    end_set = p + len;
+
+    /* Get version of signed data */
+    ret = pkcs7_get_version( &p, end_set, &signed_data->version );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    /* Get digest algorithm */
+    ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set( &p, end_set,
+            &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG );
+    }
+
+    /* Do not expect any content */
+    ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type( &p, end_set, &signed_data->content.oid );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &signed_data->content.oid ) )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO );
+    }
+
+    /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &signed_data->certs );
+    ret = pkcs7_get_certificates( &p, end_set, &signed_data->certs );
+    if( ret < 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    signed_data->no_of_certs = ret;
+
+    /*
+     * Currently CRLs are not supported. If CRL exist, the parsing will fail
+     * at next step of getting signers info and return error as invalid
+     * signer info.
+     */
+
+    signed_data->no_of_crls = 0;
+
+    /* Get signers info */
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set( &p, end_set, &signed_data->signers );
+    if( ret < 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    signed_data->no_of_signers = ret;
+
+    /* Don't permit trailing data */
+    if ( p != end )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf,
+                             const size_t buflen )
+{
+    unsigned char *p;
+    unsigned char *end;
+    size_t len = 0;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    int isoidset = 0;
+
+    if( pkcs7 == NULL )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    }
+
+    /* make an internal copy of the buffer for parsing */
+    pkcs7->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen );
+    if( pkcs7->raw.p == NULL )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        goto out;
+    }
+    memcpy( p, buf, buflen );
+    pkcs7->raw.len = buflen;
+    end = p + buflen;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type( &p, end, &pkcs7->content_type_oid );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        len = buflen;
+        goto try_data;
+    }
+
+    if( ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid )
+     || ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid )
+     || ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid )
+     || ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid )
+     || ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid )
+     || ! MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid ) )
+    {
+        ret =  MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, &pkcs7->content_type_oid ) )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    isoidset = 1;
+
+    ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len( &p, end, &len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+try_data:
+    ret = pkcs7_get_signed_data( p, len, &pkcs7->signed_data );
+    if ( ret != 0 )
+        goto out;
+
+    if ( !isoidset )
+    {
+        pkcs7->content_type_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+        pkcs7->content_type_oid.len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA );
+        pkcs7->content_type_oid.p = (unsigned char *)MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
+    }
+
+    ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
+
+out:
+    if ( ret < 0 )
+        mbedtls_pkcs7_free( pkcs7 );
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+static int mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+                                             const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                             const unsigned char *data,
+                                             size_t datalen,
+                                             const int is_data_hash )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *hash;
+    mbedtls_pk_context pk_cxt = cert->pk;
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer;
+
+    if( pkcs7->signed_data.no_of_signers == 0 )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT );
+    }
+
+    if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cert->valid_to ) ||
+        mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &cert->valid_from ))
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Potential TODOs
+     * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them
+     * verify.
+     *
+     * However, we could make this better by checking against the certificate's
+     * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow
+     * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key
+     * failed to validate'.
+     *
+     * We could also cache hashes by md, so if there are several sigs all using
+     * the same algo we don't recalculate the hash each time.
+     */
+    for( signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next )
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &signer->alg_identifier, &md_alg );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+        {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
+        if( md_info == NULL )
+        {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        hash = mbedtls_calloc( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), 1 );
+        if( hash == NULL ) {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED );
+        }
+        /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */
+        if( is_data_hash )
+        {
+            if( datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ))
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+            else
+                memcpy(hash, data, datalen);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, data, datalen, hash );
+        }
+        if( ret != 0 )
+        {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+            mbedtls_free( hash );
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk_cxt, md_alg, hash,
+                                 mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
+                                 signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len );
+        mbedtls_free( hash );
+        /* END must free hash before jumping out */
+
+        if( ret == 0 )
+            break;
+    }
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+                                      const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                      const unsigned char *data,
+                                      size_t datalen )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify( pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0 ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+                                      const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                      const unsigned char *hash,
+                                      size_t hashlen )
+{
+    return( mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify( pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1 ) );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate all pkcs7 data
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_free( mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7 )
+{
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_cur;
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_prev;
+
+    if( pkcs7 == NULL || pkcs7->raw.p == NULL )
+        return;
+
+    mbedtls_free( pkcs7->raw.p );
+
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &pkcs7->signed_data.certs );
+    mbedtls_x509_crl_free( &pkcs7->signed_data.crl );
+
+    signer_cur = pkcs7->signed_data.signers.next;
+    pkcs7_free_signer_info( &pkcs7->signed_data.signers );
+    while( signer_cur != NULL )
+    {
+        signer_prev = signer_cur;
+        signer_cur = signer_prev->next;
+        pkcs7_free_signer_info( signer_prev );
+        mbedtls_free( signer_prev );
+    }
+
+    pkcs7->raw.p = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c
index 916a7f4..2b674f6 100644
--- a/library/platform_util.c
+++ b/library/platform_util.c
@@ -143,3 +143,20 @@
 void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( const char *, int, const char *);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
 
+/*
+ * Provide external definitions of some inline functions so that the compiler
+ * has the option to not inline them
+ */
+extern inline void mbedtls_xor( unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n );
+
+extern inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16( const void *p );
+
+extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16( void *p, uint16_t x );
+
+extern inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32( const void *p );
+
+extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32( void *p, uint32_t x );
+
+extern inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64( const void *p );
+
+extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64( void *p, uint64_t x );
diff --git a/library/poly1305.c b/library/poly1305.c
index 0850f66..4d0cdee 100644
--- a/library/poly1305.c
+++ b/library/poly1305.c
@@ -32,11 +32,6 @@
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT)
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 16U )
 
 /*
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 2ce5e43..cb5791f 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -877,20 +877,7 @@
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
 }
 
-/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
- *  and lock it.
- *
- * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
- * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
- * zero, the algorithm is not checked.
- *
- * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
- * into a key slot if not already done.
- *
- * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
- * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
- */
-static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
+psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
     psa_key_usage_t usage,
@@ -3467,8 +3454,8 @@
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt(
         &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
         alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length,
-        output + default_iv_length, output_size - default_iv_length,
-        output_length );
+        mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, default_iv_length ),
+        output_size - default_iv_length, output_length );
 
 exit:
     unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
@@ -5736,63 +5723,46 @@
 /* Key agreement */
 /****************************************************************/
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
-static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_ecdh( const uint8_t *peer_key,
+psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+                                            const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+                                            size_t key_buffer_size,
+                                            psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                                            const uint8_t *peer_key,
                                             size_t peer_key_length,
-                                            const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *our_key,
                                             uint8_t *shared_secret,
                                             size_t shared_secret_size,
                                             size_t *shared_secret_length )
 {
-    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL;
-    mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh;
-    psa_status_t status;
-    size_t bits = 0;
-    psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id, &bits );
-    mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh );
-
-    status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
-                 PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve),
-                 bits,
-                 peer_key,
-                 peer_key_length,
-                 &their_key );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-
-    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
-        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
-        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-
-    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
-        mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh,
-                                  shared_secret_length,
-                                  shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
-                                  mbedtls_psa_get_random,
-                                  MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        goto exit;
-    if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) != *shared_secret_length )
-        status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-exit:
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size );
-    mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh );
-    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key );
-    mbedtls_free( their_key );
-
-    return( status );
-}
+    switch( alg )
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
+        case PSA_ALG_ECDH:
+            return( mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( attributes, key_buffer,
+                                                    key_buffer_size, alg,
+                                                    peer_key, peer_key_length,
+                                                    shared_secret,
+                                                    shared_secret_size,
+                                                    shared_secret_length ) );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */
+        default:
+            (void) attributes;
+            (void) key_buffer;
+            (void) key_buffer_size;
+            (void) peer_key;
+            (void) peer_key_length;
+            (void) shared_secret;
+            (void) shared_secret_size;
+            (void) shared_secret_length;
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    }
+}
 
-#define PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES
-
+/** Internal function for raw key agreement
+ *  Calls the driver wrapper which will hand off key agreement task
+ *  to the driver's implementation if a driver is present.
+ *  Fallback specified in the driver wrapper is built-in raw key agreement
+ *  (psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin).
+ */
 static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                                     psa_key_slot_t *private_key,
                                                     const uint8_t *peer_key,
@@ -5801,38 +5771,20 @@
                                                     size_t shared_secret_size,
                                                     size_t *shared_secret_length )
 {
-    switch( alg )
-    {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
-        case PSA_ALG_ECDH:
-            if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( private_key->attr.type ) )
-                return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-            mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
-            psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
-                                      private_key->attr.type,
-                                      private_key->attr.bits,
-                                      private_key->key.data,
-                                      private_key->key.bytes,
-                                      &ecp );
-            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-                return( status );
-            status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length,
-                                             ecp,
-                                             shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
-                                             shared_secret_length );
-            mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
-            mbedtls_free( ecp );
-            return( status );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */
-        default:
-            (void) private_key;
-            (void) peer_key;
-            (void) peer_key_length;
-            (void) shared_secret;
-            (void) shared_secret_size;
-            (void) shared_secret_length;
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-    }
+    if( !PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+      .core = private_key->attr
+    };
+
+    return( psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement( &attributes,
+                                              private_key->key.data,
+                                              private_key->key.bytes, alg,
+                                              peer_key, peer_key_length,
+                                              shared_secret,
+                                              shared_secret_size,
+                                              shared_secret_length ) );
 }
 
 /* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
@@ -5845,7 +5797,7 @@
                                                 size_t peer_key_length )
 {
     psa_status_t status;
-    uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE];
+    uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t shared_secret_length = 0;
     psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( operation->alg );
 
@@ -6046,7 +5998,7 @@
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         return( status );
     /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported
-     * for the extrernal RNG interface. */
+     * for the external RNG interface. */
     if( output_length != output_size )
         return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY );
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
index 17b3953..70f714a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h
@@ -508,4 +508,4 @@
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(
     mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation );
 
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
index 70dc74d..91a0e3b 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
@@ -516,10 +516,10 @@
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
-    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                        output + update_output_length,
-                                        output_size - update_output_length,
-                                        &finish_output_length );
+    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish(
+        &operation,
+        mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, update_output_length ),
+        output_size - update_output_length, &finish_output_length );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
@@ -563,17 +563,20 @@
             goto exit;
     }
 
-    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation, input + operation.iv_length,
-                                        input_length - operation.iv_length,
-                                        output, output_size, &olength );
+    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(
+        &operation,
+        mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( input, operation.iv_length ),
+        input_length - operation.iv_length,
+        output, output_size, &olength );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
     accumulated_length = olength;
 
-    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation, output + accumulated_length,
-                                        output_size - accumulated_length,
-                                        &olength );
+    status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish(
+        &operation,
+        mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, accumulated_length ),
+        output_size - accumulated_length, &olength );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
         goto exit;
 
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
index 9863848..614cad1 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h
@@ -183,6 +183,24 @@
 }
 #endif
 
+/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints
+ *  and lock it.
+ *
+ * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is
+ * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is
+ * zero, the algorithm is not checked.
+ *
+ * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
+ * into a key slot if not already done.
+ *
+ * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
+ * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                                    psa_key_slot_t **p_slot,
+                                                    psa_key_usage_t usage,
+                                                    psa_algorithm_t alg );
+
 /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
  *
  * Persistent storage is not affected.
@@ -531,4 +549,62 @@
  */
 psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type,
                                                      size_t bits );
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret, using
+    built-in raw key agreement functions.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement
+ *       entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in]  attributes           The attributes of the key to use for the
+ *                                  operation.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer           The buffer containing the private key
+ *                                  context.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer_size      Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[in]  alg                  A key agreement algorithm that is
+ *                                  compatible with the type of the key.
+ * \param[in]  peer_key             The buffer containing the key context
+ *                                  of the peer's public key.
+ * \param[in]  peer_key_length      Size of the \p peer_key buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[out] shared_secret        The buffer to which the shared secret
+ *                                  is to be written.
+ * \param[in]  shared_secret_size   Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make
+ *                                  up the returned shared secret.
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success. Shared secret successfully calculated.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
+ *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
+ *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with
+ *         \p private_key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         \p shared_secret_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length );
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
index ee23b6f..a19d7ec 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
@@ -357,6 +357,20 @@
     size_t output_size,
     size_t *output_length );
 
+/*
+ * Raw Key Agreement
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length );
+
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */
 
 /* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
index 29f53b9..537a748 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
 
 #include <mbedtls/ecdsa.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ecdh.h>
 #include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
 #include <mbedtls/error.h>
 
@@ -464,4 +465,76 @@
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
         * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */
 
+/****************************************************************/
+/* ECDH Key Agreement */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+    if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( attributes->core.type ) ||
+        ! PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) )
+                return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
+    status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
+                attributes->core.type,
+                attributes->core.bits,
+                key_buffer,
+                key_buffer_size,
+                &ecp );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( status );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL;
+    mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh;
+    size_t bits = 0;
+    psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ecp->grp.id, &bits );
+    mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh );
+
+    status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
+                PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve),
+                bits,
+                peer_key,
+                peer_key_length,
+                &their_key );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, ecp, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+
+    status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
+        mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh,
+                                shared_secret_length,
+                                shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                                mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+                                MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        goto exit;
+    if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) != *shared_secret_length )
+        status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+exit:
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size );
+    mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key );
+    mbedtls_free( their_key );
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
+    mbedtls_free( ecp );
+    return( status );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */
+
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
index 429c062..386e87a 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h
@@ -218,4 +218,53 @@
     const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
     psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
     const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length );
+
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw ECDH shared secret.
+ *
+ * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver
+ *       key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement
+ *       entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for
+ *       transparent drivers.
+ *
+ * \param[in]  attributes           The attributes of the key to use for the
+ *                                  operation.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer           The buffer containing the private key
+ *                                  context.
+ * \param[in]  key_buffer_size      Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[in]  alg                  A key agreement algorithm that is
+ *                                  compatible with the type of the key.
+ * \param[in]  peer_key             The buffer containing the key context
+ *                                  of the peer's public key.
+ * \param[in]  peer_key_length      Size of the \p peer_key buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[out] shared_secret        The buffer to which the shared secret
+ *                                  is to be written.
+ * \param[in]  shared_secret_size   Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in
+ *                                  bytes.
+ * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make
+ *                                  up the returned shared secret.
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success. Shared secret successfully calculated.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
+ *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
+ *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with
+ *         \p private_key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         \p shared_secret_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length );
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/library/psa_crypto_its.h
index 3a3f49a..1b8dc20 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_its.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_its.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
  * \return      A status indicating the success/failure of the operation
  *
  * \retval      #PSA_SUCCESS                     The operation completed successfully
- * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED         The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG
+ * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED         The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE
  * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED         The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid
  * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE  The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium
  * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE       The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error)
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
  *
  * \retval      #PSA_SUCCESS                  The operation completed successfully
  * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST     The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage
- * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED      The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG
+ * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED      The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE
  * \retval      #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE    The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error)
  */
 psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid);
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
index 870b5b5..da66dae 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c
@@ -197,9 +197,14 @@
 psa_status_t psa_pake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                              const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if( operation->alg != PSA_ALG_NONE )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
+    }
 
     if( cipher_suite == NULL ||
         PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(cipher_suite->algorithm ) == 0 ||
@@ -207,7 +212,8 @@
           cipher_suite->type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ) ||
         PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( cipher_suite->hash ) == 0 )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto error;
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
@@ -218,7 +224,8 @@
             cipher_suite->bits != 256 ||
             cipher_suite->hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
         {
-            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+            status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+            goto error;
         }
 
         operation->alg = cipher_suite->algorithm;
@@ -238,7 +245,11 @@
     }
     else
 #endif
-    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+error:
+    psa_pake_abort( operation );
+    return status;
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
@@ -248,16 +259,18 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
     psa_key_type_t type;
     psa_key_usage_t usage;
+    psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
 
     if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
         operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
     }
 
     status = psa_get_key_attributes( password, &attributes );
     if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        return( status );
+        goto error;
 
     type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes );
     usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags( &attributes );
@@ -267,56 +280,106 @@
     if( type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
         type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto error;
     }
 
-    if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
+    if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 ) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED;
+        goto error;
+    }
 
-    operation->password = password;
+    if( operation->password != NULL )
+        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+
+    status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( password, &slot,
+                                                    PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE,
+                                                    PSA_ALG_JPAKE );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( status );
+
+    operation->password = mbedtls_calloc( 1, slot->key.bytes );
+    if( operation->password == NULL )
+    {
+        psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
+    }
+    memcpy( operation->password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
+    operation->password_len = slot->key.bytes;
+
+    status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( status );
 
     return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+error:
+    psa_pake_abort(operation);
+    return( status );
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                 const uint8_t *user_id,
                                 size_t user_id_len )
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
     if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
         operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
     }
 
     if( user_id_len == 0 || user_id == NULL )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto error;
+    }
 
-    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+error:
+    psa_pake_abort(operation);
+    return( status );
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                 const uint8_t *peer_id,
                                 size_t peer_id_len )
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
     if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
         operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
     }
 
     if( peer_id_len == 0 || peer_id == NULL )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto error;
+    }
 
-    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+error:
+    psa_pake_abort(operation);
+    return( status );
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                 psa_pake_role_t role )
 {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
     if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ||
         operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
     }
 
     if( role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE &&
@@ -325,7 +388,8 @@
         role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT &&
         role != PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER )
     {
-        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        goto error;
     }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
@@ -341,16 +405,18 @@
     }
     else
 #endif
-        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+error:
+    psa_pake_abort(operation);
+    return( status );
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
 static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_ecjpake_role role;
-    psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
 
     if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT )
         role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT;
@@ -359,22 +425,20 @@
     else
         return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
-    if( psa_is_valid_key_id( operation->password, 1 ) == 0 )
+    if( operation->password_len == 0 )
         return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
 
-    status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( operation->password, &slot );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        return( status );
-
-
     ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &operation->ctx.ecjpake,
                                  role,
                                  MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
                                  MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
-                                 slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes );
+                                 operation->password,
+                                 operation->password_len );
 
-    psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
-    slot = NULL;
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
+    mbedtls_free( operation->password );
+    operation->password = NULL;
+    operation->password_len = 0;
 
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) );
@@ -795,7 +859,10 @@
         operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_READY ||
         operation->input_step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE ||
         operation->output_step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_DERIVE )
-        return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+    {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
+        goto error;
+    }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
     if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE )
@@ -825,7 +892,13 @@
     }
     else
 #endif
-    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+error:
+    psa_key_derivation_abort( output );
+    psa_pake_abort( operation );
+
+    return( status );
 }
 
 psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation)
@@ -840,7 +913,11 @@
     {
         operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
         operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID;
-        operation->password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+        if( operation->password_len > 0 )
+            mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len );
+        mbedtls_free( operation->password );
+        operation->password = NULL;
+        operation->password_len = 0;
         operation->role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE;
         mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE );
         operation->buffer_length = 0;
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
index 197caa8..5835c6f 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/library/psa_crypto_se.h
index 549dfb6..693c3ea 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_se.h
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_se.h
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
     psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver,
     psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number );
 
-/** Destoy a key in a secure element.
+/** Destroy a key in a secure element.
  *
  * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key
  * and updates the driver's persistent data.
diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c
index 0f0ea1d..2c4ce43 100644
--- a/library/ssl_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_client.c
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@
 
     /*
      * Generate the random bytes, except when responding to a verify request
-     * where we MUST reuse the previoulsy generated random bytes
+     * where we MUST reuse the previously generated random bytes
      * (RFC 6347 4.2.1).
      */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index 4d7f635..5808cab 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -50,17 +50,13 @@
 #include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+    !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 #include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
 #endif
 
 #include "common.h"
 
-#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
-    !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-#define inline __inline
-#endif
-
 /* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
     defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
@@ -147,7 +143,7 @@
               MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK( TRUNCATED_HMAC )                         | \
               MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK( UNRECOGNIZED ) )
 
-/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClienHello */
+/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH                                  \
             ( MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK( SERVERNAME )                             | \
               MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK( MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH )                    | \
@@ -776,7 +772,13 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx;        /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password;
+    uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok;
+#else
     mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx;        /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
     unsigned char *ecjpake_cache;               /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
     size_t ecjpake_cache_len;                   /*!< Length of cached data */
@@ -888,13 +890,6 @@
     uint16_t mtu;                       /*!<  Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
-    /*! TLS 1.3 transforms for 0-RTT and encrypted handshake messages.
-     *  Those pointers own the transforms they reference. */
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake;
-    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-
     /*
      * Checksum contexts
      */
@@ -979,6 +974,8 @@
     unsigned char *certificate_request_context;
 #endif
 
+    /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake;
     union
     {
         unsigned char early    [MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -987,6 +984,11 @@
     } tls13_master_secrets;
 
     mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets;
+    /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata;
+#endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
@@ -2493,6 +2495,52 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+
+typedef enum {
+    MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE,
+    MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
+} mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief       Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round
+ *              of key exchange. This code is common between server and client
+ *
+ * \param  pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure
+ * \param  buf      [in] input buffer to parse
+ * \param  len      [in] length of the input buffer
+ * \param  round    [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or
+ *                       MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
+ *
+ * \return               0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure
+ */
+int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                                    psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round );
+
+/**
+ * \brief       Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output
+ *              buffer. This code is common between server and client
+ *
+ * \param  pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure
+ * \param  buf      [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to
+ * \param  len      [in] length of the output buffer
+ * \param  olen     [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer
+ * \param  round    [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or
+ *                       MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
+ *
+ * \return               0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure
+ */
+int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(
+                                    psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
+                                    unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t len, size_t *olen,
+                                    mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round );
+
+#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+
 /**
  * \brief       TLS record protection modes
  */
diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c
index dbc6391..753998e 100644
--- a/library/ssl_msg.c
+++ b/library/ssl_msg.c
@@ -382,30 +382,80 @@
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
-/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled,
- * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */
+/* The size of the `add_data` structure depends on various
+ * factors, namely
+ *
+ * 1) CID functionality disabled
+ *
+ * additional_data =
+ *    8:                    seq_num +
+ *    1:                       type +
+ *    2:                    version +
+ *    2:  length of inner plaintext +
+ *
+ * size = 13 bytes
+ *
+ * 2) CID functionality based on RFC 9146 enabled
+ *
+ * size = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 2 + CID-length
+ *      = 23 + CID-length
+ *
+ * 3) CID functionality based on legacy CID version
+    according to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ *  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ *
+ * size = 13 + 1 + CID-length
+ *
+ * More information about the CID usage:
+ *
+ * Per Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 the
+ * size of the additional data structure is calculated as:
+ *
+ * additional_data =
+ *    8:                    seq_num +
+ *    1:                  tls12_cid +
+ *    2:     DTLSCipherText.version +
+ *    n:                        cid +
+ *    1:                 cid_length +
+ *    2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
+ *
+ * Per RFC 9146 the size of the add_data structure is calculated as:
+ *
+ * additional_data =
+ *    8:        seq_num_placeholder +
+ *    1:                  tls12_cid +
+ *    1:                 cid_length +
+ *    1:                  tls12_cid +
+ *    2:     DTLSCiphertext.version +
+ *    2:                      epoch +
+ *    6:            sequence_number +
+ *    n:                        cid +
+ *    2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
+ *
+ */
 static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
                                               size_t *add_data_len,
                                               mbedtls_record *rec,
                                               mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version
-                                                tls_version,
+                                              tls_version,
                                               size_t taglen )
 {
-    /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
+    /* Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS,
+     * and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. Further
+     * variants were added when the CID functionality was added with RFC 9146.
+     * This implementations also considers the use of a legacy version of the
+     * CID specification published in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
+     * which is used in deployments.
+     *
+     * We will distinguish between the non-CID and the CID cases below.
+     *
+     * --- Non-CID cases ---
+     *
+     * Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
      *
      *    additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type +
      *                      TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length;
      *
-     * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows
-     * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
-     *  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05):
-     *
-     *       additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type +
-     *                         DTLSPlaintext.version +
-     *                         cid +
-     *                         cid_length +
-     *                         length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
-     *
      * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD
      * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead.
      * Moreover, the additional data involves the length of the TLS
@@ -421,11 +471,72 @@
      *
      *     TLSCiphertext.length = TLSInnerPlaintext.length + taglen.
      *
-     */
+     * --- CID cases ---
+     *
+     * RFC 9146 uses a common pattern when constructing the data
+     * passed into a MAC / AEAD cipher.
+     *
+     * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers with
+     * Encrypt-then-MAC Processing (with CID):
+     *
+     *  data = seq_num_placeholder +
+     *         tls12_cid +
+     *         cid_length +
+     *         tls12_cid +
+     *         DTLSCiphertext.version +
+     *         epoch +
+     *         sequence_number +
+     *         cid +
+     *         DTLSCiphertext.length +
+     *         IV +
+     *         ENC(content + padding + padding_length)
+     *
+     * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers (with CID):
+     *
+     *  data =  seq_num_placeholder +
+     *          tls12_cid +
+     *          cid_length +
+     *          tls12_cid +
+     *          DTLSCiphertext.version +
+     *          epoch +
+     *          sequence_number +
+     *          cid +
+     *          length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext +
+     *          DTLSInnerPlaintext.content +
+     *          DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type +
+     *          DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros
+     *
+     * AEAD ciphers use the following additional data calculation (with CIDs):
+     *
+     *     additional_data = seq_num_placeholder +
+     *                tls12_cid +
+     *                cid_length +
+     *                tls12_cid +
+     *                DTLSCiphertext.version +
+     *                epoch +
+     *                sequence_number +
+     *                cid +
+     *                length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
+     *
+     * Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 (for legacy CID use)
+     * defines the additional data calculation as follows:
+     *
+     *     additional_data = seq_num +
+     *                tls12_cid +
+     *                DTLSCipherText.version +
+     *                cid +
+     *                cid_length +
+     *                length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext
+    */
 
     unsigned char *cur = add_data;
     size_t ad_len_field = rec->data_len;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
+    const unsigned char seq_num_placeholder[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
     if( tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 )
     {
@@ -439,25 +550,72 @@
     {
         ((void) tls_version);
         ((void) taglen);
-        memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
-        cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
+        if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
+        {
+            // seq_num_placeholder
+            memcpy( cur, seq_num_placeholder, sizeof(seq_num_placeholder) );
+            cur += sizeof( seq_num_placeholder );
+
+            // tls12_cid type
+            *cur = rec->type;
+            cur++;
+
+            // cid_length
+            *cur = rec->cid_len;
+            cur++;
+        }
+        else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+        {
+            // epoch + sequence number
+            memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
+            cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
+        }
     }
 
+    // type
     *cur = rec->type;
     cur++;
 
+    // version
     memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) );
     cur += sizeof( rec->ver );
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
-    if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 1
+
+    if (rec->cid_len != 0)
     {
-        memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
+        // CID
+        memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len);
         cur += rec->cid_len;
 
+        // cid_length
         *cur = rec->cid_len;
         cur++;
 
+        // length of inner plaintext
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0);
+        cur += 2;
+    }
+    else
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
+
+    if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
+    {
+        // epoch + sequence number
+        memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr));
+        cur += sizeof(rec->ctr);
+
+        // CID
+        memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
+        cur += rec->cid_len;
+
+        // length of inner plaintext
         MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ad_len_field, cur, 0 );
         cur += 2;
     }
@@ -511,15 +669,12 @@
                                     unsigned char const *dynamic_iv,
                                     size_t dynamic_iv_len )
 {
-    size_t i;
-
     /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */
     memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len );
     memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len );
 
     dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len;
-    for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ )
-        dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i];
+    mbedtls_xor( dst_iv, dst_iv, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
 
@@ -532,7 +687,14 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode;
     int auth_done = 0;
     unsigned char * data;
-    unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
+    /* For an explanation of the additional data length see
+    * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record().
+    */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX];
+#else
+    unsigned char add_data[13];
+#endif
     size_t add_data_len;
     size_t post_avail;
 
@@ -1015,13 +1177,7 @@
             size_t sign_mac_length = 0;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
-            /*
-             * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
-             *     TLSCipherText.type +
-             *     TLSCipherText.version +
-             *     length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) +
-             *     IV +
-             *     ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
+            /* MAC(MAC_write_key, add_data, IV, ENC(content + padding + padding_length))
              */
 
             if( post_avail < transform->maclen)
@@ -1129,7 +1285,14 @@
     size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
 #endif
     unsigned char* data;
-    unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ];
+    /* For an explanation of the additional data length see
+    * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record().
+    */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
+#else
+    unsigned char add_data[13];
+#endif
     size_t add_data_len;
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
@@ -1907,7 +2070,7 @@
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) );
             mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
 
-            if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
+            if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
             {
                 if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 )
                 {
@@ -3481,7 +3644,7 @@
     {
         /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID
          * struct {
-         *   ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
+         *   ContentType outer_type = tls12_cid;
          *   ProtocolVersion version;
          *   uint16 epoch;
          *   uint48 sequence_number;
@@ -3932,7 +4095,7 @@
     if( hs == NULL )
         return( -1 );
 
-    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) );
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_message" ) );
 
     if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
         ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
@@ -5299,7 +5462,7 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "NewSessionTicket received" ) );
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl,
-                                     MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
+                                     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
 
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
 }
@@ -5502,7 +5665,7 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
+    if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
     {
         ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
         if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
@@ -5758,7 +5921,7 @@
     }
 #endif
 
-    if( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
+    if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
     {
         if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
         {
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index da90b23..9bb9dc2 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -907,7 +907,12 @@
     mbedtls_ecdh_init( &handshake->ecdh_ctx );
 #endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    handshake->psa_pake_ctx = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#else
     mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
     handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
     handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
@@ -1442,9 +1447,11 @@
 
     if( ssl->handshake != NULL )
     {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
         mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata );
         mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata );
         ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata = NULL;
+#endif
 
         mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
         mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->transform_handshake );
@@ -1697,6 +1704,15 @@
 {
     conf->early_data_enabled = early_data_enabled;
 }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_max_early_data_size(
+         mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size )
+{
+    conf->max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
@@ -1850,6 +1866,73 @@
 /*
  * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake
  */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         const unsigned char *pw,
+                                         size_t pw_len )
+{
+    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_pake_role_t psa_role;
+    psa_status_t status;
+
+    if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
+        psa_role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER;
+    else
+        psa_role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT;
+
+    /* Empty password is not valid  */
+    if( ( pw == NULL) || ( pw_len == 0 ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_JPAKE );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD );
+
+    status = psa_import_key( &attributes, pw, pw_len,
+                                &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+
+    psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( &cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( &cipher_suite,
+                               PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE( PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,
+                                                   PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1,
+                                                   256) );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_hash( &cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
+
+    status = psa_pake_setup( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, &cipher_suite );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    status = psa_pake_set_role( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, psa_role );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    psa_pake_set_password_key( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok = 1;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          const unsigned char *pw,
                                          size_t pw_len )
@@ -1870,6 +1953,7 @@
                                    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
                                    pw, pw_len ) );
 }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
@@ -3602,7 +3686,7 @@
     if( ssl            == NULL                       ||
         ssl->conf      == NULL                       ||
         ssl->handshake == NULL                       ||
-        mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 1 )
+        ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER  )
     {
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
     }
@@ -3706,7 +3790,7 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) );
 
     /* Main handshake loop */
-    while( mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over( ssl ) == 0 )
+    while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
     {
         ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl );
 
@@ -3908,8 +3992,15 @@
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
     mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx );
 #endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_pake_abort( &handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+    psa_destroy_key( handshake->psa_pake_password );
+    handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#else
     mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
     mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache );
     handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
@@ -3987,9 +4078,11 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
     mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
+    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
     mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( handshake->transform_earlydata );
     mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_earlydata );
-    mbedtls_free( handshake->transform_handshake );
+#endif
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
 
 
@@ -4157,7 +4250,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
     }
-    /* Protocol must be DLTS, not TLS */
+    /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */
     if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) );
@@ -5033,6 +5126,15 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_early_data( conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_max_early_data_size(
+        conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE );
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
     mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(
         conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS );
@@ -6123,6 +6225,55 @@
     else
 #endif
     {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                              \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+        if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
+        {
+            psa_status_t status;
+            psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS;
+            psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation =
+                PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PMS KDF for ECJPAKE" ) );
+
+            handshake->pmslen = PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE;
+
+            status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &derivation, alg );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+
+            status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &derivation,
+                                            PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            {
+                psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+            }
+
+            status = psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                                &derivation );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            {
+                psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+            }
+
+            status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation,
+                                                      handshake->premaster,
+                                                      handshake->pmslen );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            {
+                psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+            }
+
+            status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            {
+                return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
+            }
+        }
+#endif
         ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
                                   lbl, seed, seed_len,
                                   master,
@@ -7544,7 +7695,7 @@
 #endif
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
 
-    ssl->state++;
+    ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) );
 }
@@ -8306,6 +8457,99 @@
     return( ret );
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                                    psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+    size_t input_offset = 0;
+    /*
+     * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice
+     * At round two perform a single cycle
+     */
+    unsigned int remaining_steps = ( round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1;
+
+    for( ; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps-- )
+    {
+        for( psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE;
+             step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF;
+             ++step )
+        {
+            /* Length is stored at the first byte */
+            size_t length = buf[input_offset];
+            input_offset += 1;
+
+            if( input_offset + length > len )
+            {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            }
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( pake_ctx, step,
+                                     buf + input_offset, length );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS)
+            {
+                return psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
+            }
+
+            input_offset += length;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if( input_offset != len )
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(
+                                    psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
+                                    unsigned char *buf,
+                                    size_t len, size_t *olen,
+                                    mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round )
+{
+    psa_status_t status;
+    size_t output_offset = 0;
+    size_t output_len;
+    /*
+     * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice
+     * At round two perform a single cycle
+     */
+    unsigned int remaining_steps = ( round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1;
+
+    for( ; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps-- )
+    {
+        for( psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE;
+            step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF;
+            ++step )
+        {
+            /*
+             * For each step, prepend 1 byte with the length of the data as
+             * given by psa_pake_output().
+             */
+            status = psa_pake_output( pake_ctx, step,
+                                        buf + output_offset + 1,
+                                        len - output_offset - 1,
+                                        &output_len );
+            if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+            {
+                return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
+            }
+
+            *(buf + output_offset) = (uint8_t) output_len;
+
+            output_offset += output_len + 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *olen = output_offset;
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                             unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
@@ -8864,8 +9108,13 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
+        ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1 )
+#else
     if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
         mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     {
         return( -1 );
     }
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
index 1c53a09..7a17452 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c
@@ -132,13 +132,18 @@
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     unsigned char *p = buf;
-    size_t kkpp_len;
+    size_t kkpp_len = 0;
 
     *olen = 0;
 
     /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1 )
+        return( 0 );
+#else
     if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
         return( 0 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
         ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
@@ -158,6 +163,18 @@
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                                p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+                                                MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE );
+        if ( ret != 0 )
+        {
+            psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+            psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+            return( ret );
+        }
+#else
         ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                                p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
                                                ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
@@ -167,6 +184,7 @@
                 "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
             return( ret );
         }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
         ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
         if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
@@ -208,9 +226,6 @@
     size_t ext_len;
 
     /*
-     * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     *
      *   struct {
      *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
      *   } ConnectionId;
@@ -849,10 +864,11 @@
             ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
           ( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                             \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
             mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                               p[0] );
-#endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
             return( 0 );
         }
@@ -889,6 +905,24 @@
     ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
     ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                            &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+                            MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret );
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    return( 0 );
+#else
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                                 buf, len ) ) != 0 )
     {
@@ -901,6 +935,7 @@
     }
 
     return( 0 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
 
@@ -1936,8 +1971,8 @@
     }
 
     /*
-     * Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
-     * PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
+     * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one
+     * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if
      * someone needs that feature.
      */
     *p += len;
@@ -2296,6 +2331,47 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
     if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
     {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        /*
+         * The first 3 bytes are:
+         * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+         * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+         *
+         * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only
+         * that TLS ID here
+         */
+        uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 1 );
+        const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+        if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(
+                                MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) ) == NULL )
+        {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+        }
+
+        if( ( *p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) ||
+            ( read_tls_id != curve_info->tls_id ) )
+        {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
+        }
+
+        p += 3;
+
+        if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                        &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p,
+                        MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+            psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret );
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+        }
+#else
         ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                               p, end - p );
         if( ret != 0 )
@@ -2307,6 +2383,7 @@
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
         }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     }
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
@@ -2654,7 +2731,7 @@
     for( size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
-            ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d",
+            ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x",
               sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1]  ) );
     }
 #endif
@@ -3227,6 +3304,21 @@
     {
         header_len = 4;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+        unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+                               header_len;
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                    out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO );
+        if ( ret != 0 )
+        {
+            psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+            psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+            return( ret );
+        }
+#else
         ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                 ssl->out_msg + header_len,
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
@@ -3246,6 +3338,7 @@
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
             return( ret );
         }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     }
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
index 71f703c..eeb579a 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -268,10 +268,11 @@
             ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
           ( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                             \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
             mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                               p[0] );
-#endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
             return( 0 );
         }
@@ -289,16 +290,37 @@
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                    const unsigned char *buf,
-                                   size_t len )
+                                   size_t len)
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1 )
+#else
     if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
         return( 0 );
     }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                        &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+                        MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE ) ) != 0 )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret );
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
+
+        return( ret );
+    }
+#else
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                                 buf, len ) ) != 0 )
     {
@@ -307,6 +329,7 @@
                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
         return( ret );
     }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
     /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
     ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
@@ -353,9 +376,6 @@
     }
 
     /*
-     * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     *
      *   struct {
      *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
      *   } ConnectionId;
@@ -1752,9 +1772,6 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) );
 
     /*
-     * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
-     *
      *   struct {
      *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
      *   } ConnectionId;
@@ -1996,6 +2013,18 @@
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 );
     p += 2;
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+                                MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE );
+    if ( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+        psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+        return;
+    }
+#else
     ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                         p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
                                         ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
@@ -2004,6 +2033,7 @@
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
         return;
     }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
 
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 );
     p += 2;
@@ -2531,10 +2561,15 @@
         if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( ssl, *sig_alg ) )
             continue;
 
-        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, sa_len );
+        /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the
+         * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the
+         * partial list including that element. */
         sa_len += 2;
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, sa_len );
+
     }
 
+    /* Fill in list length. */
     MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sa_len, p, 0 );
     sa_len += 2;
     p += sa_len;
@@ -2808,6 +2843,46 @@
     if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
     {
         int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+        unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+                               ssl->out_msglen;
+        size_t output_offset = 0;
+        size_t output_len = 0;
+        const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+        /*
+         * The first 3 bytes are:
+         * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+         * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+         *
+         * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its
+         * TLS ID here
+         */
+        if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(
+                                    MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) ) == NULL )
+        {
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+        }
+        *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( curve_info->tls_id, out_p, 1 );
+        output_offset += 3;
+
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                    out_p + output_offset,
+                                    end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+        {
+            psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+            psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "psa_pake_output", ret );
+            return( ret );
+        }
+
+        output_offset += output_len;
+        ssl->out_msglen += output_offset;
+#else
         size_t len = 0;
 
         ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
@@ -2822,6 +2897,7 @@
         }
 
         ssl->out_msglen += len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
 
@@ -4039,6 +4115,18 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
     if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
     {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                        &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p,
+                        MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO ) ) != 0 )
+        {
+            psa_destroy_key( ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password );
+            psa_pake_abort( &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx );
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret );
+            return( ret );
+        }
+#else
         ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
                                               p, end - p );
         if( ret != 0 )
@@ -4055,6 +4143,7 @@
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
             return( ret );
         }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     }
     else
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
index 0372f2d..0109f77 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c
@@ -1183,11 +1183,11 @@
             return( ret );
         p += ext_len;
 
-        /* Initializes the status to `indication sent`. It will be updated to
-         * `accepted` or `rejected` depending on whether the EncryptedExtension
-         * message will contain an early data indication extension or not.
+        /* Initializes the status to `rejected`. It will be updated to
+         * `accepted` if the EncryptedExtension message contain an early data
+         * indication extension.
          */
-        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_INDICATION_SENT;
+        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED;
     }
     else
     {
@@ -2060,6 +2060,21 @@
 
                 break;
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
+
+                if( extension_data_len != 0 )
+                {
+                    /* The message must be empty. */
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                                  MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+                    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
             default:
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(
                     3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
@@ -2102,6 +2117,14 @@
     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
         ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if( ssl->handshake->received_extensions &
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK( EARLY_DATA ) )
+    {
+        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED;
+    }
+#endif
+
     mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
                                         buf, buf_len );
 
@@ -2743,7 +2766,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
  */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -2857,7 +2880,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
             ret = ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket( ssl );
             if( ret != 0 )
                 break;
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
index ec84a99..cef6144 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c
@@ -215,6 +215,33 @@
     return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls ( status ) );
 }
 
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
+                    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+                    const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
+                    unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+                    unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
+                    hash_alg,
+                    secret, secret_len,
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
+                    NULL, 0,
+                    key, key_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
+                    hash_alg,
+                    secret, secret_len,
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
+                    NULL, 0,
+                    iv, iv_len );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
 /*
  * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs:
  *
@@ -240,35 +267,17 @@
 {
     int ret = 0;
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
-                    client_secret, secret_len,
-                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
-                    NULL, 0,
-                    keys->client_write_key, key_len );
+    ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
+            hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len,
+            keys->client_write_key, key_len,
+            keys->client_write_iv, iv_len );
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
-                    server_secret, secret_len,
-                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ),
-                    NULL, 0,
-                    keys->server_write_key, key_len );
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return( ret );
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
-                    client_secret, secret_len,
-                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
-                    NULL, 0,
-                    keys->client_write_iv, iv_len );
-    if( ret != 0 )
-        return( ret );
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg,
-                    server_secret, secret_len,
-                    MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ),
-                    NULL, 0,
-                    keys->server_write_iv, iv_len );
+    ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
+            hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len,
+            keys->server_write_key, key_len,
+            keys->server_write_iv, iv_len );
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
@@ -1052,6 +1061,194 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(
+                    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
+                    size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len )
+{
+    psa_key_type_t key_type;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+    size_t taglen;
+    size_t key_bits;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if( ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG )
+        taglen = 8;
+    else
+        taglen = 16;
+
+    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa( ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
+                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits );
+    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
+
+    *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits );
+
+    /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */
+    *iv_len = 12;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting
+ * the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7
+ * of RFC 8446.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to
+ *       the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus
+ *       a key for server early traffic.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+    size_t hash_len;
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len;
+    size_t key_len;
+    size_t iv_len;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *tls13_early_secrets = &handshake->tls13_early_secrets;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key" ) );
+
+    ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
+
+    hash_alg = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md( ciphersuite_info->mac );
+    hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,
+                                                transcript,
+                                                sizeof( transcript ),
+                                                &transcript_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
+                               "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript",
+                               ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets(
+              hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early,
+              transcript, transcript_len, tls13_early_secrets );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+            1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(
+        4, "Client early traffic secret",
+        tls13_early_secrets->client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len );
+
+    /*
+     * Export client handshake traffic secret
+     */
+    if( ssl->f_export_keys != NULL )
+    {
+        ssl->f_export_keys(
+            ssl->p_export_keys,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET,
+            tls13_early_secrets->client_early_traffic_secret,
+            hash_len,
+            handshake->randbytes,
+            handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */ );
+    }
+
+    ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key(
+              hash_alg,
+              tls13_early_secrets->client_early_traffic_secret,
+              hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len,
+              traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    traffic_keys->key_len = key_len;
+    traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client early write_key",
+                           traffic_keys->client_write_key,
+                           traffic_keys->key_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "client early write_iv",
+                           traffic_keys->client_write_iv,
+                           traffic_keys->iv_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key" ) );
+
+cleanup:
+    /* Erase secret and transcript */
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(
+        tls13_early_secrets, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets ) );
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transcript, sizeof( transcript ) );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys;
+    mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and
+     * key material. */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key( ssl, &traffic_keys );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key",
+                               ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
+    if( transform_earlydata == NULL )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
+                                        transform_earlydata,
+                                        ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                        ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
+                                        &traffic_keys,
+                                        ssl );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret );
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata;
+
+cleanup:
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &traffic_keys, sizeof( traffic_keys ) );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        mbedtls_free( transform_earlydata );
+
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@@ -1098,51 +1295,19 @@
     return( 0 );
 }
 
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(
-                    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
-                    size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len )
-{
-    psa_key_type_t key_type;
-    psa_algorithm_t alg;
-    size_t taglen;
-    size_t key_bits;
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    if( ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG )
-        taglen = 8;
-    else
-        taglen = 16;
-
-    status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa( ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen,
-                                        &alg, &key_type, &key_bits );
-    if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
-        return psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
-
-    *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( key_bits );
-
-    /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */
-    *iv_len = 12;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
 /* mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for
  * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of TLS 1.3. */
 int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                                mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
     mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
-
     psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
     size_t hash_len;
-
     unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t transcript_len;
-
-    size_t key_len, iv_len;
+    size_t key_len;
+    size_t iv_len;
 
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
     const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = handshake->ciphersuite_info;
@@ -1150,11 +1315,10 @@
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys" ) );
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( ciphersuite_info,
-                                                 &key_len, &iv_len );
+    ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len );
     if( ret != 0 )
     {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret );
         return ret;
     }
 
@@ -1370,11 +1534,11 @@
 
     /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */
 
-    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( handshake->ciphersuite_info,
-                                                 &key_len, &iv_len );
+    ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( handshake->ciphersuite_info,
+                                         &key_len, &iv_len );
     if( ret != 0 )
     {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret );
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
index 966b5c5..fc64737 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h
@@ -667,6 +667,27 @@
                                              size_t *actual_len,
                                              int which );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+/**
+ * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 early transform
+ *
+ * \param ssl  The SSL context to operate on.
+ *
+ * \returns    \c 0 on success.
+ * \returns    A negative error code on failure.
+ *
+ * \warning    The function does not compute the early master secret. Call
+ *             mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early() before to
+ *             call this function to generate the early master secret.
+ * \note       For a client/server endpoint, the function computes only the
+ *             encryption/decryption part of the transform as the decryption/
+ *             encryption part is not defined by the specification (no early
+ *             traffic from the server to the client).
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 /**
  * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake transform
  *
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 3cd0310..6caae89 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@
 
     if( p_identity_len != identities_end || p_binder_len != binders_end )
     {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pre_shared_key extesion decode error" ) );
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pre_shared_key extension decode error" ) );
         MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
                                       MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
@@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@
     mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
 #else
     mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER );
 #endif
@@ -2636,7 +2636,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
  */
 #define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP  0
 #define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE 1
@@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
  */
 static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
@@ -2908,8 +2908,8 @@
         else
             ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count--;
 
-        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl,
-                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH );
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH );
     }
     else
     {
@@ -3045,7 +3045,7 @@
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
             ret = ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket( ssl );
             if( ret != 0 )
             {
@@ -3054,9 +3054,9 @@
                                        ret );
             }
             break;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH:
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH:
             /* This state is necessary to do the flush of the New Session
-             * Ticket message written in MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+             * Ticket message written in MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
              * as part of ssl_prepare_handshake_step.
              */
             ret = 0;
@@ -3064,7 +3064,7 @@
             if( ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0 )
                 mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER );
             else
-                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
+                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
             break;
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c
index 362e036..be87973 100644
--- a/library/x509.c
+++ b/library/x509.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
  *
  * RFC 4055 (which defines use of RSASSA-PSS in PKIX) states that the value
  * of trailerField MUST be 1, and PKCS#1 v2.2 doesn't even define any other
- * option. Enfore this at parsing time.
+ * option. Enforce this at parsing time.
  */
 int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params,
                                 mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md,
diff --git a/library/x509_crl.c b/library/x509_crl.c
index d830fcd..dc2d2e3 100644
--- a/library/x509_crl.c
+++ b/library/x509_crl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  X.509 Certidicate Revocation List (CRL) parsing
+ *  X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing
  *
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/.gitignore b/programs/fuzz/.gitignore
index 5dc0960..34e3ed0 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/.gitignore
+++ b/programs/fuzz/.gitignore
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 fuzz_client
 fuzz_dtlsclient
 fuzz_dtlsserver
+fuzz_pkcs7
 fuzz_privkey
 fuzz_pubkey
 fuzz_server
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
index c7fcd35..7747744 100644
--- a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
     fuzz_x509crl
     fuzz_x509crt
     fuzz_x509csr
+    fuzz_pkcs7
 )
 
 set(executables_with_common_c
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.c b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..960007d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) {
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+    mbedtls_pkcs7 pkcs7;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_init( &pkcs7 );
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( &pkcs7, Data, Size );
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_free( &pkcs7 );
+#else
+    (void) Data;
+    (void) Size;
+#endif
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.options b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.options
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0824b19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/programs/fuzz/fuzz_pkcs7.options
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[libfuzzer]
+max_len = 65535
diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
index 331838b..3e81d13 100644
--- a/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
+++ b/programs/pkey/dh_genprime.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 
 #define USAGE \
     "\n usage: dh_genprime param=<>...\n"                                   \
-    "\n acceprable parameters:\n"                                           \
+    "\n acceptable parameters:\n"                                           \
     "    bits=%%d           default: 2048\n"
 
 #define DFL_BITS    2048
diff --git a/programs/psa/aead_demo.c b/programs/psa/aead_demo.c
index c4ed0dd..1efd132 100644
--- a/programs/psa/aead_demo.c
+++ b/programs/psa/aead_demo.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
 
 /* Run a PSA function and bail out if it fails.
  * The symbolic name of the error code can be recovered using:
- * programs/psa/psa_consant_name status <value> */
+ * programs/psa/psa_constant_name status <value> */
 #define PSA_CHECK( expr )                                       \
     do                                                          \
     {                                                           \
diff --git a/programs/psa/hmac_demo.c b/programs/psa/hmac_demo.c
index 6238892..f949a89 100644
--- a/programs/psa/hmac_demo.c
+++ b/programs/psa/hmac_demo.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
 
 /* Run a PSA function and bail out if it fails.
  * The symbolic name of the error code can be recovered using:
- * programs/psa/psa_consant_name status <value> */
+ * programs/psa/psa_constant_name status <value> */
 #define PSA_CHECK( expr )                                       \
     do                                                          \
     {                                                           \
diff --git a/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c b/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c
index 1303719..f40874e 100644
--- a/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c
+++ b/programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c
@@ -713,4 +713,6 @@
     usage( );
     return( EXIT_FAILURE );
 }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_MD_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_MD_C &&
+          MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_C &&
+          MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
diff --git a/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c b/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c
index 23a34e0..d13ea28 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/dtls_client.c
@@ -343,5 +343,5 @@
     mbedtls_exit( ret );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS && MBEDTLS_NET_C &&
-          MBEDTLD_TIMING_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C &&
+          MBEDTLS_TIMING_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C &&
           MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
index 1b4a94a..00624b5 100644
--- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
+++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
 #define DFL_SNI                 NULL
 #define DFL_ALPN_STRING         NULL
 #define DFL_CURVES              NULL
+#define DFL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 0
 #define DFL_SIG_ALGS            NULL
 #define DFL_DHM_FILE            NULL
 #define DFL_TRANSPORT           MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM
@@ -424,6 +425,15 @@
 #define USAGE_ECJPAKE ""
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+#define USAGE_EARLY_DATA \
+    "    max_early_data_size=%%d default: -1 (disabled)\n"             \
+    "                            options: -1 (disabled), "           \
+    "                                     >= 0 (enabled, max amount of early data )\n"
+#else
+#define USAGE_EARLY_DATA ""
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
 #define USAGE_CURVES \
     "    curves=a,b,c,d      default: \"default\" (library default)\n"  \
@@ -677,6 +687,7 @@
     const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages
                                  * after renegotiation                      */
     int reproducible;           /* make communication reproducible          */
+    uint32_t max_early_data_size; /* max amount of early data               */
     int query_config_mode;      /* whether to read config                   */
     int use_srtp;               /* Support SRTP                             */
     int force_srtp_profile;     /* SRTP protection profile to use or all    */
@@ -1535,6 +1546,9 @@
      };
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    int tls13_early_data_enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED;
+#endif
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
     mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
@@ -1691,6 +1705,7 @@
     opt.sni                 = DFL_SNI;
     opt.alpn_string         = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
     opt.curves              = DFL_CURVES;
+    opt.max_early_data_size = DFL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE;
     opt.sig_algs            = DFL_SIG_ALGS;
     opt.dhm_file            = DFL_DHM_FILE;
     opt.transport           = DFL_TRANSPORT;
@@ -1881,6 +1896,19 @@
         else if( strcmp( p, "sig_algs" ) == 0 )
             opt.sig_algs = q;
 #endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+        else if( strcmp( p, "max_early_data_size" ) == 0 )
+        {
+            long long value = atoll( q );
+            tls13_early_data_enabled =
+                value >= 0 ? MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED :
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED;
+            if( tls13_early_data_enabled )
+            {
+                opt.max_early_data_size = atoi( q );
+            }
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
         else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 )
         {
             opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ?
@@ -1949,7 +1977,7 @@
              * is not recommended in practice.
              * `psk_or_ephemeral` exists in theory, we need this mode to test if
              * this setting work correctly. With this key exchange setting, server
-             * should always perform `ephemeral` handshake. `psk` or `psk_ephermal`
+             * should always perform `ephemeral` handshake. `psk` or `psk_ephemeral`
              * is not expected.
              */
             else if( strcmp( q, "psk_or_ephemeral" ) == 0 )
@@ -2876,6 +2904,15 @@
     if( opt.cert_req_ca_list != DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( &conf, opt.cert_req_ca_list );
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_early_data( &conf, tls13_early_data_enabled );
+    if( tls13_early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED )
+    {
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls13_conf_max_early_data_size(
+            &conf, opt.max_early_data_size );
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
     /* exercise setting DN hints for server certificate request
      * (Intended for use where the client cert expected has been signed by
diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c
index ecb093e..6313c52 100644
--- a/programs/test/benchmark.c
+++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@
     Sleep( alarmMs );
     mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
     /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return
-     * That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */
+     * That ensures execution of thread function's epilogue */
 }
 
 static void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
diff --git a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
index e3386d1..ccd1303 100644
--- a/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
+++ b/programs/test/udp_proxy.c
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
 /* Return elapsed time in milliseconds since the first call */
-static unsigned ellapsed_time( void )
+static unsigned elapsed_time( void )
 {
     static int initialized = 0;
     static struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires;
@@ -413,9 +413,9 @@
     int ret;
 
     mbedtls_printf( "  %05u flush    %s: %u bytes, %u datagrams, last %u ms\n",
-                    ellapsed_time(), buf->description,
+                    elapsed_time(), buf->description,
                     (unsigned) buf->len, buf->num_datagrams,
-                    ellapsed_time() - buf->packet_lifetime );
+                    elapsed_time() - buf->packet_lifetime );
 
     ret = mbedtls_net_send( buf->ctx, buf->data, buf->len );
 
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
 
 static unsigned ctx_buffer_time_remaining( ctx_buffer *buf )
 {
-    unsigned const cur_time = ellapsed_time();
+    unsigned const cur_time = elapsed_time();
 
     if( buf->num_datagrams == 0 )
         return( (unsigned) -1 );
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
 
     buf->len += len;
     if( ++buf->num_datagrams == 1 )
-        buf->packet_lifetime = ellapsed_time();
+        buf->packet_lifetime = elapsed_time();
 
     return( (int) len );
 }
@@ -517,10 +517,10 @@
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
     if( why == NULL )
         mbedtls_printf( "  %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes)\n",
-                ellapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len );
+                elapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len );
     else
         mbedtls_printf( "  %05u dispatch %s %s (%u bytes): %s\n",
-                ellapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len, why );
+                elapsed_time(), p->way, p->type, p->len, why );
 #else
     if( why == NULL )
         mbedtls_printf( "        dispatch %s %s (%u bytes)\n",
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_req.c b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
index 30b389a..4879583 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_req.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_req.c
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
     if( ( ret = write_certificate_request( &req, opt.output_file,
                                            mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) ) != 0 )
     {
-        mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  write_certifcate_request %d", ret );
+        mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  write_certificate_request %d", ret );
         goto exit;
     }
 
diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
index f9366fe..a8910d7 100644
--- a/programs/x509/cert_write.c
+++ b/programs/x509/cert_write.c
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@
         if( ret != 0 )
         {
             mbedtls_strerror( ret, buf, sizeof(buf) );
-            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  x509write_crt_set_basic_contraints "
+            mbedtls_printf( " failed\n  !  x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints "
                             "returned -0x%04x - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, buf );
             goto exit;
         }
diff --git a/scripts/code_style.py b/scripts/code_style.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..68cd556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/code_style.py
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Check or fix the code style by running Uncrustify.
+
+Note: The code style enforced by this script is not yet introduced to
+Mbed TLS. At present this script will only be used to prepare for a future
+change of code style.
+"""
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+import argparse
+import io
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from typing import List
+
+UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION = "0.75.1"
+CONFIG_FILE = ".uncrustify.cfg"
+UNCRUSTIFY_EXE = "uncrustify"
+UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS = ["-c", CONFIG_FILE]
+STDOUT_UTF8 = io.TextIOWrapper(sys.stdout.buffer, encoding='utf-8')
+STDERR_UTF8 = io.TextIOWrapper(sys.stderr.buffer, encoding='utf-8')
+
+def print_err(*args):
+    print("Error: ", *args, file=STDERR_UTF8)
+
+def get_src_files() -> List[str]:
+    """
+    Use git ls-files to get a list of the source files
+    """
+    git_ls_files_cmd = ["git", "ls-files",
+                        "*.[hc]",
+                        "tests/suites/*.function",
+                        "scripts/data_files/*.fmt"]
+
+    result = subprocess.run(git_ls_files_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
+            stderr=STDERR_UTF8, check=False)
+
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        print_err("git ls-files returned: " + str(result.returncode))
+        return []
+    else:
+        src_files = str(result.stdout, "utf-8").split()
+        # Don't correct style for files in 3rdparty/
+        src_files = list(filter( \
+                lambda filename: not filename.startswith("3rdparty/"), \
+                src_files))
+        return src_files
+
+def get_uncrustify_version() -> str:
+    """
+    Get the version string from Uncrustify
+    """
+    result = subprocess.run([UNCRUSTIFY_EXE, "--version"], \
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False)
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        print_err("Could not get Uncrustify version:", str(result.stderr, "utf-8"))
+        return ""
+    else:
+        return str(result.stdout, "utf-8")
+
+def check_style_is_correct(src_file_list: List[str]) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check the code style and output a diff for each file whose style is
+    incorrect.
+    """
+    style_correct = True
+    for src_file in src_file_list:
+        uncrustify_cmd = [UNCRUSTIFY_EXE] + UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS + [src_file]
+        subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
+                stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False)
+
+        # Uncrustify makes changes to the code and places the result in a new
+        # file with the extension ".uncrustify". To get the changes (if any)
+        # simply diff the 2 files.
+        diff_cmd = ["diff", "-u", src_file, src_file + ".uncrustify"]
+        result = subprocess.run(diff_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, \
+                stderr=STDERR_UTF8, check=False)
+        if len(result.stdout) > 0:
+            print(src_file + " - Incorrect code style.", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+            print("File changed - diff:", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+            print(str(result.stdout, "utf-8"), file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+            style_correct = False
+        else:
+            print(src_file + " - OK.", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+
+        # Tidy up artifact
+        os.remove(src_file + ".uncrustify")
+
+    return style_correct
+
+def fix_style_single_pass(src_file_list: List[str]) -> None:
+    """
+    Run Uncrustify once over the source files.
+    """
+    code_change_args = UNCRUSTIFY_ARGS + ["--no-backup"]
+    for src_file in src_file_list:
+        uncrustify_cmd = [UNCRUSTIFY_EXE] + code_change_args + [src_file]
+        subprocess.run(uncrustify_cmd, check=False, stdout=STDOUT_UTF8, \
+                stderr=STDERR_UTF8)
+
+def fix_style(src_file_list: List[str]) -> int:
+    """
+    Fix the code style. This takes 2 passes of Uncrustify.
+    """
+    fix_style_single_pass(src_file_list)
+    fix_style_single_pass(src_file_list)
+
+    # Guard against future changes that cause the codebase to require
+    # more passes.
+    if not check_style_is_correct(src_file_list):
+        print("Code style still incorrect after second run of Uncrustify.")
+        return 1
+    else:
+        return 0
+
+def main() -> int:
+    """
+    Main with command line arguments.
+    """
+    uncrustify_version = get_uncrustify_version().strip()
+    if UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION not in uncrustify_version:
+        print("Warning: Using unsupported Uncrustify version '" \
+                + uncrustify_version + "' (Note: The only supported version" \
+                "is " + UNCRUSTIFY_SUPPORTED_VERSION + ")", file=STDOUT_UTF8)
+
+    src_files = get_src_files()
+
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('-f', '--fix', action='store_true', \
+            help='modify source files to fix the code style')
+
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    if args.fix:
+        # Fix mode
+        return fix_style(src_files)
+    else:
+        # Check mode
+        if check_style_is_correct(src_files):
+            return 0
+        else:
+            return 1
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/scripts/config.py b/scripts/config.py
index 470c63d..7e58acd 100755
--- a/scripts/config.py
+++ b/scripts/config.py
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
     if name in [
             'MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C', # part of libmbedtls
             'MBEDTLS_NET_C', # part of libmbedtls
+            'MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C', # part of libmbedx509
     ]:
         return False
     return True
diff --git a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
index a491b07..e716e40 100644
--- a/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
+++ b/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c.jinja
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
                     alg, hash, hash_length,
                     signature, signature_size, signature_length ) );
     }
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_location_t location =
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@
                     alg, hash, hash_length,
                     signature, signature_length ) );
     }
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_location_t location =
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
 
         return( PSA_SUCCESS );
     }
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
     switch( location )
     {
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@
                      *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ),
                      data, data_size, data_length ) );
     }
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
     switch( location )
     {
@@ -2476,4 +2476,72 @@
     }
 }
 
+psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length
+ )
+ {
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_location_t location =
+        PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime );
+
+    switch( location )
+    {
+        case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
+            /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
+             * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+            status =
+                mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement( attributes,
+                        key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key,
+                        peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                        shared_secret_length );
+            if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED )
+                return( status );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+
+            /* Software Fallback */
+            status = psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( attributes,
+                                                    key_buffer,
+                                                    key_buffer_size,
+                                                    alg,
+                                                    peer_key,
+                                                    peer_key_length,
+                                                    shared_secret,
+                                                    shared_secret_size,
+                                                    shared_secret_length );
+            return( status );
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+        case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION:
+            return( mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement( attributes,
+                        key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key,
+                        peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                        shared_secret_length ) );
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */
+
+        default:
+            (void) attributes;
+            (void) key_buffer;
+            (void) key_buffer_size;
+            (void) peer_key;
+            (void) peer_key_length;
+            (void) shared_secret;
+            (void) shared_secret_size;
+            (void) shared_secret_length;
+            return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+
+    }
+ }
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
diff --git a/scripts/generate_errors.pl b/scripts/generate_errors.pl
index 41b0337..5395abf 100755
--- a/scripts/generate_errors.pl
+++ b/scripts/generate_errors.pl
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
                             SHA1 SHA256 SHA512 THREADING );
 my @high_level_modules = qw( CIPHER DHM ECP MD
                              PEM PK PKCS12 PKCS5
-                             RSA SSL X509 );
+                             RSA SSL X509 PKCS7 );
 
 undef $/;
 
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
     $define_name = "ASN1_PARSE" if ($define_name eq "ASN1");
     $define_name = "SSL_TLS" if ($define_name eq "SSL");
     $define_name = "PEM_PARSE,PEM_WRITE" if ($define_name eq "PEM");
+    $define_name = "PKCS7" if ($define_name eq "PKCS7");
 
     my $include_name = $module_name;
     $include_name =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/;
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
index 8b11bc2..0339b1a 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
@@ -15,7 +15,12 @@
 # limitations under the License.
 
 from abc import abstractmethod
-from typing import Iterator, List, Tuple, TypeVar
+from typing import Iterator, List, Tuple, TypeVar, Any
+from itertools import chain
+
+from . import test_case
+from . import test_data_generation
+from .bignum_data import INPUTS_DEFAULT, MODULI_DEFAULT
 
 T = TypeVar('T') #pylint: disable=invalid-name
 
@@ -63,8 +68,7 @@
     """Return all pair combinations from input values."""
     return [(x, y) for x in values for y in values]
 
-
-class OperationCommon:
+class OperationCommon(test_data_generation.BaseTest):
     """Common features for bignum binary operations.
 
     This adds functionality common in binary operation tests.
@@ -78,22 +82,108 @@
         unique_combinations_only: Boolean to select if test case combinations
             must be unique. If True, only A,B or B,A would be included as a test
             case. If False, both A,B and B,A would be included.
+        input_style: Controls the way how test data is passed to the functions
+            in the generated test cases. "variable" passes them as they are
+            defined in the python source. "arch_split" pads the values with
+            zeroes depending on the architecture/limb size. If this is set,
+            test cases are generated for all architectures.
+        arity: the number of operands for the operation. Currently supported
+            values are 1 and 2.
     """
     symbol = ""
-    input_values = [] # type: List[str]
-    input_cases = [] # type: List[Tuple[str, str]]
-    unique_combinations_only = True
+    input_values = INPUTS_DEFAULT # type: List[str]
+    input_cases = [] # type: List[Any]
+    unique_combinations_only = False
+    input_styles = ["variable", "fixed", "arch_split"] # type: List[str]
+    input_style = "variable" # type: str
+    limb_sizes = [32, 64] # type: List[int]
+    arities = [1, 2]
+    arity = 2
+    suffix = False   # for arity = 1, symbol can be prefix (default) or suffix
 
-    def __init__(self, val_a: str, val_b: str) -> None:
-        self.arg_a = val_a
-        self.arg_b = val_b
+    def __init__(self, val_a: str, val_b: str = "0", bits_in_limb: int = 32) -> None:
+        self.val_a = val_a
+        self.val_b = val_b
+        # Setting the int versions here as opposed to making them @properties
+        # provides earlier/more robust input validation.
         self.int_a = hex_to_int(val_a)
         self.int_b = hex_to_int(val_b)
+        if bits_in_limb not in self.limb_sizes:
+            raise ValueError("Invalid number of bits in limb!")
+        if self.input_style == "arch_split":
+            self.dependencies = ["MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT{:d}".format(bits_in_limb)]
+        self.bits_in_limb = bits_in_limb
+
+    @property
+    def boundary(self) -> int:
+        if self.arity == 1:
+            return self.int_a
+        elif self.arity == 2:
+            return max(self.int_a, self.int_b)
+        raise ValueError("Unsupported number of operands!")
+
+    @property
+    def limb_boundary(self) -> int:
+        return bound_mpi(self.boundary, self.bits_in_limb)
+
+    @property
+    def limbs(self) -> int:
+        return limbs_mpi(self.boundary, self.bits_in_limb)
+
+    @property
+    def hex_digits(self) -> int:
+        return 2 * (self.limbs * self.bits_in_limb // 8)
+
+    def format_arg(self, val) -> str:
+        if self.input_style not in self.input_styles:
+            raise ValueError("Unknown input style!")
+        if self.input_style == "variable":
+            return val
+        else:
+            return val.zfill(self.hex_digits)
+
+    def format_result(self, res) -> str:
+        res_str = '{:x}'.format(res)
+        return quote_str(self.format_arg(res_str))
+
+    @property
+    def arg_a(self) -> str:
+        return self.format_arg(self.val_a)
+
+    @property
+    def arg_b(self) -> str:
+        if self.arity == 1:
+            raise AttributeError("Operation is unary and doesn't have arg_b!")
+        return self.format_arg(self.val_b)
 
     def arguments(self) -> List[str]:
-        return [
-            quote_str(self.arg_a), quote_str(self.arg_b)
-        ] + self.result()
+        args = [quote_str(self.arg_a)]
+        if self.arity == 2:
+            args.append(quote_str(self.arg_b))
+        return args + self.result()
+
+    def description(self) -> str:
+        """Generate a description for the test case.
+
+        If not set, case_description uses the form A `symbol` B, where symbol
+        is used to represent the operation. Descriptions of each value are
+        generated to provide some context to the test case.
+        """
+        if not self.case_description:
+            if self.arity == 1:
+                format_string = "{1:x} {0}" if self.suffix else "{0} {1:x}"
+                self.case_description = format_string.format(
+                    self.symbol, self.int_a
+                )
+            elif self.arity == 2:
+                self.case_description = "{:x} {} {:x}".format(
+                    self.int_a, self.symbol, self.int_b
+                )
+        return super().description()
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        return True
 
     @abstractmethod
     def result(self) -> List[str]:
@@ -111,15 +201,140 @@
         Combinations are first generated from all input values, and then
         specific cases provided.
         """
-        if cls.unique_combinations_only:
-            yield from combination_pairs(cls.input_values)
+        if cls.arity == 1:
+            yield from ((a, "0") for a in cls.input_values)
+        elif cls.arity == 2:
+            if cls.unique_combinations_only:
+                yield from combination_pairs(cls.input_values)
+            else:
+                yield from (
+                    (a, b)
+                    for a in cls.input_values
+                    for b in cls.input_values
+                )
         else:
-            yield from (
-                (a, b)
-                for a in cls.input_values
-                for b in cls.input_values
-            )
-        yield from cls.input_cases
+            raise ValueError("Unsupported number of operands!")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
+        if cls.input_style not in cls.input_styles:
+            raise ValueError("Unknown input style!")
+        if cls.arity not in cls.arities:
+            raise ValueError("Unsupported number of operands!")
+        if cls.input_style == "arch_split":
+            test_objects = (cls(a, b, bits_in_limb=bil)
+                            for a, b in cls.get_value_pairs()
+                            for bil in cls.limb_sizes)
+            special_cases = (cls(*args, bits_in_limb=bil) # type: ignore
+                             for args in cls.input_cases
+                             for bil in cls.limb_sizes)
+        else:
+            test_objects = (cls(a, b)
+                            for a, b in cls.get_value_pairs())
+            special_cases = (cls(*args) for args in cls.input_cases)
+        yield from (valid_test_object.create_test_case()
+                    for valid_test_object in filter(
+                        lambda test_object: test_object.is_valid,
+                        chain(test_objects, special_cases)
+                        )
+                    )
+
+
+class ModOperationCommon(OperationCommon):
+    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
+    """Target for bignum mod_raw test case generation."""
+    moduli = MODULI_DEFAULT # type: List[str]
+
+    def __init__(self, val_n: str, val_a: str, val_b: str = "0",
+                 bits_in_limb: int = 64) -> None:
+        super().__init__(val_a=val_a, val_b=val_b, bits_in_limb=bits_in_limb)
+        self.val_n = val_n
+        # Setting the int versions here as opposed to making them @properties
+        # provides earlier/more robust input validation.
+        self.int_n = hex_to_int(val_n)
+
+    def to_montgomery(self, val: int) -> int:
+        return (val * self.r) % self.int_n
+
+    def from_montgomery(self, val: int) -> int:
+        return (val * self.r_inv) % self.int_n
+
+    @property
+    def boundary(self) -> int:
+        return self.int_n
+
+    @property
+    def arg_n(self) -> str:
+        return self.format_arg(self.val_n)
+
+    def arguments(self) -> List[str]:
+        return [quote_str(self.arg_n)] + super().arguments()
+
+    @property
+    def r(self) -> int: # pylint: disable=invalid-name
+        l = limbs_mpi(self.int_n, self.bits_in_limb)
+        return bound_mpi_limbs(l, self.bits_in_limb)
+
+    @property
+    def r_inv(self) -> int:
+        return invmod(self.r, self.int_n)
+
+    @property
+    def r2(self) -> int: # pylint: disable=invalid-name
+        return pow(self.r, 2)
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        if self.int_a >= self.int_n:
+            return False
+        if self.arity == 2 and self.int_b >= self.int_n:
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    def description(self) -> str:
+        """Generate a description for the test case.
+
+        It uses the form A `symbol` B mod N, where symbol is used to represent
+        the operation.
+        """
+
+        if not self.case_description:
+            return super().description() + " mod {:x}".format(self.int_n)
+        return super().description()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def input_cases_args(cls) -> Iterator[Tuple[Any, Any, Any]]:
+        if cls.arity == 1:
+            yield from ((n, a, "0") for a, n in cls.input_cases)
+        elif cls.arity == 2:
+            yield from ((n, a, b) for a, b, n in cls.input_cases)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("Unsupported number of operands!")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
+        if cls.input_style not in cls.input_styles:
+            raise ValueError("Unknown input style!")
+        if cls.arity not in cls.arities:
+            raise ValueError("Unsupported number of operands!")
+        if cls.input_style == "arch_split":
+            test_objects = (cls(n, a, b, bits_in_limb=bil)
+                            for n in cls.moduli
+                            for a, b in cls.get_value_pairs()
+                            for bil in cls.limb_sizes)
+            special_cases = (cls(*args, bits_in_limb=bil)
+                             for args in cls.input_cases_args()
+                             for bil in cls.limb_sizes)
+        else:
+            test_objects = (cls(n, a, b)
+                            for n in cls.moduli
+                            for a, b in cls.get_value_pairs())
+            special_cases = (cls(*args) for args in cls.input_cases_args())
+        yield from (valid_test_object.create_test_case()
+                    for valid_test_object in filter(
+                        lambda test_object: test_object.is_valid,
+                        chain(test_objects, special_cases)
+                        ))
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1
 
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py
index 0cc86b8..118a659 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py
@@ -16,20 +16,19 @@
 
 import random
 
-from abc import ABCMeta
 from typing import Dict, Iterator, List, Tuple
 
 from . import test_case
 from . import test_data_generation
 from . import bignum_common
 
-class BignumCoreTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
+class BignumCoreTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget):
+    #pylint: disable=abstract-method, too-few-public-methods
     """Target for bignum core test case generation."""
     target_basename = 'test_suite_bignum_core.generated'
 
 
-class BignumCoreShiftR(BignumCoreTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
+class BignumCoreShiftR(BignumCoreTarget, test_data_generation.BaseTest):
     """Test cases for mbedtls_bignum_core_shift_r()."""
     count = 0
     test_function = "mpi_core_shift_r"
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@
             for count in counts:
                 yield cls(input_hex, descr, count).create_test_case()
 
-class BignumCoreCTLookup(BignumCoreTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
+class BignumCoreCTLookup(BignumCoreTarget, test_data_generation.BaseTest):
     """Test cases for mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup()."""
     test_function = "mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup"
     test_name = "Constant time MPI table lookup"
@@ -107,104 +106,33 @@
                 yield (cls(bitsize, bitsize_description, window_size)
                        .create_test_case())
 
-class BignumCoreOperation(bignum_common.OperationCommon, BignumCoreTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
-    """Common features for bignum core operations."""
-    input_values = [
-        "0", "1", "3", "f", "fe", "ff", "100", "ff00", "fffe", "ffff", "10000",
-        "fffffffe", "ffffffff", "100000000", "1f7f7f7f7f7f7f",
-        "8000000000000000", "fefefefefefefefe", "fffffffffffffffe",
-        "ffffffffffffffff", "10000000000000000", "1234567890abcdef0",
-        "fffffffffffffffffefefefefefefefe", "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe",
-        "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "100000000000000000000000000000000",
-        "1234567890abcdef01234567890abcdef0",
-        "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefefefefefefefe",
-        "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe",
-        "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
-        "10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-        "1234567890abcdef01234567890abcdef01234567890abcdef01234567890abcdef0",
-        (
-            "4df72d07b4b71c8dacb6cffa954f8d88254b6277099308baf003fab73227f34029"
-            "643b5a263f66e0d3c3fa297ef71755efd53b8fb6cb812c6bbf7bcf179298bd9947"
-            "c4c8b14324140a2c0f5fad7958a69050a987a6096e9f055fb38edf0c5889eca4a0"
-            "cfa99b45fbdeee4c696b328ddceae4723945901ec025076b12b"
-        )
-    ]
 
-    def description(self) -> str:
-        """Generate a description for the test case.
-
-        If not set, case_description uses the form A `symbol` B, where symbol
-        is used to represent the operation. Descriptions of each value are
-        generated to provide some context to the test case.
-        """
-        if not self.case_description:
-            self.case_description = "{:x} {} {:x}".format(
-                self.int_a, self.symbol, self.int_b
-            )
-        return super().description()
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
-        for a_value, b_value in cls.get_value_pairs():
-            yield cls(a_value, b_value).create_test_case()
-
-
-class BignumCoreOperationArchSplit(BignumCoreOperation):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
-    """Common features for bignum core operations where the result depends on
-    the limb size."""
-
-    def __init__(self, val_a: str, val_b: str, bits_in_limb: int) -> None:
-        super().__init__(val_a, val_b)
-        bound_val = max(self.int_a, self.int_b)
-        self.bits_in_limb = bits_in_limb
-        self.bound = bignum_common.bound_mpi(bound_val, self.bits_in_limb)
-        limbs = bignum_common.limbs_mpi(bound_val, self.bits_in_limb)
-        byte_len = limbs * self.bits_in_limb // 8
-        self.hex_digits = 2 * byte_len
-        if self.bits_in_limb == 32:
-            self.dependencies = ["MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32"]
-        elif self.bits_in_limb == 64:
-            self.dependencies = ["MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64"]
-        else:
-            raise ValueError("Invalid number of bits in limb!")
-        self.arg_a = self.arg_a.zfill(self.hex_digits)
-        self.arg_b = self.arg_b.zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-    def pad_to_limbs(self, val) -> str:
-        return "{:x}".format(val).zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
-        for a_value, b_value in cls.get_value_pairs():
-            yield cls(a_value, b_value, 32).create_test_case()
-            yield cls(a_value, b_value, 64).create_test_case()
-
-class BignumCoreAddAndAddIf(BignumCoreOperationArchSplit):
+class BignumCoreAddAndAddIf(BignumCoreTarget, bignum_common.OperationCommon):
     """Test cases for bignum core add and add-if."""
     count = 0
     symbol = "+"
     test_function = "mpi_core_add_and_add_if"
     test_name = "mpi_core_add_and_add_if"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+    unique_combinations_only = True
 
     def result(self) -> List[str]:
         result = self.int_a + self.int_b
 
-        carry, result = divmod(result, self.bound)
+        carry, result = divmod(result, self.limb_boundary)
 
         return [
-            bignum_common.quote_str(self.pad_to_limbs(result)),
+            self.format_result(result),
             str(carry)
         ]
 
-class BignumCoreSub(BignumCoreOperation):
+
+class BignumCoreSub(BignumCoreTarget, bignum_common.OperationCommon):
     """Test cases for bignum core sub."""
     count = 0
     symbol = "-"
     test_function = "mpi_core_sub"
     test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_core_sub"
-    unique_combinations_only = False
 
     def result(self) -> List[str]:
         if self.int_a >= self.int_b:
@@ -224,12 +152,11 @@
         ]
 
 
-class BignumCoreMLA(BignumCoreOperation):
+class BignumCoreMLA(BignumCoreTarget, bignum_common.OperationCommon):
     """Test cases for fixed-size multiply accumulate."""
     count = 0
     test_function = "mpi_core_mla"
     test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_core_mla"
-    unique_combinations_only = False
 
     input_values = [
         "0", "1", "fffe", "ffffffff", "100000000", "20000000000000",
@@ -289,6 +216,16 @@
         ]
 
     @classmethod
+    def get_value_pairs(cls) -> Iterator[Tuple[str, str]]:
+        """Generator to yield pairs of inputs.
+
+        Combinations are first generated from all input values, and then
+        specific cases provided.
+        """
+        yield from super().get_value_pairs()
+        yield from cls.input_cases
+
+    @classmethod
     def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
         """Override for additional scalar input."""
         for a_value, b_value in cls.get_value_pairs():
@@ -297,7 +234,7 @@
                 yield cur_op.create_test_case()
 
 
-class BignumCoreMontmul(BignumCoreTarget):
+class BignumCoreMontmul(BignumCoreTarget, test_data_generation.BaseTest):
     """Test cases for Montgomery multiplication."""
     count = 0
     test_function = "mpi_core_montmul"
@@ -818,6 +755,34 @@
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1
 
+class BignumCoreExpMod(BignumCoreTarget, bignum_common.ModOperationCommon):
+    """Test cases for bignum core exponentiation."""
+    symbol = "^"
+    test_function = "mpi_core_exp_mod"
+    test_name = "Core modular exponentiation (Mongtomery form only)"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+
+    def arguments(self) -> List[str]:
+        # Input 'a' has to be given in Montgomery form
+        mont_a = self.to_montgomery(self.int_a)
+        arg_mont_a = self.format_arg('{:x}'.format(mont_a))
+        return [bignum_common.quote_str(n) for n in [self.arg_n,
+                                                     arg_mont_a,
+                                                     self.arg_b]
+               ] + self.result()
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        # Result has to be given in Montgomery form too
+        result = pow(self.int_a, self.int_b, self.int_n)
+        mont_result = self.to_montgomery(result)
+        return [self.format_result(mont_result)]
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        # The base needs to be canonical, but the exponent can be larger than
+        # the modulus (see for example exponent blinding)
+        return bool(self.int_a < self.int_n)
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 1
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2
@@ -826,6 +791,37 @@
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3
 
+class BignumCoreSubInt(BignumCoreTarget, bignum_common.OperationCommon):
+    """Test cases for bignum core sub int."""
+    count = 0
+    symbol = "-"
+    test_function = "mpi_core_sub_int"
+    test_name = "mpi_core_sub_int"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        # This is "sub int", so b is only one limb
+        if bignum_common.limbs_mpi(self.int_b, self.bits_in_limb) > 1:
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    # Overriding because we don't want leading zeros on b
+    @property
+    def arg_b(self) -> str:
+        return self.val_b
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = self.int_a - self.int_b
+
+        borrow, result = divmod(result, self.limb_boundary)
+
+        # Borrow will be -1 if non-zero, but we want it to be 1 in the test data
+        return [
+            self.format_result(result),
+            str(-borrow)
+        ]
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 3
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_data.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_data.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9658933
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_data.py
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""Base values and datasets for bignum generated tests and helper functions that
+produced them."""
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+import random
+
+# Functions calling these were used to produce test data and are here only for
+# reproducibility, they are not used by the test generation framework/classes
+try:
+    from Cryptodome.Util.number import isPrime, getPrime #type: ignore #pylint: disable=import-error
+except ImportError:
+    pass
+
+# Generated by bignum_common.gen_safe_prime(192,1)
+SAFE_PRIME_192_BIT_SEED_1 = "d1c127a667786703830500038ebaef20e5a3e2dc378fb75b"
+
+# First number generated by random.getrandbits(192) - seed(2,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO1 = "177219d30e7a269fd95bafc8f2a4d27bdcf4bb99f4bea973"
+
+# Second number generated by random.getrandbits(192) - seed(2,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO2 = "cf1822ffbc6887782b491044d5e341245c6e433715ba2bdd"
+
+# Third number generated by random.getrandbits(192) - seed(2,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO3 = "3653f8dd9b1f282e4067c3584ee207f8da94e3e8ab73738f"
+
+# Fourth number generated by random.getrandbits(192) - seed(2,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO4 = "ffed9235288bc781ae66267594c9c9500925e4749b575bd1"
+
+# Ninth number generated by random.getrandbits(192) - seed(2,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO9 = "2a1be9cd8697bbd0e2520e33e44c50556c71c4a66148a86f"
+
+# Generated by bignum_common.gen_safe_prime(1024,3)
+SAFE_PRIME_1024_BIT_SEED_3 = ("c93ba7ec74d96f411ba008bdb78e63ff11bb5df46a51e16b"
+                              "2c9d156f8e4e18abf5e052cb01f47d0d1925a77f60991577"
+                              "e128fb6f52f34a27950a594baadd3d8057abeb222cf3cca9"
+                              "62db16abf79f2ada5bd29ab2f51244bf295eff9f6aaba130"
+                              "2efc449b128be75eeaca04bc3c1a155d11d14e8be32a2c82"
+                              "87b3996cf6ad5223")
+
+# First number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(4,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO1 = ("6905269ed6f0b09f165c8ce36e2f24b43000de01b2ed40ed"
+                              "3addccb2c33be0ac79d679346d4ac7a5c3902b38963dc6e8"
+                              "534f45738d048ec0f1099c6c3e1b258fd724452ccea71ff4"
+                              "a14876aeaff1a098ca5996666ceab360512bd13110722311"
+                              "710cf5327ac435a7a97c643656412a9b8a1abcd1a6916c74"
+                              "da4f9fc3c6da5d7")
+
+# Second number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(4,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO2 = ("f1cfd99216df648647adec26793d0e453f5082492d83a823"
+                              "3fb62d2c81862fc9634f806fabf4a07c566002249b191bf4"
+                              "d8441b5616332aca5f552773e14b0190d93936e1daca3c06"
+                              "f5ff0c03bb5d7385de08caa1a08179104a25e4664f5253a0"
+                              "2a3187853184ff27459142deccea264542a00403ce80c4b0"
+                              "a4042bb3d4341aad")
+
+# Third number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(4,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO3 = ("14c15c910b11ad28cc21ce88d0060cc54278c2614e1bcb38"
+                              "3bb4a570294c4ea3738d243a6e58d5ca49c7b59b995253fd"
+                              "6c79a3de69f85e3131f3b9238224b122c3e4a892d9196ada"
+                              "4fcfa583e1df8af9b474c7e89286a1754abcb06ae8abb93f"
+                              "01d89a024cdce7a6d7288ff68c320f89f1347e0cdd905ecf"
+                              "d160c5d0ef412ed6")
+
+# Fourth number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(4,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO4 = ("32decd6b8efbc170a26a25c852175b7a96b98b5fbf37a2be"
+                              "6f98bca35b17b9662f0733c846bbe9e870ef55b1a1f65507"
+                              "a2909cb633e238b4e9dd38b869ace91311021c9e32111ac1"
+                              "ac7cc4a4ff4dab102522d53857c49391b36cc9aa78a330a1"
+                              "a5e333cb88dcf94384d4cd1f47ca7883ff5a52f1a05885ac"
+                              "7671863c0bdbc23a")
+
+# Fifth number generated by random.getrandbits(1024) - seed(4,2), not a prime
+RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO5 = ("53be4721f5b9e1f5acdac615bc20f6264922b9ccf469aef8"
+                              "f6e7d078e55b85dd1525f363b281b8885b69dc230af5ac87"
+                              "0692b534758240df4a7a03052d733dcdef40af2e54c0ce68"
+                              "1f44ebd13cc75f3edcb285f89d8cf4d4950b16ffc3e1ac3b"
+                              "4708d9893a973000b54a23020fc5b043d6e4a51519d9c9cc"
+                              "52d32377e78131c1")
+
+# Adding 192 bit and 1024 bit numbers because these are the shortest required
+# for ECC and RSA respectively.
+INPUTS_DEFAULT = [
+        "0", "1", # corner cases
+        "2", "3", # small primes
+        "4",      # non-prime even
+        "38",     # small random
+        SAFE_PRIME_192_BIT_SEED_1,  # prime
+        RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO1,  # not a prime
+        RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO2,  # not a prime
+        SAFE_PRIME_1024_BIT_SEED_3, # prime
+        RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO1, # not a prime
+        RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO3, # not a prime
+        RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO2, # largest (not a prime)
+        ]
+
+# Only odd moduli are present as in the new bignum code only odd moduli are
+# supported for now.
+MODULI_DEFAULT = [
+        "53", # safe prime
+        "45", # non-prime
+        SAFE_PRIME_192_BIT_SEED_1,  # safe prime
+        RANDOM_192_BIT_SEED_2_NO4,  # not a prime
+        SAFE_PRIME_1024_BIT_SEED_3, # safe prime
+        RANDOM_1024_BIT_SEED_4_NO5, # not a prime
+        ]
+
+# Some functions, e.g. mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(), only support prime moduli.
+ONLY_PRIME_MODULI = [
+        "53", # safe prime
+        "8ac72304057392b5",     # 9999999997777777333 (longer, not safe, prime)
+        SAFE_PRIME_192_BIT_SEED_1,  # safe prime
+        SAFE_PRIME_1024_BIT_SEED_3, # safe prime
+        ]
+
+def __gen_safe_prime(bits, seed):
+    '''
+    Generate a safe prime.
+
+    This function is intended for generating constants offline and shouldn't be
+    used in test generation classes.
+
+    Requires pycryptodomex for getPrime and isPrime and python 3.9 or later for
+    randbytes.
+    '''
+    rng = random.Random()
+    # We want reproducibility across python versions
+    rng.seed(seed, version=2)
+    while True:
+        prime = 2*getPrime(bits-1, rng.randbytes)+1 #pylint: disable=no-member
+        if isPrime(prime, 1e-30):
+            return prime
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py
index 2bd7fbb..aa06fe8 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py
@@ -14,12 +14,13 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 
-from abc import ABCMeta
+from typing import Dict, List # pylint: disable=unused-import
 
 from . import test_data_generation
+from . import bignum_common # pylint: disable=unused-import
 
-class BignumModTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
+class BignumModTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget):
+    #pylint: disable=abstract-method, too-few-public-methods
     """Target for bignum mod test case generation."""
     target_basename = 'test_suite_bignum_mod.generated'
 
@@ -33,6 +34,20 @@
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3
 
+class BignumModSub(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon, BignumModTarget):
+    """Test cases for bignum mpi_mod_sub()."""
+    symbol = "-"
+    test_function = "mpi_mod_sub"
+    test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+    arity = 2
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = (self.int_a - self.int_b) % self.int_n
+        # To make negative tests easier, append 0 for success to the
+        # generated cases
+        return [self.format_result(result), "0"]
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 3
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
index bd694a6..6fc4c91 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
@@ -14,99 +14,74 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 
-from abc import ABCMeta
-from typing import Dict, Iterator, List
+from typing import Dict, List
 
-from . import test_case
 from . import test_data_generation
 from . import bignum_common
+from .bignum_data import ONLY_PRIME_MODULI
 
-class BignumModRawTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
+class BignumModRawTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget):
+    #pylint: disable=abstract-method, too-few-public-methods
     """Target for bignum mod_raw test case generation."""
     target_basename = 'test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.generated'
 
-class BignumModRawOperation(bignum_common.OperationCommon, BignumModRawTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
-    """Target for bignum mod_raw test case generation."""
-
-    def __init__(self, val_n: str, val_a: str, val_b: str = "0", bits_in_limb: int = 64) -> None:
-        super().__init__(val_a=val_a, val_b=val_b)
-        self.val_n = val_n
-        self.bits_in_limb = bits_in_limb
-
-    @property
-    def int_n(self) -> int:
-        return bignum_common.hex_to_int(self.val_n)
-
-    @property
-    def boundary(self) -> int:
-        data_in = [self.int_a, self.int_b, self.int_n]
-        return max([n for n in data_in if n is not None])
-
-    @property
-    def limbs(self) -> int:
-        return bignum_common.limbs_mpi(self.boundary, self.bits_in_limb)
-
-    @property
-    def hex_digits(self) -> int:
-        return 2 * (self.limbs * self.bits_in_limb // 8)
-
-    @property
-    def hex_n(self) -> str:
-        return "{:x}".format(self.int_n).zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-    @property
-    def hex_a(self) -> str:
-        return "{:x}".format(self.int_a).zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-    @property
-    def hex_b(self) -> str:
-        return "{:x}".format(self.int_b).zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-    @property
-    def r(self) -> int: # pylint: disable=invalid-name
-        l = bignum_common.limbs_mpi(self.int_n, self.bits_in_limb)
-        return bignum_common.bound_mpi_limbs(l, self.bits_in_limb)
-
-    @property
-    def r_inv(self) -> int:
-        return bignum_common.invmod(self.r, self.int_n)
-
-    @property
-    def r2(self) -> int: # pylint: disable=invalid-name
-        return pow(self.r, 2)
-
-class BignumModRawOperationArchSplit(BignumModRawOperation):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
-    """Common features for bignum mod raw operations where the result depends on
-    the limb size."""
-
-    limb_sizes = [32, 64] # type: List[int]
-
-    def __init__(self, val_n: str, val_a: str, val_b: str = "0", bits_in_limb: int = 64) -> None:
-        super().__init__(val_n=val_n, val_a=val_a, val_b=val_b, bits_in_limb=bits_in_limb)
-
-        if bits_in_limb not in self.limb_sizes:
-            raise ValueError("Invalid number of bits in limb!")
-
-        self.dependencies = ["MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT{:d}".format(bits_in_limb)]
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
-        for a_value, b_value in cls.get_value_pairs():
-            for bil in cls.limb_sizes:
-                yield cls(a_value, b_value, bits_in_limb=bil).create_test_case()
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1
 
 # END MERGE SLOT 1
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2
 
+class BignumModRawSub(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                      BignumModRawTarget):
+    """Test cases for bignum mpi_mod_raw_sub()."""
+    symbol = "-"
+    test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_sub"
+    test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+    arity = 2
+
+    def arguments(self) -> List[str]:
+        return [bignum_common.quote_str(n) for n in [self.arg_a,
+                                                     self.arg_b,
+                                                     self.arg_n]
+               ] + self.result()
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = (self.int_a - self.int_b) % self.int_n
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 2
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3
 
+class BignumModRawInvPrime(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                           BignumModRawTarget):
+    """Test cases for bignum mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()."""
+    moduli = ONLY_PRIME_MODULI
+    symbol = "^ -1"
+    test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime"
+    test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime (Montgomery form only)"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+    arity = 1
+    suffix = True
+
+    @property
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        return self.int_a > 0 and self.int_a < self.int_n
+
+    @property
+    def arg_a(self) -> str:
+        # Input has to be given in Montgomery form
+        mont_a = self.to_montgomery(self.int_a)
+        return self.format_arg('{:x}'.format(mont_a))
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = bignum_common.invmod(self.int_a, self.int_n)
+        if result < 0:
+            result += self.int_n
+        mont_result = self.to_montgomery(result)
+        return [self.format_result(mont_result)]
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 3
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4
@@ -115,6 +90,19 @@
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 5
 
+class BignumModRawAdd(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                      BignumModRawTarget):
+    """Test cases for bignum mpi_mod_raw_add()."""
+    symbol = "+"
+    test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_add"
+    test_name = "mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add"
+    input_style = "fixed"
+    arity = 2
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = (self.int_a + self.int_b) % self.int_n
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 5
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 6
@@ -122,126 +110,45 @@
 # END MERGE SLOT 6
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 7
-class BignumModRawConvertToMont(BignumModRawOperationArchSplit):
-    """ Test cases for mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(). """
 
+class BignumModRawConvertToMont(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                                BignumModRawTarget):
+    """ Test cases for mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(). """
     test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep"
     test_name = "Convert into Mont: "
-
-    test_data_moduli = ["b",
-                        "fd",
-                        "eeff99aa37",
-                        "eeff99aa11",
-                        "800000000005",
-                        "7fffffffffffffff",
-                        "80fe000a10000001",
-                        "25a55a46e5da99c71c7",
-                        "1058ad82120c3a10196bb36229c1",
-                        "7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f"
-                        "18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a"
-                        "98df75154f8c914a282f8b",
-                        "8335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63",
-                        "ffcece570f2f991013f26dd5b03c4c5b65f97be5905f36cb4664f"
-                        "2c78ff80aa8135a4aaf57ccb8a0aca2f394909a74cef1ef6758a6"
-                        "4d11e2c149c393659d124bfc94196f0ce88f7d7d567efa5a649e2"
-                        "deefaa6e10fdc3deac60d606bf63fc540ac95294347031aefd73d"
-                        "6a9ee10188aaeb7a90d920894553cb196881691cadc51808715a0"
-                        "7e8b24fcb1a63df047c7cdf084dd177ba368c806f3d51ddb5d389"
-                        "8c863e687ecaf7d649a57a46264a582f94d3c8f2edaf59f77a7f6"
-                        "bdaf83c991e8f06abe220ec8507386fce8c3da84c6c3903ab8f3a"
-                        "d4630a204196a7dbcbd9bcca4e40ec5cc5c09938d49f5e1e6181d"
-                        "b8896f33bb12e6ef73f12ec5c5ea7a8a337"
-                        ]
-
-    test_input_numbers = ["0",
-                          "1",
-                          "97",
-                          "f5",
-                          "6f5c3",
-                          "745bfe50f7",
-                          "ffa1f9924123",
-                          "334a8b983c79bd",
-                          "5b84f632b58f3461",
-                          "19acd15bc38008e1",
-                          "ffffffffffffffff",
-                          "54ce6a6bb8247fa0427cfc75a6b0599",
-                          "fecafe8eca052f154ce6a6bb8247fa019558bfeecce9bb9",
-                          "a87d7a56fa4bfdc7da42ef798b9cf6843d4c54794698cb14d72"
-                          "851dec9586a319f4bb6d5695acbd7c92e7a42a5ede6972adcbc"
-                          "f68425265887f2d721f462b7f1b91531bac29fa648facb8e3c6"
-                          "1bd5ae42d5a59ba1c89a95897bfe541a8ce1d633b98f379c481"
-                          "6f25e21f6ac49286b261adb4b78274fe5f61c187581f213e84b"
-                          "2a821e341ef956ecd5de89e6c1a35418cd74a549379d2d4594a"
-                          "577543147f8e35b3514e62cf3e89d1156cdc91ab5f4c928fbd6"
-                          "9148c35df5962fed381f4d8a62852a36823d5425f7487c13a12"
-                          "523473fb823aa9d6ea5f42e794e15f2c1a8785cf6b7d51a4617"
-                          "947fb3baf674f74a673cf1d38126983a19ed52c7439fab42c2185"
-                          ]
-
-    descr_tpl = '{} #{} N: \"{}\" A: \"{}\".'
+    symbol = "R *"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+    arity = 1
 
     def result(self) -> List[str]:
-        return [self.hex_x]
+        result = self.to_montgomery(self.int_a)
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
 
-    def arguments(self) -> List[str]:
-        return [bignum_common.quote_str(n) for n in [self.hex_n,
-                                                     self.hex_a,
-                                                     self.hex_x]]
-
-    def description(self) -> str:
-        return self.descr_tpl.format(self.test_name,
-                                     self.count,
-                                     self.int_n,
-                                     self.int_a)
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
-        for bil in [32, 64]:
-            for n in cls.test_data_moduli:
-                for i in cls.test_input_numbers:
-                    # Skip invalid combinations where A.limbs > N.limbs
-                    if bignum_common.hex_to_int(i) > bignum_common.hex_to_int(n):
-                        continue
-                    yield cls(n, i, bits_in_limb=bil).create_test_case()
-
-    @property
-    def x(self) -> int: # pylint: disable=invalid-name
-        return (self.int_a * self.r) % self.int_n
-
-    @property
-    def hex_x(self) -> str:
-        return "{:x}".format(self.x).zfill(self.hex_digits)
-
-class BignumModRawConvertFromMont(BignumModRawConvertToMont):
+class BignumModRawConvertFromMont(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                                  BignumModRawTarget):
     """ Test cases for mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(). """
-
     test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep"
     test_name = "Convert from Mont: "
+    symbol = "1/R *"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+    arity = 1
 
-    test_input_numbers = ["0",
-                          "1",
-                          "3ca",
-                          "539ed428",
-                          "7dfe5c6beb35a2d6",
-                          "dca8de1c2adfc6d7aafb9b48e",
-                          "a7d17b6c4be72f3d5c16bf9c1af6fc933",
-                          "2fec97beec546f9553142ed52f147845463f579",
-                          "378dc83b8bc5a7b62cba495af4919578dce6d4f175cadc4f",
-                          "b6415f2a1a8e48a518345db11f56db3829c8f2c6415ab4a395a"
-                          "b3ac2ea4cbef4af86eb18a84eb6ded4c6ecbfc4b59c2879a675"
-                          "487f687adea9d197a84a5242a5cf6125ce19a6ad2e7341f1c57"
-                          "d43ea4f4c852a51cb63dabcd1c9de2b827a3146a3d175b35bea"
-                          "41ae75d2a286a3e9d43623152ac513dcdea1d72a7da846a8ab3"
-                          "58d9be4926c79cfb287cf1cf25b689de3b912176be5dcaf4d4c"
-                          "6e7cb839a4a3243a6c47c1e2c99d65c59d6fa3672575c2f1ca8"
-                          "de6a32e854ec9d8ec635c96af7679fce26d7d159e4a9da3bd74"
-                          "e1272c376cd926d74fe3fb164a5935cff3d5cdb92b35fe2cea32"
-                          "138a7e6bfbc319ebd1725dacb9a359cbf693f2ecb785efb9d627"
-                         ]
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = self.from_montgomery(self.int_a)
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
 
-    @property
-    def x(self): # pylint: disable=invalid-name
-        return (self.int_a * self.r_inv) % self.int_n
+class BignumModRawModNegate(bignum_common.ModOperationCommon,
+                            BignumModRawTarget):
+    """ Test cases for mpi_mod_raw_neg(). """
+    test_function = "mpi_mod_raw_neg"
+    test_name = "Modular negation: "
+    symbol = "-"
+    input_style = "arch_split"
+    arity = 1
+
+    def result(self) -> List[str]:
+        result = (self.int_n - self.int_a) % self.int_n
+        return [self.format_result(result)]
 # END MERGE SLOT 7
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8
diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
index eec0f9d..02aa510 100644
--- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
+++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 import os
 import posixpath
 import re
+import inspect
 
 from abc import ABCMeta, abstractmethod
 from typing import Callable, Dict, Iterable, Iterator, List, Type, TypeVar
@@ -35,12 +36,8 @@
 T = TypeVar('T') #pylint: disable=invalid-name
 
 
-class BaseTarget(metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    """Base target for test case generation.
-
-    Child classes of this class represent an output file, and can be referred
-    to as file targets. These indicate where test cases will be written to for
-    all subclasses of the file target, which is set by `target_basename`.
+class BaseTest(metaclass=ABCMeta):
+    """Base class for test case generation.
 
     Attributes:
         count: Counter for test cases from this class.
@@ -48,8 +45,6 @@
             automatically generated using the class, or manually set.
         dependencies: A list of dependencies required for the test case.
         show_test_count: Toggle for inclusion of `count` in the test description.
-        target_basename: Basename of file to write generated tests to. This
-            should be specified in a child class of BaseTarget.
         test_function: Test function which the class generates cases for.
         test_name: A common name or description of the test function. This can
             be `test_function`, a clearer equivalent, or a short summary of the
@@ -59,7 +54,6 @@
     case_description = ""
     dependencies = [] # type: List[str]
     show_test_count = True
-    target_basename = ""
     test_function = ""
     test_name = ""
 
@@ -121,6 +115,21 @@
         """
         raise NotImplementedError
 
+
+class BaseTarget:
+    #pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
+    """Base target for test case generation.
+
+    Child classes of this class represent an output file, and can be referred
+    to as file targets. These indicate where test cases will be written to for
+    all subclasses of the file target, which is set by `target_basename`.
+
+    Attributes:
+        target_basename: Basename of file to write generated tests to. This
+            should be specified in a child class of BaseTarget.
+    """
+    target_basename = ""
+
     @classmethod
     def generate_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
         """Generate test cases for the class and its subclasses.
@@ -132,7 +141,8 @@
         yield from `generate_tests()` in each. Calling this method on a class X
         will yield test cases from all classes derived from X.
         """
-        if cls.test_function:
+        if issubclass(cls, BaseTest) and not inspect.isabstract(cls):
+            #pylint: disable=no-member
             yield from cls.generate_function_tests()
         for subclass in sorted(cls.__subclasses__(), key=lambda c: c.__name__):
             yield from subclass.generate_tests()
diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index c23cb6b..71dd70b 100644
--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
+            ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
             ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
     )
@@ -106,6 +108,10 @@
 # the risk of a race.
 add_custom_target(test_suite_bignum_generated_data DEPENDS ${bignum_generated_data_files})
 add_custom_target(test_suite_psa_generated_data DEPENDS ${psa_generated_data_files})
+# If SKIP_TEST_SUITES is not defined with -D, get it from the environment.
+if((NOT DEFINED SKIP_TEST_SUITES) AND (DEFINED ENV{SKIP_TEST_SUITES}))
+    set(SKIP_TEST_SUITES $ENV{SKIP_TEST_SUITES})
+endif()
 # Test suites caught by SKIP_TEST_SUITES are built but not executed.
 # "foo" as a skip pattern skips "test_suite_foo" and "test_suite_foo.bar"
 # but not "test_suite_foobar".
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index 7c08f54..2d2d70a 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@
 generated_bignum_test_data: scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
 generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_common.py
 generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_core.py
+generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod_raw.py
+generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/bignum_mod.py
 generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_case.py
 generated_bignum_test_data: ../scripts/mbedtls_dev/test_data_generation.py
 generated_bignum_test_data:
diff --git a/tests/compat.sh b/tests/compat.sh
index d681217..529c2c5 100755
--- a/tests/compat.sh
+++ b/tests/compat.sh
@@ -595,6 +595,20 @@
     G_CLIENT_ARGS="-p $PORT --debug 3 $G_MODE"
     G_CLIENT_PRIO="NONE:$G_PRIO_MODE:+COMP-NULL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL"
 
+    # Newer versions of OpenSSL have a syntax to enable all "ciphers", even
+    # low-security ones. This covers not just cipher suites but also protocol
+    # versions. It is necessary, for example, to use (D)TLS 1.0/1.1 on
+    # OpenSSL 1.1.1f from Ubuntu 20.04. The syntax was only introduced in
+    # OpenSSL 1.1.0 (21e0c1d23afff48601eb93135defddae51f7e2e3) and I can't find
+    # a way to discover it from -help, so check the openssl version.
+    case $($OPENSSL_CMD version) in
+        "OpenSSL 0"*|"OpenSSL 1.0"*) :;;
+        *)
+            O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
+            O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
+            ;;
+    esac
+
     if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ];
     then
         M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required"
diff --git a/tests/configs/tls13-only.h b/tests/configs/tls13-only.h
index 7483f1c..963086f 100644
--- a/tests/configs/tls13-only.h
+++ b/tests/configs/tls13-only.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
 #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
 #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
 
 /* Enable some invasive tests */
 #define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS
diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile
index d4f2011..388b0ce 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/Makefile
+++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
 	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS non-printable othername SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions nonprintable_othername_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@
 
 server5-unsupported_othername.crt: server5.key
-	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS unsupported othername SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions unsupoported_othername_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@
+	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS unsupported othername SAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions unsupported_othername_san -days 3650 -sha256 -key $< -out $@
 
 server5-fan.crt: server5.key
 	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -new -subj "/C=UK/O=Mbed TLS/CN=Mbed TLS FAN" -set_serial 77 -config $(test_ca_config_file) -extensions fan_cert -days 3650 -sha256 -key server5.key -out $@
@@ -1139,6 +1139,108 @@
 all_final += ecdsa_secp521r1.crt ecdsa_secp521r1.key
 tls13_certs: ecdsa_secp521r1.crt ecdsa_secp521r1.key
 
+# PKCS7 test data
+pkcs7_test_cert_1 = pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
+pkcs7_test_cert_2 = pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt
+pkcs7_test_file = pkcs7_data.bin
+
+$(pkcs7_test_file):
+	echo -e "Hello\xd" > $@
+all_final += $(pkcs7_test_file)
+
+pkcs7_data_1.bin:
+	echo -e "2\xd" > $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_1.bin
+
+# Generate signing cert
+pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt:
+	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -subj="/C=NL/O=PKCS7/CN=PKCS7 Cert 1" -sha256 -nodes -days 365  -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key -out pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
+	cat pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key > pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem
+all_final += pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
+
+pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt:
+	$(OPENSSL) req -x509 -subj="/C=NL/O=PKCS7/CN=PKCS7 Cert 2" -sha256 -nodes -days 365  -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.key -out pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt
+	cat pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.key > pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem
+all_final += pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt
+
+# Convert signing certs to DER for testing PEM-free builds
+pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der: $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) x509 -in pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt -out $@ -outform DER
+all_final += pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der
+
+pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der: $(pkcs7_test_cert_2)
+	$(OPENSSL) x509 -in pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt -out $@ -outform DER
+all_final += pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with CERT
+pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha256 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with CERT and sha1
+pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha1 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with CERT and sha512
+pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha512 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file without CERT
+pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha256 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -nocerts -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with multiple signers
+pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1) $(pkcs7_test_cert_2)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha256 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem -nocerts -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with multiple certificates
+pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1) $(pkcs7_test_cert_2)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -sign -binary -in pkcs7_data.bin -out $@ -md sha256 -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem -signer pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem -noattr -outform DER -out $@
+all_final += pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with corrupted CERT
+pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	cp pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der $@
+	echo -en '\xa1' | dd of=$@ bs=1 seek=547 conv=notrunc
+all_final += pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file with corrupted signer info
+pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	cp pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der $@
+	echo -en '\xa1' | dd of=$@ bs=1 seek=918 conv=notrunc
+all_final += pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der
+
+# pkcs7 file with version 2
+pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	cp pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der $@
+	echo -en '\x02' | dd of=$@ bs=1 seek=25 conv=notrunc
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der
+
+pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der: $(pkcs7_test_file) $(pkcs7_test_cert_1)
+	$(OPENSSL) smime -encrypt -aes256 -in pkcs7_data.bin -binary -outform DER -out $@ pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der
+
+## Negative tests
+# For some interesting sizes, what happens if we make them off-by-one?
+pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	cp $< $@
+	echo -en '\x35' | dd of=$@ seek=919 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+all_final += pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der
+
+pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	cp $< $@
+	echo -en '\x15' | dd of=$@ seek=973 bs=1 conv=notrunc
+all_final += pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der
+
+# pkcs7 signature file just with signed data
+pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der: pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
+	dd if=pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der of=$@ skip=19 bs=1
+all_final += pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der
+
 ################################################################
 #### Diffie-Hellman parameters
 ################################################################
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e461cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d799ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e31159d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.key
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3795b71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+NcyG4zEy/srLhtiIFnu8Fo40+hFzL/nlX6JBMc3KHJa1Hy43krF+ET6d5gAffndd
+moDKxbzgFksRHPuHhCobSucuHpJq6RjYdvDcJYS7OwxXVRi9+KFcZE52RaBQdWGv
+qQTvr7RrMDoa5dN3B8TVgpGT2JBTN02JXjKKo7zkiQKBgCZwKDiXl7qsGidvlFZc
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+LrS/V2yBrDJVczQQM4psonLF
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0df7d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDSTCCAjGgAwIBAgIUVk1VQCWvWZ4ycHmycg7wDfN8+3wwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
+BQAwNDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxDjAMBgNVBAoMBVBLQ1M3MRUwEwYDVQQDDAxQS0NT
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+MBaAFI5FVrtfLwPXRERcyVX6qBVvfoduMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZI
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+q1UH9CIMMAd6Kb0kh5GlJT2shg/EAYWoitMwntkeRYTln2k2/B5jux+U5Ph4HyC+
+ad2GqmsoXWDru79rltT7Pv1hS1ofJyQ4Jv88vQA/SuIIRGdTC24VAVgg00JxvDRB
+xeqsQ9Pld4ebg4VvqsInnSpmKCcxfWxFhJk/Ax8bK/tV/GnrPiwsvry1j9nZyebS
+IyI01/6DwJS2ZhFnsLGyPHFOAFNtomjIdQ6gf2L1wq0qiGOKj/K9IzFNCpCz82a+
+gMgqFzCT5TCZC16kUG2NA2pXAx9O4uppKjRk97U=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc7a3ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.key b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..659c015
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.key
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDJlTWWdP6nE/of
+5VTTvoD+uZREU07nUNeYfEEy42ioceUkky57lIQ9Iy20fp4PDzKnSfHj5GRIdfu5
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+IyQDJH6+gYNYnnCtwJZxCOBdAbEHwuXYAOEHHtqJL3E7oWILx7S2flDeHGudCsNK
+OLuRWHZfPSgwhOMzafDGmsRgvN8XDOAPV6ox8me2tsLwAk5Zi0NqvxPkTf/ExxHp
+eGPsr/NlI49i6qhGgNOnb0nTj3Whs/Y1GWrqgcO03Lhhlc667GdIP7B1yp4PU6aX
+oQFfx6yVAgMBAAECggEBAMVHm3w134qQCHfyroPTqtaftDTx+wRyn6yB3iT5XdGM
+NZ8H07Pp80kKBo7gY7uFOiNyQKKxQFuR69sPWc3+LI3YzC8IpGslhUfHdjN46gn7
+73hfAVgnf/4qmlEq0cRUOAY/hIUMjUhNhglB9tqEeu3iPjMaTFgfZJwW/czH/QMD
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+i5TsS+pZQyp+mTvyCI3A1hkr2Vw5tULWO8SPhuEQkdtC/CL+luCUO7L16lU6KhFB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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b11a00a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data.bin b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data.bin
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40ee264
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data.bin
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Hello
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_1.bin b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_1.bin
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78c6bae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_1.bin
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+2
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7b1c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb1deb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dc2f4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4aa587
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f4cb04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb7d751
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a237e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..095b80c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed00f65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa5447c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b47fe92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-leak-fuzz_pkcs7-4541044530479104.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-leak-fuzz_pkcs7-4541044530479104.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51aef0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-leak-fuzz_pkcs7-4541044530479104.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-missing_free-fuzz_pkcs7-6213931373035520.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-missing_free-fuzz_pkcs7-6213931373035520.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce4fb3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-missing_free-fuzz_pkcs7-6213931373035520.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..898ca67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4b4e38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der
Binary files differ
diff --git a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
index 3bb2379..b2c2fa1 100644
--- a/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
+++ b/tests/data_files/test-ca.opensslconf
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 [nonprintable_othername_san]
 subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:nonprintable_hw_module_name
 
-[unsupoported_othername_san]
+[unsupported_othername_san]
 subjectAltName=otherName:1.2.3.4;UTF8:some other identifier
 
 [dns_alt_names]
diff --git a/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h b/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h
index 9626af9..f3d676e 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/constant_flow.h
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@
  * This file contains two implementations: one based on MemorySanitizer, the
  * other on valgrind's memcheck. If none of them is enabled, dummy macros that
  * do nothing are defined for convenience.
+ *
+ * \note #TEST_CF_SECRET must be called directly from within a .function file,
+ *       not indirectly via a macro defined under tests/include or a function
+ *       under tests/src. This is because we only run Valgrind for constant
+ *       flow on test suites that have greppable annotations inside them (see
+ *       `skip_suites_without_constant_flow` in `tests/scripts/all.sh`).
  */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
index 0bbca4a..fbfe8da 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h
@@ -54,6 +54,14 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)
+#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5)
 #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5
@@ -202,7 +210,6 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
@@ -215,6 +222,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
@@ -229,6 +237,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
 #endif
+#endif
 
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_agreement.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_agreement.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f28cef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_agreement.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Test driver for key agreement functions.
+ */
+/*  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_AGREEMENT_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_AGREEMENT_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* If non-null, on success, copy this to the output. */
+    void *forced_output;
+    size_t forced_output_length;
+    /* If not PSA_SUCCESS, return this error code instead of processing the
+     * function call. */
+    psa_status_t forced_status;
+    /* Count the amount of times one of the signature driver functions is called. */
+    unsigned long hits;
+} mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_AGREEMENT_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }
+static inline mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_t
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_init( void )
+{
+    const mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_t
+        v = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_AGREEMENT_INIT;
+    return( v );
+}
+
+extern mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_t
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks;
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length );
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length );
+
+#endif /*PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVERS_KEY_AGREEMENT_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
index b3c29e4..0a65b40 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/test_driver.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include "test/drivers/key_management.h"
 #include "test/drivers/signature.h"
 #include "test/drivers/asymmetric_encryption.h"
+#include "test/drivers/key_agreement.h"
 
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_H */
diff --git a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
index bc2b016..3542950 100644
--- a/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
+++ b/tests/include/test/psa_crypto_helpers.h
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
  *
  * Do a key policy permission extension on key usage policies always involves
  * permissions of other usage policies
- * (like PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH involves PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSGAE).
+ * (like PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH involves PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE).
  */
 psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_test_update_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t usage_flags );
 
diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
index edece45..ed42848 100755
--- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
+++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
             -c "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension received." \
             -c "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \
             -c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension received." \
-            -c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension ( ignored )." \
+            -c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \
             -s "Parsing extension 'Early Data/42' (0 bytes)" \
             -s "Sending extension Early Data/42 (0 bytes)" \
             -s "early data accepted"
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@
             -C "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension received." \
             -c "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension does not exist." \
             -C "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension received." \
-            -C "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension ( ignored )."
+            -C "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists."
 
 #TODO: OpenSSL tests don't work now. It might be openssl options issue, cause GnuTLS has worked.
 skip_next_test
diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh
index 8272dcc..db46b03 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/all.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@
     export CTEST_OUTPUT_ON_FAILURE=1
 
     # CFLAGS and LDFLAGS for Asan builds that don't use CMake
-    ASAN_CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all'
+    # default to -O2, use -Ox _after_ this if you want another level
+    ASAN_CFLAGS='-O2 -Werror -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all'
 
     # Gather the list of available components. These are the functions
     # defined in this script whose name starts with "component_".
@@ -1217,6 +1218,7 @@
     # Direct dependencies
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
     # Indirect dependencies
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
     make
@@ -1245,6 +1247,7 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
@@ -1437,6 +1440,31 @@
     tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "TLS 1.2"
 }
 
+# We're not aware of any other (open source) implementation of EC J-PAKE in TLS
+# that we could use for interop testing. However, we now have sort of two
+# implementations ourselves: one using PSA, the other not. At least test that
+# these two interoperate with each other.
+component_test_tls1_2_ecjpake_compatibility() {
+    msg "build: TLS1.2 server+client w/ EC-JPAKE w/o USE_PSA"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
+    make -C programs ssl/ssl_server2 ssl/ssl_client2
+    cp programs/ssl/ssl_server2 s2_no_use_psa
+    cp programs/ssl/ssl_client2 c2_no_use_psa
+
+    msg "build: TLS1.2 server+client w/ EC-JPAKE w/ USE_PSA"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+    make clean
+    make -C programs ssl/ssl_server2 ssl/ssl_client2
+    make -C programs test/udp_proxy test/query_compile_time_config
+
+    msg "test: server w/o USE_PSA - client w/ USE_PSA"
+    P_SRV=../s2_no_use_psa tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECJPAKE
+    msg "test: client w/o USE_PSA - server w/ USE_PSA"
+    P_CLI=../c2_no_use_psa tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECJPAKE
+
+    rm s2_no_use_psa c2_no_use_psa
+}
+
 component_test_psa_external_rng_use_psa_crypto () {
     msg "build: full + PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + USE_PSA_CRYPTO minus CTR_DRBG"
     scripts/config.py full
@@ -1564,6 +1592,17 @@
     env OPENSSL_CMD="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA'
 }
 
+skip_suites_without_constant_flow () {
+    # Skip the test suites that don't have any constant-flow annotations.
+    # This will need to be adjusted if we ever start declaring things as
+    # secret from macros or functions inside tests/include or tests/src.
+    SKIP_TEST_SUITES=$(
+        git -C tests/suites grep -L TEST_CF_ 'test_suite_*.function' |
+            sed 's/test_suite_//; s/\.function$//' |
+            tr '\n' ,)
+    export SKIP_TEST_SUITES
+}
+
 component_test_memsan_constant_flow () {
     # This tests both (1) accesses to undefined memory, and (2) branches or
     # memory access depending on secret values. To distinguish between those:
@@ -1615,12 +1654,13 @@
     scripts/config.py full
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+    skip_suites_without_constant_flow
     cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
     # this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type)
     # details are left in Testing/<date>/DynamicAnalysis.xml
-    msg "test: main suites (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, valgrind + constant flow)"
+    msg "test: some suites (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, valgrind + constant flow)"
     make memcheck
 }
 
@@ -1637,12 +1677,13 @@
     msg "build: cmake release GCC, full config with constant flow testing"
     scripts/config.py full
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+    skip_suites_without_constant_flow
     cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
     # this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type)
     # details are left in Testing/<date>/DynamicAnalysis.xml
-    msg "test: main suites (valgrind + constant flow)"
+    msg "test: some suites (valgrind + constant flow)"
     make memcheck
 }
 
@@ -1952,6 +1993,38 @@
     make test
 }
 
+component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecdh () {
+    msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated ECDH"
+
+    # Disable ALG_STREAM_CIPHER and ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING to avoid having
+    # partial support for cipher operations in the driver test library.
+    scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER
+    scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING
+
+    loc_accel_list="ALG_ECDH KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY"
+    loc_accel_flags=$( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DLIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )
+    make -C tests libtestdriver1.a CFLAGS=" $ASAN_CFLAGS $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
+
+    loc_accel_flags="$loc_accel_flags $( echo "$loc_accel_list" | sed 's/[^ ]* */-DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_&/g' )"
+    make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -O -Werror -I../tests/include -I../tests -I../../tests -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 $loc_accel_flags" LDFLAGS="-ltestdriver1 $ASAN_CFLAGS"
+
+    not grep mbedtls_ecdh_ library/ecdh.o
+
+    msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated ECDH"
+    make test
+}
+
 component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_rsa_signature () {
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated RSA signature"
 
@@ -2099,6 +2172,7 @@
     fi
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C # has independent PSA implementation
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
     scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA
 }
@@ -2135,11 +2209,16 @@
     msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash and USE_PSA"
     make test
 
+    # This is mostly useful so that we can later compare outcome files with
+    # the reference config in analyze_outcomes.py, to check that the
+    # dependency declarations in ssl-opt.sh and in TLS code are correct.
     msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash and USE_PSA"
     tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
-    msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG without accelerated hash and USE_PSA"
-    tests/compat.sh
+    # This is to make sure all ciphersuites are exercised, but we don't need
+    # interop testing (besides, we already got some from ssl-opt.sh).
+    msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated hash and USE_PSA"
+    tests/compat.sh -p mbedTLS -V YES
 }
 
 # This component provides reference configuration for test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hash_use_psa
@@ -2738,21 +2817,20 @@
     tests/compat.sh
 }
 
-component_test_variable_ssl_in_out_buffer_len_CID () {
-    msg "build: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled (ASan build)"
-    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH
-    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+component_test_dtls_cid_legacy () {
+    msg "build: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (legacy) enabled (ASan build)"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 1
 
     CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
     make
 
-    msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID"
+    msg "test: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (legacy)"
     make test
 
-    msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled"
+    msg "test: ssl-opt.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (legacy) enabled"
     tests/ssl-opt.sh
 
-    msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled"
+    msg "test: compat.sh, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (legacy) enabled"
     tests/compat.sh
 }
 
@@ -3250,6 +3328,7 @@
 
 component_test_tls13_only () {
     msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3, without MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2"
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'"
 
     msg "test: TLS 1.3 only, all key exchange modes enabled"
@@ -3269,6 +3348,8 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+    scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'"
 
     msg "test_suite_ssl: TLS 1.3 only, only PSK key exchange mode enabled"
@@ -3301,6 +3382,8 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+    scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'"
 
     msg "test_suite_ssl: TLS 1.3 only, only PSK ephemeral key exchange mode"
@@ -3318,6 +3401,8 @@
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+    scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'"
 
     msg "test_suite_ssl: TLS 1.3 only, PSK and PSK ephemeral key exchange modes"
@@ -3330,6 +3415,7 @@
 component_test_tls13_only_ephemeral_all () {
     msg "build: TLS 1.3 only from default, without PSK key exchange mode"
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
+    scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'"
 
     msg "test_suite_ssl: TLS 1.3 only, ephemeral and PSK ephemeral key exchange modes"
@@ -3344,6 +3430,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1
+    scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
     make
     msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 enabled, without padding"
@@ -3357,6 +3444,7 @@
     scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
     scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1
+    scripts/config.py set   MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
     CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
     make
     msg "test: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 enabled, without padding"
@@ -3407,30 +3495,43 @@
 
 component_test_valgrind () {
     msg "build: Release (clang)"
+    # default config, in particular without MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
     CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
     make
 
-    msg "test: main suites valgrind (Release)"
+    msg "test: main suites, Valgrind (default config)"
     make memcheck
 
     # Optional parts (slow; currently broken on OS X because programs don't
     # seem to receive signals under valgrind on OS X).
+    # These optional parts don't run on the CI.
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then
-        msg "test: ssl-opt.sh --memcheck (Release)"
+        msg "test: ssl-opt.sh --memcheck (default config)"
         tests/ssl-opt.sh --memcheck
     fi
 
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 1 ]; then
-        msg "test: compat.sh --memcheck (Release)"
+        msg "test: compat.sh --memcheck (default config)"
         tests/compat.sh --memcheck
     fi
 
     if [ "$MEMORY" -gt 0 ]; then
-        msg "test: context-info.sh --memcheck (Release)"
+        msg "test: context-info.sh --memcheck (default config)"
         tests/context-info.sh --memcheck
     fi
 }
 
+component_test_valgrind_psa () {
+    msg "build: Release, full (clang)"
+    # full config, in particular with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+    scripts/config.py full
+    CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
+    make
+
+    msg "test: main suites, Valgrind (full config)"
+    make memcheck
+}
+
 support_test_cmake_out_of_source () {
     distrib_id=""
     distrib_ver=""
@@ -3567,6 +3668,26 @@
     [ "$ver_major" -eq 3 ] && [ "$ver_minor" -ge 10 ]
 }
 
+component_test_corrected_code_style () {
+    ./scripts/code_style.py --fix
+
+    msg "build: make, default config (out-of-box), corrected code style"
+    make
+
+    msg "test: main suites make, default config (out-of-box), corrected code style"
+    make test
+
+    # Clean up code-style corrections
+    git checkout -- .
+}
+
+support_test_corrected_code_style() {
+    case $(uncrustify --version) in
+        *0.75.1*) true;;
+        *) false;;
+    esac
+}
+
 component_check_python_files () {
     msg "Lint: Python scripts"
     tests/scripts/check-python-files.sh
diff --git a/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh b/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh
index 31beb1c..a96254f 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh
+++ b/tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
-# basic-build-tests.sh
+# basic-build-test.sh
 #
 # Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 #
 # This script has been written to be generic and should work on any shell.
 #
-# Usage: basic-build-tests.sh
+# Usage: basic-build-test.sh
 #
 
 # Abort on errors (and uninitiliased variables)
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_files.py b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
index 5c18702..42f2e82 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_files.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_files.py
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
     r'tests/data_files/.*\.req\.[^/]+\Z',
     r'tests/data_files/.*malformed[^/]+\Z',
     r'tests/data_files/format_pkcs12\.fmt\Z',
+    r'tests/data_files/pkcs7_data.*\.bin\Z',
 ]
 BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE = re.compile('|'.join(BINARY_FILE_PATH_RE_LIST))
 
diff --git a/tests/scripts/check_names.py b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
index 396ab74..13b6c2d 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/check_names.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/check_names.py
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
   declared in the header files. This uses the nm command.
 - All macros, constants, and identifiers (function names, struct names, etc)
   follow the required regex pattern.
-- Typo checking: All words that begin with MBED exist as macros or constants.
+- Typo checking: All words that begin with MBED|PSA exist as macros or constants.
 
 The script returns 0 on success, 1 on test failure, and 2 if there is a script
 error. It must be run from Mbed TLS root.
@@ -191,11 +191,12 @@
 
 class Typo(Problem): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
     """
-    A problem that occurs when a word using MBED doesn't appear to be defined as
-    constants nor enum values. Created with NameCheck.check_for_typos()
+    A problem that occurs when a word using MBED or PSA doesn't
+    appear to be defined as constants nor enum values. Created with
+    NameCheck.check_for_typos()
 
     Fields:
-    * match: the Match object of the MBED name in question.
+    * match: the Match object of the MBED|PSA name in question.
     """
     def __init__(self, match):
         self.match = match
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@
             .format(str(self.excluded_files))
         )
 
-        all_macros = {"public": [], "internal": []}
+        all_macros = {"public": [], "internal": [], "private":[]}
         all_macros["public"] = self.parse_macros([
             "include/mbedtls/*.h",
             "include/psa/*.h",
@@ -256,9 +257,14 @@
             "library/*.h",
             "tests/include/test/drivers/*.h",
         ])
+        all_macros["private"] = self.parse_macros([
+            "library/*.c",
+        ])
         enum_consts = self.parse_enum_consts([
             "include/mbedtls/*.h",
+            "include/psa/*.h",
             "library/*.h",
+            "library/*.c",
             "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
             "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
         ])
@@ -269,7 +275,7 @@
             "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/everest.h",
             "3rdparty/everest/include/everest/x25519.h"
         ])
-        mbed_words = self.parse_mbed_words([
+        mbed_psa_words = self.parse_mbed_psa_words([
             "include/mbedtls/*.h",
             "include/psa/*.h",
             "library/*.h",
@@ -302,10 +308,11 @@
         return {
             "public_macros": actual_macros["public"],
             "internal_macros": actual_macros["internal"],
+            "private_macros": all_macros["private"],
             "enum_consts": enum_consts,
             "identifiers": identifiers,
             "symbols": symbols,
-            "mbed_words": mbed_words
+            "mbed_psa_words": mbed_psa_words
         }
 
     def is_file_excluded(self, path, exclude_wildcards):
@@ -373,25 +380,28 @@
 
         return macros
 
-    def parse_mbed_words(self, include, exclude=None):
+    def parse_mbed_psa_words(self, include, exclude=None):
         """
-        Parse all words in the file that begin with MBED, in and out of macros,
-        comments, anything.
+        Parse all words in the file that begin with MBED|PSA, in and out of
+        macros, comments, anything.
 
         Args:
         * include: A List of glob expressions to look for files through.
         * exclude: A List of glob expressions for excluding files.
 
-        Returns a List of Match objects for words beginning with MBED.
+        Returns a List of Match objects for words beginning with MBED|PSA.
         """
         # Typos of TLS are common, hence the broader check below than MBEDTLS.
-        mbed_regex = re.compile(r"\bMBED.+?_[A-Z0-9_]*")
+        mbed_regex = re.compile(r"\b(MBED.+?|PSA)_[A-Z0-9_]*")
         exclusions = re.compile(r"// *no-check-names|#error")
 
         files = self.get_files(include, exclude)
-        self.log.debug("Looking for MBED words in {} files".format(len(files)))
+        self.log.debug(
+            "Looking for MBED|PSA words in {} files"
+            .format(len(files))
+        )
 
-        mbed_words = []
+        mbed_psa_words = []
         for filename in files:
             with open(filename, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fp:
                 for line_no, line in enumerate(fp):
@@ -399,14 +409,14 @@
                         continue
 
                     for name in mbed_regex.finditer(line):
-                        mbed_words.append(Match(
+                        mbed_psa_words.append(Match(
                             filename,
                             line,
                             line_no,
                             name.span(0),
                             name.group(0)))
 
-        return mbed_words
+        return mbed_psa_words
 
     def parse_enum_consts(self, include, exclude=None):
         """
@@ -629,7 +639,7 @@
         self.log.info("Compiling...")
         symbols = []
 
-        # Back up the config and atomically compile with the full configratuion.
+        # Back up the config and atomically compile with the full configuration.
         shutil.copy(
             "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h",
             "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h.bak"
@@ -832,12 +842,14 @@
             for match
             in self.parse_result["public_macros"] +
             self.parse_result["internal_macros"] +
+            self.parse_result["private_macros"] +
             self.parse_result["enum_consts"]
             }
         typo_exclusion = re.compile(r"XXX|__|_$|^MBEDTLS_.*CONFIG_FILE$|"
-                                    r"MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER*")
+                                    r"MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER*|"
+                                    r"PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST")
 
-        for name_match in self.parse_result["mbed_words"]:
+        for name_match in self.parse_result["mbed_psa_words"]:
             found = name_match.name in all_caps_names
 
             # Since MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_XXX defines are defined by the
@@ -892,7 +904,7 @@
     parser.add_argument(
         "-q", "--quiet",
         action="store_true",
-        help="hide unnecessary text, explanations, and highlighs"
+        help="hide unnecessary text, explanations, and highlights"
     )
 
     args = parser.parse_args()
diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py b/tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
index eee2f65..0b84711 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_bignum_tests.py
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
 import sys
 
 from abc import ABCMeta
-from typing import Iterator, List
+from typing import List
 
 import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import
 from mbedtls_dev import test_case
@@ -66,17 +66,19 @@
 # Import modules containing additional test classes
 # Test function classes in these modules will be registered by
 # the framework
-from mbedtls_dev import bignum_core, bignum_mod_raw # pylint: disable=unused-import
+from mbedtls_dev import bignum_core, bignum_mod_raw, bignum_mod # pylint: disable=unused-import
 
-class BignumTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
-    #pylint: disable=abstract-method
+class BignumTarget(test_data_generation.BaseTarget):
+    #pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
     """Target for bignum (legacy) test case generation."""
     target_basename = 'test_suite_bignum.generated'
 
 
-class BignumOperation(bignum_common.OperationCommon, BignumTarget, metaclass=ABCMeta):
+class BignumOperation(bignum_common.OperationCommon, BignumTarget,
+                      metaclass=ABCMeta):
     #pylint: disable=abstract-method
     """Common features for bignum operations in legacy tests."""
+    unique_combinations_only = True
     input_values = [
         "", "0", "-", "-0",
         "7b", "-7b",
@@ -132,11 +134,6 @@
             tmp = "large " + tmp
         return tmp
 
-    @classmethod
-    def generate_function_tests(cls) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
-        for a_value, b_value in cls.get_value_pairs():
-            yield cls(a_value, b_value).create_test_case()
-
 
 class BignumCmp(BignumOperation):
     """Test cases for bignum value comparison."""
diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py b/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
index 2f09007..b271048 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
 # A temporary hack: at the time of writing, not all dependency symbols
 # are implemented yet. Skip test cases for which the dependency symbols are
 # not available. Once all dependency symbols are available, this hack must
-# be removed so that a bug in the dependency symbols proprely leads to a test
+# be removed so that a bug in the dependency symbols properly leads to a test
 # failure.
 def read_implemented_dependencies(filename: str) -> FrozenSet[str]:
     return frozenset(symbol
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
         """Prepare to generate a key.
 
         * `usage`                 : The usage flags used for the key.
-        * `without_implicit_usage`: Flag to defide to apply the usage extension
+        * `without_implicit_usage`: Flag to define to apply the usage extension
         """
         usage_flags = set(usage)
         if not without_implicit_usage:
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
     ) -> None:
         """Prepare to generate test data
 
-        * `description`   : used for the the test case names
+        * `description`   : used for the test case names
         * `expected_usage`: the usage flags generated as the expected usage flags
                             in the test cases. CAn differ from the usage flags
                             stored in the keys because of the usage flags extension.
diff --git a/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl b/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl
index 8a5bb93..cedc0bf 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl
+++ b/tests/scripts/run-test-suites.pl
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@
            'verbose|v:1' => \$verbose,
           ) or die;
 
-# All test suites = executable files derived from a .data file.
+# All test suites = executable files with a .datax file.
 my @suites = ();
-for my $data_file (glob 'suites/test_suite_*.data') {
-    (my $base = $data_file) =~ s#^suites/(.*)\.data$#$1#;
+for my $data_file (glob 'test_suite_*.datax') {
+    (my $base = $data_file) =~ s/\.datax$//;
     push @suites, $base if -x $base;
     push @suites, "$base.exe" if -e "$base.exe";
 }
diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
index 7d06db1..92db417 100755
--- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
+++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Run the PSA Crypto API compliance test suite.
 Clone the repo and check out the commit specified by PSA_ARCH_TEST_REPO and PSA_ARCH_TEST_REF,
-then complie and run the test suite. The clone is stored at <Mbed TLS root>/psa-arch-tests.
+then compile and run the test suite. The clone is stored at <Mbed TLS root>/psa-arch-tests.
 Known defects in either the test suite or mbedtls - identified by their test number - are ignored,
 while unexpected failures AND successes are reported as errors,
 to help keep the list of known defects as up to date as possible.
diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_agreement.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_agreement.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c37b03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_agreement.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Test driver for key agreement functions.
+ */
+/*  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ *
+ *  Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+ *  not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ *  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ *  distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+ *  WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ *  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ *  limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <test/helpers.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) && defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
+
+#include "test/drivers/key_agreement.h"
+#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1)
+#include "libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto.h"
+#include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_t
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_KEY_AGREEMENT_INIT;
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.hits++;
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        return( mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_status );
+
+    if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output != NULL )
+    {
+        if( mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output_length > shared_secret_size )
+            return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+
+        memcpy( shared_secret, mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output,
+                mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output_length );
+        *shared_secret_length = mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output_length;
+
+        return( PSA_SUCCESS );
+    }
+
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) )
+    {
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+    defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH))
+        return( libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(
+                    (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes,
+                    key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                    alg, peer_key, peer_key_length,
+                    shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                    shared_secret_length ) );
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
+        return( mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(
+                attributes,
+                key_buffer, key_buffer_size,
+                alg, peer_key, peer_key_length,
+                shared_secret, shared_secret_size,
+                shared_secret_length ) );
+#else
+        (void) attributes;
+        (void) key_buffer;
+        (void) key_buffer_size;
+        (void) peer_key;
+        (void) peer_key_length;
+        (void) shared_secret;
+        (void) shared_secret_size;
+        (void) shared_secret_length;
+        return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+#endif
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    }
+
+}
+
+psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement(
+    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+    const uint8_t *key_buffer,
+    size_t key_buffer_size,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *peer_key,
+    size_t peer_key_length,
+    uint8_t *shared_secret,
+    size_t shared_secret_size,
+    size_t *shared_secret_length )
+{
+    (void) attributes;
+    (void) key_buffer;
+    (void) key_buffer_size;
+    (void) alg;
+    (void) peer_key;
+    (void) peer_key_length;
+    (void) shared_secret;
+    (void) shared_secret_size;
+    (void) shared_secret_length;
+    return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS && PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
index fdbb310..1fe8bae 100755
--- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh
+++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@
 
     if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
         kill $PXY_PID >/dev/null 2>&1
-        wait $PXY_PID
+        wait $PXY_PID >> $PXY_OUT 2>&1
     fi
 }
 
@@ -1689,6 +1689,20 @@
     O_LEGACY_CLI="$O_LEGACY_CLI -connect 127.0.0.1:+SRV_PORT"
 fi
 
+# Newer versions of OpenSSL have a syntax to enable all "ciphers", even
+# low-security ones. This covers not just cipher suites but also protocol
+# versions. It is necessary, for example, to use (D)TLS 1.0/1.1 on
+# OpenSSL 1.1.1f from Ubuntu 20.04. The syntax was only introduced in
+# OpenSSL 1.1.0 (21e0c1d23afff48601eb93135defddae51f7e2e3) and I can't find
+# a way to discover it from -help, so check the openssl version.
+case $($OPENSSL_CMD version) in
+    "OpenSSL 0"*|"OpenSSL 1.0"*) :;;
+    *)
+        O_CLI="$O_CLI -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
+        O_SRV="$O_SRV -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
+        ;;
+esac
+
 if [ -n "${OPENSSL_NEXT:-}" ]; then
     O_NEXT_SRV="$O_NEXT_SRV -accept $SRV_PORT"
     O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT="$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -accept $SRV_PORT"
@@ -2384,6 +2398,31 @@
             -u "IV used" \
             -U "IV used"
 
+# Test for correctness of sent single supported algorithm
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_hash_alg SHA_256
+run_test    "Single supported algorithm sending: mbedtls client" \
+            "$P_SRV sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 debug_level=3" \
+            0 \
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 03"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+requires_hash_alg SHA_256
+run_test    "Single supported algorithm sending: openssl client" \
+            "$P_SRV sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$O_CLI -cert data_files/server6.crt \
+                    -key data_files/server6.key" \
+            0
+
 # Tests for certificate verification callback
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 run_test    "Configuration-specific CRT verification callback" \
@@ -2575,7 +2614,6 @@
             -c "Deserializing connection..." \
             -S "Deserializing connection..."
 
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
 run_test    "Context serialization, server serializes, CCM" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=1 exchanges=2" \
@@ -2649,7 +2687,6 @@
             -c "Deserializing connection..." \
             -s "Deserializing connection..."
 
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
 run_test    "Context serialization, re-init, client serializes, CCM" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=0 exchanges=2" \
@@ -2686,7 +2723,6 @@
             -c "Deserializing connection..." \
             -S "Deserializing connection..."
 
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
 run_test    "Context serialization, re-init, server serializes, CCM" \
             "$P_SRV dtls=1 serialize=2 exchanges=2" \
@@ -5287,8 +5323,8 @@
              key_file=data_files/server6.key \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
             0 \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,"
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 " \
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 05 "
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
@@ -5298,8 +5334,8 @@
              key_file=data_files/server6.key \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
             0 \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,"
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 " \
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 05 "
 
 requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: client has no cert, server required (TLS)" \
@@ -5700,8 +5736,8 @@
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384" \
             0 \
             -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,"
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 " \
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 05 "
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
@@ -5713,8 +5749,8 @@
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
             0 \
             -s "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4," \
-            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,"
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 04 " \
+            -c "Supported Signature Algorithm found: 05 "
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
@@ -12920,8 +12956,8 @@
             "$O_NEXT_CLI -msg -debug -tls1_3 -reconnect" \
             0 \
             -s "=> write NewSessionTicket msg" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"
 
 requires_gnutls_tls1_3
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
@@ -12937,8 +12973,8 @@
             -c "Connecting again- trying to resume previous session" \
             -c "NEW SESSION TICKET (4) was received" \
             -s "=> write NewSessionTicket msg" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
             -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
             -s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
             -s "found pre_shared_key extension"
@@ -12960,8 +12996,8 @@
             -c "Reconnecting with saved session" \
             -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"    \
             -s "=> write NewSessionTicket msg" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
             -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
             -s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
             -s "found pre_shared_key extension"
@@ -13015,8 +13051,8 @@
             -c "Reconnecting with saved session" \
             -c "HTTP/1.0 200 OK"    \
             -s "=> write NewSessionTicket msg" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH" \
             -s "key exchange mode: ephemeral" \
             -s "key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral" \
             -s "found pre_shared_key extension"
@@ -13039,8 +13075,8 @@
             -c "Reconnecting with saved session" \
             -c "Hostname mismatch the session ticket, disable session resumption."    \
             -s "=> write NewSessionTicket msg" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
-            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET" \
+            -s "server state: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"
 
 # Test heap memory usage after handshake
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c0c21d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.data
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+Aligned 16-bit access
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:16:0
+
+Aligned 32-bit access
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:32:0
+
+Aligned 64-bit access
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:64:0
+
+Unaligned 16-bit access offset=1
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:16:1
+
+Unaligned 32-bit access offset=1
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:32:1
+
+Unaligned 64-bit access offset=1
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:64:1
+
+Unaligned 16-bit access offset=4
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:16:4
+
+Unaligned 32-bit access offset=4
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:32:4
+
+Unaligned 64-bit access offset=4
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:64:4
+
+Unaligned 16-bit access offset=7
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:16:7
+
+Unaligned 32-bit access offset=7
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:32:7
+
+Unaligned 64-bit access offset=7
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:64:7
+
+Unaligned 16-bit access offset=8
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:16:8
+
+Unaligned 32-bit access offset=8
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:32:8
+
+Unaligned 64-bit access offset=8
+mbedtls_unaligned_access:64:8
+
+Byteswap 16
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0100":16:"0001"
+
+Byteswap 16 with truncation
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0706050403020100":16:"0001"
+
+Byteswap 16 all-zero
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0000":16:"0000"
+
+Byteswap 16 all-ones
+mbedtls_byteswap:"ffffffffffffffff":16:"ffff"
+
+Byteswap 32
+mbedtls_byteswap:"03020100":32:"00010203"
+
+Byteswap 32 with truncation
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0706050403020100":32:"00010203"
+
+Byteswap 32 all-zero
+mbedtls_byteswap:"00000000":32:"00000000"
+
+Byteswap 32 all-ones
+mbedtls_byteswap:"ffffffffffffffff":32:"ffffffff"
+
+Byteswap 64
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0706050403020100":64:"01020304050607"
+
+Byteswap 64 all-zero
+mbedtls_byteswap:"0000000000000000":64:"0000000000000000"
+
+Byteswap 64 all-ones
+mbedtls_byteswap:"ffffffffffffffff":64:"ffffffffffffffff"
+
+Get individual bytes
+get_byte
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 16-bit BE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:16:0:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 16-bit BE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:16:3:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 16-bit LE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:16:0:0
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 16-bit LE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:16:3:0
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 32-bit BE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:32:0:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 32-bit BE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:32:3:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 32-bit LE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:32:0:0
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 32-bit LE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:32:3:0
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 64-bit BE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:64:0:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 64-bit BE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:64:3:1
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 64-bit LE offset=0
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:64:0:0
+
+Endian-aware unaligned 64-bit LE offset=3
+unaligned_access_endian_aware:64:3:0
+
+Big-endian check
+mbedtls_is_big_endian
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06c5668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_alignment.function
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+#include "../library/alignment.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunreachable-code"
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string of the form "abcd" (case-insensitive) to a uint64_t.
+ */
+int parse_hex_string( char* hex_string, uint64_t *result )
+{
+    uint8_t raw[8];
+    size_t olen;
+    if ( mbedtls_test_unhexify(raw, sizeof(raw), hex_string, &olen) != 0 ) return 0;
+    *result = 0;
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < olen; i++ )
+    {
+        if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN ) {
+            *result |= ((uint64_t)raw[i]) << ( i * 8 );
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            *result |= ((uint64_t)raw[i]) << ( (olen - i - 1) * 8 );
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_unaligned_access( int size, int offset )
+{
+    /* Define 64-bit aligned raw byte array */
+    uint64_t raw[2];
+
+    /* Populate with known data */
+    uint8_t *x = (uint8_t *) raw;
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(raw); i++ )
+        x[i] = (uint8_t)i;
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( size == 16 || size == 32 || size == 64 );
+
+    uint64_t r = 0;
+    switch ( size )
+    {
+        case 16:
+            r = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16( x + offset );
+            break;
+        case 32:
+            r = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32( x + offset );
+            break;
+        case 64:
+            r = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64( x + offset );
+            break;
+    }
+
+    /* Generate expected result */
+    uint64_t expected = 0;
+    for ( uint8_t i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
+    {
+        uint8_t shift;
+        if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )
+        {
+            /*
+            * Similar to little-endian case described below, but the shift needs
+            * to be inverted
+            */
+            shift = 7 - ( i * 8 );
+        } else {
+            /* example for offset == 1:
+            * expected = (( 1 + 0 ) << (0 * 8)) | (( 1 + 1 ) << (1 * 8)) | (( 1 + 2 ) << (2 * 8)))
+            *          = (1 << 0) | (2 << 8) | (3 << 16) ...
+            *          = 0x0807060504030201
+            * x = { 0, 1, 2, 3, ... }
+            * ie expected is the value that would be read from x on a LE system, when
+            * byte swapping is not performed
+            */
+            shift = i * 8;
+        }
+        uint64_t b = offset + i;
+        expected |= b << shift;
+    }
+
+    /* Mask out excess bits from expected result */
+    switch ( size )
+    {
+        case 16:
+            expected &= 0xffff;
+            break;
+        case 32:
+            expected &= 0xffffffff;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( r, expected );
+
+    /* Write sentinel to the part of the array we will testing writing to */
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < (size_t) ( size / 8 ); i++ )
+    {
+        x[i + offset] = 0xff;
+    }
+    /*
+        * Write back to the array with mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16 and validate
+        * that the array is unchanged as a result.
+        */
+    switch ( size )
+    {
+        case 16:
+            mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16( x + offset, r );
+            break;
+        case 32:
+            mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32( x + offset, r );
+            break;
+        case 64:
+            mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64( x + offset, r );
+            break;
+    }
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(x); i++ )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( x[i], (uint8_t)i );
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_byteswap( char* input_str, int size, char *expected_str )
+{
+    uint64_t input, expected;
+    TEST_ASSERT( parse_hex_string( input_str, &input ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( parse_hex_string( expected_str, &expected ) );
+
+    /* Check against expected result */
+    uint64_t r = 0;
+    switch ( size )
+    {
+        case 16:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP16( input );
+            break;
+        case 32:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP32( input );
+            break;
+        case 64:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP64( input );
+            break;
+        default:
+            TEST_ASSERT( ! "size must be 16, 32 or 64" );
+    }
+    TEST_EQUAL( r, expected );
+
+    /*
+     * Check byte by byte by extracting bytes from opposite ends of
+     * input and r.
+     */
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < (size_t)( size / 8 ); i++ )
+    {
+        size_t s1 = i * 8;
+        size_t s2 = ( ( size / 8 - 1 ) - i ) * 8;
+        uint64_t a = ( input & ( (uint64_t)0xff << s1 ) ) >> s1;
+        uint64_t b = ( r & ( (uint64_t)0xff << s2 ) ) >> s2;
+        TEST_EQUAL( a, b );
+    }
+
+    /* Check BSWAP(BSWAP(x)) == x */
+    switch ( size )
+    {
+        case 16:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP16( r );
+            TEST_EQUAL( r, input & 0xffff );
+            break;
+        case 32:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP32( r );
+            TEST_EQUAL( r, input & 0xffffffff );
+            break;
+        case 64:
+            r = MBEDTLS_BSWAP64( r );
+            TEST_EQUAL( r, input );
+            break;
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void get_byte()
+{
+    uint8_t data[16];
+
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(data); i++ )
+        data[i] = (uint8_t) i;
+
+    uint64_t u64 = 0x0706050403020100;
+    for ( size_t b = 0; b < 8 ; b++ )
+    {
+        uint8_t expected = b;
+        uint8_t actual = b + 1;
+        switch ( b )
+        {
+            case 0:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 3:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 4:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 5:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 6:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( u64 );
+                break;
+            case 7:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( u64 );
+                break;
+        }
+        TEST_EQUAL( actual, expected );
+    }
+
+    uint32_t u32 = 0x03020100;
+    for ( size_t b = 0; b < 4 ; b++ )
+    {
+        uint8_t expected = b;
+        uint8_t actual = b + 1;
+        switch ( b )
+        {
+            case 0:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( u32 );
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( u32 );
+                break;
+            case 2:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( u32 );
+                break;
+            case 3:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( u32 );
+                break;
+        }
+        TEST_EQUAL( actual, expected );
+    }
+
+    uint16_t u16 = 0x0100;
+    for ( size_t b = 0; b < 2 ; b++ )
+    {
+        uint8_t expected = b;
+        uint8_t actual = b + 1;
+        switch ( b )
+        {
+            case 0:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( u16 );
+                break;
+            case 1:
+                actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( u16 );
+                break;
+        }
+        TEST_EQUAL( actual, expected );
+    }
+
+    uint8_t u8 = 0x01;
+    uint8_t actual = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( u8 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( actual, u8 );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void unaligned_access_endian_aware(int size, int offset, int big_endian )
+{
+    TEST_ASSERT( size == 16 || size == 24 || size == 32 || size == 64 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( offset >= 0 && offset < 8 );
+
+    /* Define 64-bit aligned raw byte array */
+    uint64_t raw[2];
+    /* Populate with known data: x == { 0, 1, 2, ... } */
+    uint8_t *x = (uint8_t *) raw;
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(raw); i++ )
+        x[i] = (uint8_t) i;
+
+    uint64_t read = 0;
+    if ( big_endian )
+    {
+        switch ( size )
+        {
+            case 16:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 24:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 32:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 64:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( x, offset );
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        switch ( size )
+        {
+            case 16:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 24:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 32:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 64:
+                read = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, offset );
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Build up expected value byte by byte, in either big or little endian format */
+    uint64_t expected = 0;
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < (size_t)(size / 8); i++ )
+    {
+        uint64_t b = x[i + offset];
+        uint8_t shift = (big_endian) ? (8 * ((size / 8 - 1) - i)) : (8 * i);
+        expected |= b << shift;
+    }
+
+    /* Verify read */
+    TEST_EQUAL( read, expected );
+
+    /* Test writing back to memory. First write sentiel */
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < (size_t)(size / 8); i++ )
+    {
+        x[i + offset] = 0xff;
+    }
+    /* Overwrite sentinel with endian-aware write macro */
+    if ( big_endian )
+    {
+        switch ( size )
+        {
+            case 16:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 24:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 32:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 64:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        switch ( size )
+        {
+            case 16:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+                case 24:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 32:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+            case 64:
+                MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( read, x, offset );
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Verify write - check memory is correct */
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(raw); i++ )
+        TEST_EQUAL( x[i], (uint8_t) i );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_is_big_endian()
+{
+    uint16_t check = 0x1234;
+    uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*) &check;
+
+    if ( MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN )
+    {
+        /* Big-endian: data stored MSB first, i.e. p == { 0x12, 0x34 } */
+        TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 0x12 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( p[1], 0x34 );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* Little-endian: data stored LSB first, i.e. p == { 0x34, 0x12 } */
+        TEST_EQUAL( p[0], 0x34 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( p[1], 0x12 );
+    }
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
index b75f534..55bb2f5 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function
@@ -1458,6 +1458,150 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void most_negative_mpi_sint( )
+{
+    /* Ad hoc tests for n = -p = -2^(biL-1) as a mbedtls_mpi_sint. We
+     * guarantee that mbedtls_mpi_sint is a two's complement type, so this
+     * is a valid value. However, negating it (`-n`) has undefined behavior
+     * (although in practice `-n` evaluates to the value n).
+     *
+     * This function has ad hoc tests for this value. It's separated from other
+     * functions because the test framework makes it hard to pass this value
+     * into test cases.
+     *
+     * In the comments here:
+     * - biL = number of bits in limbs
+     * - p = 2^(biL-1) (smallest positive value not in mbedtls_mpi_sint range)
+     * - n = -2^(biL-1) (largest negative value in mbedtls_mpi_sint range)
+     */
+
+    mbedtls_mpi A, R, X;
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &A );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &X );
+
+    const size_t biL = 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_sint );
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint most_positive_plus_1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( biL - 1 );
+    const mbedtls_mpi_sint most_positive = most_positive_plus_1 - 1;
+    const mbedtls_mpi_sint most_negative = - most_positive - 1;
+    TEST_EQUAL( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) most_negative,
+                (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( biL - 1 ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) most_negative << 1, 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_lset() */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( A.s, -1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( A.n, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( A.p[0], most_positive_plus_1 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(): -p == -p */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(): -(p+1) < -p */
+    A.p[0] = most_positive_plus_1 + 1;
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, most_negative ), -1 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(): -(p-1) > -p */
+    A.p[0] = most_positive_plus_1 - 1;
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, most_negative ), 1 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int(): (p-1) + (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_positive ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, -1 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int(): (0) + (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, 0 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, most_negative ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_add_int(): (-p) + (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.s, -1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.n, 2 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.p[0], 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.p[1], 1 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(): (p) - (-p) */
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &X );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_positive ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.s, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.n, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.p[0], ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(): (0) - (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, 0 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.s, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.n, 1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X.p[0], most_positive_plus_1 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(): (-p) - (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &X, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (-p+1) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, -most_positive ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, -most_positive ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (-p) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, 0 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (-2*p) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &A, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 2 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, 0 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (-2*p+1) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &A, &A, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, -most_positive ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (p-1) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &A, most_positive ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, most_positive ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (p) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &A, &A, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, -1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, 0 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_div_int(): (2*p) / (-p) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &A, 1 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( &X, &R, &A, most_negative ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, -2 ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R, 0 ), 0 );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(): never valid */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( X.p, &A, most_negative ),
+                MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE );
+
+    /* Test mbedtls_mpi_random(): never valid */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_random( &X, most_negative, &A,
+                                    mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ),
+                MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &A );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &X );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 void mpi_selftest(  )
 {
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
index 818f361..dc6830e 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data
@@ -1958,6 +1958,9 @@
 MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 1, 0 limb in upper bound
 mpi_random_fail:2:"000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
+Most negative mbedtls_mpi_sint
+most_negative_mpi_sint:
+
 MPI Selftest
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
 mpi_selftest:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
index 612a7c6..7bf03fb 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_core.function
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
 void mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup( int bitlen, int window_size )
 {
     size_t limbs = BITS_TO_LIMBS( bitlen );
@@ -1041,6 +1041,81 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_core_exp_mod( char * input_N, char * input_A,
+                       char * input_E, char * input_X )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *E = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    size_t A_limbs, E_limbs, N_limbs, X_limbs;
+    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *R2 = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = NULL;
+    /* Legacy MPIs for computing R2 */
+    mbedtls_mpi N_mpi;
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &N_mpi );
+    mbedtls_mpi R2_mpi;
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R2_mpi );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A, &A_limbs, input_A ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &E, &E_limbs, input_E ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &N_limbs, input_N ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &X, &X_limbs, input_X ) );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( Y, N_limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( A_limbs, N_limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X_limbs, N_limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &N_mpi, N_limbs ) );
+    memcpy( N_mpi.p, N, N_limbs * sizeof( *N ) );
+    N_mpi.n = N_limbs;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0,
+                mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe( &R2_mpi, &N_mpi ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &R2_mpi, N_limbs ) );
+    R2 = R2_mpi.p;
+
+    size_t working_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs( N_limbs,
+                                                                   E_limbs );
+
+    /* No point exactly duplicating the code in mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()
+     * to see if the output is correct, but we can check that it's in a
+     * reasonable range.  The current calculation works out as
+     * `1 + N_limbs * (welem + 3)`, where welem is the number of elements in
+     * the window (1 << 1 up to 1 << 6).
+     */
+    size_t min_expected_working_limbs = 1 + N_limbs * 4;
+    size_t max_expected_working_limbs = 1 + N_limbs * 67;
+
+    TEST_LE_U( min_expected_working_limbs, working_limbs );
+    TEST_LE_U( working_limbs, max_expected_working_limbs );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( T, working_limbs );
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod( Y, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, memcmp( X, Y, N_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) );
+
+    /* Check when output aliased to input */
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod( A, A, N, N_limbs, E, E_limbs, R2, T );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, memcmp( X, A, N_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( T );
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( E );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+    mbedtls_free( Y );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &N_mpi );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R2_mpi );
+    // R2 doesn't need to be freed as it is only aliasing R2_mpi
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 1 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
@@ -1049,6 +1124,52 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_core_sub_int( char * input_A, char * input_B,
+                       char * input_X, int borrow )
+{
+    /* We are testing A - b, where A is an MPI and b is a scalar, expecting
+     * result X with borrow borrow.  However, for ease of handling we encode b
+     * as a 1-limb MPI (B) in the .data file. */
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *B = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R = NULL;
+    size_t A_limbs, B_limbs, X_limbs;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A, &A_limbs, input_A ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &B, &B_limbs, input_B ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &X, &X_limbs, input_X ) );
+
+    /* The MPI encoding of scalar b must be only 1 limb */
+    TEST_EQUAL( B_limbs, 1 );
+
+    /* The subtraction is fixed-width, so A and X must have the same number of limbs */
+    TEST_EQUAL( A_limbs, X_limbs );
+    size_t limbs = A_limbs;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( R, limbs );
+
+#define TEST_COMPARE_CORE_MPIS( A, B, limbs ) \
+                ASSERT_COMPARE( A, (limbs) * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), B, (limbs) * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) )
+
+    /* 1. R = A - b. Result and borrow should be correct */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( R, A, B[0], limbs ), borrow );
+    TEST_COMPARE_CORE_MPIS( R, X, limbs );
+
+    /* 2. A = A - b. Result and borrow should be correct */
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int( A, A, B[0], limbs ), borrow );
+    TEST_COMPARE_CORE_MPIS( A, X, limbs );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( B );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+    mbedtls_free( R );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.data
index 95faa53..501d9d7 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.data
@@ -1,29 +1,11 @@
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #1 (Both representations invalid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #1 (Internal representation invalid)
+mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #2 (Internal representation invalid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #6 (Optimised reduction)
+mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:0
 
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #3 (Internal representation invalid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #4 (External representation invalid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #5 (External representation invalid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #6 (Both representations valid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:0
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #7 (Both representations valid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:0
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #8 (Both representations valid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:0
-
-Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #9 (Both representations valid)
-mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:0
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_setup #7 (Montgomery representation)
+mpi_mod_setup:MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:0
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1
 
@@ -35,6 +17,27 @@
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3
 
+mpi_mod_sub base case for negative testing (N, a, b all >= 1 limb)
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"00033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"013fe57440828b4a0008aa4159":0
+
+mpi_mod_sub with modulus too long/both inputs too short
+mpi_mod_sub:"0000000014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"00033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+mpi_mod_sub with first input too long
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"0000000000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"00033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+mpi_mod_sub with second input too long
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"000000000033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+mpi_mod_sub with both inputs too long
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"0000000000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"000000000033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+mpi_mod_sub with first input too short
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"a99c71c7":"00033b2e3c9fd0803ce8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+mpi_mod_sub with second input too short
+mpi_mod_sub:"014320a022ccb75bdf470ddf25":"000000025a55a46e5da99c71c7":"e8000f93":"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
 # END MERGE SLOT 3
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4
@@ -50,17 +53,269 @@
 # END MERGE SLOT 6
 
 # BEGIN MERGE SLOT 7
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #1 m > r
+mpi_residue_setup:"fe":"01":0
 
-# END MERGE SLOT 7
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #2 r == m - 1
+mpi_residue_setup:"ff":"fe":0
 
-# BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #3 m->limbs = r-> limbs && m > r
+mpi_residue_setup:"7dfe5c6":"fe":0
 
-# END MERGE SLOT 8
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #4 m->limbs = r-> limbs && m > r
+mpi_residue_setup:"7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff1":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fe":0
 
-# BEGIN MERGE SLOT 9
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #5 m->limbs > r-> limbs && m > r
+mpi_residue_setup:"7ffffffff00000000":"fe":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
-# END MERGE SLOT 9
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #6 m->limbs < r-> limbs && m > r
+mpi_residue_setup:"ff":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
-# BEGIN MERGE SLOT 10
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #7 r == m
+mpi_residue_setup:"fe":"fe":-4
 
-# END MERGE SLOT 10
+Test mbedtls_mpi_residue_setup #8 r > m
+mpi_residue_setup:"fe":"ff":-4
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io_neg #1 input_r < modulo m
+mpi_mod_io_neg:"fe":"fd":0
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io_neg #2  input_r == modulo m
+mpi_mod_io_neg:"fe":"fe":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io_neg #3  input_r > modulo m
+mpi_mod_io_neg:"fe":"ff":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io_neg #4  input_r too large to fit
+mpi_mod_io_neg:"fe":"ffffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io_neg #5  Sucesfull read / output buffer too small
+mpi_mod_io_neg:"7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff1":"ffff":0
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #1 N: "11" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"000000000000000b":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #2 N: "11" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"000000000000000b":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #3 N: "11" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"000000000000000b":"0000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #4 N: "11" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"000000000000000b":"0100000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #5 N: "140737488355333" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #6 N: "140737488355333" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #7 N: "140737488355333" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"0000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #8 N: "140737488355333" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"0100000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #9 N: "140737488355333" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"00000000000003ca":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #10 N: "140737488355333" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"ca03000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #11 N: "140737488355333" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"00000000539ed428":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #12 N: "140737488355333" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"0000800000000005":"28d49e5300000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #13 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #14 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"0000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #15 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"0000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #16 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"0100000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #17 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"00000000000003ca":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #18 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"ca03000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #19 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"00000000539ed428":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #20 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"28d49e5300000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #21 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"7dfe5c6beb35a2d6":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #22 N: "9223372036854775807" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7fffffffffffffff":"d6a235eb6b5cfe7d":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #23 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #24 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #25 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #26 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #27 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003ca":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #28 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"ca030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #29 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000539ed428":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #30 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"28d49e53000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #31 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007dfe5c6beb35a2d6":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #32 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"d6a235eb6b5cfe7d0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #33 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000dca8de1c2adfc6d7aafb9b48e":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #34 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"8eb4b9af7a6dfcadc2e18dca0d000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #35 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a7d17b6c4be72f3d5c16bf9c1af6fc933":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #36 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"33c96fafc1f96bc1d5f372bec4b6177d0a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #37 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002fec97beec546f9553142ed52f147845463f579":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #38 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"79f563548447f152ed423155f946c5ee7bc9fe020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #39 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000378dc83b8bc5a7b62cba495af4919578dce6d4f175cadc4f":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #40 N: "6610145858169835373800827072568987987787972943497619105736762797475099959212160692262984293277166612477845864397201463825139894315919781838969391314120587" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"7e35b84cb19ea5bc57ec37f5e431462fa962d98c1e63738d4657f18ad6532e6adc3eafe67f1e5fa262af94cee8d3e7268593942a2a98df75154f8c914a282f8b":"4fdcca75f1d4e6dc789591f45a49ba2cb6a7c58b3bc88d3700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #41 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #42 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #43 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #44 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #45 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003ca":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #46 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"ca0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #47 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000539ed428":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #48 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"28d49e530000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #49 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"000000000000000000000000000000007dfe5c6beb35a2d6":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #50 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"d6a235eb6b5cfe7d00000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #51 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"00000000000000000000000dca8de1c2adfc6d7aafb9b48e":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #52 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"8eb4b9af7a6dfcadc2e18dca0d0000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #53 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"000000000000000a7d17b6c4be72f3d5c16bf9c1af6fc933":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #54 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"33c96fafc1f96bc1d5f372bec4b6177d0a00000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #55 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"0000000002fec97beec546f9553142ed52f147845463f579":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #56 N: "201076468338594879614802819276237850336264827391977454179" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"08335616aed761f1f7f44e6bd49e807b82e3bf2bf11bfa63":"79f563548447f152ed423155f946c5ee7bc9fe0200000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #57 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #58 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #59 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #60 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #61 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003ca":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #62 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"ca030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #63 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000539ed428":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #64 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"28d49e53000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #65 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007dfe5c6beb35a2d6":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #66 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"d6a235eb6b5cfe7d0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #67 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000dca8de1c2adfc6d7aafb9b48e":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #68 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"8eb4b9af7a6dfcadc2e18dca0d000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #69 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a7d17b6c4be72f3d5c16bf9c1af6fc933":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #70 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"33c96fafc1f96bc1d5f372bec4b6177d0a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #71 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"ffcece570f2f991013f26dd5b03c4c5b65f97be5905f36cb4664f2c78ff80aa8135a4aaf57ccb8a0aca2f394909a74cef1ef6758a64d11e2c149c393659d124bfc94196f0ce88f7d7d567efa5a649e2deefaa6e10fdc3deac60d606bf63fc540ac95294347031aefd73d6a9ee10188aaeb7a90d920894553cb196881691cadc51808715a07e8b24fcb1a63df047c7cdf084dd177ba368c806f3d51ddb5d3898c863e687ecaf7d649a57a46264a582f94d3c8f2edaf59f77a7f6bdaf83c991e8f06abe220ec8507386fce8c3da84c6c3903ab8f3ad4630a204196a7dbcbd9bcca4e40ec5cc5c09938d49f5e1e6181db8896f33bb12e6ef73f12ec5c5ea7a8a337":"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002fec97beec546f9553142ed52f147845463f579":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #72 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"79f563548447f152ed423155f946c5ee7bc9fe020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #73 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000378dc83b8bc5a7b62cba495af4919578dce6d4f175cadc4f":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #74 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"4fdcca75f1d4e6dc789591f45a49ba2cb6a7c58b3bc88d3700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #75 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "119".
+mpi_mod_io:"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":"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":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+
+Test mbedtls_mpi_mod_io #76 N: "32292747613635961694771916499883650667878589411552643628627186850993060141490368296439843252993342320145797691611646027435006878234727648863911408777308953382400333083852585109256846643097239747078406546553406955958288616728627292699264194880486908744773379992784153004816057528456043920098334713005039494478693892693017304730883448003944721685094014669042959451482141781404822386404101555113742346277194830729517252154824958327000717338180410404929239489607893939166712107274943411892079802406181464789204374234653633818543559183821503846194953493439237710780169796543565449952151334229364816621060143650318299210551" A: "136".
+mpi_mod_io:"ffcece570f2f991013f26dd5b03c4c5b65f97be5905f36cb4664f2c78ff80aa8135a4aaf57ccb8a0aca2f394909a74cef1ef6758a64d11e2c149c393659d124bfc94196f0ce88f7d7d567efa5a649e2deefaa6e10fdc3deac60d606bf63fc540ac95294347031aefd73d6a9ee10188aaeb7a90d920894553cb196881691cadc51808715a07e8b24fcb1a63df047c7cdf084dd177ba368c806f3d51ddb5d3898c863e687ecaf7d649a57a46264a582f94d3c8f2edaf59f77a7f6bdaf83c991e8f06abe220ec8507386fce8c3da84c6c3903ab8f3ad4630a204196a7dbcbd9bcca4e40ec5cc5c09938d49f5e1e6181db8896f33bb12e6ef73f12ec5c5ea7a8a337":"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":MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.function
index 1a2d0c1..0d2e232 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod.function
@@ -4,6 +4,47 @@
 #include "bignum_mod.h"
 #include "constant_time_internal.h"
 #include "test/constant_flow.h"
+
+#define TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( a, b ) \
+            ASSERT_COMPARE( (a).p, (a).limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), \
+                            (b).p, (b).limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) )
+
+static int test_read_modulus( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                              mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep,
+                              char *input )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL;
+    size_t limbs;
+
+    int ret = mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &p, &limbs, input );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( m, p, limbs, int_rep ) );
+}
+
+static int test_read_residue( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+                              const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *m,
+                              char *input,
+                              int skip_limbs_and_value_checks )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL;
+    size_t limbs;
+
+    int ret = mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &p, &limbs, input );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    if( skip_limbs_and_value_checks )
+    {
+        r->p = p;
+        r->limbs = limbs;
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+
+    /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() checks limbs, and that value < m */
+    return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( r, m, p, limbs ) );
+}
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -12,7 +53,7 @@
  */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
-void mpi_mod_setup( int ext_rep, int int_rep, int iret )
+void mpi_mod_setup( int int_rep, int iret )
 {
     #define MLIMBS 8
     mbedtls_mpi_uint mp[MLIMBS];
@@ -22,7 +63,7 @@
     memset( mp, 0xFF, sizeof(mp) );
 
     mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
-    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, mp, MLIMBS, ext_rep, int_rep );
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, mp, MLIMBS, int_rep );
     TEST_EQUAL( ret, iret );
 
     /* Only test if the constants have been set-up  */
@@ -64,7 +105,104 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_sub( char * input_N,
+                  char * input_A, char * input_B,
+                  char * input_D, int oret )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue a = { NULL, 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue b = { NULL, 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue d = { NULL, 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue x = { NULL, 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X_raw = NULL;
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0,
+        test_read_modulus( &m, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY, input_N ) );
+
+    /* test_read_residue() normally checks that inputs have the same number of
+     * limbs as the modulus. For negative testing we can ask it to skip this
+     * with a non-zero final parameter. */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, test_read_residue( &a, &m, input_A, oret != 0 ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, test_read_residue( &b, &m, input_B, oret != 0 ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, test_read_residue( &d, &m, input_D, oret != 0 ) );
+
+    size_t limbs = m.limbs;
+    size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof( *X_raw );
+
+    /* One spare limb for negative testing */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( X_raw, limbs + 1 );
+
+    if( oret == 0 )
+    {
+        /* Sneak in a couple of negative tests on known-good data */
+
+        /* First, negative test with too many limbs in output */
+        x.p = X_raw;
+        x.limbs = limbs + 1;
+        TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                    mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &a, &b, &m ) );
+
+        /* Then negative test with too few limbs in output */
+        if( limbs > 1 )
+        {
+            x.p = X_raw;
+            x.limbs = limbs - 1;
+            TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                        mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &a, &b, &m ) );
+        }
+
+        /* Negative testing with too many/too few limbs in a and b is covered by
+         * manually-written test cases with oret != 0. */
+
+        /* Back to the normally-scheduled programme */
+    }
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( &x, &m, X_raw, limbs ) );
+
+    /* a - b => Correct result, or expected error */
+    TEST_EQUAL( oret, mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &a, &b, &m ) );
+    if( oret != 0 )
+        goto exit;
+
+    TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( x, d );
+
+    /* a - b: alias x to a => Correct result */
+    memcpy( x.p, a.p, bytes );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &x, &b, &m ) );
+    TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( x, d );
+
+    /* a - b: alias x to b => Correct result */
+    memcpy( x.p, b.p, bytes );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &a, &x, &m ) );
+    TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( x, d );
+
+    if ( memcmp( a.p, b.p, bytes ) == 0 )
+    {
+        /* a == b: alias a and b */
+
+        /* a - a => Correct result */
+        TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &a, &a, &m ) );
+        TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( x, d );
+
+        /* a - a: x, a, b all aliased together => Correct result */
+        memcpy( x.p, a.p, bytes );
+        TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub( &x, &x, &x, &m ) );
+        TEST_COMPARE_MPI_RESIDUES( x, d );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( (void *)m.p ); /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() sets m.p = NULL */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+
+    mbedtls_free( a.p );
+    mbedtls_free( b.p );
+    mbedtls_free( d.p );
+    mbedtls_free( X_raw );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -80,7 +218,214 @@
 /* END MERGE SLOT 6 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 7 */
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_residue_setup( char * input_N, char * input_R, int ret )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R = NULL;
+    size_t n_limbs, r_limbs;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue r;
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    /* Allocate the memory for intermediate data structures */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &n_limbs, input_N ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &R, &r_limbs, input_R ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
+                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( ret, mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( &r, &m, R , r_limbs ) );
+
+    if ( ret == 0 )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( r.limbs, r_limbs );
+        TEST_ASSERT( r.p == R );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( R );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_io_neg( char * input_N, data_t * buf, int ret )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue r = { NULL, 0 };
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep endian = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    size_t n_limbs;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &n_limbs, input_N ) );
+    size_t r_limbs = n_limbs;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( R, r_limbs );
+
+    /* modulus->p == NULL || residue->p == NULL ( m has not been set-up ) */
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+
+    /* Set up modulus and test with residue->p == NULL */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
+                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+
+    /* Do the rest of the tests with a residue set up with the input data */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( &r, &m, R , r_limbs ) );
+
+    /* Fail for r_limbs < m->limbs */
+    r.limbs--;
+    TEST_ASSERT( r.limbs < m.limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+    r.limbs++;
+
+    /* Fail for r_limbs > m->limbs */
+    m.limbs--;
+    TEST_ASSERT( r.limbs > m.limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+                mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+    m.limbs++;
+
+    /* Test the read */
+    TEST_EQUAL( ret, mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, buf->x, buf->len, endian ) );
+
+    /* Test write overflow only when the representation is large and read is successful  */
+    if ( r.limbs > 1 && ret == 0 )
+        TEST_EQUAL( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
+                        mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, buf->x, 1, endian ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release( &r );
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( R );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_io( char * input_N, data_t * input_A, int endian )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R_COPY = NULL;
+    unsigned char *obuf = NULL;
+    unsigned char *ref_buf = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue r;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue r_copy;
+    size_t n_limbs, n_bytes, a_bytes;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    /* Read inputs */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &n_limbs, input_N ) );
+    n_bytes = n_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
+    a_bytes = input_A->len;
+
+    /* Allocate the memory for intermediate data structures */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( R, n_bytes );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( R_COPY, n_bytes );
+
+    /* Test that input's size is not greater to modulo's */
+    TEST_LE_U( a_bytes, n_bytes );
+
+    /* Init Structures */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
+                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+
+    /* Enforcing p_limbs >= m->limbs */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( &r, &m, R, n_limbs ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r, &m, input_A->x, input_A->len,
+                                         endian ) );
+
+    /* Read a copy for checking that writing didn't change the value of r */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup( &r_copy, &m,
+                                                  R_COPY, n_limbs ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_read( &r_copy, &m, input_A->x, input_A->len,
+                                         endian ) );
+
+    /* Get number of bytes without leading zeroes */
+    size_t a_bytes_trimmed = a_bytes;
+    while( a_bytes_trimmed > 0 )
+    {
+        unsigned char* r_byte_array = (unsigned char*) r.p;
+        if( r_byte_array[--a_bytes_trimmed] != 0 )
+            break;
+    }
+    a_bytes_trimmed++;
+
+    /* Test write with three output buffer sizes: tight, same as input and
+     * longer than the input */
+    size_t obuf_sizes[3];
+    const size_t obuf_sizes_len = sizeof( obuf_sizes ) / sizeof( obuf_sizes[0] );
+    obuf_sizes[0] = a_bytes_trimmed;
+    obuf_sizes[1] = a_bytes;
+    obuf_sizes[2] = a_bytes + 8;
+
+    for( size_t i = 0; i < obuf_sizes_len; i++ )
+    {
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( obuf, obuf_sizes[i] );
+        TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_write( &r, &m, obuf, obuf_sizes[i], endian ) );
+
+        /* Make sure that writing didn't corrupt the value of r */
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( r.p, r.limbs, r_copy.p, r_copy.limbs );
+
+        /* Set up reference output for checking the result */
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( ref_buf, obuf_sizes[i] );
+        switch( endian )
+        {
+            case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
+                memcpy( ref_buf, input_A->x, a_bytes_trimmed );
+                break;
+            case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:
+                {
+                    size_t a_offset = input_A->len - a_bytes_trimmed;
+                    size_t ref_offset = obuf_sizes[i] - a_bytes_trimmed;
+                    memcpy( ref_buf + ref_offset, input_A->x + a_offset,
+                            a_bytes_trimmed );
+                }
+                break;
+            default:
+                TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
+        }
+
+        /* Check the result */
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( obuf, obuf_sizes[i], ref_buf, obuf_sizes[i] );
+
+        mbedtls_free( ref_buf );
+        ref_buf = NULL;
+        mbedtls_free( obuf );
+        obuf = NULL;
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( R );
+    mbedtls_free( R_COPY );
+    mbedtls_free( obuf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
index ff766b9..83e1f54 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum_mod_raw.function
@@ -49,22 +49,22 @@
 
     mbedtls_mpi_uint init[sizeof( X ) / sizeof( X[0] )];
     memset( init, 0xFF, sizeof( init ) );
-    int ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, init, nx, endian,
+    int ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, init, nx,
                                              MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY );
     TEST_EQUAL( ret, 0 );
 
     if( iendian == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID && iret != 0 )
-        m.ext_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
+       endian = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
 
-    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read( X, &m, input->x, input->len );
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read( X, &m, input->x, input->len, endian );
     TEST_EQUAL( ret, iret );
 
     if( iret == 0 )
     {
         if( iendian == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID && oret != 0 )
-            m.ext_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
+            endian = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID;
 
-        ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write( X, &m, buf, nb );
+        ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write( X, &m, buf, nb, endian );
         TEST_EQUAL( ret, oret );
     }
 
@@ -117,10 +117,12 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *buff_m = NULL;
-    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
     size_t limbs_X;
     size_t limbs_Y;
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &X, &limbs_X, input_X ), 0 );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &Y, &limbs_Y, input_Y ), 0 );
 
@@ -129,8 +131,6 @@
     size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
     size_t copy_bytes = copy_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
-
     TEST_EQUAL( limbs_X, limbs_Y );
     TEST_ASSERT( copy_limbs <= limbs );
 
@@ -138,7 +138,6 @@
     memset( buff_m, 0xFF, copy_limbs );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
                         &m, buff_m, copy_limbs,
-                        MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE,
                         MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ), 0 );
 
     /* condition is false */
@@ -190,10 +189,12 @@
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y = NULL;
     mbedtls_mpi_uint *buff_m = NULL;
-    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
     size_t limbs_X;
     size_t limbs_Y;
 
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &tmp_X, &limbs_X, input_X ), 0 );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &tmp_Y, &limbs_Y, input_Y ), 0 );
 
@@ -202,8 +203,6 @@
     size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
     size_t copy_bytes = copy_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
-
     TEST_EQUAL( limbs_X, limbs_Y );
     TEST_ASSERT( copy_limbs <= limbs );
 
@@ -211,7 +210,6 @@
     memset( buff_m, 0xFF, copy_limbs );
     TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
                         &m, buff_m, copy_limbs,
-                        MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE,
                         MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ), 0 );
 
     ASSERT_ALLOC( X, limbs );
@@ -275,10 +273,151 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_raw_sub( char * input_A,
+                      char * input_B,
+                      char * input_N,
+                      char * result )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *B = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *res = NULL;
+    size_t limbs_A;
+    size_t limbs_B;
+    size_t limbs_N;
+    size_t limbs_res;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A,   &limbs_A,   input_A ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &B,   &limbs_B,   input_B ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N,   &limbs_N,   input_N ), 0 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &res, &limbs_res, result  ), 0 );
+
+    size_t limbs = limbs_N;
+    size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( limbs_A,   limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( limbs_B,   limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( limbs_res, limbs );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( X, limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
+                        &m, N, limbs,
+                        MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ), 0 );
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X, A, B, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, res, bytes );
+
+    /* alias X to A */
+    memcpy( X, A, bytes );
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X, X, B, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, res, bytes );
+
+    /* alias X to B */
+    memcpy( X, B, bytes );
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X, A, X, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, res, bytes );
+
+    /* A == B: alias A and B */
+    if( memcmp( A, B, bytes ) == 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X, A, A, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, res, bytes );
+
+        /* X, A, B all aliased together */
+        memcpy( X, A, bytes );
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub( X, X, X, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, res, bytes );
+    }
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( B );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+    mbedtls_free( res );
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 2 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime( char * input_N, char * input_A, char * input_X )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    size_t A_limbs, N_limbs, X_limbs;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = NULL;
+    const mbedtls_mpi_uint *R2 = NULL;
+
+    /* Legacy MPIs for computing R2 */
+    mbedtls_mpi N_mpi;  /* gets set up manually, aliasing N, so no need to free */
+    mbedtls_mpi R2_mpi;
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &R2_mpi );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A, &A_limbs, input_A ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &N_limbs, input_N ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &X, &X_limbs, input_X ) );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( Y, N_limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( A_limbs, N_limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( X_limbs, N_limbs );
+
+    N_mpi.s = 1;
+    N_mpi.p = N;
+    N_mpi.n = N_limbs;
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe( &R2_mpi, &N_mpi ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &R2_mpi, N_limbs ) );
+    R2 = R2_mpi.p;
+
+    size_t working_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs( N_limbs );
+
+    /* No point exactly duplicating the code in mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()
+     * to see if the output is correct, but we can check that it's in a
+     * reasonable range.  The current calculation works out as
+     * `1 + N_limbs * (welem + 4)`, where welem is the number of elements in
+     * the window (1 << 1 up to 1 << 6).
+     */
+    size_t min_expected_working_limbs = 1 + N_limbs * 5;
+    size_t max_expected_working_limbs = 1 + N_limbs * 68;
+
+    TEST_LE_U( min_expected_working_limbs, working_limbs );
+    TEST_LE_U( working_limbs, max_expected_working_limbs );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( T, working_limbs );
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime( Y, A, N, N_limbs, R2, T );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, memcmp( X, Y, N_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) );
+
+    /* Check when output aliased to input */
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime( A, A, N, N_limbs, R2, T );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, memcmp( X, A, N_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( T );
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+    mbedtls_free( Y );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &R2_mpi );
+    // R2 doesn't need to be freed as it is only aliasing R2_mpi
+    // N_mpi doesn't need to be freed as it is only aliasing N
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 3 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 4 */
@@ -287,6 +426,97 @@
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 5 */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_raw_add( char * input_N,
+                      char * input_A, char * input_B,
+                      char * input_S )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *B = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *S = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    size_t A_limbs, B_limbs, N_limbs, S_limbs;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A, &A_limbs, input_A ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &B, &B_limbs, input_B ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &N_limbs, input_N ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &S, &S_limbs, input_S ) );
+
+    /* Modulus gives the number of limbs; all inputs must have the same. */
+    size_t limbs = N_limbs;
+    size_t bytes = limbs * sizeof( *A );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( A_limbs, limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( B_limbs, limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( S_limbs, limbs );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( X, limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(
+                        &m, N, limbs,
+                        MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY
+                ), 0 );
+
+    /* A + B => Correct result */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, A, B, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+    /* A + B: alias X to A => Correct result */
+    memcpy( X, A, bytes );
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, X, B, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+    /* A + B: alias X to B => Correct result */
+    memcpy( X, B, bytes );
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, A, X, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+    if ( memcmp(A, B, bytes ) == 0 )
+    {
+        /* A == B: alias A and B */
+
+        /* A + A => Correct result */
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, A, A, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+        /* A + A: X, A, B all aliased together => Correct result */
+        memcpy( X, A, bytes );
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, X, X, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* A != B: test B + A */
+
+        /* B + A => Correct result */
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, B, A, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+        /* B + A: alias X to A => Correct result */
+        memcpy( X, A, bytes );
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, B, X, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+
+        /* B + A: alias X to B => Correct result */
+        memcpy( X, B, bytes );
+        mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add( X, X, A, &m );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( X, bytes, S, bytes );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( B );
+    mbedtls_free( S );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
 /* END MERGE SLOT 5 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 6 */
@@ -315,7 +545,7 @@
     TEST_LE_U(a_limbs, n_limbs);
 
     TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
-                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
 
     /* Convert from cannonical into Montgomery representation */
     TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep( A, &m ) );
@@ -351,7 +581,7 @@
     TEST_LE_U(a_limbs, n_limbs);
 
     TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
-                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+                MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
 
     /* Convert from Montgomery into cannonical representation */
     TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep( A, &m ) );
@@ -365,6 +595,60 @@
     mbedtls_free( X );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_mod_raw_neg( char * input_N, char * input_A, char * input_X )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *N = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *A = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *X = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *R = NULL;
+    mbedtls_mpi_uint *Z = NULL;
+    size_t n_limbs, a_limbs, x_limbs, bytes;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus m;
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init( &m );
+
+    /* Read inputs */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &N, &n_limbs, input_N ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &A, &a_limbs, input_A ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_test_read_mpi_core( &X, &x_limbs, input_X ) );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( a_limbs, n_limbs );
+    TEST_EQUAL( x_limbs, n_limbs );
+    bytes = n_limbs * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint );
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( R, n_limbs );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( Z, n_limbs );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup( &m, N, n_limbs,
+            MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY ) );
+
+    /* Neg( A == 0 ) => Zero result */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( R, Z, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( R, bytes, Z, bytes );
+
+    /* Neg( A == N ) => Zero result */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( R, N, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( R, bytes, Z, bytes );
+
+    /* Neg( A ) => Correct result */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( R, A, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( R, bytes, X, bytes );
+
+    /* Neg( A ): alias A to R => Correct result */
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg( A, A, &m );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( A, bytes, X, bytes );
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free( &m );
+    mbedtls_free( N );
+    mbedtls_free( A );
+    mbedtls_free( X );
+    mbedtls_free( R );
+    mbedtls_free( Z );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* END MERGE SLOT 7 */
 
 /* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 8 */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
index b7c3b51..ff936df 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
@@ -450,8 +450,12 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, ad, sizeof( ad ) - i ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, ad, sizeof( ad ) - i ) );
+    int expected = ( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                     cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                   0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, ad, sizeof(ad) - i ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, ad, sizeof(ad) - i ) );
 #endif
 
     block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx_enc );
@@ -470,7 +474,7 @@
     total_len += outlen;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( &ctx_enc, tag, sizeof( tag ) ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( &ctx_enc, tag, sizeof(tag) ) );
 #endif
 
     TEST_ASSERT( total_len == length ||
@@ -491,7 +495,7 @@
     total_len += outlen;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx_dec, tag, sizeof( tag ) ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx_dec, tag, sizeof(tag) ) );
 #endif
 
     /* check result */
@@ -547,7 +551,11 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv, 16 ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx ) );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
+    int expected = ( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                     cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                   0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
 #endif
 
     /* encode length number of bytes from inbuf */
@@ -609,7 +617,11 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_dec ) );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) );
+    int expected = ( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                     cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                   0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) );
 #endif
 
     /* decode 0-byte string */
@@ -710,8 +722,12 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx_enc ) );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, NULL, 0 ) );
+    int expected = ( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                     cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                   0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_dec, NULL, 0 ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx_enc, NULL, 0 ) );
 #endif
 
     block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( &ctx_enc );
@@ -795,7 +811,11 @@
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len ) );
     TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_reset( &ctx ) );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, ad->x, ad->len ) );
+    int expected = ( ctx.cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                     ctx.cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                   0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected, mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( &ctx, ad->x, ad->len ) );
 #endif
 
     /* decode buffer and check tag->x */
@@ -806,7 +826,11 @@
                                                  &outlen ) );
     total_len += outlen;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
-    TEST_ASSERT( tag_result == mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx, tag->x, tag->len ) );
+    int tag_expected = ( ctx.cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
+                         ctx.cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) ?
+                       tag_result : MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( tag_expected, mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( &ctx, tag->x, tag->len ) );
 #endif
 
     /* check plaintext only if everything went fine */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_common.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_common.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..500852d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_common.data
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Block xor, length 0
+mbedtls_xor:0
+
+Block xor, length 1
+mbedtls_xor:1
+
+Block xor, length 3
+mbedtls_xor:3
+
+Block xor, length 4
+mbedtls_xor:4
+
+Block xor, length 7
+mbedtls_xor:7
+
+Block xor, length 8
+mbedtls_xor:8
+
+Block xor, length 16
+mbedtls_xor:16
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_common.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_common.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4444a52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_common.function
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+#include "../library/common.h"
+
+void fill_arrays( unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *r1, unsigned char *r2, size_t n )
+{
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        a[i]  = (unsigned char) i * 3;
+        b[i]  = (unsigned char) i * 3 + 1;
+        r1[i] = (unsigned char) i * 3 + 2;
+        r2[i] = r1[i];
+    }
+}
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mbedtls_xor( int len )
+{
+    size_t n = (size_t) len;
+    unsigned char *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( a, n + 1 );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( b, n + 1 );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( r1, n + 1 );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( r2, n + 1 );
+
+    /* Test non-overlapping */
+    fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n );
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r1[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
+    }
+    mbedtls_xor( r2, a, b, n );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( r1, n, r2, n );
+
+    /* Test r == a */
+    fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n );
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r1[i] = r1[i] ^ b[i];
+    }
+    mbedtls_xor( r2, r2, b, n );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( r1, n, r2, n );
+
+    /* Test r == b */
+    fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n );
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r1[i] = a[i] ^ r1[i];
+    }
+    mbedtls_xor( r2, a, r2, n );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( r1, n, r2, n );
+
+    /* Test a == b */
+    fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n );
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r1[i] = a[i] ^ a[i];
+    }
+    mbedtls_xor( r2, a, a, n );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( r1, n, r2, n );
+
+    /* Test a == b == r */
+    fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n );
+    for ( size_t i = 0; i < n; i++ )
+    {
+        r1[i] = r1[i] ^ r1[i];
+    }
+    mbedtls_xor( r2, r2, r2, n );
+    ASSERT_COMPARE( r1, n, r2, n );
+
+    /* Test non-word-aligned buffers, for all combinations of alignedness */
+    for ( int i = 0; i < 7; i++ )
+    {
+        int r_off = i & 1, a_off = (i & 2) >> 1, b_off = (i & 4) >> 2;
+        fill_arrays( a, b, r1, r2, n + 1 );
+
+        for ( size_t j = 0; j < n; j++ )
+        {
+            r1[j + r_off] = a[j + a_off] ^ b[j + b_off];
+        }
+        mbedtls_xor( r2 + r_off, a + a_off, b + b_off, n );
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( r1 + r_off, n, r2 + r_off, n );
+    }
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( a );
+    mbedtls_free( b );
+    mbedtls_free( r1 );
+    mbedtls_free( r2 );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4504aa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.data
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# these are the numbers we'd get with an empty plaintext and truncated HMAC
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: small
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:5:10
+
+# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-256
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: medium
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:255:32
+
+# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384
+Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large
+ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3673b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time.function
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+/** \file test_suite_constant_time.function
+ *
+ * Functional testing of functions in the constant_time module.
+ *
+ * The tests are instrumented with #TEST_CF_SECRET and #TEST_CF_PUBLIC
+ * (see tests/include/test/constant_flow.h) so that running the tests
+ * under MSan or Valgrind will detect a non-constant-time implementation.
+ */
+
+#include <mbedtls/constant_time.h>
+#include <constant_time_internal.h>
+#include <constant_time_invasive.h>
+
+#include <test/constant_flow.h>
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( int offset_min, int offset_max, int len )
+{
+    unsigned char *dst = NULL;
+    unsigned char *src = NULL;
+    size_t src_len = offset_max + len;
+    size_t secret;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( dst, len );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( src, src_len );
+
+    /* Fill src in a way that we can detect if we copied the right bytes */
+    mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, src, src_len );
+
+    for( secret = offset_min; secret <= (size_t) offset_max; secret++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret );
+
+        TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
+        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
+                                  offset_min, offset_max, len );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
+        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );
+
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( dst, len, src + secret, len );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( dst );
+    mbedtls_free( src );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abf90f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.data
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Constant-flow HMAC: MD5
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA256
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+
+Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
+ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8c1bfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+
+#include <mbedtls/constant_time.h>
+#include <mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h>
+#include <mbedtls/md.h>
+#include <constant_time_internal.h>
+#include <hash_info.h>
+
+#include <test/constant_flow.h>
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
+{
+    /*
+     * Test the function mbedtls_ct_hmac() against a reference
+     * implementation.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+    psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+#else
+    mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    size_t out_len, block_size;
+    size_t min_in_len, in_len, max_in_len, i;
+    /* TLS additional data is 13 bytes (hence the "lucky 13" name) */
+    unsigned char add_data[13];
+    unsigned char ref_out[MBEDTLS_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    unsigned char rec_num = 0;
+
+    USE_PSA_INIT( );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md( hash ) );
+
+    out_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg );
+    block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( alg );
+
+    /* mbedtls_ct_hmac() requires the key to be exportable */
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT |
+                                          PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg ) );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
+#else
+    mbedtls_md_init( &ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_init( &ref_ctx );
+
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash );
+    TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL );
+    out_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
+    TEST_ASSERT( out_len != 0 );
+    block_size = hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    /* Use allocated out buffer to catch overwrites */
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( out, out_len );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    /* Set up dummy key */
+    memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_import_key( &attributes,
+                                             ref_out, out_len,
+                                             &key ) );
+#else
+    /* Set up contexts with the given hash and a dummy key */
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ref_ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
+    memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ref_ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
+    memset( ref_out, 0, sizeof( ref_out ) );
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Test all possible lengths up to a point. The difference between
+     * max_in_len and min_in_len is at most 255, and make sure they both vary
+     * by at least one block size.
+     */
+    for( max_in_len = 0; max_in_len <= 255 + block_size; max_in_len++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 );
+
+        /* Use allocated in buffer to catch overreads */
+        ASSERT_ALLOC( data, max_in_len );
+
+        min_in_len = max_in_len > 255 ? max_in_len - 255 : 0;
+        for( in_len = min_in_len; in_len <= max_in_len; in_len++ )
+        {
+            mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 + in_len );
+
+            /* Set up dummy data and add_data */
+            rec_num++;
+            memset( add_data, rec_num, sizeof( add_data ) );
+            for( i = 0; i < in_len; i++ )
+                data[i] = ( i & 0xff ) ^ rec_num;
+
+            /* Get the function's result */
+            TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( key, PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg ),
+                                            add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+                                            data, in_len,
+                                            min_in_len, max_in_len,
+                                            out ) );
+#else
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
+                                            data, in_len,
+                                            min_in_len, max_in_len,
+                                            out ) );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+            TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
+            TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation,
+                                                           key, alg ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update( &operation, add_data,
+                                                     sizeof( add_data ) ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update( &operation,
+                                                     data, in_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation,
+                                                            out, out_len ) );
+#else
+            /* Compute the reference result */
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, add_data,
+                                                   sizeof( add_data ) ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, data, in_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ref_ctx, ref_out ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ref_ctx ) );
+
+            /* Compare */
+            ASSERT_COMPARE( out, out_len, ref_out, out_len );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+        }
+
+        mbedtls_free( data );
+        data = NULL;
+    }
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_mac_abort( &operation );
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+#else
+    mbedtls_md_free( &ref_ctx );
+    mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    mbedtls_free( data );
+    mbedtls_free( out );
+
+    USE_PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function
index c40c50e..ec1122a 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_mps.function
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
     /* This test exercises the behaviour of the MPS reader with accumulator
      * in the situation where upon calling mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(), the
      * uncommitted data together with the excess data missing in the last
-     * call to medtls_mps_reader_get() exceeds the bounds of the type
+     * call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() exceeds the bounds of the type
      * holding the buffer length.
      */
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3cbb62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.data
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Pass SHA256 #1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Pass SHA1 #2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der":MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Pass Without CERT #3
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_without_cert_signed.der":MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Fail with multiple certs #4
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_certs_signed.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Fail with corrupted cert #5
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badcert.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Fail with corrupted signer info #6
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_signed_badsigner.der":MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO,MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Fail Version other than 1 #7
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_v2.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Fail Encrypted Content #8
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_encrypted.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass SHA256 #9
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass SHA256 #9.1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass SHA1 #10
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha1.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Pass SHA512 #11
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha512.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Fail because of different certificate #12
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verification Fail because of different data hash #13
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signed_sha256.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.der":"data_files/pkcs7_data_1.bin":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Failure Corrupt signerInfo.issuer #15.1
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_issuer_invalid_size.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Parse Failure Corrupt signerInfo.serial #15.2
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_signerInfo_serial_invalid_size.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO
+
+pkcs7_get_signers_info_set error handling (6213931373035520)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-missing_free-fuzz_pkcs7-6213931373035520.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+pkcs7_get_signers_info_set error handling (4541044530479104)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_get_signers_info_set-missing_free-fuzz_pkcs7-6213931373035520.der":MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+
+PKCS7 Only Signed Data Parse Pass #15
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+pkcs7_parse:"data_files/pkcs7_data_cert_signeddata_sha256.der":MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Verify with multiple signers #16
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify_multiple_signers:"data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":0:0
+
+PKCS7 Signed Data Hash Verify with multiple signers #17
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+pkcs7_verify_multiple_signers:"data_files/pkcs7_data_multiple_signed.der":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-1.crt":"data_files/pkcs7-rsa-sha256-2.crt":"data_files/pkcs7_data.bin":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d7dec6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "sys/types.h"
+#include "sys/stat.h"
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
+ * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ * END_DEPENDENCIES
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+void pkcs7_parse( char *pkcs7_file, int res_expect )
+{
+    unsigned char *pkcs7_buf = NULL;
+    size_t buflen;
+    int res;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7 pkcs7;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_init( &pkcs7 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_pk_load_file( pkcs7_file, &pkcs7_buf, &buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( &pkcs7, pkcs7_buf, buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, res_expect );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( pkcs7_buf );
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_free( &pkcs7 );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+void pkcs7_verify( char *pkcs7_file, char *crt, char *filetobesigned, int do_hash_alg, int res_expect )
+{
+    unsigned char *pkcs7_buf = NULL;
+    size_t buflen;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    unsigned char hash[32];
+    struct stat st;
+    size_t datalen;
+    int res;
+    FILE *file;
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7 pkcs7;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt x509;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_init( &pkcs7 );
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &x509 );
+
+    USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+    res = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &x509, crt );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_pk_load_file( pkcs7_file, &pkcs7_buf, &buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( &pkcs7, pkcs7_buf, buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA );
+
+    res = stat( filetobesigned, &st );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    file = fopen( filetobesigned, "rb" );
+    TEST_ASSERT( file != NULL );
+
+    datalen = st.st_size;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( data, datalen );
+    TEST_ASSERT( data != NULL );
+
+    buflen = fread( (void *)data , sizeof( unsigned char ), datalen, file );
+    TEST_EQUAL( buflen, datalen );
+    fclose( file );
+
+    if( do_hash_alg )
+    {
+        res = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &pkcs7.signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( md_alg, (mbedtls_md_type_t) do_hash_alg );
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
+
+        res = mbedtls_md( md_info, data, datalen, hash );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+        res = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify( &pkcs7, &x509, hash, sizeof(hash) );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        res = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify( &pkcs7, &x509, data, datalen );
+    }
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, res_expect );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &x509 );
+    mbedtls_free( data );
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_free( &pkcs7 );
+    mbedtls_free( pkcs7_buf );
+    USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_FS_IO:MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+void pkcs7_verify_multiple_signers( char *pkcs7_file, char *crt1, char *crt2, char *filetobesigned, int do_hash_alg, int res_expect )
+{
+    unsigned char *pkcs7_buf = NULL;
+    size_t buflen;
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    unsigned char hash[32];
+    struct stat st;
+    size_t datalen;
+    int res;
+    FILE *file;
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7 pkcs7;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt x509_1;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt x509_2;
+
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_init( &pkcs7 );
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &x509_1 );
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &x509_2 );
+
+    USE_PSA_INIT();
+
+    res = mbedtls_pk_load_file( pkcs7_file, &pkcs7_buf, &buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der( &pkcs7, pkcs7_buf, buflen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( pkcs7.signed_data.no_of_signers, 2 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &x509_1, crt1 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &x509_2, crt2 );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    res = stat( filetobesigned, &st );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+    file = fopen( filetobesigned, "rb" );
+    TEST_ASSERT( file != NULL );
+
+    datalen = st.st_size;
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( data, datalen );
+    buflen = fread( ( void * )data , sizeof( unsigned char ), datalen, file );
+    TEST_EQUAL( buflen, datalen );
+
+    fclose( file );
+
+    if( do_hash_alg )
+    {
+        res = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &pkcs7.signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( md_alg, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 );
+
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
+
+        res = mbedtls_md( md_info, data, datalen, hash );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, 0 );
+
+        res = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify( &pkcs7, &x509_1, hash, sizeof(hash) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, res_expect );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        res = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify( &pkcs7, &x509_1, data, datalen );
+        TEST_EQUAL( res, res_expect );
+    }
+
+    res = mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify( &pkcs7, &x509_2, data, datalen );
+    TEST_EQUAL( res, res_expect );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &x509_1 );
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &x509_2 );
+    mbedtls_pkcs7_free( &pkcs7 );
+    mbedtls_free( data );
+    mbedtls_free( pkcs7_buf );
+    USE_PSA_DONE();
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
index cce3fd0..9ced77c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data
@@ -4138,7 +4138,7 @@
 sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f"
 
 PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
 sign_hash_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):"59e1748777448c69de6b800d7a33bbfb9ff1b463e44354c3553bcdb9c666fa90125a3c79f90397bdf5f6a13de828684f":"cd40ba1b555ca5994d30ddffc4ad734b1f5c604675b0f249814aa5de3992ef3ddf4d5dc5d2aab1979ce210b560754df671363d99795475882894c048e3b986ca"
 
 PSA sign hash: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
@@ -4406,7 +4406,7 @@
 sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"616263":"36e5b5a7da1c9c265dc447de3a5a704fcb8c03f7a3749dde48d84c9bf736fc1ed48d8b3660e7d3cbc6b1870730b7ce2a043f69e37ccb340b98d1e65184e03548"
 
 PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
 sign_message_deterministic:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263":"7ea712a20e3a8cbe0c6e64195362ba7635bbe78af51ddedd7a5fd858395250c592654c35d3b0614ae0e3b329c25cf5b4a5fcb243af3e3ad15c8446fe401be066"
 
 PSA sign message: deterministic ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
@@ -4526,7 +4526,7 @@
 sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263"
 
 PSA sign/verify message: deterministic ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-384
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDLTS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384
 sign_verify_message:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"616263"
 
 PSA sign/verify message: randomized ECDSA SECP384R1 SHA-256
@@ -6490,111 +6490,3 @@
 
 PSA derive persistent key: HKDF SHA-256, exportable
 persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:DERIVE_KEY
-
-PSA PAKE: invalid alg
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: invalid primitive type
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: invalid primitive family
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: invalid primitive bits
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 128):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: invalid hash
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup server output step first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"abcd":0:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup server input step first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:"abcd":0:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup server empty password
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:"":0:0:0:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup client output step first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT:0:"abcd":0:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup client input step first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT:1:"abcd":0:0:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup client empty password
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT:0:"":0:0:0:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup client bad password key type
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT:0:"abcd":0:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup client bad password key usage
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT:0:"abcd":0:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup invalid role NONE
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE:0:"abcd":0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:0:0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
-ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
-ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake no input errors
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:0:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake no input errors, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:0:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, first round client
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:1:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, first round client, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:1:1:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, first round server
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:2:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, first round server, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:1:2:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, second round client
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:3:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, second round client, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:1:3:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, second round server
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:4:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake inject input errors, second round server, client input first
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
-ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:1:4:"abcdef"
-
-PSA PAKE: ecjpake size macros
-depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
-ecjpake_size_macros:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
index 779f594..dbbac76 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
 #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
 #include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "common.h"
 
 /* For MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST, knowing that psa_generate_random()
  * uses mbedtls_ctr_drbg internally. */
@@ -31,6 +32,27 @@
 #define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE(   operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id != 0 )
 #define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id == 0 )
 
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+int ecjpake_operation_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+                              psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+                              psa_pake_role_t role,
+                              mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                              size_t key_available )
+{
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( operation ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( operation, cipher_suite ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( operation, role) );
+
+    if( key_available )
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( operation, key ) );
+    return 0;
+exit:
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
 /** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */
 static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U;
 
@@ -600,7 +622,7 @@
  *                                  the data in to be encrypted / decrypted. If
  *                                  -1, no chunking
  * \param expected_output           Expected output
- * \param is_verify                 If non-zero this is an verify operation.
+ * \param is_verify                 If non-zero this is a verify operation.
  * \param do_zero_parts             If non-zero, interleave zero length chunks
  *                                  with normal length chunks.
  * \return int                      Zero on failure, non-zero on success.
@@ -1297,6 +1319,24 @@
 }
 #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
 
+typedef enum
+{
+    INJECT_ERR_NONE = 0,
+    INJECT_ERR_UNINITIALIZED_ACCESS,
+    INJECT_ERR_DUPLICATE_SETUP,
+    INJECT_ERR_INVALID_USER,
+    INJECT_ERR_INVALID_PEER,
+    INJECT_ERR_SET_USER,
+    INJECT_ERR_SET_PEER,
+    INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER,
+    INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP,
+    INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP,
+    INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE,
+    INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE,
+    INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_1,
+    INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_2,
+} ecjpake_injected_failure_t;
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -3962,7 +4002,7 @@
     TEST_LE_U( length, output_buffer_size );
     output_length += length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                   output + output_length,
+                                   mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, output_length ),
                                    output_buffer_size - output_length,
                                    &length ) );
     output_length += length;
@@ -3980,7 +4020,7 @@
     TEST_LE_U( length, output_buffer_size );
     output_length += length;
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_cipher_finish( &operation,
-                                   output + output_length,
+                                   mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, output_length ),
                                    output_buffer_size - output_length,
                                    &length ) );
     output_length += length;
@@ -6091,7 +6131,7 @@
 
     psa_aead_abort( &operation );
 
-    /* Test for calling set lengths with an plaintext length of SIZE_MAX, after setting nonce */
+    /* Test for calling set lengths with a plaintext length of SIZE_MAX, after setting nonce */
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) );
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation, nonce->x, nonce->len ) );
@@ -8732,15 +8772,12 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
 void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg,
                     int primitive_arg, int hash_arg, int role_arg,
-                    int input_first, data_t *pw_data,
-                    int expected_status_setup_arg,
-                    int expected_status_set_role_arg,
-                    int expected_status_set_password_key_arg,
-                    int expected_status_input_output_arg)
+                    int test_input, data_t *pw_data,
+                    int inj_err_type_arg,
+                    int expected_error_arg)
 {
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
     psa_pake_operation_t operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
-    psa_pake_operation_t op_copy = psa_pake_operation_init();
     psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
     psa_pake_primitive_t primitive = primitive_arg;
     psa_key_type_t key_type_pw = key_type_pw_arg;
@@ -8749,12 +8786,9 @@
     psa_pake_role_t role = role_arg;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_status_t expected_status_setup = expected_status_setup_arg;
-    psa_status_t expected_status_set_role = expected_status_set_role_arg;
-    psa_status_t expected_status_set_password_key =
-                        expected_status_set_password_key_arg;
-    psa_status_t expected_status_input_output =
-                        expected_status_input_output_arg;
+    ecjpake_injected_failure_t inj_err_type = inj_err_type_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_error = expected_error_arg;
+    psa_status_t status;
     unsigned char *output_buffer = NULL;
     size_t output_len = 0;
 
@@ -8779,54 +8813,90 @@
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
-                                 NULL, 0, NULL ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, NULL, 0),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
-    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
-
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite ),
-                expected_status_setup );
-    if( expected_status_setup != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_UNINITIALIZED_ACCESS )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key ),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role ),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                    NULL, 0, NULL ),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, NULL, 0),
+                    expected_error );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
         goto exit;
+    }
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite ),
-                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role),
-                expected_status_set_role );
-    if( expected_status_set_role != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    status = psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite );
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS)
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error );
         goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_DUPLICATE_SETUP )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite ),
+                expected_error );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    status = psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role);
+    if ( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     if( pw_data->len > 0 )
     {
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key ),
-                    expected_status_set_password_key );
-        if( expected_status_set_password_key != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        status = psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key );
+        if ( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error );
             goto exit;
+        }
     }
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_INVALID_USER )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
-    const uint8_t unsupported_id[] = "abcd";
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_INVALID_PEER )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, unsupported_id, 4 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, unsupported_id, 4 ),
-                PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_SET_USER )
+    {
+        const uint8_t unsupported_id[] = "abcd";
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, unsupported_id, 4 ),
+                    PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ERR_SET_PEER )
+    {
+        const uint8_t unsupported_id[] = "abcd";
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, unsupported_id, 4 ),
+                    PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     const size_t size_key_share = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive,
                                                 PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE );
@@ -8835,79 +8905,109 @@
     const size_t size_zk_proof = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive,
                                                 PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF );
 
-    /* First round */
-    if( input_first )
+    if ( test_input )
     {
-        /* Invalid parameters (input) */
-        op_copy = operation;
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
-                                    NULL, 0 ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-        /* Invalid parameters (step) */
-        op_copy = operation;
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
-                                    output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-        /* Invalid first step */
-        op_copy = operation;
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
-                                    output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
-        /* Possibly valid */
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
-                                    output_buffer, size_key_share ),
-                    expected_status_input_output);
-
-        if( expected_status_input_output == PSA_SUCCESS )
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER )
         {
-            /* Buffer too large */
-            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
-                                    output_buffer, size_zk_public + 1 ),
-                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, NULL, 0 ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            goto exit;
+        }
 
-            /* The operation's state should be invalidated at this point */
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        status = psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                        output_buffer, size_key_share );
+        if ( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public + 1 ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE )
+        {
+            // Just trigger any kind of error. We don't care about the result here
+            psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public + 1 );
             TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
                                         output_buffer, size_zk_public ),
-                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+                                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            goto exit;
         }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        /* Invalid parameters (output) */
-        op_copy = operation;
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
-                                     NULL, 0, NULL ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-        op_copy = operation;
-        /* Invalid parameters (step) */
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
-                                     output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
-        /* Invalid first step */
-        op_copy = operation;
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
-                                     output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
-                    PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-
-        /* Possibly valid */
-        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
-                                     output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
-                    expected_status_input_output );
-
-        if( expected_status_input_output == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    } else {
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER )
         {
-            TEST_ASSERT( output_len > 0 );
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        NULL, 0, NULL ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            goto exit;
+        }
 
-            /* Buffer too small */
-            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
-                                         output_buffer, size_zk_public - 1, &output_len ),
-                        PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
+            goto exit;
+        }
 
-            /* The operation's state should be invalidated at this point */
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        status = psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                    output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len );
+        if ( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
+        {
+            TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        TEST_ASSERT( output_len > 0 );
+
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE )
+        {
             TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
-                                         output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
-                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public - 1, &output_len ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE )
+        {
+            // Just trigger any kind of error. We don't care about the result here
+            psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public - 1, &output_len );
+            TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                        PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+            goto exit;
         }
     }
 
@@ -8974,7 +9074,7 @@
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
 void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
                      int derive_alg_arg, data_t *pw_data,
-                     int client_input_first )
+                     int client_input_first, int inj_err_type_arg )
 {
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
     psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init();
@@ -8988,6 +9088,7 @@
                             PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
     psa_key_derivation_operation_t client_derive =
                             PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+    ecjpake_injected_failure_t inj_err_type = inj_err_type_arg;
 
     PSA_INIT( );
 
@@ -9025,19 +9126,27 @@
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) );
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) );
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
+    if( inj_err_type == INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_1 )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
                 PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
                 PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     /* First round */
     ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
                       client_input_first, 1, 0 );
 
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
+    if ( inj_err_type == INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_2 )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
                 PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
-    TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
                 PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        goto exit;
+    }
 
     /* Second round */
     ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
index 0a8d595..6069a69 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data
@@ -299,6 +299,22 @@
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
 export_key:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
 
+raw key agreement through driver: fake
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":"0102030405":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+raw key agreement through driver: in-driver
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":"":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+raw key agreement through driver: fallback
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH
+key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":"":PSA_SUCCESS
+
+raw key agreement through driver: error
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de":"":PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
+
 PSA symmetric encrypt validation: AES-CTR, 16 bytes, good
 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES
 cipher_encrypt_validation:PSA_ALG_CTR:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
index 128352b..b713cb2 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function
@@ -542,6 +542,94 @@
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
+void key_agreement( int alg_arg,
+                    int force_status_arg,
+                    int our_key_type_arg,
+                    data_t *our_key_data,
+                    data_t *peer_key_data,
+                    data_t *expected_output,
+                    data_t* fake_output,
+                    int expected_status_arg )
+{
+    psa_status_t force_status = force_status_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_key_type_t our_key_type = our_key_type_arg;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t our_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    const uint8_t *expected_output_ptr = NULL;
+    size_t expected_output_length = 0;
+    unsigned char *actual_output = NULL;
+    size_t actual_output_length = ~0;
+    size_t key_bits;
+    psa_status_t actual_status;
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks =
+        mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_init();
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, our_key_type );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes,
+                                our_key_data->x, our_key_data->len,
+                                &our_key ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_get_key_attributes( our_key, &attributes ) );
+    key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes );
+
+    TEST_LE_U( expected_output->len,
+               PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( our_key_type, key_bits ) );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( our_key_type, key_bits ),
+               PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+
+    if( fake_output->len > 0 )
+    {
+        expected_output_ptr =
+            mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output =
+            fake_output->x;
+
+        expected_output_length =
+            mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_output_length =
+            fake_output->len;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        expected_output_ptr = expected_output->x;
+        expected_output_length = expected_output->len;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.hits = 0;
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.forced_status = force_status;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( actual_output, expected_output->len );
+    actual_status = psa_raw_key_agreement( alg, our_key,
+                                       peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len,
+                                       actual_output, expected_output->len,
+                                       &actual_output_length ) ;
+    TEST_EQUAL( actual_status, expected_status );
+    TEST_EQUAL( mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks.hits, 1 );
+
+    if( actual_status == PSA_SUCCESS )
+    {
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( actual_output, actual_output_length,
+                        expected_output_ptr, expected_output_length);
+    }
+    mbedtls_free( actual_output );
+    actual_output = NULL;
+    actual_output_length = ~0;
+
+exit:
+    psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
+    psa_destroy_key( our_key );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+    mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks =
+        mbedtls_test_driver_key_agreement_hooks_init();
+}
+
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
 void cipher_encrypt_validation( int alg_arg,
                                 int key_type_arg,
                                 data_t *key_data,
@@ -660,14 +748,14 @@
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_operation =
             MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
-    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t tranparent_operation =
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_operation =
             MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
     mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_operation =
             MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
     operation.ctx.mbedtls_ctx = mbedtls_operation;
-    operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = tranparent_operation;
+    operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = transparent_operation;
     operation.ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx = opaque_operation;
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
@@ -792,14 +880,14 @@
     mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_operation =
             MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
-    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t tranparent_operation =
+    mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_operation =
             MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
     mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_operation =
             MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
 
     operation.ctx.mbedtls_ctx = mbedtls_operation;
-    operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = tranparent_operation;
+    operation.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx = transparent_operation;
     operation.ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx = opaque_operation;
 
     PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function
index dbe9a0e..6dc6043 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.function
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
     psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = INVALID_KEY_ID;
 
-    // key lifetiem, usage flags, algorithm are irrelevant for this test
+    // key lifetime, usage flags, algorithm are irrelevant for this test
     psa_key_type_t key_type = key_type_arg;
     size_t bits = bits_arg;
     psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg;
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f447ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.data
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+PSA PAKE: uninitialized access to psa_pake_operation_t
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_UNINITIALIZED_ACCESS:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid alg
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid primitive type
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid primitive family
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid primitive bits
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 128):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid hash
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_1:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: duplicate a valid setup
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_DUPLICATE_SETUP:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: ecjpake setup invalid role NONE
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE:0:ERR_IN_SET_ROLE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: wrong password key type
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SET_PASSWORD_KEY:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: wrong password key usage
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_IN_SET_PASSWORD_KEY:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+
+PSA PAKE: set invalid user
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_INVALID_USER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: set invalid peer
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_INVALID_PEER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: set user
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_SET_USER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: set peer
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_SET_PEER:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid input
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:ERR_INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: unkown input step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:ERR_INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid first input step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:ERR_INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: input buffer too large
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:ERR_INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: valid input operation after a failure
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:1:ERR_INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid output
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: unkown output step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+
+PSA PAKE: invalid first output step
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: output buffer too small
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+
+PSA PAKE: valid output operation after a failure
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER:0:ERR_INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+
+PSA PAKE: check rounds w/o forced errors
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0:ERR_NONE
+
+PSA PAKE: check rounds w/o forced errors, TLS12_PRF
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0:ERR_NONE
+
+PSA PAKE: check rounds, key is destroyed after being passed to set_password_key
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:1:ERR_NONE
+
+PSA PAKE: check rounds w/o forced errors, client input first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1:0:ERR_NONE
+
+PSA PAKE: force early key derivation 1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0:ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_1
+
+PSA PAKE: force early key derivation 2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS
+ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0:ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_2
+
+PSA PAKE: no injected errors
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA PAKE: no injected errors, client input first
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:1:"abcdef":ERR_NONE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART1
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART1:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: inject ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
+ecjpake_rounds_inject:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:0:"abcdef":ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+
+PSA PAKE: ecjpake size macros
+depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+ecjpake_size_macros:
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.function
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f000c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_pake.function
@@ -0,0 +1,917 @@
+/* BEGIN_HEADER */
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+typedef enum
+{
+    ERR_NONE = 0,
+    /* errors forced internally in the code */
+    ERR_INJECT_UNINITIALIZED_ACCESS,
+    ERR_INJECT_DUPLICATE_SETUP,
+    ERR_INJECT_INVALID_USER,
+    ERR_INJECT_INVALID_PEER,
+    ERR_INJECT_SET_USER,
+    ERR_INJECT_SET_PEER,
+    ERR_INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER,
+    ERR_INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP,
+    ERR_INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP,
+    ERR_INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE,
+    ERR_INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE,
+    ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART1,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC,
+    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF,
+    /* erros issued from the .data file */
+    ERR_IN_SETUP,
+    ERR_IN_SET_ROLE,
+    ERR_IN_SET_PASSWORD_KEY,
+    ERR_IN_INPUT,
+    ERR_IN_OUTPUT,
+} ecjpake_error_stage_t;
+
+typedef enum
+{
+    PAKE_ROUND_ONE,
+    PAKE_ROUND_TWO
+} pake_round_t;
+
+/*
+ * Inject an error on the specified buffer ONLY it this is the correct stage.
+ * Offset 7 is arbitrary, but chosen because it's "in the middle" of the part
+ * we're corrupting.
+ */
+#define DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT( this_stage, buf ) \
+    if ( this_stage == err_stage )                  \
+    {                                               \
+        *( buf + 7) ^= 1;                           \
+    }
+
+#define DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( main_buf_offset, step_offset, step_size ) \
+    {                                       \
+        step_offset = main_buf_offset;      \
+        main_buf_offset += step_size;        \
+    }
+
+#define DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  )                                  \
+    if( err_stage != ERR_NONE && status != PSA_SUCCESS )            \
+    {                                                               \
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error_arg );                   \
+        break;                                                      \
+    }                                                               \
+    else                                                            \
+    {                                                               \
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS );                          \
+    }
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+static void ecjpake_do_round( psa_algorithm_t alg, unsigned int primitive,
+                              psa_pake_operation_t *server,
+                              psa_pake_operation_t *client,
+                              int client_input_first,
+                              pake_round_t round,
+                              ecjpake_error_stage_t err_stage,
+                              int expected_error_arg )
+{
+    unsigned char *buffer0 = NULL, *buffer1 = NULL;
+    size_t buffer_length = (
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) +
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) +
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF)) * 2;
+    /* The output should be exactly this size according to the spec */
+    const size_t expected_size_key_share =
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE);
+    /* The output should be exactly this size according to the spec */
+    const size_t expected_size_zk_public =
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC);
+    /* The output can be smaller: the spec allows stripping leading zeroes */
+    const size_t max_expected_size_zk_proof =
+        PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF);
+    size_t buffer0_off = 0;
+    size_t buffer1_off = 0;
+    size_t s_g1_len, s_g2_len, s_a_len;
+    size_t s_g1_off, s_g2_off, s_a_off;
+    size_t s_x1_pk_len, s_x2_pk_len, s_x2s_pk_len;
+    size_t s_x1_pk_off, s_x2_pk_off, s_x2s_pk_off;
+    size_t s_x1_pr_len, s_x2_pr_len, s_x2s_pr_len;
+    size_t s_x1_pr_off, s_x2_pr_off, s_x2s_pr_off;
+    size_t c_g1_len, c_g2_len, c_a_len;
+    size_t c_g1_off, c_g2_off, c_a_off;
+    size_t c_x1_pk_len, c_x2_pk_len, c_x2s_pk_len;
+    size_t c_x1_pk_off, c_x2_pk_off, c_x2s_pk_off;
+    size_t c_x1_pr_len, c_x2_pr_len, c_x2s_pr_len;
+    size_t c_x1_pr_off, c_x2_pr_off, c_x2s_pr_off;
+    psa_status_t status;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer0, buffer_length );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( buffer1, buffer_length );
+
+    switch( round )
+    {
+        case PAKE_ROUND_ONE:
+            /* Server first round Output */
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_g1_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_g1_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_g1_off, s_g1_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x1_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_x1_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x1_pk_off, s_x1_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x1_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( s_x1_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART1,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x1_pr_off, s_x1_pr_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_g2_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_g2_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART2,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_g2_off, s_g2_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x2_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_x2_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x2_pk_off, s_x2_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x2_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( s_x2_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x2_pr_off, s_x2_pr_len );
+
+            /*
+             * When injecting errors in inputs, the implementation is
+             * free to detect it right away of with a delay.
+             * This permits delaying the error until the end of the input
+             * sequence, if no error appears then, this will be treated
+             * as an error.
+             */
+            if( client_input_first == 1 )
+            {
+                /* Client first round Input */
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_g1_off, s_g1_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x1_pk_off,
+                                         s_x1_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x1_pr_off,
+                                         s_x1_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_g2_off,
+                                         s_g2_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2_pk_off,
+                                         s_x2_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2_pr_off,
+                                         s_x2_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+                if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1 ) &&
+                    ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2 ) )
+                {
+                    TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Client first round Output */
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_g1_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_g1_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART1,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_g1_off, c_g1_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x1_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_x1_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART1,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x1_pk_off, c_x1_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x1_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( c_x1_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART1,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x1_pr_off, c_x1_pr_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_g2_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_g2_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART2,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_g2_off, c_g2_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x2_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_x2_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC_PART2,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x2_pk_off, c_x2_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x2_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( c_x2_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART2,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x2_pr_off, buffer1_off );
+
+            if( client_input_first == 0 )
+            {
+                /* Client first round Input */
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_g1_off, s_g1_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x1_pk_off,
+                                         s_x1_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x1_pr_off,
+                                         s_x1_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_g2_off,
+                                         s_g2_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2_pk_off,
+                                         s_x2_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2_pr_off,
+                                         s_x2_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+                if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_KEY_SHARE_PART1 ) &&
+                    ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_SERVER_ZK_PROOF_PART2 ) )
+                {
+                    TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Server first round Input */
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                     buffer1 + c_g1_off, c_g1_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x1_pk_off, c_x1_pk_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x1_pr_off, c_x1_pr_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                     buffer1 + c_g2_off, c_g2_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x2_pk_off, c_x2_pk_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x2_pr_off, c_x2_pr_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+            if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_PART1 ) &&
+                ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND1_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF_PART2 ) )
+            {
+                TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+            }
+
+            break;
+
+        case PAKE_ROUND_TWO:
+            /* Server second round Output */
+            buffer0_off = 0;
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_a_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_a_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_a_off, s_a_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x2s_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( s_x2s_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x2s_pk_off, s_x2s_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + buffer0_off,
+                                         512 - buffer0_off, &s_x2s_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( s_x2s_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF,
+                                    buffer0 + buffer0_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer0_off, s_x2s_pr_off, s_x2s_pr_len );
+
+            if( client_input_first == 1 )
+            {
+                /* Client second round Input */
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_a_off, s_a_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2s_pk_off,
+                                         s_x2s_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2s_pr_off,
+                                         s_x2s_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+                if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE ) &&
+                    ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF ) )
+                {
+                    TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Client second round Output */
+            buffer1_off = 0;
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_a_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_a_len, expected_size_key_share );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_a_off, c_a_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x2s_pk_len ) );
+            TEST_EQUAL( c_x2s_pk_len, expected_size_zk_public );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x2s_pk_off, c_x2s_pk_len );
+
+            PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_output( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer1 + buffer1_off,
+                                         512 - buffer1_off, &c_x2s_pr_len ) );
+            TEST_LE_U( c_x2s_pr_len, max_expected_size_zk_proof );
+            DO_ROUND_CONDITIONAL_INJECT(
+                                    ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF,
+                                    buffer1 + buffer1_off );
+            DO_ROUND_UPDATE_OFFSETS( buffer1_off, c_x2s_pr_off, c_x2s_pr_len );
+
+            if( client_input_first == 0 )
+            {
+                /* Client second round Input */
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                         buffer0 + s_a_off, s_a_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2s_pk_off,
+                                         s_x2s_pk_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                status = psa_pake_input( client, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                         buffer0 + s_x2s_pr_off,
+                                         s_x2s_pr_len );
+                DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+                /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+                if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_KEY_SHARE ) &&
+                    ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_SERVER_ZK_PROOF ) )
+                {
+                    TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Server second round Input */
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                     buffer1 + c_a_off, c_a_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x2s_pk_off, c_x2s_pk_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            status = psa_pake_input( server, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                     buffer1 + c_x2s_pr_off, c_x2s_pr_len );
+            DO_ROUND_CHECK_FAILURE(  );
+
+            /* Error didn't trigger, make test fail */
+            if( ( err_stage >= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE ) &&
+                ( err_stage <= ERR_INJECT_ROUND2_CLIENT_ZK_PROOF ) )
+            {
+                TEST_ASSERT( ! "One of the last psa_pake_input() calls should have returned the expected error." );
+            }
+
+            break;
+
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( buffer0 );
+    mbedtls_free( buffer1 );
+}
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
+
+/*
+ * This check is used for functions that might either succeed or fail depending
+ * on the parameters that are passed in from the *.data file:
+ * - in case of success following functions depend on the current one
+ * - in case of failure the test is always terminated. There are two options
+ *   here
+ *     - terminated successfully if this exact error was expected at this stage
+ *     - terminated with failure otherwise (either no error was expected at this
+ *       stage or a different error code was expected)
+ */
+#define SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( test_function, this_check_err_stage )      \
+    status = test_function;                                                 \
+    if( err_stage != this_check_err_stage )                                 \
+    {                                                                       \
+        PSA_ASSERT( status );                                               \
+    }                                                                       \
+    else                                                                    \
+    {                                                                       \
+        TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_error );                               \
+        goto exit;                                                          \
+    }
+
+/*
+ * This check is used for failures that are injected at code level. There's only
+ * 1 input parameter that is relevant in this case and it's the stage at which
+ * the error should be injected.
+ * The check is conditional in this case because, once the error is triggered,
+ * the pake's context structure is compromised and the setup function cannot
+ * proceed further. As a consequence the test is terminated.
+ * The test succeeds if the returned error is exactly the expected one,
+ * otherwise it fails.
+ */
+#define SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( test_function, this_check_err_stage ) \
+    if( err_stage == this_check_err_stage )                                 \
+    {                                                                       \
+        TEST_EQUAL( test_function, expected_error );                        \
+        goto exit;                                                          \
+    }
+/* END_HEADER */
+
+/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
+ * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ * END_DEPENDENCIES
+ */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
+void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg,
+                    int primitive_arg, int hash_arg, int role_arg,
+                    int test_input,
+                    int err_stage_arg,
+                    int expected_error_arg)
+{
+    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
+    psa_pake_operation_t operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_pake_primitive_t primitive = primitive_arg;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type_pw = key_type_pw_arg;
+    psa_key_usage_t key_usage_pw = key_usage_pw_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hash_arg;
+    psa_pake_role_t role = role_arg;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    ecjpake_error_stage_t err_stage = err_stage_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_error = expected_error_arg;
+    psa_status_t status;
+    unsigned char *output_buffer = NULL;
+    size_t output_len = 0;
+    const uint8_t unsupp_id[] = "abcd";
+    const uint8_t password[] = "abcd";
+    psa_key_derivation_operation_t key_derivation =
+                            PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+
+    PSA_INIT( );
+
+    size_t buf_size = PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive_arg,
+                                       PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE );
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( output_buffer, buf_size );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, key_usage_pw );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type_pw );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, password, sizeof( password ),
+                &key ) );
+
+    psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( &cipher_suite, alg );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( &cipher_suite, primitive );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_hash( &cipher_suite, hash_alg );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+
+    if ( err_stage == ERR_INJECT_UNINITIALIZED_ACCESS )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                    NULL, 0, NULL ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                    NULL, 0 ),
+                    expected_error );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &operation, &key_derivation ),
+                    expected_error );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite ),
+                            ERR_IN_SETUP );
+
+    SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite ),
+                                    ERR_INJECT_DUPLICATE_SETUP);
+
+    SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_role( &operation, role),
+                                ERR_IN_SET_ROLE );
+
+    SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_password_key( &operation, key ),
+                                ERR_IN_SET_PASSWORD_KEY );
+
+    SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                                    ERR_INJECT_INVALID_USER );
+
+    SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, NULL, 0 ),
+                                    ERR_INJECT_INVALID_PEER );
+
+    SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_user( &operation, unsupp_id, 4 ),
+                                    ERR_INJECT_SET_USER );
+
+    SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_set_peer( &operation, unsupp_id, 4 ),
+                                    ERR_INJECT_SET_PEER );
+
+    const size_t size_key_share = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive,
+                                                PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE );
+    const size_t size_zk_public = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive,
+                                                PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC );
+    const size_t size_zk_proof = PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE( alg, primitive,
+                                                PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF );
+
+    if ( test_input )
+    {
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_input( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,  NULL, 0 ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_input( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_input( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_proof ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP )
+
+        SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_input( &operation,
+                                    PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                    output_buffer, size_key_share ),
+                                    ERR_IN_INPUT );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_input( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public + 1 ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP(
+                  ( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public + 1 ),
+                    psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public ) ),
+                    ERR_INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE );
+    } else {
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_output( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        NULL, 0, NULL ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_EMPTY_IO_BUFFER );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_output( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_UNKNOWN_STEP );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_output( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_INVALID_FIRST_STEP );
+
+        SETUP_ALWAYS_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_output( &operation,
+                                    PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE,
+                                    output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ),
+                                    ERR_IN_OUTPUT );
+
+        TEST_ASSERT( output_len > 0 );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP( psa_pake_output( &operation,
+                                        PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, size_zk_public - 1,
+                                        &output_len ),
+                                        ERR_INJECT_WRONG_BUFFER_SIZE );
+
+        SETUP_CONDITIONAL_CHECK_STEP(
+              ( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                        output_buffer, size_zk_public - 1, &output_len ),
+                psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC,
+                                        output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ) ),
+                ERR_INJECT_VALID_OPERATION_AFTER_FAILURE );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( &operation ) );
+    mbedtls_free( output_buffer );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
+void ecjpake_rounds_inject( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
+                            int client_input_first,
+                            data_t *pw_data,
+                            int err_stage_arg,
+                            int expected_error_arg )
+{
+    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
+    psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    psa_pake_operation_t client = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hash_arg;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    ecjpake_error_stage_t err_stage = err_stage_arg;
+
+    PSA_INIT( );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, pw_data->x, pw_data->len,
+                &key ) );
+
+    psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( &cipher_suite, alg );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( &cipher_suite, primitive_arg );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_hash( &cipher_suite, hash_alg );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( &server, &cipher_suite ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( &client, &cipher_suite ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( &server, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( &client, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) );
+
+    ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
+                      client_input_first, PAKE_ROUND_ONE,
+                      err_stage, expected_error_arg );
+
+    if( err_stage != ERR_NONE )
+        goto exit;
+
+    ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
+                      client_input_first, PAKE_ROUND_TWO,
+                      err_stage, expected_error_arg );
+
+exit:
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    psa_pake_abort( &server );
+    psa_pake_abort( &client );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
+void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg,
+                     int derive_alg_arg, data_t *pw_data,
+                     int client_input_first, int destroy_key,
+                     int err_stage_arg )
+{
+    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
+    psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    psa_pake_operation_t client = psa_pake_operation_init();
+    psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hash_arg;
+    psa_algorithm_t derive_alg = derive_alg_arg;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    psa_key_derivation_operation_t server_derive =
+                            PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+    psa_key_derivation_operation_t client_derive =
+                            PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+    ecjpake_error_stage_t err_stage = err_stage_arg;
+
+    PSA_INIT( );
+
+    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
+    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
+    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, pw_data->x, pw_data->len,
+                &key ) );
+
+    psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( &cipher_suite, alg );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( &cipher_suite, primitive_arg );
+    psa_pake_cs_set_hash( &cipher_suite, hash_alg );
+
+    /* Get shared key */
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &server_derive, derive_alg ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &client_derive, derive_alg ) );
+
+    if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( derive_alg ) ||
+        PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( derive_alg ) )
+    {
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &server_derive,
+                                                PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED,
+                                                (const uint8_t*) "", 0) );
+        PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &client_derive,
+                                                PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED,
+                                                (const uint8_t*) "", 0) );
+    }
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( &server, &cipher_suite ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( &client, &cipher_suite ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( &server, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( &client, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ) );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) );
+
+    if( destroy_key == 1 )
+        psa_destroy_key( key );
+
+    if( err_stage == ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_1 )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /* First round */
+    ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
+                      client_input_first, PAKE_ROUND_ONE,
+                      ERR_NONE, PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+    if ( err_stage == ERR_INJECT_ANTICIPATE_KEY_DERIVATION_2 )
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),
+                PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /* Second round */
+    ecjpake_do_round( alg, primitive_arg, &server, &client,
+                      client_input_first, PAKE_ROUND_TWO,
+                      ERR_NONE, PSA_SUCCESS );
+
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ) );
+    PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ) );
+
+exit:
+    psa_key_derivation_abort( &server_derive );
+    psa_key_derivation_abort( &client_derive );
+    psa_destroy_key( key );
+    psa_pake_abort( &server );
+    psa_pake_abort( &client );
+    PSA_DONE( );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void ecjpake_size_macros( )
+{
+    const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_JPAKE;
+    const size_t bits = 256;
+    const psa_pake_primitive_t prim = PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(
+            PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, bits );
+    const psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(
+            PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 );
+
+    // https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/1.1_PAKE_Extension.0-bet.0/html/pake.html#pake-step-types
+    /* The output for KEY_SHARE and ZK_PUBLIC is the same as a public key */
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE),
+                PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, bits ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC),
+                PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, bits ) );
+    /* The output for ZK_PROOF is the same bitsize as the curve */
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF),
+                PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) );
+
+    /* Input sizes are the same as output sizes */
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE),
+                PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC),
+                PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF),
+                PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) );
+
+    /* These inequalities will always hold even when other PAKEs are added */
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE),
+               PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC),
+               PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF),
+               PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE),
+               PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC),
+               PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+    TEST_LE_U( PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, prim, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF),
+               PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
index 08db34a..bb87923 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 /* The tests in this module verify the contents of key store files. They
  * access internal key storage functions directly. Some of the tests depend
- * on the the storage format. On the other hand, these tests treat the storage
+ * on the storage format. On the other hand, these tests treat the storage
  * subsystem as a black box, and in particular have no reliance on the
  * internals of the ITS implementation.
  *
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
index a35762d..a7f0501 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
@@ -417,59 +417,59 @@
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:"":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_256
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, bad usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, non-opaque
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE:0:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, PSA_ALG_SHA_384
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing alg
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH|PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Handshake, select ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384, opaque, missing usage
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
 handshake_ciphersuite_select:"TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384":MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:"":PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:0
 
 Sending app data via TLS, MFL=512 without fragmentation
@@ -3378,34 +3378,6 @@
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
 ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:0:"":MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3
 
-Constant-flow HMAC: MD5
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5
-
-Constant-flow HMAC: SHA1
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
-
-Constant-flow HMAC: SHA256
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
-
-Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA
-ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
-
-# these are the numbers we'd get with an empty plaintext and truncated HMAC
-Constant-flow memcpy from offset: small
-ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:5:10
-
-# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-256
-Constant-flow memcpy from offset: medium
-ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:255:32
-
-# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384
-Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large
-ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48
-
 Test configuration of groups for DHE through mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
 conf_curve:
 
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
index 7447a1d..674e649 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@
  * \p peer1 and \p peer2 must have been previously initialized by calling
  * mbedtls_mock_socket_init().
  *
- * The capacites of the internal buffers are set to \p bufsize. Setting this to
+ * The capacities of the internal buffers are set to \p bufsize. Setting this to
  * the correct value allows for simulation of MTU, sanity testing the mock
  * implementation and mocking TCP connections with lower memory cost.
  */
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Setup a given mesasge socket context including initialization of
+ * Setup a given message socket context including initialization of
  * input/output queues to a chosen capacity of messages. Also set the
  * corresponding mock socket.
  *
@@ -5438,189 +5438,6 @@
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
-void ssl_cf_hmac( int hash )
-{
-    /*
-     * Test the function mbedtls_ct_hmac() against a reference
-     * implementation.
-     */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    psa_algorithm_t alg;
-    psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
-#else
-    mbedtls_md_context_t ctx, ref_ctx;
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-    size_t out_len, block_size;
-    size_t min_in_len, in_len, max_in_len, i;
-    /* TLS additional data is 13 bytes (hence the "lucky 13" name) */
-    unsigned char add_data[13];
-    unsigned char ref_out[MBEDTLS_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
-    unsigned char *data = NULL;
-    unsigned char *out = NULL;
-    unsigned char rec_num = 0;
-
-    USE_PSA_INIT( );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md( hash ) );
-
-    out_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg );
-    block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( alg );
-
-    /* mbedtls_ct_hmac() requires the key to be exportable */
-    psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT |
-                                          PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH );
-    psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg ) );
-    psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
-#else
-    mbedtls_md_init( &ctx );
-    mbedtls_md_init( &ref_ctx );
-
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash );
-    TEST_ASSERT( md_info != NULL );
-    out_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
-    TEST_ASSERT( out_len != 0 );
-    block_size = hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-
-    /* Use allocated out buffer to catch overwrites */
-    ASSERT_ALLOC( out, out_len );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    /* Set up dummy key */
-    memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_import_key( &attributes,
-                                             ref_out, out_len,
-                                             &key ) );
-#else
-    /* Set up contexts with the given hash and a dummy key */
-    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_setup( &ref_ctx, md_info, 1 ) );
-    memset( ref_out, 42, sizeof( ref_out ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
-    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ref_ctx, ref_out, out_len ) );
-    memset( ref_out, 0, sizeof( ref_out ) );
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Test all possible lengths up to a point. The difference between
-     * max_in_len and min_in_len is at most 255, and make sure they both vary
-     * by at least one block size.
-     */
-    for( max_in_len = 0; max_in_len <= 255 + block_size; max_in_len++ )
-    {
-        mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 );
-
-        /* Use allocated in buffer to catch overreads */
-        ASSERT_ALLOC( data, max_in_len );
-
-        min_in_len = max_in_len > 255 ? max_in_len - 255 : 0;
-        for( in_len = min_in_len; in_len <= max_in_len; in_len++ )
-        {
-            mbedtls_test_set_step( max_in_len * 10000 + in_len );
-
-            /* Set up dummy data and add_data */
-            rec_num++;
-            memset( add_data, rec_num, sizeof( add_data ) );
-            for( i = 0; i < in_len; i++ )
-                data[i] = ( i & 0xff ) ^ rec_num;
-
-            /* Get the function's result */
-            TEST_CF_SECRET( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( key, PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg ),
-                                            add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
-                                            data, in_len,
-                                            min_in_len, max_in_len,
-                                            out ) );
-#else
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_ct_hmac( &ctx, add_data, sizeof( add_data ),
-                                            data, in_len,
-                                            min_in_len, max_in_len,
-                                            out ) );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-            TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &in_len, sizeof( in_len ) );
-            TEST_CF_PUBLIC( out, out_len );
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation,
-                                                           key, alg ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update( &operation, add_data,
-                                                     sizeof( add_data ) ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_update( &operation,
-                                                     data, in_len ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( PSA_SUCCESS, psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation,
-                                                            out, out_len ) );
-#else
-            /* Compute the reference result */
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, add_data,
-                                                   sizeof( add_data ) ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ref_ctx, data, in_len ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ref_ctx, ref_out ) );
-            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ref_ctx ) );
-
-            /* Compare */
-            ASSERT_COMPARE( out, out_len, ref_out, out_len );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-        }
-
-        mbedtls_free( data );
-        data = NULL;
-    }
-
-exit:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_mac_abort( &operation );
-    psa_destroy_key( key );
-#else
-    mbedtls_md_free( &ref_ctx );
-    mbedtls_md_free( &ctx );
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-
-    mbedtls_free( data );
-    mbedtls_free( out );
-
-    USE_PSA_DONE( );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
-void ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( int offset_min, int offset_max, int len )
-{
-    unsigned char *dst = NULL;
-    unsigned char *src = NULL;
-    size_t src_len = offset_max + len;
-    size_t secret;
-
-    ASSERT_ALLOC( dst, len );
-    ASSERT_ALLOC( src, src_len );
-
-    /* Fill src in a way that we can detect if we copied the right bytes */
-    mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, src, src_len );
-
-    for( secret = offset_min; secret <= (size_t) offset_max; secret++ )
-    {
-        mbedtls_test_set_step( (int) secret );
-
-        TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
-        mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
-                                  offset_min, offset_max, len );
-        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
-        TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );
-
-        ASSERT_COMPARE( dst, len, src + secret, len );
-    }
-
-exit:
-    mbedtls_free( dst );
-    mbedtls_free( src );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
 void test_multiple_psks()
 {