diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
index 853c50d..52208ad 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
-#if default_RNG_defined
-static uECC_RNG_Function g_rng_function = &default_CSPRNG;
-#else
-static uECC_RNG_Function g_rng_function = 0;
-#endif
-
 int uECC_make_key_with_d(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key,
 			 unsigned int *d, uECC_Curve curve)
 {
@@ -160,11 +154,6 @@
 
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
 	uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
-
-	uECC_word_t tmp[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
-	uECC_word_t *p2[2] = {_private, tmp};
-	uECC_word_t *initial_Z = 0;
-	uECC_word_t carry;
 	wordcount_t num_words = curve->num_words;
 	wordcount_t num_bytes = curve->num_bytes;
 	int r;
@@ -186,30 +175,15 @@
 			       public_key + num_bytes,
 			       num_bytes);
 
-	/* Regularize the bitcount for the private key so that attackers cannot use a
-	 * side channel attack to learn the number of leading zeros. */
-	carry = regularize_k(_private, _private, tmp, curve);
-
-	/* If an RNG function was specified, try to get a random initial Z value to
-	 * improve protection against side-channel attacks. */
-	if (g_rng_function) {
-		if (!uECC_generate_random_int(p2[carry], curve->p, num_words)) {
-			r = 0;
-			goto clear_and_out;
-    		}
-    		initial_Z = p2[carry];
-  	}
-
-	EccPoint_mult(_public, _public, p2[!carry], initial_Z, curve->num_n_bits + 1,
-		      curve);
+	r = EccPoint_mult_safer(_public, _public, _private, curve);
+        if (r == 0)
+            goto clear_and_out;
 
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(secret, num_bytes, _public);
 	r = !EccPoint_isZero(_public, curve);
 
 clear_and_out:
 	/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
-	mbedtls_platform_zeroize(p2, sizeof(p2));
-	mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 	mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
 
 	return r;