PK: change pk_verify arguments (md_info "optional")
diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c
index 4c16de8..62302b0 100644
--- a/library/pk.c
+++ b/library/pk.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
*/
int pk_can_do( pk_context *ctx, pk_type_t type )
{
- /* null of NONE context can't do anything */
+ /* null or NONE context can't do anything */
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL )
return( 0 );
@@ -120,14 +120,16 @@
/*
* Verify a signature
*/
-int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
- return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, hash, md_info, sig, sig_len ) );
+ return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg,
+ hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*
diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c
index 8f61500..beaa3fd 100644
--- a/library/pk_wrap.c
+++ b/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -58,15 +58,15 @@
return( 8 * ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len );
}
-static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( sig_len != ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( rsa_pkcs1_verify( (rsa_context *) ctx,
- RSA_PUBLIC, md_info->type, 0, hash, sig ) );
+ RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, hash_len, hash, sig ) );
}
static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void )
@@ -128,19 +128,20 @@
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
/* Forward declaration */
-static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
#endif
-static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
#if !defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
((void) ctx);
+ ((void) md_alg);
((void) hash);
- ((void) md_info);
+ ((void) hash_len);
((void) sig);
((void) sig_len);
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@
ecdsa_init( &ecdsa );
ret = ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ||
- ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, hash, md_info, sig, sig_len );
+ ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len );
ecdsa_free( &ecdsa );
@@ -203,13 +204,14 @@
type == POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH );
}
-static int eckeydh_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+static int eckeydh_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
((void) ctx);
+ ((void) md_alg);
((void) hash);
- ((void) md_info);
+ ((void) hash_len);
((void) sig);
((void) sig_len);
@@ -234,12 +236,14 @@
return( type == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA );
}
-static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
- const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
return( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ctx,
- hash, md_info->size, sig, sig_len ) );
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) );
}
static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void )
diff --git a/library/x509parse.c b/library/x509parse.c
index 4da4e75..bbaca8e 100644
--- a/library/x509parse.c
+++ b/library/x509parse.c
@@ -3429,7 +3429,7 @@
md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &ca->pk, crl_list->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
- pk_verify( &ca->pk, hash, md_info,
+ pk_verify( &ca->pk, crl_list->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
@@ -3546,7 +3546,7 @@
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &trust_ca->pk, child->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
- pk_verify( &trust_ca->pk, hash, md_info,
+ pk_verify( &trust_ca->pk, child->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
@@ -3623,7 +3623,7 @@
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
- pk_verify( &parent->pk, hash, md_info,
+ pk_verify( &parent->pk, child->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;