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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001/**
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00002 * \file ssl_internal.h
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02003 *
4 * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00005 */
6/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6fb81872015-07-27 11:11:48 +02007 * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard37ff1402015-09-04 14:21:07 +02008 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
9 *
10 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
11 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
12 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
13 *
14 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
15 *
16 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
17 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
18 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
19 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
20 * limitations under the License.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020021 *
22 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020023 */
24#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
25#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
26
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050027#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010028#include "mbedtls/config.h"
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050029#else
30#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
31#endif
32
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010033#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
34#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020035
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -050036#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
37#include "psa/crypto.h"
38#endif
39
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020040#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010041#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020042#endif
43
44#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010045#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020046#endif
47
48#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010049#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020050#endif
51
52#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010053#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020054#endif
55
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +020056#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010057#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +020058#endif
59
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000060#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
61#include "psa/crypto.h"
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010062#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000063#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
64
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0223ab92015-10-05 11:40:01 +010065#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
66 !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020067#define inline __inline
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard20af64d2015-07-07 18:33:39 +020068#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020069
70/* Determine minimum supported version */
71#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
72
73#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
74#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0
75#else
76#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
77#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
78#else
79#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
80#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
81#else
82#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
83#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
84#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
85#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
86#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
87#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
88
Ron Eldor5e9f14d2017-05-28 10:46:38 +030089#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
90#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
91
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020092/* Determine maximum supported version */
93#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
94
95#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
96#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
97#else
98#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
99#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
100#else
101#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
102#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
103#else
104#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
105#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0
106#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
107#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
108#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
109#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
110
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard862cde52017-05-17 11:56:15 +0200111/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200112#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
113 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
114 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
115 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
116#define MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE
117#endif
118
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200119#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
120#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
121#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
122#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
123
124/*
125 * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
126 *
127 * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
128 * but is distinct for resends.
129 *
130 * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
131 */
132#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
133#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
134#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
135#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
136
137/*
138 * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
139 * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256)
140 * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if
141 * enabled.
142 */
143#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
144#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024
145#else
146#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0
147#endif
148
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000149#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
150 ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
151 ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
152 defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
Hanno Becker34f88af2018-07-17 10:19:47 +0100153 defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
154 defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) )
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000155#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
156#endif
157
158#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200159/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
160#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
161#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
162#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
163#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
164#else
165#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
166#endif
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000167#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200168/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
169#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
170#endif
171
172#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
173#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
174#else
175#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
176#endif
177
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100178#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerb1aa1b32019-05-08 17:37:58 +0100179#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100180#else
181#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
182#endif
183
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000184#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \
185 MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
186 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100187 MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
188 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000189 )
190
191#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
192 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) )
193
194#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
195 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
196
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100197/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
Hanno Beckerd488b9e2018-08-16 16:35:37 +0100198#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100199
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000200/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
201 RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
202 (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
203 */
204#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
205 (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
206 ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \
207 : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \
208 )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200209
210/*
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100211 * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
212 */
213
214#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000215#error "Bad configuration - record content too large."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100216#endif
217
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000218#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
219#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100220#endif
221
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000222#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
223#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
224#endif
225
226#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
227#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
228#endif
229
230#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
231#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
232#endif
233
234/* Calculate buffer sizes */
235
Hanno Becker25d6d1a2017-12-07 08:22:51 +0000236/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
237 long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
238 implicit sequence number. */
Hanno Beckerd25d4442017-10-04 13:56:42 +0100239#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100240
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100241#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000242#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
243 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100244#else
245#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
246 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
247 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) )
248#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000249
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100250#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000251#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
252 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100253#else
254#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
255 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
256 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
257#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000258
259#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
260/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */
261#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \
262 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \
263 ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
264 : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
265 )
266#endif
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100267
268/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200269 * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
270 * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
271 * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
272 */
273#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardbf57be62015-09-16 15:04:01 +0200274#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200275
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200276#ifdef __cplusplus
277extern "C" {
278#endif
279
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100280#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
281 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
282/*
283 * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs.
284 */
285struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
286{
287 /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable
288 * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's
289 * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function -
290 * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures
291 * to hash algorithms. */
292 mbedtls_md_type_t rsa;
293 mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa;
294};
295#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
296 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
297
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300298typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
299 const char *label,
300 const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
301 unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200302/*
303 * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
304 */
305struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
306{
307 /*
308 * Handshake specific crypto variables
309 */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100310
311#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
312 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
313 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */
314#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200315#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
316 mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */
317#endif
318#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
319 mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000320
321#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Gilles Peskine42459802019-12-19 13:31:53 +0100322 psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type;
323 uint16_t ecdh_bits;
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000324 psa_key_handle_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
325 unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
326 size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
327#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
328#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
329
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200330#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +0200331 mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard77c06462015-09-17 13:59:49 +0200332#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
333 unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
334 size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
335#endif
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100336#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf4721792015-09-15 10:53:51 +0200337#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200338 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200339 const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
340#endif
341#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100342#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek2349c4d2019-01-08 09:36:01 -0500343 psa_key_handle_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100344#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200345 unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
346 size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100347#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200348#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
349 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
350#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcdc26ae2015-06-19 12:16:31 +0200351 int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200352 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
353 mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
354 mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100355#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200356#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200357#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd27d1a52017-08-15 11:49:08 +0200358 int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6b7301c2017-08-15 12:08:45 +0200359 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200360 enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
361 ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
362 ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardc37423f2018-10-16 10:28:17 +0200363 ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
364 ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200365 ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
366 } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
Hanno Becker3fd3f5e2019-02-25 10:08:06 +0000367 mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200368 size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200369#endif
Hanno Becker75173122019-02-06 16:18:31 +0000370#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
371 !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
372 mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
373#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200374#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
375 unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
376 unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
377
378 unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie
379 Srv: unused */
380 unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
381 Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
382
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200383 uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
384 unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard28f4bea2017-09-13 14:00:05 +0200385 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
386 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
387 unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200388 unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
389 flight being received */
390 mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
391 resending messages */
392 unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
393 for resending messages */
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100394
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100395#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100396 /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
397
398 uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
Hanno Beckerf1a28082019-05-15 10:17:48 +0100399 * has been negotiated. Possible values are
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100400 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
401 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
402 unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */
403 uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
404 * \c peer_cid. */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100405#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100406
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100407 struct
408 {
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100409 size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
410 * buffers used for message buffering. */
411
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100412 uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100413 * been seen in the current flight. */
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100414
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100415 struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
416 {
Hanno Becker98081a02018-08-22 13:32:50 +0100417 unsigned is_valid : 1;
418 unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
419 unsigned is_complete : 1;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100420 unsigned char *data;
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100421 size_t data_len;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100422 } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
423
Hanno Becker5f066e72018-08-16 14:56:31 +0100424 struct
425 {
426 unsigned char *data;
427 size_t len;
428 unsigned epoch;
429 } future_record;
430
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100431 } buffering;
Hanno Becker35462012018-08-22 10:25:40 +0100432
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf47a4af2018-08-22 10:38:52 +0200433 uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100434#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200435
436 /*
437 * Checksum contexts
438 */
439#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
440 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
441 mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5;
442 mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1;
443#endif
444#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
445#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500446#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
447 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
448#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200449 mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
450#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500451#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200452#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500453#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek972fba52019-01-30 03:29:12 -0500454 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500455#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200456 mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
457#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500458#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200459#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
460
461 void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardde718b92019-05-03 11:43:28 +0200462 void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200463 void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300464 mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200465
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000466 mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
467
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200468 size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
469
470 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */
471 unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
472 /*!< premaster secret */
473
474 int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
475 int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/
476 int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/
477 int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
478
479#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
480 int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
481#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
482#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
483 int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
484#endif
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200485
486#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
Gilles Peskine78300732018-04-26 13:03:29 +0200487 unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200488#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
489
490#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
491 /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
492 * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
493 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start,
494 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
495 * The library does not use it internally. */
496 void *user_async_ctx;
497#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200498};
499
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100500typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
501
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200502/*
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000503 * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
504 *
505 * There are the following general types of record transformations:
506 * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
507 * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
508 * to the authenticated message.
509 * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
510 * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and
511 * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the
512 * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3
513 * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used
514 * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained
515 * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted
516 * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no
517 * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted
518 * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted.
519 * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only)
520 * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
521 * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
522 * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
523 * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
524 * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
525 * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
526 * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
527 * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
528 * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
529 * latter to the encrypted record.
530 *
531 * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
532 * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
533 * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
534 * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
535 * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100536 * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
537 * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000538 * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0)
539 * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC)
540 * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
541 * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
542 * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
543 * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
544 * - The length of the authentication tag.
545 *
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100546 * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are
547 * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations.
548 * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each
549 * operation.
550 *
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000551 * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
552 * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
553 * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
554 * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
555 * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
556 * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
557 * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
558 * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
559 * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
560 * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
561 * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
562 * are unused for AEAD transformations.
563 * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the
564 * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within
565 * md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
566 * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC
567 * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have
568 * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for
569 * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0.
570 * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
571 * the transformation context, its contents are stored within
572 * iv_{enc/dec}.
573 * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
574 * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
575 * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
576 * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
577 * different from the underlying cipher's block length
578 * in this case.
579 * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
580 * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
581 * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
582 * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
583 * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec}
584 * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations,
585 * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are
586 * not being used!
587 * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version
588 * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
589 * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
590 * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
591 * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
592 * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
593 * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
594 * in other transformations.
595 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200596 */
597struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
598{
599 /*
600 * Session specific crypto layer
601 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200602 size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
603 size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
604 size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000605 size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
606 size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200607
608 unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
609 unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
610
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000611#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
612
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200613#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
614 /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */
615 unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */
616 unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */
617#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
618
619 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
620 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
621
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000622#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
623 int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
624#endif
625
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000626#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
627
628 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
629 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000630 int minor_ver;
631
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100632#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100633 uint8_t in_cid_len;
634 uint8_t out_cid_len;
635 unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
636 unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100637#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100638
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200639 /*
640 * Session specific compression layer
641 */
642#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
643 z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */
644 z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */
645#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard96fb0ee2019-07-09 12:54:17 +0200646
647#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
648 /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
649 * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */
650 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
651#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200652};
653
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000654/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard1aaf6692019-07-10 14:14:05 +0200655 * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
656 * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
657 */
658static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
659 const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
660{
661#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
662 return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
663#else
664 (void) transform;
665 return( 1 );
666#endif
667}
668
669/*
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000670 * Internal representation of record frames
671 *
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000672 * Instances come in two flavors:
673 * (1) Encrypted
674 * These always have data_offset = 0
675 * (2) Unencrypted
Hanno Beckercd430bc2019-04-04 16:29:48 +0100676 * These have data_offset set to the amount of
677 * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
678 * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
679 * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
680 * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers).
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000681 *
682 * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
683 * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
684 * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
685 * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
686 * make space for the fixed IV.
687 *
688 */
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100689#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100690#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100691#else
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100692#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100693#endif
694
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000695typedef struct
696{
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100697 uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
698 * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
699 * the 6-byte sequence number.
700 * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
701 * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
702 * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
703 * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
704 * MAC computations. */
705 uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
706 uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
707 * Convert to internal presentation of versions
708 * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
709 * mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
710 * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000711
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100712 unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
713 size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
714 size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
715 size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000716
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100717#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100718 uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
719 unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100720#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000721} mbedtls_record;
722
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200723#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
724/*
725 * List of certificate + private key pairs
726 */
727struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert
728{
729 mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
730 mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
731 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
732};
733#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
734
735#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
736/*
737 * List of handshake messages kept around for resending
738 */
739struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item
740{
741 unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
742 size_t len; /*!< length of p */
743 unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
744 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
745};
746#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
747
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100748#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
749 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
750
751/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
752mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
753 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg );
754/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */
755void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
756 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg,
757 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
758/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */
759void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
760 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
761
762/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */
763static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set )
764{
765 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
766}
767
768#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
769 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200770
771/**
772 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
773 * memory
774 *
775 * \param transform SSL transform context
776 */
777void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
778
779/**
780 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
781 * memory
782 *
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200783 * \param ssl SSL context
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200784 */
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200785void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200786
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200787int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
788int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
789void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
790
791int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
792
793void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
794int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
795
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +0100796int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
797int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
798void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
799
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100800/**
801 * \brief Update record layer
802 *
803 * This function roughly separates the implementation
804 * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
805 * of the secure transport.
806 *
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100807 * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
808 * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
809 * should be automatically updated in case
810 * a handshake message is found.
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100811 *
812 * \return 0 or non-zero error code.
813 *
814 * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
815 * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
816 *
817 * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
818 * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
819 * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
820 * conceptually provides the following:
821 *
822 * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
823 * for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
824 * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
825 * for application data.
826 * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
827 * securing the contents.
828 *
829 * The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
830 *
831 * a Updating
832 * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
833 *
834 * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
835 * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
836 * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
837 * provide access to the data for the user to process it.
838 * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
839 * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
840 * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
841 * data (2) is user-controlled.
842 *
843 * b Reading of application data
844 * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
845 *
846 * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
847 * is different from the automatic consumption of control
848 * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
849 *
850 * c Tracking availability of application data
851 * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
852 *
853 * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
854 * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
855 * provides functionality for checking how much application
856 * data is still available in the internal buffer.
857 *
858 * d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
859 *
860 * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
861 * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
862 * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
863 * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
864 * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
865 * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
866 *
867 * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
868 * record layer, but the current implementation deviates
869 * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
870 * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
871 * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
872 * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
873 * following the above definition.
874 *
875 */
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100876int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
877 unsigned update_hs_digest );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200878int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
879
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard31c15862017-09-13 09:38:11 +0200880int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker67bc7c32018-08-06 11:33:50 +0100881int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200882int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
883
884int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
885int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
886
887int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
888int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
889
890int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
891int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
892
893void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
894 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info );
895
896#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
897int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex );
898#endif
899
900#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
901unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk );
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100902unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200903mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig );
904#endif
905
906mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +0200907unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md );
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +0100908int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200909
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardb541da62015-06-17 11:43:30 +0200910#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9d412d82015-06-17 12:10:46 +0200911int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200912#endif
913
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde5f30722015-10-22 17:01:15 +0200914#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +0200915int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
916 mbedtls_md_type_t md );
917#endif
918
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200919#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
920static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
921{
922 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
923
924 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
925 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
926 else
927 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
928
929 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key );
930}
931
932static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
933{
934 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
935
936 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
937 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
938 else
939 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
940
941 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert );
942}
943
944/*
945 * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
946 * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
947 *
948 * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
949 * check a cert we received from them)!
950 *
951 * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
952 */
953int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
954 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
955 int cert_endpoint,
956 uint32_t *flags );
957#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
958
959void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
960 unsigned char ver[2] );
961void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
962 const unsigned char ver[2] );
963
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +0100964static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200965{
Hanno Becker47be7682019-07-12 09:55:46 +0100966#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
967 ((void) ssl);
968#endif
969
970#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
971 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
972 {
973 return( 13 );
974 }
975 else
976#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
977 {
978 return( 5 );
979 }
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +0100980}
981
982static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
983{
Hanno Becker3b154c12019-05-03 15:05:27 +0100984 return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200985}
986
987static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
988{
989#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
990 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
991 return( 12 );
992#else
993 ((void) ssl);
994#endif
995 return( 4 );
996}
997
998#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
999void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1000void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1001int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard87a346f2017-09-13 12:45:21 +02001002int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001003#endif
1004
1005/* Visible for testing purposes only */
1006#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
Hanno Becker0183d692019-07-12 08:50:37 +01001007int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001008void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1009#endif
1010
Hanno Becker52055ae2019-02-06 14:30:46 +00001011int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
1012 const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
1013
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001014/* constant-time buffer comparison */
1015static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
1016{
1017 size_t i;
Hanno Becker59e69632017-06-26 13:26:58 +01001018 volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
1019 volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
1020 volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001021
1022 for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
Azim Khan45b79cf2018-05-23 16:55:16 +01001023 {
1024 /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
1025 * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
1026 * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
1027 unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
1028 diff |= x ^ y;
1029 }
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001030
1031 return( diff );
1032}
1033
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001034#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
1035 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
1036int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1037 unsigned char *output,
1038 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
1039#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
1040 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
1041
1042#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
1043 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Andrzej Kurek814feff2019-01-14 04:35:19 -05001044/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001045int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
Gilles Peskineca1d7422018-04-24 11:53:22 +02001046 unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
1047 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
1048 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001049#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
1050 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
1051
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001052#ifdef __cplusplus
1053}
1054#endif
1055
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001056void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1057int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1058 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1059 mbedtls_record *rec,
1060 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1061 void *p_rng );
Hanno Becker605949f2019-07-12 08:23:59 +01001062int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001063 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1064 mbedtls_record *rec );
1065
Hanno Beckerdd772292020-02-05 10:38:31 +00001066/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
1067static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1068{
1069#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1070 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1071 return( 2 );
1072#else
1073 ((void) ssl);
1074#endif
1075 return( 0 );
1076}
1077
Hanno Becker786300f2020-02-05 10:46:40 +00001078int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker0f57a652020-02-05 10:37:26 +00001079
1080void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs );
Hanno Becker7876d122020-02-05 10:39:31 +00001081int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1082
Hanno Becker3e6f8ab2020-02-05 10:40:57 +00001083void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1084void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1085 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1086void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1087
Hanno Becker43aefe22020-02-05 10:44:56 +00001088int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
1089
Hanno Becker7e8e6a62020-02-05 10:45:48 +00001090#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
1091void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1092#endif
1093
Hanno Beckerce5f5fd2020-02-05 10:47:44 +00001094void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1095
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001096#endif /* ssl_internal.h */