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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001/**
Chris Jones84a773f2021-03-05 18:38:47 +00002 * \file ssl_misc.h
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02003 *
4 * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00005 */
6/*
Bence Szépkúti1e148272020-08-07 13:07:28 +02007 * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard37ff1402015-09-04 14:21:07 +02008 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
9 *
10 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
11 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
12 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
13 *
14 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
15 *
16 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
17 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
18 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
19 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
20 * limitations under the License.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020021 */
Chris Jones84a773f2021-03-05 18:38:47 +000022#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
23#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020024
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050025#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010026#include "mbedtls/config.h"
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050027#else
28#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
29#endif
30
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010031#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
32#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020033
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -050034#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
35#include "psa/crypto.h"
36#endif
37
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020038#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010039#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020040#endif
41
42#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010043#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020044#endif
45
46#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010047#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020048#endif
49
50#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010051#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020052#endif
53
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +020054#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010055#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +020056#endif
57
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000058#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
59#include "psa/crypto.h"
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010060#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000061#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
62
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0223ab92015-10-05 11:40:01 +010063#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
64 !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020065#define inline __inline
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard20af64d2015-07-07 18:33:39 +020066#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020067
TRodziewicz345165c2021-07-06 13:42:11 +020068/* Legacy minor version numbers as defined by:
69 * - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 }; // TLS v1.0
70 * - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 }; // TLS v1.1
71 *
72 * We no longer support these versions, but some code still references those
TRodziewicz458280e2021-07-07 11:33:06 +020073 * constants as part of negotiating with the peer, so keep them available
74 * internally.
TRodziewicz345165c2021-07-06 13:42:11 +020075 */
76#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1
77#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2
78
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020079/* Determine minimum supported version */
80#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
81
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020082#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
83#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
84#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020085
TRodziewicz4ca18aa2021-05-20 14:46:20 +020086#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
Ron Eldor5e9f14d2017-05-28 10:46:38 +030087#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
88
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020089/* Determine maximum supported version */
90#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
91
92#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
93#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020094#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
95
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard862cde52017-05-17 11:56:15 +020096/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +020097#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
98 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
99 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
100 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100101#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200102#endif
103
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200104#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
105#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
106#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
107#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
108
109/*
110 * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
111 *
112 * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
113 * but is distinct for resends.
114 *
115 * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
116 */
117#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
118#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
119#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
120#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
121
122/*
123 * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
Mateusz Starzyka3a99842021-02-19 14:27:22 +0100124 * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256).
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200125 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200126
TRodziewicz4ca18aa2021-05-20 14:46:20 +0200127#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Hanno Becker0cc46612020-11-30 08:56:52 +0000128
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard05579c42020-07-31 12:53:39 +0200129/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2df1f1f2020-07-09 12:11:39 +0200130#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
131 ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
132 defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
133 defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
134 defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) )
135#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
136#endif
137
Hanno Becker0cc46612020-11-30 08:56:52 +0000138/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a
139 * stream cipher can be used. */
140#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
141#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM
142#endif
143
TRodziewicz0f82ec62021-05-12 17:49:18 +0200144/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarded0e8642020-07-21 11:20:30 +0200145#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
TRodziewicz0f82ec62021-05-12 17:49:18 +0200146 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarded0e8642020-07-21 11:20:30 +0200147#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
148#endif
149
Hanno Becker31351ce2021-03-22 11:05:58 +0000150#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2df1f1f2020-07-09 12:11:39 +0200151 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000152#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000153#endif
154
TRodziewicz4ca18aa2021-05-20 14:46:20 +0200155#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
Hanno Becker0cc46612020-11-30 08:56:52 +0000156
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000157#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200158/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
Mateusz Starzykc6d94ab2021-05-19 13:31:59 +0200159#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200160#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
161#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
162#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
163#else
164#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
165#endif
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000166#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200167/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
168#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
169#endif
170
171#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
172#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
173#else
174#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
175#endif
176
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100177#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
TRodziewicze8dd7092021-05-12 14:19:11 +0200178#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100179#else
180#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
181#endif
182
Mateusz Starzyka3a99842021-02-19 14:27:22 +0100183#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000184 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100185 MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
186 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000187 )
188
189#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
190 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) )
191
192#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
193 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
194
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100195/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
Hanno Beckerd488b9e2018-08-16 16:35:37 +0100196#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100197
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000198/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
199 RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
200 (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
201 */
202#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
203 (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
204 ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \
205 : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \
206 )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200207
Hanno Beckere131bfe2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100208/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */
209#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534
210
211/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */
212#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535
213
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200214/*
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100215 * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
216 */
217
David Horstmann95d516f2021-05-04 18:36:56 +0100218#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
219#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100220#endif
221
David Horstmann95d516f2021-05-04 18:36:56 +0100222#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
223#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100224#endif
225
David Horstmann95d516f2021-05-04 18:36:56 +0100226#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000227#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
228#endif
229
David Horstmann95d516f2021-05-04 18:36:56 +0100230#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000231#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
232#endif
233
234/* Calculate buffer sizes */
235
Hanno Becker25d6d1a2017-12-07 08:22:51 +0000236/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
237 long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
238 implicit sequence number. */
Hanno Beckerd25d4442017-10-04 13:56:42 +0100239#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100240
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500241#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000242#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
243 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100244#else
245#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
246 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
247 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) )
248#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000249
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500250#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000251#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
252 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100253#else
254#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
255 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
256 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
257#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000258
Hanno Becker9752aad2021-04-21 05:54:33 +0100259#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
260/**
261 * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
262 * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured
263 * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the
264 * configured value and the negotiated one.
265 *
266 * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
267 * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
268 *
269 * \param ssl SSL context
270 *
271 * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
272 */
273size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
274
275/**
276 * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
277 * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment
Hanno Beckerdf3b8632021-06-08 05:30:45 +0100278 * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN.
Hanno Becker9752aad2021-04-21 05:54:33 +0100279 * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function
280 * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len().
281 *
282 * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
283 * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
284 *
285 * \param ssl SSL context
286 *
287 * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
288 */
289size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
290#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
291
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500292#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500293static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500294{
295#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500296 return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500297 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
298 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX;
299#else
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500300 return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500301 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
302#endif
303}
304
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500305static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500306{
307#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500308 return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500309 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
310 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX;
311#else
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500312 return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500313 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
314#endif
315}
316#endif
317
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100318/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200319 * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
320 * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
321 * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
322 */
323#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardbf57be62015-09-16 15:04:01 +0200324#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200325
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100326/**
327 * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
328 * greater or equal than a needed space.
329 *
330 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
331 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
332 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
333 *
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200334 * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100335 * otherwise.
336 */
337static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur,
338 const uint8_t *end, size_t need )
339{
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200340 return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) );
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100341}
342
343/**
344 * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
345 * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case,
346 * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error.
347 *
348 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
349 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
350 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
351 *
352 */
353#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \
354 do { \
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200355 if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100356 { \
357 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \
358 } \
359 } while( 0 )
360
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200361#ifdef __cplusplus
362extern "C" {
363#endif
364
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100365#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100366 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100367/*
368 * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs.
369 */
370struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
371{
372 /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable
373 * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's
374 * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function -
375 * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures
376 * to hash algorithms. */
377 mbedtls_md_type_t rsa;
378 mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa;
379};
380#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100381 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100382
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300383typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
384 const char *label,
385 const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
386 unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100387
Hanno Becker61baae72020-09-16 09:24:14 +0100388/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100389 * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those
390 * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled
391 * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is
392 * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS.
393 *
394 * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures,
395 * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV}
396 * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into
397 * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS.
398 *
399 * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH
400 * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here
Hanno Becker9a7a2ac2020-09-09 09:24:54 +0100401 * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100402 * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the
403 * computation of the maximum key length. */
404#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16
405#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
406#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
407
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100408/**
409 * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV)
410 * used for record protection in TLS 1.3.
411 */
412struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set
413{
414 /*! The key for client->server records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100415 unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100416 /*! The key for server->client records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100417 unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100418 /*! The IV for client->server records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100419 unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100420 /*! The IV for server->client records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100421 unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100422
Hanno Becker493ea7f2020-09-08 11:01:00 +0100423 size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and
424 * server_write_key, in Bytes. */
425 size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and
426 * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100427};
428typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set;
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100429
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200430/*
431 * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
432 */
433struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
434{
435 /*
436 * Handshake specific crypto variables
437 */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100438
439#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100440 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100441 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */
442#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200443#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
444 mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */
445#endif
John Durkop07cc04a2020-11-16 22:08:34 -0800446/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due
447 * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap
448 * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for
449 * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct.
450 */
451#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200452 mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000453
454#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Gilles Peskine42459802019-12-19 13:31:53 +0100455 psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type;
456 uint16_t ecdh_bits;
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +0200457 psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000458 unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
459 size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
460#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
John Durkop07cc04a2020-11-16 22:08:34 -0800461#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000462
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200463#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +0200464 mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard77c06462015-09-17 13:59:49 +0200465#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
466 unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
467 size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
468#endif
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100469#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf4721792015-09-15 10:53:51 +0200470#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200471 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200472 const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
473#endif
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100474#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100475#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +0200476 psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100477#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200478 unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
479 size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100480#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200481#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
482 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
483#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcdc26ae2015-06-19 12:16:31 +0200484 int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200485 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
486 mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
487 mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100488#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200489#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100490#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd27d1a52017-08-15 11:49:08 +0200491 int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6b7301c2017-08-15 12:08:45 +0200492 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200493 enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
494 ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
495 ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardc37423f2018-10-16 10:28:17 +0200496 ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
497 ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200498 ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
499 } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
Hanno Becker3fd3f5e2019-02-25 10:08:06 +0000500 mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200501 size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200502#endif
Hanno Becker75173122019-02-06 16:18:31 +0000503#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
504 !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
505 mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
506#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200507#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
508 unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
509 unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
510
511 unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie
512 Srv: unused */
513 unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
514 Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
515
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200516 uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
517 unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard28f4bea2017-09-13 14:00:05 +0200518 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
519 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
520 unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200521 unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
522 flight being received */
523 mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
524 resending messages */
525 unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
526 for resending messages */
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100527
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100528#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100529 /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
530
531 uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
Hanno Beckerf1a28082019-05-15 10:17:48 +0100532 * has been negotiated. Possible values are
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100533 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
534 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
535 unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */
536 uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
537 * \c peer_cid. */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100538#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100539
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100540 struct
541 {
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100542 size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
543 * buffers used for message buffering. */
544
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100545 uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100546 * been seen in the current flight. */
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100547
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100548 struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
549 {
Hanno Becker98081a02018-08-22 13:32:50 +0100550 unsigned is_valid : 1;
551 unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
552 unsigned is_complete : 1;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100553 unsigned char *data;
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100554 size_t data_len;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100555 } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
556
Hanno Becker5f066e72018-08-16 14:56:31 +0100557 struct
558 {
559 unsigned char *data;
560 size_t len;
561 unsigned epoch;
562 } future_record;
563
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100564 } buffering;
Hanno Becker35462012018-08-22 10:25:40 +0100565
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf47a4af2018-08-22 10:38:52 +0200566 uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100567#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200568
569 /*
570 * Checksum contexts
571 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200572#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
573#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500574#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
575 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
576#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200577 mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
578#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500579#endif
Mateusz Starzykc6d94ab2021-05-19 13:31:59 +0200580#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500581#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek972fba52019-01-30 03:29:12 -0500582 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500583#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200584 mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
585#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500586#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200587#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
588
589 void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardde718b92019-05-03 11:43:28 +0200590 void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200591 void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300592 mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200593
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000594 mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
595
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200596 size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
597
598 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */
599 unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
600 /*!< premaster secret */
601
602 int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
603 int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/
604 int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/
605 int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
606
607#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
608 int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
609#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
610#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
611 int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
612#endif
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200613
614#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
Gilles Peskine78300732018-04-26 13:03:29 +0200615 unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200616#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
617
618#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
619 /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
620 * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
621 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start,
622 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
623 * The library does not use it internally. */
624 void *user_async_ctx;
625#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200626};
627
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100628typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
629
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200630/*
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000631 * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
632 *
633 * There are the following general types of record transformations:
TRodziewicz2abf03c2021-06-25 14:40:09 +0200634 * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only)
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000635 * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
636 * to the authenticated message.
TRodziewicz2abf03c2021-06-25 14:40:09 +0200637 * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
638 * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every
639 * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was
640 * encrypted.
641 * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000642 * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
643 * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
644 * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
645 * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
646 * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
647 * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
648 * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
649 * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
650 * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
651 * latter to the encrypted record.
652 *
Hanno Becker7d343ec2020-05-04 12:29:05 +0100653 * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext
654 * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true
655 * content type.
656 *
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000657 * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
658 * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
659 * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
660 * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
661 * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100662 * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
663 * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
TRodziewicz299510e2021-07-09 16:55:11 +0200664 * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static
665 * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
666 * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000667 * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
668 * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
669 * - The length of the authentication tag.
670 *
671 * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
672 * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
673 * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
674 * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
675 * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
676 * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
677 * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
678 * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
679 * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
680 * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
681 * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
682 * are unused for AEAD transformations.
TRodziewicz2abf03c2021-06-25 14:40:09 +0200683 * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly
684 * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
685 * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations.
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000686 * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
687 * the transformation context, its contents are stored within
688 * iv_{enc/dec}.
689 * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
690 * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
691 * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
692 * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
693 * different from the underlying cipher's block length
694 * in this case.
695 * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
696 * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
697 * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
698 * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000699 * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version
700 * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
701 * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
702 * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
703 * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
704 * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
705 * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
706 * in other transformations.
707 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200708 */
709struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
710{
711 /*
712 * Session specific crypto layer
713 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200714 size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
715 size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
716 size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000717 size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
718 size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200719
720 unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
721 unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
722
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000723#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000724
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200725 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
726 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
727
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000728#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
729 int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
730#endif
731
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000732#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000733
734 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
735 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000736 int minor_ver;
737
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100738#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100739 uint8_t in_cid_len;
740 uint8_t out_cid_len;
741 unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
742 unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100743#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100744
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard96fb0ee2019-07-09 12:54:17 +0200745#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
746 /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
747 * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */
748 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
749#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200750};
751
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000752/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard1aaf6692019-07-10 14:14:05 +0200753 * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
754 * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
755 */
756static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
757 const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
758{
Hanno Beckerfd86ca82020-11-30 08:54:23 +0000759#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard1aaf6692019-07-10 14:14:05 +0200760 return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
761#else
762 (void) transform;
763 return( 1 );
764#endif
765}
766
767/*
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000768 * Internal representation of record frames
769 *
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000770 * Instances come in two flavors:
771 * (1) Encrypted
772 * These always have data_offset = 0
773 * (2) Unencrypted
Hanno Beckercd430bc2019-04-04 16:29:48 +0100774 * These have data_offset set to the amount of
775 * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
776 * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
777 * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
TRodziewicz2abf03c2021-06-25 14:40:09 +0200778 * (e.g. for stream ciphers).
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000779 *
780 * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
781 * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
782 * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
783 * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
784 * make space for the fixed IV.
785 *
786 */
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100787#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100788#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100789#else
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100790#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100791#endif
792
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000793typedef struct
794{
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100795 uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
796 * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
797 * the 6-byte sequence number.
798 * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
799 * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
800 * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
801 * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
802 * MAC computations. */
803 uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
804 uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
805 * Convert to internal presentation of versions
806 * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
807 * mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
808 * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000809
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100810 unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
811 size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
812 size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
813 size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000814
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100815#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100816 uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
817 unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100818#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000819} mbedtls_record;
820
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200821#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
822/*
823 * List of certificate + private key pairs
824 */
825struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert
826{
827 mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
828 mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
829 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
830};
831#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
832
833#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
834/*
835 * List of handshake messages kept around for resending
836 */
837struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item
838{
839 unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
840 size_t len; /*!< length of p */
841 unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
842 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
843};
844#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
845
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100846#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100847 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100848
849/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
850mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
851 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg );
852/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */
853void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
854 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg,
855 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
856/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */
857void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
858 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
859
860/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */
861static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set )
862{
863 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
864}
865
866#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100867 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200868
869/**
870 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
871 * memory
872 *
873 * \param transform SSL transform context
874 */
875void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
876
877/**
878 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
879 * memory
880 *
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200881 * \param ssl SSL context
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200882 */
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200883void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200884
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200885int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
886int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
887void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
888
889int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
890
891void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
892int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
893
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +0100894int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
895int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
896void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
897
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100898/**
899 * \brief Update record layer
900 *
901 * This function roughly separates the implementation
902 * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
903 * of the secure transport.
904 *
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100905 * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
906 * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
907 * should be automatically updated in case
908 * a handshake message is found.
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100909 *
910 * \return 0 or non-zero error code.
911 *
912 * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
913 * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
914 *
915 * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
916 * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
917 * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
918 * conceptually provides the following:
919 *
920 * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
921 * for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
922 * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
923 * for application data.
924 * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
925 * securing the contents.
926 *
927 * The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
928 *
929 * a Updating
930 * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
931 *
932 * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
933 * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
934 * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
935 * provide access to the data for the user to process it.
936 * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
937 * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
938 * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
939 * data (2) is user-controlled.
940 *
941 * b Reading of application data
942 * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
943 *
944 * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
945 * is different from the automatic consumption of control
946 * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
947 *
948 * c Tracking availability of application data
949 * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
950 *
951 * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
952 * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
953 * provides functionality for checking how much application
954 * data is still available in the internal buffer.
955 *
956 * d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
957 *
958 * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
959 * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
960 * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
961 * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
962 * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
963 * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
964 *
965 * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
966 * record layer, but the current implementation deviates
967 * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
968 * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
969 * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
970 * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
971 * following the above definition.
972 *
973 */
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100974int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
975 unsigned update_hs_digest );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200976int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
977
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard31c15862017-09-13 09:38:11 +0200978int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker67bc7c32018-08-06 11:33:50 +0100979int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200980int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
981
982int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
983int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
984
985int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
986int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
987
988int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
989int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
990
991void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
992 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info );
993
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100994#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200995int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex );
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000996
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +0000997/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000998 * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence:
999 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
1000 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()
1001 * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function
1002 */
1003static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1004 const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len )
1005{
1006 if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 )
1007 {
1008 *psk = ssl->handshake->psk;
1009 *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len;
1010 }
1011
1012 else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 )
1013 {
1014 *psk = ssl->conf->psk;
1015 *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
1016 }
1017
1018 else
1019 {
Guilhem Bryantb5f04e42020-04-01 11:23:58 +01001020 *psk = NULL;
1021 *psk_len = 0;
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001022 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
1023 }
1024
1025 return( 0 );
1026}
1027
1028#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +00001029/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001030 * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence:
1031 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK
1032 * callback
1033 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
1034 * Return an opaque PSK
1035 */
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001036static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001037 const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1038{
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001039 if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) )
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001040 return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque );
1041
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001042 if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) )
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001043 return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque );
1044
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001045 return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT );
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001046}
1047#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
1048
1049#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001050
1051#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
1052unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk );
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +01001053unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001054mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig );
1055#endif
1056
1057mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001058unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md );
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +01001059int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001060
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardb541da62015-06-17 11:43:30 +02001061#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9d412d82015-06-17 12:10:46 +02001062int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001063#endif
1064
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +01001065#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001066int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1067 mbedtls_md_type_t md );
1068#endif
1069
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001070#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001071static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
1072 ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value )
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001073{
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001074 switch( srtp_profile_value )
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001075 {
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001076 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001077 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001078 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001079 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001080 return srtp_profile_value;
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001081 default: break;
1082 }
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001083 return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET );
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001084}
1085#endif
1086
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001087#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
1088static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1089{
1090 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1091
1092 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1093 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1094 else
1095 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1096
1097 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key );
1098}
1099
1100static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1101{
1102 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1103
1104 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1105 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1106 else
1107 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1108
1109 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert );
1110}
1111
1112/*
1113 * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
1114 * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
1115 *
1116 * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
1117 * check a cert we received from them)!
1118 *
1119 * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
1120 */
1121int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
1122 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
1123 int cert_endpoint,
1124 uint32_t *flags );
1125#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
1126
1127void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
1128 unsigned char ver[2] );
1129void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
1130 const unsigned char ver[2] );
1131
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001132static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001133{
Hanno Becker47be7682019-07-12 09:55:46 +01001134#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1135 ((void) ssl);
1136#endif
1137
1138#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1139 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1140 {
1141 return( 13 );
1142 }
1143 else
1144#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1145 {
1146 return( 5 );
1147 }
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001148}
1149
1150static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1151{
Hanno Becker3b154c12019-05-03 15:05:27 +01001152 return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001153}
1154
1155static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1156{
1157#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1158 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1159 return( 12 );
1160#else
1161 ((void) ssl);
1162#endif
1163 return( 4 );
1164}
1165
1166#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1167void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1168void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1169int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard87a346f2017-09-13 12:45:21 +02001170int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001171#endif
1172
1173/* Visible for testing purposes only */
1174#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
Hanno Becker0183d692019-07-12 08:50:37 +01001175int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001176void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1177#endif
1178
Hanno Becker52055ae2019-02-06 14:30:46 +00001179int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
1180 const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
1181
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001182/* constant-time buffer comparison */
1183static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
1184{
1185 size_t i;
Hanno Becker59e69632017-06-26 13:26:58 +01001186 volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
1187 volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
1188 volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001189
1190 for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
Azim Khan45b79cf2018-05-23 16:55:16 +01001191 {
1192 /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
1193 * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
1194 * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
1195 unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
1196 diff |= x ^ y;
1197 }
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001198
1199 return( diff );
1200}
1201
TRodziewicz0f82ec62021-05-12 17:49:18 +02001202#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Andrzej Kurek814feff2019-01-14 04:35:19 -05001203/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001204int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
Gilles Peskineca1d7422018-04-24 11:53:22 +02001205 unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
1206 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
1207 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
TRodziewicz0f82ec62021-05-12 17:49:18 +02001208#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001209
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001210#ifdef __cplusplus
1211}
1212#endif
1213
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001214void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1215int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1216 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1217 mbedtls_record *rec,
1218 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1219 void *p_rng );
Hanno Becker605949f2019-07-12 08:23:59 +01001220int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001221 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1222 mbedtls_record *rec );
1223
Hanno Beckerdd772292020-02-05 10:38:31 +00001224/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
1225static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1226{
1227#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1228 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1229 return( 2 );
1230#else
1231 ((void) ssl);
1232#endif
1233 return( 0 );
1234}
1235
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001236#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker786300f2020-02-05 10:46:40 +00001237int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001238#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Hanno Becker0f57a652020-02-05 10:37:26 +00001239
1240void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs );
Hanno Becker7876d122020-02-05 10:39:31 +00001241int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1242
Hanno Becker3e6f8ab2020-02-05 10:40:57 +00001243void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1244void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1245 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1246void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1247
Hanno Becker43aefe22020-02-05 10:44:56 +00001248int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
1249
Hanno Becker7e8e6a62020-02-05 10:45:48 +00001250#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
1251void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1252#endif
1253
Hanno Beckerce5f5fd2020-02-05 10:47:44 +00001254void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1255
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001256#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
Hanno Becker40cdaa12020-02-05 10:48:27 +00001257int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001258#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
Hanno Becker89490712020-02-05 10:50:12 +00001259
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001260#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001261size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001262void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1263void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight );
1264#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1265
Chris Jones84a773f2021-03-05 18:38:47 +00001266#endif /* ssl_misc.h */