diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config.h b/include/mbedtls/config.h
index b490e33..cff9391 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -619,11 +619,11 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  *
- * \warning    The possibility for the use of custom groups
- *             in the use of DHM in TLS constitutes a security
- *             risk. If possible, it is recommended to use
- *             EC-based key exchanges instead. See the documentation
- *             at the top of dhm.h for more information.
+ * \warning    Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ *             is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ *             If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ *             preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ *             See dhm.h for more details.
  *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
@@ -725,11 +725,11 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *
- * \warning    The possibility for the use of custom groups
- *             in the use of DHM in TLS constitutes a security
- *             risk. If possible, it is recommended to use
- *             EC-based key exchanges instead. See the documentation
- *             at the top of dhm.h for more information.
+ * \warning    Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ *             is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ *             If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ *             preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ *             See dhm.h for more details.
  *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
@@ -1850,11 +1850,11 @@
  * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
  *      DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK
  *
- * \warning    The possibility for the use of custom groups
- *             in the use of DHM in TLS constitutes a security
- *             risk. If possible, it is recommended to use
- *             EC-based key exchanges instead. See the documentation
- *             at the top of dhm.h for more information.
+ * \warning    Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ *             is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ *             If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ *             preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ *             See dhm.h for more details.
  *
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_DHM_C
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
index ed39f8d..9ef8146 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -25,22 +25,20 @@
  *           of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying
  *           discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks
  *           leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used
- *           and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM parameters
- *           are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM, while the
- *           criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for ephemeral DHM.
+ *           and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM
+ *           parameters are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM,
+ *           while the criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for
+ *           ephemeral DHM.
  *
  *           For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality
  *           nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid
- *           subgroups.
+ *           subgroups. Moreover, even if these were performed, non-standardized
+ *           primes cannot be trusted because of the possibility of backdoors
+ *           that can't be effectively checked for.
  *
- *           The possibility for the use of custom, non-safe primes in DHM
- *           is a deficiency in the TLS protocol that has been adressed only
- *           recently through the addition of the named group extension from
- *           RFC 7919, which however is not yet implemented in Mbed TLS.
- *
- *           If possible, we recommend to use elliptic curve based key
- *           exchanges instead of DHM-based ones, because the former only
- *           accepts standardized groups.
+ *           We therefore consider DHE a security risk. If possible, it is
+ *           recommended users should consider preferring other methods of
+ *           key exchange.
  *
  */
 #ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H